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2ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Indian Nuclear Strategy from
1947 to 1991. It explores India's political and strategic ra-
tionale, and the modus operandi for the development of a
nuclear weapons capability. The central argument in the thesis
is that there has been a coherent and continuous strategic
rationale in India's development of its nuclear weapons
capability. The study is carried out in the light of histori-
cal and political developments which influenced the Indian
nuclear decision-making process. Chapter One is an introduc-
tion which outlines various dimensions of Indian nuclear
strategy and the methodology adopted for its study. Chapter
Two explores the historical background and doctrinal founda-
tion of Indian foreign and security policies which set the
general terms under which Indian nuclear policy operates. Its
purpose is to understand the inspirational base and guidelines
for the development of India's nuclear power programme and its
weapons capability. Chapter Three traces out the origin of
India's development strategy formulated to design a nuclear
weapons option within the structural framework of the civilian
nuclear programme in the Nehru era. Chapter Four explores the
transformation from a nuclear option to a weapons capability
in the period between 1964 to 1977 under the influence of
various political, diplomatic and domestic inputs. An assess-
ment of regional inputs such as Pakistan's development of a
nuclear weapons capability is carried out in Chapter Five to
evaluate their impact in the proper perspective. Chapter Six
explores the tenets of India's nuclear policies under succes-
sive governments from Mr. Morarji Desai in 1977 to the pre-
sent and their effect on its nuclear weapons capability.
Chapter Seven provides an assessment of various elements of
Indian nuclear weapons capability and explores the strategy
governing its possible employment. Broad conclusions are
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7Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
The central argument in this thesis is that there
has been a coherent and continuous strategic rationale in
India's development of its nuclear weapons capability. The
capability is designed within the overall structural frame-
work of the civilian nuclear power programme and its genesis
dates back to the Nehru era. Since its inception, the objec-
tive of the Indian nuclear programme has been, and continues
to be, twofold; to develop nuclear power for civilian pur-
poses, and to promote a parallel, built-in nuclear weapons
capability. It was in Nehru's life-time that two dual-purpose
facilities, a research-cum-power reactor, CIRtJS (1960) and the
Trombay Reprocessing Plant (1964) were completed. Both are
free from international safeguards and were used for the 1974
nuclear test. Among nuclear capable states, India is the only
one which has acquired a nuclear weapons capability directly
from its civilian nuclear programme.
There is a substantial volume of literature on
Indian nuclear policies and programme, delineating various
rationales of development, defence, security and power. The
available literature addresses these issues primarily from a
political perspective, or in terms of the debate on nuclear
weapons proliferation. From these viewpoints, the subject is,
in fact, overwritten. However, it has not provided a broad
enough framework of analysis to bring into perspective the
Indian strategic objectives inherent in its nuclear capability
and the strategy governing its employment. The size and
sophistication of India's nuclear programme has equipped it
with an imminent weapons capability. On the other hand, Indian
nuclear policies have generated much ambiguity governing the
employment of that capability. From an official standpoint,
India denies that it has ever initiated a nuclear weapons
8programme since independence. Such denials create misunder-
standing about the strategic objectives associated with the
Indian nuclear programme. Objectives are crucial determinants
in the formulation of strategy but difficult to identify in
this case because of the pervading ambiguity. This makes it
imperative to meticulously examine India's nuclear strategy
under successive governments and their strategic objectives.
A survey of the literature suggests that it tends
to follow nationalistic lines. The dominant Indian perspec-
tive originates from the pro-bomb lobbyists, K. Subrahmanyam
and associates, who consider nuclear weapons an internation-
al currency of power monopolized by the great powers, and want
India to go nuclear to realize the aspirations commensurate
with its size. 1
 This lobby is divided into two groups. K.
Subrahmanyam and an equally ardent group want an immediate
commitment by the Indian government to develop nuclear
weapons. Second group of th pro-bomb lobby wants
QUt' cA&v
	 1'.e4d( 4	 tiJ,
n2esp.cnse fro India in accordance with and adequate to
existing threats, nuclear and conventional. 2 A considerable
further literature is inspired by various perspectives of
security, defence, deterrence and power; reflecting different
degrees of commitment to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
India. 3
 A small but growing anti-nuclear lobby wants India to
stick to the principles of non-violence. 4
 Some scholars
1 K Subrahmanyam (ed.), NUCLEAR MYTHS AND REALITIES (New
Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1981), and A STRATEGY FOR INDIA
FOR A CREDIBLE POSTURE AGAINST A NUCLEAR ADVERSARY (New Delhi,
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses [hereafter IDSA],
1968)
2 Bhabani Sen Gupta, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR
INDIA (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1983).
See for example, T.T. Pouloose (ed.), PERSPECTIVES ON
INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY (New Delhi. Young Publishers, 1978).
Dhirendra Sharma, INDIA'S NUCLEAR ESTATE (New Delhi,
Lancer Publishers, 1983).
9believe that the official nuclear policy in the Nehru era had
exclusively peaceful purposes, but the decision to go nuclear
was thrust upon India by China's entry into the nuclear club.5
Many more believe that India has no choice but to develop
nuclear weapons in view of Pakistan's nuclear pursuits.'
Indian scholars based in the West present a more
balanced view of India's nuclear capability, and tend to
address Indian nuclear policy with varying degrees of skep-
ticism about its peaceful intent.. 7
 Ragu G.C. Thomas believes
that India's nuclear policy combines defence and development
motives, and its nuclear and space programmes are geared to
meet these objectives. But he does not identify the stage when
the two objective were integrated.' Only a few think that the
Indian nuclear policy of peaceful intent is a 'facade' and the
1974 test was 'India's initial, formal, and public step
towards a strategic weapons capability'.'
The lines of division among Western authors on
Indian nuclear policy are less sharp and there is almost a
consensus that the Indian nuclear programme was initially
peaceful but a weapons option was triggered by the first
G.G. Mirchandani, INDIA'S NUCLEAR DILEM1fA (New Delhi,
Popular Book Services, 1968) and Gupta, pp. 1-5.
' B.M Kaushik, PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR BOMB (New Delhi, Sopan
Publishing House, 1980), and D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodri,
PAKISTAN'S ISLAMIC BOMB (New Delhi, Vikas, 1980).
' Ashok Kapur, INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY
AND DECISION MAKING (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1976) and
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
AND REGIONAL ASPECTS (New York, Praeger, 1979).
' Ragu G.C. Thomas, 'India's Nuclear and Space Programs:
Defense or Development,' World Politics, 38 (2), January 1986.
Onkar Marwah, 'India's Nuclear and Space Programs:
Intent and Policy', International Securit y, 2 (2), Fall, 1977.
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Chinese nuclear test in 1964.'° It is widely believed that
India used civilian nuclear facilities acquired from abroad
for exclusively peaceful purposes to develop its nuclear
weapons capability and has therefore, violated its interna-
tional obligations." However, there is a parallel consensus
that global nuclear issues, including . the Indian one, are best
addressed within the perspective of non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons.'2 Rodney W. Jones has written few volumes from
a futuristic viewpoint on the type of small nuclear forces
(SNF) that might be developed in the South Asian region.' 3 How-
ever, his projections are primarily based upon speculative
assumptions and not supported by evidence. The Pakistani
scholarly contribution on India's nuclear development is
limited, and the existing volumes view it in terms of an
emergent threat which has exacerbated Pakistan's security
'° George H. Quester, THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(London, The John Hopkins Press, 1973). Many other Western
authors have taken a similar line after Quester.
' Roberta Wohistetter, BHUDHA SMILES: ABSENT-MINDED
PEACEFUL AID AND THE INDIAN BOMB, U.S. Energy Research and
Development Administration, Monograph 3, (49-1), 3747, 10
April 1977, Leonard S. spector, THE UNDECLARED BOMB (Cambri-
dge Mass: Ballinger, 1988), and Spector with Jacqueline R.
Smith, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS: THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1989-
90 (Boulder, Westview Press, 1990), and many others.
12 George Quester, (ed). NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: BREAKING
THE CHAIN (Wisconsin, the University of Wisconsin Press,
1981), William C. Potter, NUCLEAR POWER AND NONPROLIFERATION
(Cambridge Mass: Gunn & Ham Publishers, 1982), Joseph
Go 1 dbl at (ed.), NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE WHY AND WHEREFORE
(Stockholm, SIPRI, 1985), Leonard S. Spector, NUCLEAR PROLI-
FERATION TODAY (Cambridge Mass: Ballinger, 1984) and many
more.
13 Rodney W. Jones, (ed.), SMALL NUCLEAR FORCES AND U.S.
SECURITY POLICY (Lexington, Lexington Books, 1984), and SMALL




 Akhtar All has tried to conceptualize the Indo-
Pakistan nuclear stalemate in his later work but has gone
beyond than the available evidence allows. The Pakistani
periodical literature on the subject is also limited.'5
This survey of the literature reveals a gap between
India's stated nuclear objectives and those underlying its
nuclear capability. This is so because the primary focus of
the literature is upon the political dimensions of the Indian
decision-making process and it ignores the technological
orientation and structure of the Indian nuclear programme.
There is no doubt that the development of nuclear weapons is
inherently a political decision. However, an exclusively
political criterion to assess whether or not a country is
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability is misleading if that
country fosters ambiguity about its nuclear intentions. India
appears such a case. It has a large and sophisticated nuclear
industry based upon dual-purpose technologies and refuses to
allow the verification of its 'only peaceful use' by reject-
ing the non-proliferation regime and all its associated
elements as discriminatory.' 6
 It carried out a nuclear test in
May 1974 which provided it the requisite expertise to fabri-
cate nuclear weapons even if Indian statements are taken at
Akhtar Au, PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA: Energy and
Securit y
 Dimensions (Karachi, Economist's Research unit, 1984)
and SOUTH ASIA: NUCLEAR STALEMATE OR CONFLAGRATION (Karachi,
Publishers United for REAP, 1987). Thre-is- a lot of periodi-
ci -litc tu	 -from	 t•ni- uthorc. onI.ndin
	 c'r
evelopment-.
' Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'India's Nuclear Goals and
Policy', Regional Studies, (5), 2, Spring 1987 and, 'Pakis-
tan's Nuclear Option', The Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies, 7, Summer 1984.
16 Non-proliferation regime is mainly based upon the NPT,
full-scope safeguards exercised by the IAEA and restrictions
on the supply of nuclear weapons technology to the non-
nuclear weapon states (NNWS).
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their face value that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion
(PNE). There is no fundamental difference between the two,
though techniques vary at times.
Over the years, Indian nuclear diplomacy has
provided the rationale for the development of a safeguards-
free nuclear programme and a weapons capability disguised
within it. The rationale has varied from government to
government, for adjusting to the operative international
environment, but the underlying strategic content remains un-
changed. This rationale began with India's rejection of the
international safeguards system as 'inequitable' during the
Nehru era (1947-64), and then continually shifted. It focussed
on the nuclear threat from the Peoples Republic of China and
the 'inadequate' nuclear security guarantees to cope with that
threat during the brief tenure of Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri
(1964-66). India rejected the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT) during the first tenure of Mrs.
Indira Gandhi (1966-77). Subsequently, the Pakistani nuclear
threat became the centre of foci of Indian nuclear diplomacy
during the governments of Mrs. Gandhi (1980-984) and her son,
Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89). The Pakistani nuclear threat con-
tinues until today. All these rationales constitute the basis
of Indian nuclear diplomacy which has consistently provided a
protective shield against verification of the official Indian
claim that its nuclear programme is 'exclusively for peaceful
purposes'. Notwithstanding the rationale, the parallel
development of a nuclear weapons capability has been pursued
with tenacity, dexterity and finesse but without formal ack-
nowledgement.
However, with the continual growth of a sizeable
nuclear weapons capability, the gap between an evident
military dimension of the Indian nuclear programme and its
public declarations of 'exclusively peaceful use', has widened
to highlight the underlying contradictions. While no Indian
13
government has ever acknowledged the initiation or existence
of a nuclear weapons programme, there is an increasing volume
of collateral evidence which substantiates the view that India
can deploy nuclear weapons in any future conflict at
relatively short notice." Some sources point out that it may
have fabricated an arsenal of unassembled nuclear weapons. A
Washington-based report, quoting U.S. intelligence and State
Department sources, suggests that India has been producing
nuclear-weapons components since November 1986.'° One report
suggests that India has already produced an arsenal of several
low-yield nuclear weapons. 19
 Another source points out that,
"India has nuclear-weapons components on the shelf and a
special team ready to assemble them". 2° Full assembly is not
necessary. In the late 1940s, the United States stored the
plutonium and highly enriched uranium cores of its nuclear
weapons separately from the other components. During J
testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Operations
on 18 May 1989, the Director of Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), Mr. William Webster, stated that there were many
indications that India was involved in the work on nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons. 2' Even if the accuracy of several such
reports is questionable, no one has doubted India's capabi-
lity to fabricate and deploy nuclear weapons in a future
conflict since its nuclear test in 1974.
17 Spector with Smith, p. 79.
18 Richard Sale, "India Said to Upgrade Nuclear Arsenal,"
United Press International, 19 March 1988 (AN Cycle), in
Spector, THE UNDECLARED BOMB, p. 106.
' 'India "has a Nuclear Arsenal" ', THE INDEPENDENT, 22
March 1988.
20 WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, 3 April 1989, p. 16.
21 NEW YORK TIMES, 19 May 1989, p. A7 and WASHINGTON POST,
19 May 1989, p. A29.
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India has a large number of long-range, high perfor-
mance attack aircraft capable of nuclear delivery missions
after necessary modifications (the Jaguars, MIG-27, and MIG-
29 fighter / interceptors and Mirage-2000) 22 All of these
aircraft have a payload capacity of about 2000 pounds which is
considered enough to deliver an early generation of nuclear
weapons. All the air bases and strategic installations of
India's main adversary, Pakistan, are within the range of the
Indian Air Force. On 22 May 1989, India successfully test-
fired a ballistic missile named Agni (fire), which has 2500 km
(1,500 miles) range and 2,200 pounds (1,000 kg) payload
capacity. 23
 The Agni provides a basis for an IREM capability to
engage many industrial and strategic targets in China and the
Indian Ocean if deployed in adjacent areas.
Whether India has actually integrated nuclear
weapons into its armed forces is not known. There is no public
evidence to identify the support mechanism for their immediate
assembly in crisis situations, deployment strategy and target
acquisition alternatives. These require elaborate procedures,
3
and command, control and communication (C) infrastructure
which may not escape international scrutiny by satellite
reconnaissance. However, it is difficult to dismiss the pos-
sibility altogether that, given its fears of a Pakistani
nuclear threat, India would not have taken the necessary steps
to cope with an extreme eventuality.
India's response to its alleged involvement in the
development of nuclear weapons is equivocal. Successive
governments have not only refuted the available evidence but
have denied any intention of producing nuclear weapons.
However, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, did
22 MILITARY BALANCE 1988-89 (London, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 160-62.
23 WASHINGTON POST, 23 May 1989, p. Al.
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state in response to a question about Pakistan's nuclear
threat in 1985, that India has the capability (nuclear] to
meet the Pakistani nuclear threat if its national security is
threatened. 24 Gandhi reiterated that position in April 1987.25
What could be the basis of these statements if India had never
initiated a nuclear weapons programme? Is it an inescapable
by-product of the Indian civilian nuclear programme or a
deliberately designed capability within it, resulting from a
cost-benefit analysis of an overt versus covert nuclear
weapons capability? It suggests that India deliberately
fosters ambiguity in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capabi-
lity. India thus escapes the price of an open and dedicated
nuclear weapons programme in an international environment
increasingly unfavourable to nuclear proliferation, but
without sacrificing its vital strategic interests. It has
therefore, devised a nuclear strategy to safeguard its
national interests without paying the penalties. The policy of
ambiguity began with Nehru and the successive Indian Prime
Ministers pursued a similar course according to their own
political circumstances, though with less subtlety.
The study of Indian nuclear strategy cannot be
confined to a particular period because continuity and
coherence emerge as central elements in its formulation since
1947. It happened quite often that a particular decision taken
by one government could not be implemented in its tenure due
to a wide range of domestic and international difficulties. It
was completed later on by the successor government. For exam-
ple, the decision to carry out an underground nuclear ex-
plosion was originally taken by the government of Prime
24 The late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's interview to
MONDE, 5 June 1985, translated in Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service (FBIS) I South Asia, 5 June 1985, p. E-1.
25 REUTERS, 27 April 1987, translated in FBIS I South
Asia, 27 April 1987, p. E-1.
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Minister Shastri in November 1964. However, the explosion was
actually carried out under Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government,
and not until 1974. It can also be argued that there was
nothing altogether new in the decision of Mr. Shastri's
government. Beaton and Maddox concluded that Mr. Nehru,
advised by Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, decided in favour of an option
to produce a nuclear device in 1962 if it became politically
or militarily necessary. 26
 Ashok Kapur has also concluded that
Nehru had sanctioned a PNE development before his death. 2' In
any case, such type of decisions are intermediate steps
towards a higher objective, i.e. the development of a nuclear
weapons capability. In this case, technological determinism
indicates a weapons oriented direction during the Nehru era,
rather than the professed, tlexclusively peaceful use.tt The
technological facts point toward the development of a nuclear
weapons option. Nehru's government assigned priority to the
completion of two weapons oriented projects; the CIRUS reactor
in 1960 and the Trombay Reprocessing Plant in 1964. These
facilities were used by India to develop a nuclear device and
test it in 1974.
Since independence, there has been a general
consensus on Indian national interests among India's ruling
elite, and on the role and imperatives of power in the pursuit
of national security. This consensus constitutes the doctrinal
foundation of Indian nuclear thinking. The formulation of
Indian nuclear strategy exemplifies the intra-governmental
consensus. It is the only policy area where no previous
government's policy decisions have been abandoned. Successive
Indian governments continued their predecessors' nuclear
26 Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS (London, Chatto & Windus for The Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1962), pp. 141-142.
27 Kapur, INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: MULTI-
LATERAL DIPLOMACY AND REGIONAL ASPECTS, p. 184.
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policies and advanced the underlying objectives. Therefore,
the pedigree of nearly all decisions and policies dates back
to Nehru. Nehru's was an epoch-making era which shaped Indian
thinking and left an indelible impression on subsequent Indian
foreign and security policies. Nehru's nuclear policy has been
advanced without substantial changes, depending upon the time,
resources and constraints. Indian nuclear strategy, therefore,
must be studied as a continuum rather than a terminal process.
This study is organized on that basis.
ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS
Chapter One (Introduction) outlines the various
dimensions of Indian nuclear strategy. Chapter Two examines
the historical and political background of Indian policies
and their influence on the formulation of India's nuclear
strategy and its doctrinal foundation. It analyses Nehru's
perceptions about international relations, the role of power,
non-violence, non-alignment and disarmament. It underlines
Nehru's deep-rooted influence on Indian political thinking
which shaped the policies of all subsequent Indian govern-
ments. It also describes India's aspirations for a great power
role, and the management of Indian national security through
diplomacy and the use of force. Despite Nehru's strong
influence on every aspect of Indian statecraft, there was a
shift from reliance on diplomacy during his era to the
development of a strong military capability in the post-Nehru
era. Chapter two also explores perceptions which underlay
Indian foreign and security policies, and examines the
relationships within the policy-making process. Does India
consider itself a legitimate heir of the British Raj and its
Forward Defence Policy? Or alternately, is such a pre-eminent
Indian position a logical result of its sheer size? Why have
India's South Asian neighbours perceived its inherent strength
18
as potentially hegemonic in nature, and why has India been
unable to assuage their apprehensions?
Chapter Three examines the formative phase of
India's nuclear strategy and explores the creation of a
weapons option in the Nehru era. It indicates that the
foundation of a nuclear weapons capability was laid down in
the Nehru era. Nehru himself was the political architect of
that objective, and its technological framework was conceived
by Dr. Bhabha. Nehru also created the basis of an ambiguous
nuclear posture to rationalize India's development of a
nuclear weapons option. The chapter describes the approach
adopted by Nehru to realize the twin objectives of economic
development and nuclear power. The Indian nuclear programme
was considered instrumental to realize these elements of a
"Greater India". It underlines the paradoxes and equivocation
in Nehru's nuclear policy, between his call for general and
complete disarmament and simultaneous rejection of unilater-
al nuclear disarmament. He appeared to renounce nuclear
weapons but steadfastly resisted the application of interna-
tional safeguards to India's nuclear programme because he
considered them inequitable. Nehru spoke about defending India
"by all means at her disposal", including "the latest scien-
tific devices for its protection." 20
 Yet he also appeared to
give definite assurances against the use of nuclear power for
Itevil purposes" not only by his own government, but "all
future governments of India?t.29
The apparent contradictions in Nehru's approach
towards India's acquisition or non-acquisition of nuclear
28 Lorne J. Kavic, INDIA'S OUEST FOR SECURITY: DEFENCE
POLICIES, 1947-1965 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of
California Press, 1967), p. 28.
29 Jawaharlal Nehru, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECHES VOL. III




weapons raise fundamental questions. How could a person of
his statesmanship and pragmatism give assurances on behalf of
"all future governments of India", when such assurances were
not contractual in nature and could not be generally tenable
in view of the volatile nature of international politics? What
credibility would those assurances have in examining Indian
nuclear strategy in the light of Prime Ministers Shastri and
Mrs. Indira Gandhi's nuclear policies. Should Nehru's assu-
rances be taken as deliberate equivocation or inadvertent
paradoxes? These questions make it imperative to re-examine
the substance of his thinking about the use of nuclear power
for peaceful and military purposes.
This evaluation is carried out by using declas-
sified documents of the U.S. State Department which reveal
that India had an underlying interest in nuclear explosions
technology as early as January 1954.° Dr. Bhabha then in-
quired from the U.S. officials whether the U.S. AEC and other
agencies would invite the cooperation of the Indian Atomic
Energy Commission in collecting observational data on atomic
explosions. 3' Bhabha suggested the establishment of an in-
stallation for such purposes in India. 32
 This chapter also
analyses Indian nuclear development strategy, and details how
Bhabha worked out the blueprints for the Indian nuclear
programme and provided the guidelines for its development. It
took into account its future military employment but without
an overt manifestation. He adopted a development strategy
based upon dual-purpose technologies with room for progres-
sive indigenisation to achieve rapid self-sufficiency to
° General Records of the U.S. De partment of State
[hereafter Department of State]; National Defense Affairs of
India, Central Decimal File 891.2546 / 1-2954, dated 29
January 1954 (Washington DC, National Archives, 1989).
31 ibid, p. 1.
32 ibid.
20
protect the Indian nuclear programme from external pressures
and surveillance. His nuclear planning catered for the
eventual military employment of the programme. Bhabha's objec-
tives were shared by Nehru.
Chapter Four analyses the transformation from a
nuclear option to a weapons capability in the period 1964 to
1977. This policy is addressed in the light of the nuclear
issues and developments of that period. The chapter under-
lines the Indian threat perceptions and responses to China's
first nuclear test in October 1964. It suggests that Mr.
Shastri rejected nuclear security guarantees against the
Chinese nuclear threat as inadequate. He took a decisive step
forward in nuclear strategic planning by formally sanctioning
a Subterranean Nuclear Explosion (SNE) Project on Bhabha's
advice. 33
 An analysis of Indian nuclear diplomacy and its
significance in the formulation of nuclear strategy is also
provided in this chapter. It also describes how India or-
chestrated its nuclear diplomacy to create and maintain
legitimacy for a safeguards-free nuclear weapons capability by
balancing its rejection of international safeguards with
support for global arms control and disarmament. Indian ad-
herence to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and its rejection of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
project a coherent and well articulated diplomacy supportive
of its overall strategic nuclear objectives.
Mrs. Gandhi rejected the NPT and decided to test a
nuclear device in May 1974. India carried out a "peaceful
nuclear explosion" ostensibly for the purposes of subsoil
civil nuclear engineering projects. 34
 The 1974 nuclear ex-
plosion raised complex questions, many of which have yet to
Wohlstetter, p. 109.
• Annual Report 1974-1975: Department of Atomic Energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1975), p. 7. This Report described the 1974 test
as a successful experiment.
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be answered satisfactorily. For example, where did India apply
the benefits of that "successful nuclear experiment" over the
past 17 years? The use of a PNE for civil engineering purposes
is something which did not before, and still do not exist in
India. If it was a weapon test, why India did not openly build
a nuclear force immediately after the experiment? Was the PNE
label a convenient rationale for the Indian government to
escape international sanctions, to which an openly ack-
nowledged weapon test would have been subjected? Whether
peaceeful or otherwise, the experiment did give India a
capability to fabricate nuclear warheads because a PNE is
generally regarded as a functional equivalent of a weapon
test. The answers to these questions are explored with
reference to available documentary evidence which indicates
the fallacy of the entrenched assumptions that the 1974
nuclear test was a PNE.
This chapter also analyses domestic imperatives of
Indian nuclear politics. The roles of intra-governmental and
extra-governmental groups, and political parties in the
formulation of Indian nuclear policy after the Chinese nuclear
test is added. Post-Nehru nuclear politics is divided into two
periods, the first nuclear debate (1964 to 1968) which was
followed by the first nuclear test in 1974, and the second
nuclear debate (1980 to 1991). Their contribution to the
Indian decision-making process is assessed. In both debates,
the role of public institutions, political parties, strategic
elite and academic experts is discussed. In order to maintain
a sequential pattern, the first nuclear debate is analysed in
this chapter and a discussion of the second nuclear debate is
included in Chapter Six.
Chapter Five evaluates Pakistan's development of a
nuclear weapons capability and its impact on Indian nuclear
decision-making. It indicates that Pakistan's rapid develop-
ment of a nuclear weapons capability in the last decade and a
22
half is viewed as a threat by India. Pakistan, like India,
denies the military nature of its nuclear programme as a
matter of government policy. However, Pakistani officials are
less guarded in private about the military purpose of its
nuclear capability. 35
 The evident Pakistani rationale for the
nuclear development is a perception of an Indian nuclear
threat or blackmail activated by the 1974 nuclear test.
Despite its declarations of peaceful intent, Pakistan's
nuclear development has accelerated the Indian nuclear
military development. This chapter specifically addresses the
questions such as, how the 1974 nuclear test exacerbated
Pakistani threat perceptions. It also describes how Pakistan
attempted swiftly to neutralize the emergent nuclear threat
from India by developing its own nuclear weapons capability.
It is noteworthy that Pakistan developed a weapons capabili-
ty more rapidly than India, though it lags behind in numbers
and delivery capabilities. Pakistan's development of a nuclear
weapons capability acted as a catalyst, accelerating Indian
nuclear weapons capability. The chapter presents nuclear
competition between India and Pakistan and the cycle of
suspicion, reaction and the resultant stimulus in both count-
ries nuclear weapons programmes. Indo-Pakistani nuclear
competition has developed into an action-reaction trap and
both states are now pursuing an undeclared race for the
acquisition of nuclear arms. The dynamics of Indo-Pakistari
nuclear competition are complex. An evaluation of this
complexity is carried out in the context of their historical
relationship which is marred by hostility and mistrust. It is
For example, the late President of Pakistan, General
Zia-Ul-Hag claimed the existence of a Pakistani nuclear
deterrent against India. See, Re port of the Visit to India
and Pakistan by the Delegation of the Carnegie Task Force on
Non-Proliferation and South Asian Securit y, June-July 1988
(Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1988), unpublished, pp. 7-8.
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at times punctuated by belated attempts for normalization.
Chapter Six offers an analysis of the expansion of
Indian nuclear weapons capability from 1977 to 1991 in the
light of the developments of that period. The brief tenure of
the first Janata government (1977 to 1980) was a period of
inaction in India's nuclear development. Mrs. Gandhi regained
the premiership in 1980 and restarted from where she left in
1974-77 to expand India's nuclear weapons capability. The
expansion she initiated in 1980-84 culminated under the
government of late P.M. Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89) and second
Janata regime (1989-1991). The 1980s saw an advancement of
Indian nuclear weapons capability, particularly R & D in
nuclear military expertise, thermonuclear weapons and delivery
systems. Indeed, all elements of Indian nuclear strategy were
advanced. India's rejection of Pakistani bilateral nuclear
arms control proposals suggests that any framework of regional
non-proliferation is ancillary to Indian strategic nuclear
imperatives.
Chapter Seven is a critical assessment of Indian
nuclear weapons capability from its inception. This study does
not question the legitimacy of the Indian nuclear programme
for the generation of nuclear power for civilian purposes and
as a vehicle for its socio-economic development. However, it
does question the credibility of the official Indian claim
that its nuclear power programme has had exclusively peaceful
purposes. The argument is based upon the premise that Indian
nuclear strategy cannot be fully comprehended without a
dispassionate analysis of the structural dynamics of its
nuclear power programme. On the other hand, the Indian nuclear
programme is very large in size and a full account of purely
civilian facilities is beyond the scope of this study.
Therefore, only those capacities are discussed which have
either a dual-purpose or a weapons related significance. A
brief account of its origin is provided to maintain the
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continuity of argument. The rest of the chapter analyses in
details all the nuclear elements which form the basis of
Indian weapons capability, like safeguards-free research and
power reactors, technological infrastructure, heavy-water,
nuclear materials, reprocessing plants, nuclear weapons
technology and delivery systems. The data on these elements is
based on the annual reports of India's Department of Atomic
Energy and official Indian documents. While analyzing India's
nuclear weapons capability, its various estimates by indepen-
dent authors and institutions are taken into account but not
relied upon unless supported by evidence. The calculations
worked out in appendices I to X are original. Out of these, I
to VIII deal with India and the rest with Pakistan.
Chapter Eight concludes the analyses of the fore-
going chapters. Given the source limitations and the nature of
subject, conclusions cannot be definitive. India and Pakistan
do not officially admit the existence of their nuclear weapons
programmes. Therefore, there is a need to be guarded against
search for exact and precise answers to questions which are
essentially normative.
This study is mostly based upon primary sources:
statements of Indian Prime Ministers and government offi-
cials, Parliamentary debates, annual reports of the Depart-
ment of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) of India. The material from the U.S. archives has proved
extremely useful for an evaluation of the Indian nuclear
programme and policy in the 1950s. Information drawn from
three files of the Department of State, Central file 791.5
MSP: National Defense affairs of India, Central File 791.
5611: Atomic Energy, Military use in India, and Central
Decimal File 891.2546: Strategic Export; India, have proved
very valuable to study the formative phase of Indian nuclear
strategy. Information from the National Security File,
Committee File - Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, India,
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and National Security File, Country File, India, from the
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, has also been useful for the mid-
1960s. National Security Archives in Washington DC provided
a large number of documents and primary source material from
its catalogue on nuclear non-proliferation (1989) which were
pertinent to Indian nuclear weapons capability. Additional
material was drawn from the Liddell Hart Centre for Military
Archives, King's College, London, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Washington DC, and the Congressional Research
Service, which was helpful in analyzing the Indian nuclear
programme and policy. A wide range of secondary source
material has been explored, but not relied upon unless sup-
ported by independent corroborative evidence. However, it has
been listed in the bibliography. A large number of serving and
retired government officials, professional experts, academi-
cians and journalists have been interviewed in New Delhi,
Islamabad and Washington. These interviews proved very useful
in the exploration of relevant literature, confirmation or
rejection of reports and opinions, the validity of data, and
improvement of my personal understanding and opinion.
There is a scarcity of documentary material origina-
ting from India and Pakistan which is directly related to
their nuclear weapons capabilities because neither country
declassifies the relevant documents. Both countries do not
admit to have started a nuclear weapons programme. Secrecy has
been the hallmark of their nuclear decision-making process.
The only available primary documents from the two countries
are annual reports of their atomic energy establishments which
contain little information about their weapons capabilities.
It is therefore, obviously difficult to write about the
nuclear strategy of a state which has never admitted the
military purposes of its nuclear power programme, even if it
could deploy nuclear weapons at a relatively short notice. A
wide gap exists between policy declarations and operational 
f
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realties. Rhetoric and deliberate ambiguity has often obfus-
cated intentions. One must piece together a wide range of




HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The determinants of Indian nuclear strategy must be
first explored from a historical perspective. This requires
an examination of the perception and vision of its architect,
Mr. Nehru. He led the Indian nationalist movement and upon
independence became India's first Prime Minister (1947 to
1964). An understanding of his conception of power and
international politics, the role of non-violence, diplomacy,
and use of force in inter-state relations is fundamental to a
study of Indian policies. In order to appreciate the evolution
of India's nuclear strategy, the doctrinal foundation of its
foreign and security policies, their objectives and conduct in
the light of Nehru's perceptions of Indian strategic interests
is investigated. Indian policies of non-alignment vis-a-vis
the superpowers and peaceful co-existence with China are also
analysed in this chapter. Since India's foreign and security
policies set the general terms under which Indian nuclear
policy operates, their analysis will help to understand the
inspirational base and principles which guided the develop-
ment of the Indian nuclear power programme and its weapons
capability. Indian aspirations for a regional great power role
in South Asia are assessed. However, despite Nehru's strong
influence on every aspect of Indian statecraft, the shift of
policy from a primary reliance on diplomacy during his era to
the development of military power in the post-Nehru era
requires meticulous examination. An analysis of India's
official declarations at home and abroad on disarmament is
also included in this chapter. Finally, the role of domestic
politics in nuclear decision-making is addressed and con-
clusions are summarized.
The genesis of India's external and internal
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policies invariably goes back to their formative phase in the
Nehru era. Nehru was not only the architect of Indian foreign
and security policies, but he also left an indelible mark on
the national and international outlook of India. According to
Michael Brecher, Nehru was 'the philosopher, the architect,
the engineer and the voice of his country's policies towards
the outside world' . Former Canadian High Commissioner in
India, Escott Reid's description of Nehru provided a glimpse
of his image in India, and his influence on national policies.
He wrote, 'For the people of India, he [Nehru) is the king as
well as prophet and priest, for he is the symbol of unity of
India; he is the spokesman of India, the head of its govern-
ment. Some times, he behaves as if he were also the leader of
opposition' 2
Nehru envisioned a 'Greater India' [Maha Bharat]
which would play a role in world affairs commensurate with
its size and power potential. 3
 He believed that India, despite
being a great civilization based upon a rich history, had lost
its due place under colonialism. He was determined that
India's due place ought to be rediscovered with a new spirit
enlightened by modern philosophy. 4
 Nehru believed that India
and China both were potential great-powers of some equiva-
lence to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. He
considered Indian resources as diverse and vast as Chinese.5
' Michael Brecher, INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: AN INTER-
PRETATION (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957),
p.9.
2 Escott Reid, 'Nehru: an Assessment in 1957', Interna-
tional Journal, Summer 1964, p. 279.
Jawaharlal Nehru, THE DISCOVERY OF INDIA (London,




He had a strong conviction that India would recapture its lost
glory and power through dedicated efforts in the fields of
scientific, industrial and economic development. 6
 Therefore,
he thought the Indian national interests required a vigorous
pursuit of these objectives.
1. NEHRU'S CONCEPT OF POWER ND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
India's perception of international politics, power,
security and use of force was largely shaped by Nehru's
thinking. Nehru was not a pacifist but a pragmatic statesman.
He never held any altruistic pretensions about the Gandhian
philosophy of non-violence as a principle of state policy. As
he told the Lok Sabha on 15 February 1956: 'I am not aware of
our government having ever said that they adopted the doctrine
of .Ahimsa [Non-violence] to our activities' . He later
reiterated that position: 'We were moved by these arguments,
but for us and for the National Congress as a whole, the non-
violent method was not and could not be a religion, or an
unchallengeable creed or dogma' . on another occasion he
refused to endorse the policy of non-violence by asking: 'Do
we all believe in non-violence, taking it fully to its utmost
conclusion? I suppose not' . Speaking to the Far East-American
Council of Commerce and Industry in December 1956, Nehru
admitted that India's approach to economic problems was not
doctrinaire but pragmatic, except its insistence on the
6 ibid, pp. 40-42 and 534-35.
' Lok Sabha Debates, part 2, vol. 1, 15 February 1956,
columns 814-15.
B M.N. Das, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
(London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 59.
Gandhi Marcy, (New Delhi), Vol. 6, 1962, p. 191.
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democratic method.'°
Nehru held a power-politics view of international
relations and believed in the balance of power concept. His
pre-independence views provide evidence of his belief in
protecting India through a balance of power approach. He
espoused this approach in a presidential address to the Kerala
Provincial Conference of the Indian National Congress at
Payyanur on 28 May 1928." According to Kavic, the central
premise of Nehru's views on balance of power stated:
No country will tolerate the idea of another acquir-
ing the commanding position [in India] which England
occupied for so long. If any power was covetous
enough to make the attempt, all others would com-
bine to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry
would in itself be the surest guarantee against an
attack on India.'2
G.S. Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of
External Affairs, stated in 1952 that the balance of power
concept was neither evil nor incompatible with India's highest
ideals.'3
 He further stated that in a world of power-politics
where military force was the only safeguard against a threat
to national independence, India must develop its strength to
safeguard its independence, to support its foreign policy and
to maintain a power equilibrium in Asia.'4
However, an over ambitious diplomacy presented as
an alternative to military power was characteristic of Nehru's
10 Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, [hereafter] FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. VIII, South Asia,
(Washington DC, USGPO, 1987), p. 341.
Kavic, p. 23.
12 ibid.
' G.S. Bajpai, 'India and the Balance of Power', in




government. Indian policies of non-alignment and peaceful co-
existence were claimed as politically and morally superior to
the politics of power-blocs which were considered more prone
to conflict and warfare. 15 Speaking at the Bangalore session of
the Indian National Congress on 17 January 1960, Nehru stated
that the philosophical basis of the Indian policies was wholly
opposed to purely military modes of thought. 16
 Nonetheless, as
will be shown later on, the actual Indian policies proved
contrary to their proclaimed ideals. There was no solid basis
for Nehru's claim of politico-moral superiority of Indian
policies.
Nehru's perception of India's strategic environment
immediately after independence did not reflect a serious sense
of threat. Pakistan was contemptuously disregarded until the
mid-1950s, when it joined SEATO and CENTO and received
sophisticated weapon systems and military aid from the United
States. Indian threat perception rapidly changed after
Pakistan became a member of the above two alliances. During a
visit to India in December 1956, U.S. Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, observed that hatred and fear of Pakistan was
Nehru's dominant sentiment. 17
 China was perceived as a friendly
state. Nehru recognized the rise of China to a great power
status as a major fact of the mid-twentieth century. 18
 His
subsequent policy toward China was based upon that premise.
Nehru's government refused to accept the validity of inter-
national opinions about a communist threat to India. In his
15 Jawaharlal Nehru, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: SELECT
SPEECHES, SEPTEMBER 1946-APRIL 1961 (New Delhi, Publication
Division, Government of India [hereafter GOl], 1961), p. 24.
16 Jawaharlal Nehru, SPEECHES, 1953-1957 (New Delhi,
Publications Division, GOl, 1958), pp. 266-67.
' FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. VIII, p. 326.
18 Nehru, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: SELECT SPEECHES, p. 304.
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address to the Lok Sabha on 3]. March 1955, Nehru condemned the
practice of viewing everything from a communist or an anti-
communist perspective. 19
 He was extremely critical of cold-
war military alliances, development of atomic weapons,
racialism and the alleged tendency of Western Powers to
intrude in Asian affairs. 2° Its perception of China as a
friendly great power continued to influence Indian Foreign
Policy until the late 1950s, when the Sino-Indian boundary
dispute became sharp. 2' On 29 April 1954, India signed an
agreement with China over Tibet which was considered to be a
foundation of Sino-Indian relations in the future. The 1954
Sino-Indian Agreement, contained five principles of peaceful
co-existence, generally known as Panch Sheel [five prin-
ciples] :22 Ci) Renunciation of the use of force or mutual non-
aggression, (ii) Non-interference in each other's internal
affairs, (iii) Respect for each other's territorial integri-
ty and sovereign equality, (iv) Peaceful resolution of dis-
putes, and (v) Cooperation for mutual benefit and develop-
ment.
Nehru believed that the West had failed to appre-
ciate the evolution underway in Asia. 23
 He thought that the
U.S. made a great mistake by not voluntarily recognizing
'9 Department of State, National Defense Affairs of India,
Central Decimal Files 791.00(W)! 4-255, dated 28 May 1955.
20 ibid.
21 India and China have profound differences on the
demarcation of their territorial boundary based on the McMahon
1 me.
22 Jawaharlal Nehru, FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA: TEXT OF
DOCUMENTS 1947-64 (New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966),
p. 199.
23 Memoranda of Conversation Between Secretar y
 of State
Dulles and Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister's Residence,
New Delhi, March 9, 1956 (4 p.m.) and March 10, 1956, (10 p.
m.), Department of State, Central File, 791.13/3-1056.
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communist China at an early stage rather than doing it later
under compulsion when there would be no choice. He often
pronounced his distaste of Western policies as 'imperialis-
tic and opportunistic' •24 His government continued to oppose
Western collective security arrangements like SEATO and CENTO
on the premise that they enhanced existing tensions and
brought the cold-war to Asia. 25
 However, by the late 1950s, the
Sino-Indian boundary dispute became too complex to be resolved
through the framework of the Panch Sheel. Indian perception of
threat from China accentuated in 1959-60 when both countries
initiated precautionary military deployments on the border.
The United States' perception of India was initia-
lly influenced by its global imperative to search for poten-
tial Asian allies to join the 'Free World' in its struggle
against communism. The fundamental premise of United States'
post-1945 India policy originated from the fact that India was
the largest country in South Asia and was strategically lo-
cated. It could be a valuable asset in that struggle. The U.S.
perceived that Soviet inroads in India would undermine Western
influence in Asia. 26
 To pre-empt this, the United States signed
a military sales agreement with India in 1951 to help main-
tain its defence capability against the communist threat and
protect its political sovereignty. 27
 During the period 1951-
1957, India received various types of military equipment and
services worth $ 38,000,000 under the terms of the 1951
Military Sales Agreement.2a
24 FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VIII, p. 47.
25 ibid.
26 Department of State, Central File, 791.5-MSP/3-1356,
dated 13 March 1956.
27 FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VIII, p. 358.
ibid.
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Despite the best U.S. efforts to keep India protec-
ted from communist influence, the Soviet bloc made some
inroads. Nehru continued to criticize the U.S. policies for
not appreciating the 'Asian evolution', not recognizing China
and bringing the cold-war to Asia. 29 In practical terms,
enhanced trade between India and China, active Indian con-
sideration of a Soviet offer to construct a large steel mill,
and ever increasing exchange of delegations between India and
the Communist bloc were the developments contrary to U.S.
objectives. 30
 On 19 November 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev
arrived in India in a bid to compete with the West for India's
friendship. 31
 Bulganin's attacks on Western sponsored military
alliances complemented Nehru's criticism of SEATO and CENTO.
It appeared to generate a greater political harmony between
India and the Soviet Union. The Soviets succeeded at least in
increasing the U.S. cost of keeping India in the Free World.
Nehru attempted to keep a balance by criticizing the Cominform
by saying that, "The functioning of the Cominform is an
interference in other countries' affairs and is not com-
patible with the policy of non-interference". 32 However, it
was less strident compared with his attacks on imperialism
[Western]. President Eisenhower, apparently surprised over
Nehru's anti-U.S. attitude, wrote a note to John Foster Dulles
which read: 'In the Indian situation I am struck by the amount
of evidence we have that Nehru seems to be often more swayed
by personality than logical argument'
29 See notes, 23, 24 and 25.
30 FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. VIII, p. 275.
' ibid, p. 299.
32 ibid, p. 305.
Letter from the President to the Secretary of State,
dated 23 March 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VIII, p. 278.
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2. INDIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES UNDER NEHRU
Nehru's vision of a 'Greater India' was instrumen-
tal in defining the aims and objectives of Indian foreign and
security policies. The central edifice of these policies was
the primacy of Indian national interests. India's territorial
integrity and sovereignty, economic development, industrial
progress, and adequate military strength for a great-power
role were the primary objectives of these policies. These
objectives were not different than that of any newly indepen-
dent and under-developed state like India except the aspira-
tions for a great-power role. India's geographic size and
manpower potential was large enough to undertake that role.
India formulated policies in pursuit of these objective and
according to its perceptions of regional and international
strategic environment. The main Indian policies formulated in
the Nehru era were non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, and
regional leadership. The salient feature of these policies are
discussed in detail in the subsequent paragraphs and an ap-
praisal is carried afterwards in section 3.
NON-AL I GNNT
According to Nehru, Indian policy of non-alignment
in essence meant that in order to realize his vision, he did
not want India embroiled in cold-war politics which he
believed would generate conflict and warfare. 34
 He thought that
non-alignment combined the twin objectives of peace and
economic development. 35
 Since then, different versions of non-
alignment have been presented at official and academic levels.
An official version which has been reiterated quite often
Nehru, INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: SELECT SPEECHES, p. 2.
ibid.
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defines Indian non-alignment as: 'maintaining India's in-
dependence and freedom to take decisions on national and
international questions on merits in each case without
attaching ourselves to any ideological or military bloc'
Many Indian and Western versions present non-alignment in
different ways. Most Indian scholars are inclined to inter-
pret non-alignment as an essential rationale for India's
international outlook to attain maximum independence in the
foreign policy-making process. 37
 It is usually considered to
be a policy of non-alignment with power-blocs. It is not seen
in the negative sense of neutralism, but as an active, dynamic
and positive assertion of independent judgement on all issues,
taking each on its merit, but maintaining freedom of action
and maneuver in international politics. However, Werner Levi's
view that the Indian non-alignment developed into a 'compre-
hensive theory of international relations' is not only
excessive but also untenable.38
Ashok Kapur's view of Indian non-alignment deser-
yes consideration, not only for its merit, but also because
his overall emphasis is on Indian nuclear policy rather than
on non-alignment itself. In his view:"
It is a strategy to become involved in global
politics rather than to stay away from bloc con-
flicts. Second, non-alignment is a strategy to gain
influence despite the condition of material weak-
ness... In other words, it is a strategy to gain
influence on the cheap; it is a low-risk strategy.
36 Annual Report 1963-64: Ministry
 of Defence, Government
of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1964), p. 1.
" M.M. Rehman, THE POLITICS OF NON-ALIGNMENT (New Delhi,
Associating Publishing House, 1969), p. 50.
38 Werner Levi, 'Indian Neutralism Reconsidered', Paci-
fic Affairs, Summer 1964, p. 142.
" Kapur, INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY AND
DECISION MAKING, pp. 56-57.
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He infers that non-alignment does not avoid entanglement in
great-power politics but avoids enrolment in formal alliance
structures. It is a form of power-politics suitable to weaker
states. 4° However, his differentiation between great power
politics and power-politics looks superficial.4'
In most Western interpretations, non-alignment is
analysed within the context of cold-war bipolarity. Michael
Brecher's description is quite apt, that it was an attempt to
placate the growing intensity of cold-war politics and to
create an environment of peace for India's economic develop-
ment. 42
 Non-alignment as a policy of equi-distance appears
inadequate if judged against the actual conduct of Indian
Foreign Policy, which always remained left of the centre in
the East-West conflict. India's criticism of imperialism
reflected an anti-Western tinge. A view of non-alignment as
substitute for balance of power overlooks its inadequacy. 43
 The
theoretical substance of non-alignment in general and the
specific Indian version do not provide a comprehensive
analytical framework for the study of international behaviour
of states as does the balance of power theory. On the other
hand, the theory of balance of power provides a comprehensive
framework for international analysis addressing the behaviour
of all kinds of states in world politics. 44
 Non-alignment is
40 ibid, p. 58.
' ibid, pp. 58-59 and note 49 on p. 79.
42 Michael Brecher, THE NEW STATES OF ASIA: A POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 111-
122.
Coral Bell, 'Non-Alignment and Power Balance', Austra-
han Outlook, Vol. 17, August 1963.
One of the best and comprehensive exposition of the
theory of balance of power is provided in, Hans J. Morgen-
thou, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
(New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 161-215.
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deficient to offer an explanation of the complex interplay of
international forces where dominant actors are great powers or
superpowers. Nehru's policy of non-alignment was not a
rejection of balance of power but a rejection of its underly-
ing ideological conflict and the potentially dangerous arms
race, both conventional and nuclear.
Officially, the United States viewed non-alignment
not merely as a philosophical attitude but an approach that
would best serve the national interests of the non-aligned
states like India through an independent international
policy. 45
 However, within the cold-war politics, it was viewed
as 'immoral' by Dulles. A less noted U.S. view of Indian non-
alignment was expressed by President Eisenhower in the
following words: 'we were better off with India following its
policy of non-alignment than were she to join up actively on
our side, with the consequent added burden on the American
taxpayer and 2000 miles more of active frontier'
As a practical policy, non-alignment is not viable
in cases where a militarily weaker non-aligned state is in-
volved in a conflict with either of the great or superpowers
without some form of protection from the later's adversary or
bloc. Indian non-alignment virtually collapsed during and im-
mediately after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. India had to
seek military assistance from the Western bloc which Nehru had
long criticized. The inadequacy of non-alignment prompted
President Charles De Gaulle of France to remark on the Indian
plight in 1962 that, 'When a country chooses to be non-
aligned, it must proceed in belief that it is capable of
Department of State, S/S-NSC File: Lot 63 D 351, NSC
5701 Memoranda dated 10 January, 1957, in FRUS 1955-1957, Vol.
VIII, p. 30.
46 Department of State, NEA/SOA, Central Files: Lot 62 D
43, India, June-December 1957, in FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VIII,
p. 348.
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defending its frontiers without the aid of allies' .
Indian non-alignment was formulated to maximize the
independence of action in terms of foreign policy in the
pursuit of Indian national interests. It was an attempt to
escape from the East-West competition. In nutshell, it was a
political strategy to pursue the Indian national interests
which were perceived as endangered by the dynamics of the
cold-war politics. Ultimately, it became an inevitable
necessity for seeking financial and technological assistance
from the industrially developed states for the economic
revolution envisioned by Nehru. To a certain degree, Nehru
successfully exploited the Soviet-American competition in
favour of India in the pursuit of its national interests. In
cases where Western countries failed to provide economic,
industrial and technological assistance requested by the
Indian government for specific projects, India invited and
accepted support from the Soviet Union along with the careful-
ly calculated risk of communist political penetration. The
Soviet Union appeared eager to oblige in a bid to neutralize
the Western influence in India and dissuade it from joining
anti-Soviet military alliances. The West was equally obliged
to respond favourably to the Indian requests for economic aid.
Otherwise, India might accommodate the Soviet Union for
financial and military assistance which it did in fact,
despite Western support against China. So, non-alignment was
aimed at creating a favourable international environment in
the pursuit of Indian national interests, and seek economic
and technological assistance from both the cold-war blocs. In
this pursuit, India did not want to be entangled in the
ideological conflict between East and West. India simul-
taneously followed the policy of peaceful co-existence with
China which is discussed below.
President Charles De Gaulle cited in Durga Das, India:
From Curzon to Nehru and After (London, Collins, 1969), p. 31.
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PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE
A consideration of non-alignment without bringing
into focus the policy of peaceful co-existence cannot provi-
de a complete view of Indian Foreign Policy. While non-
alignment addressed issues generated by the East-West con-
flict, peaceful co-existence provided a framework for manag-
ing relations with the Soviet Union and China. Although, many
interpretations have been derived from Nehru's statements on
peaceful co-existence, its centremost argument was renuncia-
tion of the use of force in inter-state relations. 48
 However,
the concept and practice of peaceful co-existence is not an
Indian idea. It is enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations as a fundamental principle of international relations.
This principle had also provided the basis of the Briand-
Kellog Pact for the 'Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy' . The philosophical base of Indian policy of
peaceful co-existence appears a synthesis of principles of the
U.N. Charter and the Gandhian concept of non-violence. 50
 Nehru
gave it a specific orientation and application suitable to
Indian national interests. It was incorporated in the 1954
Sino-Indian Agreement in the form of Panch Sheel [five
principles] 51
Analysis of the broad context of Panch Sheel is
48 Nehru, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: SELECT SPEECHES, pp. 40-
50.
The Treaty was signed at Paris on 27 August 1928; full
details are provided in Forei gn Relations of United States,
1928, Vol. I, p. 153.
50 According to Raju Thomas, origin of the Indian policy
of peaceful co-existence lays in the Bhudhist philosophy, Raju
G.C. Thomas, INDIAN SECURITY POLICY (Princeton, New Jersey,
Princeton University press, 1986), p. 14.
' See note 22.
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beyond the scope of this study. However, some account of its
Indian application would help to identify the overall orien-
tation of Nehru's foreign policy. Indian policy of peaceful
co-existence was Nehru's mechanism for managing Indian rela-
tions with the two giant communist states. Nehru must be
credited with the foresight to visualize a great diversity of
national and cultural outlook between the Soviet Union and
China. 52
 He visualized the potentiality of Sino-Soviet conflict
despite their firm embrace to communism. 53
 In 1952, he imagined
before anybody else that the Sino-Soviet association would not
possibly last more than a few years. 54
 At that time, Western
scholars were almost unanimous in their view of communism as
a monolithic bloc. In Nehru's opinion, friendship with China
was basic to the Soviet strategy in that period and the
Soviets would pay any price to maintain it. But he thought
that as China gained confidence, differences were bound to
develop between them. 55
 In his view, the Chinese had an old and
deep-rooted philosophy, whereas the Soviets had a superficial
culture which could not compete with China. 56
 His observations
appear quite realistic, except the conclusion he drew: 'there
are more chances of China running Russia twenty years from
this day than Russia running China'."
Nehru was conscious of India's military weakness
against China and the existence of a boundary dispute which
could trigger a conflict. He therefore, opted for peaceful





56 ibid, pp. 3-4.
ibid.
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co-existence to safeguard his priority of economic develop-
ment. He endeavoured to neutralize the possible emergence of
a Chinese threat through political means, in order to avoid
the economic cost of developing comparable military power at
that stage. The formulation of this policy had no negative or
sinister design, but was inspired by the ascendancy of a
political approach at least in relation to the great powers.
This approach was not adopted vis-a-vis India's small neigh-
bours. Contrary to Indian claims, the policy of peaceful co-
existence was based upon pragmatism rather than principle,
superimposed by the belief that it was possible to maintain
security through diplomacy alone. India could not afford to
indulge in an arms race with China at that time. It had
neither the requisite industrial and technological base, nor
the economic strength to develop military power with its own
resources in the immediate future. Nehru wanted at least 15
to 20 years of peace to develop Indian resources before it
could play its due role in the world affairs.58
The policy of peaceful co-existence had broad
support within India. Not only government circles but the
opposition also supported the Panch Sheel as a basis of Sino-
Indian relations. However, there was limited opposition within
and outside the Lok Sabha. It was considered as appeasement of
China implicit in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29 April 1954
which endorsed China's sovereignty over Tibet. 59
 Acharya
Kripalani, leader of the Praja Socialist Party criticized the
1954 Agreement in the Lok Sabha as a 'surrender of Indian
rights in Tibet' The Jan Sangh Party was equally critical of
the Agreement and described it as 'Indian Government's policy
Nehru, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: SELECT SPEECHES, p. 48.




of general acquiescence towards China' •61
Despite Nehru's efforts to manage the Sino-Indian
relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence and avoid a
conflict with China, one eventually took place in 1962. The
policy of peaceful co-existence failed to achieve the objec-
tive for which it was formulated. However, the failure cannot
be ascribed to the intrinsic merit of the policy but its
application. Unlike non-alignment, there was nothing wrong
with the theoretical substance of the policy of peaceful co-
existence. The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict resulted from gross
miscalculations in its application (see section 3)
REGIONAL LEADERSHIP
Since independence, regional leadership has emer-
ged as a cardinal objective of Indian foreign and security
policies, from the Nehru era until today. Indian behaviour in
South Asia is that of a great-power. The objective of Indian
regional leadership was not only implicit in Nehru's vision of
'Greater India', but explicit in policy statements and the
actual conduct of Indian policies. Before and after indepen-
dence, Nehru recurrently expressed his views about India's
leading role in the region. Speaking in Bombay on 22 August
1946, he stated that, 'the Middle East, Middle West, Southeast
Asia and China all impinge on India; all depend on India;
economically, politically or for defence purposes' •62 He
continued that India was also pivotal for defence of the coun-
tries of Western Asia and therefore, it obviously had to be a
61 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 18, August 1958, col. 1676.
62 Cited in M. Venkatarangaiya, 'Indo-American Rela-
tions', in, ASPECTS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS, paper no.
2, (London, Indian Council of World Affairs, August 1949), p.
2.
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central base for defence. 63
 During a policy debate in the Cons-
tituent Assembly, Nehru impressed upon the members: 'remember
that India, not because of any ambitions of her, but because
of history and so many other things, has to play a very impor-
tant part in Asia'. 64
 He reiterated that view later: 'India
will always make a difference to the world. Fate has marked us
for big things. When we fall, we fall low, when we rise, we
inevitably play our part in the world drama'. 65
 This theme was
continuously discernable from his statements on Indian foreign
policy in South Asia. He believed that not only India's size
was good enough for a leading role but the policies he adopted
would ensure that status for India. Prophesying India's role
in the region, he said,
I am quite sure by adopting that position (Non-
alignment], we shall ultimately gain national and
international prestige... fairly soon... A large
number of small nations will probably look to India
more than to other countries for a lead.'6
An often repeated Indian rationale which many
Western scholars share with varying reservations, is that the
role of a regional great-power is inherent in India's size and
power potential, and therefore, a geo-strategic imperative of
its foreign policy. That need not be disputed. But its logical
inference is that Indian foreign policy behaviour in the South
Asian region is inspired by a power-politics view, which India
denied in the Nehru era. In fact, the British legacy added to
Nehru's vision of 'Greater India', a security doctrine
' ibid.
64 Constituent Assembl y-Legislative Debates, Vol. 2, Part
II, 8 March 1949, p. 1225.
65 Dorothy Norman (ed.), NEHRU: THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS,
VOL. 1 (London, Bodley Head, 1965), p. 650.
66 s . L. Poplai (ed.), SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON ASIAN AFFAIRS:
INDIA 1947-1950, Vol. 2, (London, Oxford University Press for
ICWA, 1959), p. 15.
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identical to the Raj's Forward Defence Policy. 61
 Post-indepen-
dence Indian regional security policy was inspired by that
legacy. According to Pran Chopra, 'By the compulsions of
geography, the force of this example [British], and self-
imagery of a "potential great-power", India made this strate-
gic concept the foundation of its foreign policy, and so it
remains until today'." India always resisted, or at least
strongly protested, against what it called a 'great-power
intrusion' into its defence perimeters formerly covered by the
Forward Defence Policy.
Nehru set the pattern of a limited use of force in
the pursuit of perceived Indian national interests in the
region. Immediately after independence, India used military
force to take over the princely states of Junagadh and
Hyderabad, which were given a right of accession to either
India or Pakistan at the time of independence. India jus-
tified its use of force by explaining that the majority of
people in those states were Hindus and wanted to accede to
India against the wishes of their Muslim rulers who might had
opted for Pakistan. On Kashmir, India applied a diametrically
opposite criterion that the Maharajah of Kashmir, who was a
Hindu, had the legitimate authority to accede to India,
without regard to the wishes of the majority of the people who
were Muslims. Chester Bowles, who had extremely close rela-
tions with Nehru, expected irritations in the Indo-US rela-
tions because of "Nehru's obstinacy on Kashinir".'9
67 A good description of the Forward Defence Policy is
provided by Kavic, pp. 8-20.
68 Pran Chopra, 'Change and Continuity in India's Forei-
gn Policy,' an unpublished paper read at the Wilton Park Con-
ference no. 329, organized by the British Foreign Office,
November 21-25, 1988, p. 2.
69 Department of State, Central File 791.00 MSPI7-1552,
dated 23 July, p. 6.
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Indian troops marched into the Portuguese colony of
Goa in 1961 despite Portuguese recognition of the Indian claim
on the colony and a willingness to vacate it after negotia-
tions. Indian behaviour closely resembled with Argentina's
adventure in the Falklands in 1982, except that it was not
challenged through military response by Portugal. The U.S.
President, John F. Kennedy remarked to Mr. B. K. Nehru, Indian
Ambassador to Washington at the time. He said:
I have not uttered a word, not a thing on Goa Mr.
Ambassador. India could have taken over Goa four-
teen years ago. It was yours. What you have done
now, any self-respecting country would have done to
assert its sovereignty. But you should not have
preached us morality for fourteen years. You had no
business to indulge in "holier than thou" attitude
when you are just like any other nation. The reason
why people are criticizing you is that they have
seen a minister coming out of a brothel. They are
happily clapping that he is like any other normal
being.'°
Kavic's observation corroborates this view: 'While urging
other states to resolve disputes through negotiation, the
Nehru administration resorted to force on a number of occa-
sions to obtain its goals' .' To the outside world, Nehru
behaved and appeared as the architect of non-alignment and
peaceful co-existence. He never hesitated to criticize the
great-powers whenever he thought their policies were imping-
ing upon the tenets of Indian policies. But in the South Asian
region, his own policies were in sharp contrast to what he
demanded from the great-powers. There was an apparent con-
tradiction.
'° President John F. Kennedy's statement is quoted in
Kuldip Nayyar, INDIA IN THE CRITICAL YEARS (New Delhi, Offset
Press, 1977), p. 145.
' Kavic, p. 3.
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3. INDIAN POLICIES TJNDER NEHRU: AN APPRAISAL
The two tiers of Indian foreign policy, i.e., non-
alignment and peaceful co-existence nearly collapsed in the
wake of 1962 Sino-Indian conflict when Nehru tried to apply
the 'Forward Defence Policy' approach to its borders with
China and it backfired. The defeat of the Indian Army was the
result of a gross miscalculation by the Indian leadership who
badly under-estimated China's political resolve and military
capability to back-up its territorial claim by armed force.
China's political (domestic) and economic weaknesses were
misjudged as an inhibiting factor to undertake military
operations against India. The Sino-Indian conflict was a
classic case of misperception and misjudgment by India. The
Indian leadership did not believe that large scale military
operations were possible on the Himalayan border. The 1963-
64 annual report of the Indian Ministry of Defence brings out
that belief quite clearly. It said,
The massive and unprovoked attack launched by China
in October 1962 brought into focus the grave threat
to the security of this country along a border major
portions of which were traditionally considered most
unsuited for military campaign.'2
The Indian defence establishment and intelligence services
equally failed to identify the large scale concentration of
Chinese troops on the border. They could not make out a
coherent picture of China's immediate military objective to
attack India. This lack of appreciation was surprising in the
light of the Indian government's view that the Chinese attack
was pre-meditated. According to official Indian assessment:
'The nature and weight of the Chinese attack was such that it
72 Annual Report 1963-64, MOD, GOl, p. 1.
48
could have been made only after long and careful planning'
Ambassador Bowles' view of Indian threat percep-
tions about China proved quite correct: 'Nehru and his as-
sociates were full of contradictions about China and had
obviously confused their minds on the subject' .' Yaacov
Vertzberger explains Nehru's frame of mind at that time. He
observes, 'Nehru juxtaposed China's political, military and
economic weakness against India's international political
strength. Both politically and militarily, his judgement
caused him to take unjustified risks'." Nehru himself was
quite candid in admitting not only the failure of his policies
but his judgement.In a speech after the conflict, he stated:
'We were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world
and were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own. We
have been shocked out of it, all of US .' According to Pran
Chopra, Nehru suffered a loss of political vision as a result
of the 1962 conflict.'7
India's defeat in 1962 generated an intense debate
within and outside the government. The Indian strategic com-
munity criticized the efficacy of political strategies such as
non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, and the adequacy of
India's military capability to safeguard Indian territorial
integrity. As an immediate measure, the strength of the Indian
" Annual Report 1962-63, Ministry of Defence, Government
of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1963), p. 1.
' Department of State, Central File 791.00 MSP/ 7-1552.
Yaacov Vertzberger, 'India's strategic Posture and the
Border War Defeat of 1962: A Case Study in Miscalculation',
The Journal of Stratecric Studies, 5 (3), September 1982, p.
379.
76 R. Nyrop and B. Benderly (ed.), Area Handbook For
India (Washington, American University, 1975), p. 561.
' Personal Interview with Pran Chopra on 23 November 1988
at Wilton Park, England.
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Army was increased on an emergency basis. Weapons and equip-
ment were improved through major imports from abroad and with
'special assistance received from friendly foreign countries'
and increasing domestic production." In July 1963, India
accepted an Anglo-American offer to hold joint air force exer-
cises.'9
 An official report conceded that, 'Our ideas of
overall strategy as well as the requirements of weapons and
equipment had to be reoriented' There were serious demands
for the reappraisal and even abandonment of non-alignment. In
an editorial comment, INDIAN EXPRESS echoed the public mood:
"if alignment [means] a bit of sovereignty lost, non-alignment
[means] a good bit of territory lost".81
It may be worthwhile to explore a body of opinions
on the Indian behaviour in this context. It is neither
desirable here to bring into focus the contentious issues
which have become the root-cause of conflict between India
and Pakistan nor intended to impute any sinister motives to
the Indian approach. An extract from a report to the British
government from Field Marshall Auckinleck, Supreme Commander
of the British Indian Armed Forces, and Chairman of the Armed
Forces Reconstitution Committee for India and Pakistan,
explained Indian behaviour. He reported: 'I have no hesitation
whatsoever in affirming that the present Indian Cabinet is
implacably determined to do all in its power to prevent the
establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis' •e
In an editorial on Nehru's foreign policy, THE OBSERVER corn-
° Annual Report 1962-63, MOD, GOl, p. 2.
Thomas, p. 26.
80 Annual Report 1963-64, MOD, GOI, p. 2.
81 Cited by Levi, p. 140.
82 John Connell, AUCKINLECK (London, Assell & Company
Ltd., 1959), pp. 220-222.
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mented: 'The Indian people often seen to have had a double
standard, indignantly anti-imperialist abroad but quite ready
to apply a little imperialism within their historic fron-
tiers' In an assessment of Indian regional policy, Ian
Stephen, observed: 'Whatever may be the outward semblance, a
cardinal underlying purpose of Indian Foreign Policy was to
keep her small neighbours weak and isolated for eventual re-
absorption'." These observations lend credibility to another
opinion by Wayne A. Wilcox, who aptly described the duality of
the Indian approach: 'To the world and world issues, India
appeared the dove of peace. Within the region, she stood
accused of power-politics'." Similarly, THE IRISH INDEPENDENT
wrote in 1962 that:
On the subject of Kashinir, to which Pakistan has an
arguable claim, Mr. Nehru refuses both a plebiscite
and a conference. On Goa, where India has a good
case if not a watertight one, he chooses the uni-
lateral decision of military occupation. On the
Chinese border dispute, where India is one hundred
per cent in the right, he is ready to grasp at any
straw to bring the aggressor to the negotiating
table. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
what Mr. Nehru has he holds, what he can obtain
without trouble he takes, what has been taken from
him by superior force he considers negotiable even
when it is his in all justice."
Nehru was a pragmatic statesman who sought nation-
al security through political strategies, e.g., non-alignment
with the cold-war blocs and peaceful co-existence with China.
83 THE OBSERVER, 4 November 1962.
" Ian Stephen, PAKISTAN (London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1963),
p. 267.
85 Wayne A. Wilcox, INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE RISE OF CHINA
(New York, Walker and Company, 1964), pp. 38-39.
06 THE IRISH INDEPENDENT (Dublin), 9 August 1962, cited
by Kavic, p. 210.
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He compensated India's relative military weakness against the
great-powers through reliance on the policies of non-align-
ment and peaceful co-existence. India's economic, industrial
and technological under-development in the 1950s and 1960s did
not permit the pursuit of a great-power role beyond the South
Asian region. However, Nehru relied on military power vis-a-
vis India's small neighbours to establish its position as a
regional great power. He did not hesitate to use force within
the South Asian region to settle territorial disputes.
4. NEHRU ON NUCLEAR DI SABNAMENT
Nehru was no doubt committed to peace and disarma-
ment. He considered general and complete disarmament an
essential instrument for the development of international
peace and security. 87
 He often spoke against the development
of nuclear weapons by the great-powers as detrimental to
international peace and security." He launched a massive
disarmament campaign to apply political pressure on nuclear
weapon states. In July 1956, India presented far reaching
proposals in the U.N. Disarmament Commission, which includ-
ed: i) immediate cessation of nuclear explosions; ii) a ban
on the production of fissionable material; iii) a ban on the
transfer of fissionable materials from the civilian estab-
lishments to any military use by the nuclear weapon states;
iv) an arrangement by the nuclear weapon states to dismantle
their nuclear weapon stockpiles and make available the
fissionable material contained in them for civilian purposes;
and, v) a ban on the further spread of nuclear weapons.' 9 ' India
87 Jawaharlal Nehru, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECHES: 1963-
1964, Vol. V, (New Delhi, GOl, 1968), pp. 202-05.
ibid.
89 Disarmament Commission Document DC/98, 31 July 1956.
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continued to reiterate these proposals in many forms at
various international forums. In 1956, under direct instruc-
tions from Nehru, the Indian government published a book which
highlighted the devastating consequences of nuclear, thermo-
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction." Its objective
was to generate world-wide awareness about the horrible
implications of the continuing nuclear arms race and the
urgency to end it.91
India provided unqualified support for the negotia-
tions on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and signed it on
8th August 1963, the day it was opened for signatures. Indian
diplomacy during the PTBT negotiations suggested that it would
accept that kind of arrangement. Nehru personally indicated
that any partial treaty which did not rule out a comprehensive
settlement of the nuclear disarmament issues but led to that
direction would be acceptable to India. 92
 However, India's role
in the negotiations for the PTBT was limited by the fact that
it was primarily settled between the two superpowers and the
United Kingdom, outside the U.N. Disarmament framework.
Another compelling reason for Nehru to opt for
disarmament was India's abject poverty and underdevelopment.
Nehru's statement bears that out quite clearly when he said;
'It gives me pain to divert our resources for armament when
there is so much to be done in the sphere of socio-economic
development. Our socio-economic situation compels us to pursue
disarmament'." Disarmament might have appeared to Nehru as a
90 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS (New Delhi, GOl,
1956)
' ibid.
92 J'awahar1al Nehru, INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: SELECT
SPEECHES, p. 199.
" Nehru cited in J.P. Jam, INDIA AND DISARMAMENT: AN
ANALYTICAL STUDY, (New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1974), pp.
4-5.
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suitable course of action to improve the Indian military
position in relation to the great powers. According to N.M.
Ghatate, Indian interest in disarmament during the Nehru era
'though not publicly stated but evident' was the enhancement
of its own stature in the power equation vis-a-vis the great
powers because it would have stripped them of their instru-
ments of power and thereby, reduced the power gap against
India. 94
 Leonard Beaton's view supports the above argument when
he says that statesmen often use the language of 'disarmament
rather than security' in the pursuit of their perceived
national interests. 95
 A similar assessment of Nehru's disarma-
ment strategy by Kapur supplements the aforesaid contention.
He noted, 'It appears that Nehru's strategy was to seek
nuclear disarmament of the superpowers and the strategy up to
the Test Ban reflected this approach. Yet in the 1950s, the
policy revealed a dual orientation' •96
Nehru believed that no country
 was aoina to ban
atomic weapons, 'unless it was certain that the other ttcolo_
ssus" would take similar steps' . According to Bowles, Nehru
stated to him in a private conversation that his [Nehru's)
criticism of the United States was not over armaments because
he felt they were necessary but 'at the fact that we spend too
much time attempting to match the Russians in vituperation and
Narayan M. Ghatate, DISARMAMENT IN INDIA'S FOREIGN
POLICY: 1947-65, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis cited at length
in Jam, pp. 5-6. Jam rejects the validity of Ghatate's
argument because it assigns Machiavellian motives to Nehru
and India.
" Leonard Beaton, THE REFORM OF POWER (New York, Viking
Press, 1972), p. 167.
96 Ashok Kapur, 'India and the Atom', Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, September 1974, p. 28.
" Department of State, Central Decimal File, 891.2546 I.
5-1154, 11 May 1954.
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rancor' . To some extent, it indicates a discrepancy between
Nehru's public rhetoric on disarmament and what he believed as
a realistic policy. Such an impression is also borne out from
his speech in the Lok Sabha during a policy debate on nuclear
disarmament and atomic energy. He stated:
Hon. Members opposite and those on this side talked
about banning these weapons [nuclear]. Well, we feel
that we should ban or control all these terrible
weapons. But it is not clear to me how our senti-
ments in this matter are going to result in that
ban, or how a strong speech in this House can result
in banning them. Ultimately, sometime or other, they
will have to be controlled, if not put an end to.
Well, from a good deal of what we know of this
world, if one is all the time talking about banning
this, who is to bell the cat.99
It is not intended here to discredit Nehru's support
for disarmament which was beyond any doubt, but to suggest
that his approach in its pursuit was pragmatic rather than
idealistic. Nehru is generally misunderstood for his occa-
sional rhetoric on the subject. It would be more appropriate
to say that India sought nuclear disarmament as a policy
instrument for the realization of an equitable international
order. This view is reflected in a statement by a renowned
Indian diplomat, V.C. Trivedi, when he said: 'Disarmament is
not an end in itself but a means to an end, and the objective
of a peaceful, progressive and just world is impossible of
realization unless the world is first disarmed'
	 However,
° Chester Bowles' Despatch to the State Department after
his conversation with Nehru in July 1952, Department of State,
Central File, 791.00/7-1552.
" Text of The Prime Minister's S peech on Uses of Atomic
Energy , HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE (Lok Sabha), 10 May 1954, New
Delhi, Press Information Bureau, GOl, p. 4.
°° U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents
on Disarmament: 1962, Vol. II, (Washington, USGPO, 1962), pp.
1240-42.
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Nehru categorically rejected unilateral nuclear disarmament
for India. 10' His rejection of unilateral disarmament is not in
contradiction with his support for general and complete
disarmament. He believed nuclear disarmament as an integral
part of general and complete disarmament..'°2
 However, his
disarmament policy in the late 1950s clearly shifted from
generalities to specific emphasis on China.' 03
 A more empirical
assessment of Nehru's policy on conventional disarmament is
provided by Kavic. He stated that,
While lecturing the great powers on the evils of
the armaments race, the Indian government during
the period from 1947 to 1962 expended on defence a
sum exceeding Rs. 3,000 crores (about $6,300
million), or between 21 to 46 percent of the current
expenditure of Indian government.'04
Nehru's support for disarmament was in line with
the principle of international peace and security. He belie-
ved his policy of nuclear disarmament might dissuade the
great-powers from piling up weapons of mass destruction which
he considered a threat to international peace. In case of
success, India would also gain significantly as it had nothing
to disarm. Its power position would be enhanced thereby
without investing large sums of money which it could not
afford at that level. And finally, his campaign for disarma-
ment built India's international image.
At the end, it is argued that there was no basis
for Nehru to claim that India adhered to a unique approach to
international politics, based upon politico-moral superiority




104 Kavic, p. 4.
56
distinct from the traditional power-politics perspective.
Nehru was a statesman of high calibre but his views lacked
the finesse of a strategist. His policies of non-alignment
from cold-war politics and peaceful co-existence were under-
standable. But the fact remains that ultimately he had to face
the prospect of war with China, the very reason for which he
devised the policy of peaceful co-existence. He criticized the
West for their lack of appreciation about the 'ensuing Asian
evolution' in general, and about China in particular. He
himself proved seriously wrong on the perception of Chinese
threat to India, and paid direly for it in 1962.
The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 proved a watershed
in regional and global politics. It gradually transformed the
existing patterns of relations between regional and extra-
regional powers into different security triangles which
crystallized in the late 1960s. India immediately sought U. S.
and Western military aid against China, particularly weapons
suitable for high altitude air and ground defence. Soviet
economic and military assistance to India also increased
gradually. Both the superpowers tried to build India as an
anti-Chinese bulwark for their own objectives. It brought into
shape a confluence of U.S.- Soviet interests for some time.
Nehru died on 27 May 1964 and could not witness the outcome of
the post-1962 debate. In the wake of reappraisal, there was a
shift of emphasis from primary reliance on security through
political strategies towards the development of a credible
force posture. Instead of economic development being the sole
priority of the Indian government in the Nehru era, an
increasing precedence was accorded to the development of
military capability. Thereafter, security and development were
recognized as two integral parts of national policy. However,
the post-Nehru era reflected a preoccupation with the deve-
lopment of military power.
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Chapter Three
INDIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN THE NEHRU ERAS
CREATING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION
This chapter deals with the political dimension of
India's nuclear strategy and explores the rationale for the
creation of a nuclear weapons option. It also examines the
technical modus operandi adopted by India to develop its
nuclear programme in a way that incorporated a built-in
capacity for the development of a nuclear weapons option. This
study suggests that Nehru, who was considered a staunch
opponent of nuclear weapons, laid the technological founda-
tion for a nuclear weapons option. It indicates the fallacy
of the traditional view that Nehru's nuclear policy ruled out
the possible development of nuclear weapons and entailed
exclusively peaceful applications. 1
 Nehru appears the archi-
tect of India's doctrine of nuclear ambiguity formulated to
pursue a weapons course. It enabled India to escape the price
of a declared weapons programme in an environment increas-
ingly unfavourable to nuclear proliferation. Since indepen-
dence, the objective of developing a nuclear weapons capabili-
ty seems to have been pursued skillfully but without formal
acknowledgement. Nehru rejected the application of interna-
tional safeguards on the Indian nuclear programme through a
coherent diplomacy which denied verification of the Indian
claims that its programme had exclusively peaceful purposes.
However, the gap between the evident form of India's develop-
ing nuclear weapons capability, and its public denials has
gradually become so wide that it highlights the inherent
contradictions. All these issues are examined in detail below
in the light of the available evidence.
Mirchandani, pp. 3-7, and Gupta, p. 1-8.
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1. NEHRU'S POLICY OF NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY
As noted in the previous chapter, Nehru envisioned
a 'Greater India' and emphasized that the road to its redis-
covery as a great-power led through industrial, scientific
and economic development. 2 His vision predated independence.
He hoped to harness the potential of nuclear energy for
India's development and displayed remarkable foresight to
pursue these objectives. Nehru's pre-independence views did
not rule out the use of atomic energy for producing nuclear
weapons. According to Kavic,
Nehru informed a Bombay audience on 6 June 1946, if
India was threatened she would "inevitably" try to
defend herself by all means at her disposal with the
clear implication that such means did not exclude
atomic bombs (emphasis added) .
Nehru's statement reflects a broad view about the potential
use of atomic energy and not a precise security declaration
about Indian defence. It does not indicate whether India would
first exhaust conventional means of defence and if those
failed, it then had a right to use nuclear weapons. However,
his pre-independence views were explicit and he did not rule
out the development of nuclear weapons. Kavic notes another
statement by Nehru in reply to a query as to whether the
future GOl would have atomic bombs in its arsenal:
Nehru stated his hope that India would develop
atomic power for peaceful uses but warned that, so
long as the world was constituted as it was, every
country would have to develop
 and use the latest
scientific devices for its protection (emphasis
added) .
2 Nehru, THE DISCOVERY OF INDIA, pp. 15-20 and 35-45.
Kavic, p. 27. For similar views, also see Shyam Bhati-
a, INDIA'S NUCLEAR BOMB (New Delhi, Vikas, 1979), p. 71 and
Norman, NEHRU: THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS, VOL.11 p. 186.
Kavic, pp. 27-28.
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After independence, Nehru set on course to realize
his vision of a 'Greater India'. He convened a meeting of the
Atomic Energy Research Board on the 12th day after indepen-
dence. 5
 It demonstrated the high priority he assigned to the
development of nuclear science and technology. In a policy
debate on atomic energy in the Lok Sabha, Nehru told the House
that nuclear power was more important for India than for any
other country.' On another occasion, Nehru reiterated: 'India
was determined not to be left behind the advance in the use of
this new power'.' He seemed fascinated by the discovery of the
atom and its potential for development. Nehru also had a deep
understanding of Indian history and came to the conclusion
that the fundamental cause of India's backwardness was its
lack of scientific and indust-rial development. He held a deep
conviction that India would not progress until it undertook
the process of scientific and technological modernization.' He
expressed the urgency of benefiting from the nuclear revolu-
tion which he believed was underway. Therefore, he was
determined to pursue the development of nuclear power. Nehru's
government introduced legislation on atomic energy within
eight months of independence. It indicates the priority his
government attached to the development of atomic energy. He
spoke frequently on this subject. The following passage from
his speech in the debate on the Atomic Energy Bill in the Con-
stituent / legislative Assembly on 6 April 1948 reflects his
mind:
Nuclear India (Bombay, Department of Atomic Energy,
Government of India), 5 (2), 5 January 1967, p. 3.
' Text of The Prime Minster's S peech on Uses of Atomic
Energy , HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE, dated 10 May 1954, (New Delhi,
Press Information Bureau, GOI, 1954), p. 6.
' Nehru, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECHES, Vol. III, (New
Delhi, GOl, 1958), p. 435.
ibid.
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Consider the past four hundred years of history. The
world developed a new source of power, i.e. steam,
and the industrial age came in. India with all its
many virtues did not develop that source of power.It
became a backward country and a slave country
because of that. Now we are on the verge of atomic
age. The point I shall like India to consider is
that, if we are to remain abreast in the world as a
nation that keeps ahead of things, we must develop
this atomic energy quite apart from war. Of cour-
se, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for
other purposes, no pious sentiments of an y one can
StoP the nation from using
 it that way
 (emphasis
added) .
It is evident from his statements at the time of
independence that he favoured the development of nuclear
energy primarily for scientific and industrial purposes but
also endorsed its military application if it became impera-
tive for national security. However, during the early phase
of the Indian nuclear programme when India sou ght techno-
logical and financial assistance from the developed states,
a different orientation was noticeable in Nehru's policy. He
frequently spoke against the development of nuclear weapons
by the great powers and seemed to reject their acquisition by
India. On 20 January 1957, at the inauguration of ASPARA
(India's first research reactor), he said,
No man can prophesy the future. But I should like
to say on behalf of my government, and I think I
can say with some assurance on behalf any future
government of India that whatever might happen,
whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this
atomic energy for evil purposes (emphasis added) .'°
Similarly in a policy debate in the Lok Sabha on 24 July 1957,
India: Constituent Assembly
 (Legislative Debates-
Official Reports), Second Session, Vol. V (1), 6 April 1948,
p. 3326.




In no event we will use atomic energy for destruc-
tive purposes. I am sure when I say this, I repre-
sent every member of this House. I hope it will be
the policy of all future governments. The fact re-
mains that if one has these fissionable materials,
and if one has the resources, then one can make a
bomb, unless the world is wise enough to come to
some decision to stop the production pf such bombs
emphasis added)
It is noteworthy that in all the statements on the
use of nuclear energy made during the formative phase of the
Indian nuclear programme, Nehru's assurances highlighted the
Indian policy of not making nuclear weapons. 12
 However, his
choice of terms for those assurances needs careful scrutiny.
It appears that Nehru was deliberately evasive and excluded
the term 'military' from his assurances. He invariably
preferred more ambiguous terms like "evil" and "destructive"
in the context of the debate on the military versus peaceful
uses of atomic energy. Otherwise, it is difficult to believe
that a statesman of Nehru's stature was careless in the choice
of such terms and was not conscious about the inherent
incongruities. In an assessment of the 'Atomic Energy
 Develop
-ment in India', the Scientific Adviser to the British govern-
ment, Dr. H.R. Ambler, noted in January 1960 that,
The unequivocal statement by the Prime Minister
(Government of India press note of 16.12.59) that
atomic energy would never be used for "evil pur-
poses" means little, as self-defence would not be
considered "evil" •13
Foreign Policy of India: Text of Documents, 1947-64,
(New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1966), pp. 242-43.
12 Emphasis is added by underlining the relevant terms.
British Forei gn Office Records, FO 371 I 149591, dated
23 January 1960 (London, Public Record Office, 1990)
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Nehru was not willing to provide contractually binding
obligations and instead chose to give vague assurances. Ashok
Kapur has rationalized the Indian policy by saying: 'Implicit
in the Indian approach was the view that peaceful and military
uses of nuclear power were not simply antonymous concepts'
In a more detailed assessment of the Indian nuclear decision-
making process, Kapur further elaborated the point: 'a Western
reader, familiar with his country's culture-bound analyses, is
cautioned against assuming as a given that, since Nehru
explicitly favoured civilian nuclear power, he favoured Indian
nuclear weapons implicitly' However, Kapur questioned that,
'there was and is no legal definition of the term "peaceful
use". 16
 It indicates a line of thinking which amounts to hair-
splitting legalism for justifying a weapons option within the
framework of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Nehru's statements reveal three themes of Indian
nuclear policy. First, he attached great importance to the
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Second,
India would not produce nuclear weapons. However, this theme
lacked a deep-rooted commitment which appears as an integral
part of the first. The third theme lies between the two and
is based upon nuances highlighting equivocation and ambigui-
ty. Each of Nehru's assurances about the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy has a proviso, such as: 'India would defend
itself by all means at her disposal', including the use of
"latest scientific techniques for its protection"; 'if we are
compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, no pious
sentiments of any one can stop the nation from using it that
14 Ashok Kapur, 'India and the Atom', Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, September 1974, pp. 27-28.
' Kapur, INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY AND
DECISION MAKING, p. 100.
16 ibid. p. 110.
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way' (military]; and 'unless the world is wise enough to stop
producing such bombs' [nuclear]." Each of these provisos is an
integral part of the assurances given against the non-peaceful
uses of atomic energy. In fact, they render the assurances
invalid, because these provisos are based upon extremely
subjective evaluation. At times when Nehru sounded unequivo-
cal, his assurances reflected an expression of hope rather
than a clear statement of intent. Therefore, equivocation and
ambiguity in Nehru's statements appear as deliberately inten-
ded to avoid binding commitments against the military use of
atomic energy. Nehru had developed a clear perception of the
potential role of nuclear technology for the future security
of India and did not want to surrender that option.
Nehru's most trusted lieutenant on atomic energy
matters, Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha, the architect of India's
nuclear programme, was known to be a 'bomb man'. From the out-
set, he contemplated the use of nuclear energy for military
purposes and subtly manoeuvred to develop the Indian nuclear
programme along military lines. Bhabha expressed a firm
conviction that, 'for the continuation of our civilization
and its further development, atomic energy is not merely an
aid: it is an absolute necessity'.'° In 1948, he proclaimed
that India would develop 'an atomic research centre comparable
to those in the most advanced countries' . The concept of PNE
(peaceful nuclear explosion) had not developed in 1948 when
Bhabha was made this statement. It had obvious military
overtone. An Indian defence analyst, S.S. Khera believed that
' Please refer back to notes 3 to 11.
ie Keesin g's Contemporary
 Archives, Vol. 10, 6-13 August
1955, p. 14360.
19 R. P. Kulkarni and V. Sharma, HOMI J. BHABHA: FATHER
OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR INDUSTRY (Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1969),
p.1.
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Bhabha wanted to have 'everything ready for the bomb' 20 Bhabha
held a power-politics view of international affairs. Speaking
at the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy, he stated: 'No form of power is as expensive as
no power' •21 He drove India towards the development of nuclear
weapons.
Additional primary evidence of India's interest in
nuclear explosions technology dates back to early 1954 when
the idea of plowshares was embryonic, even in the leading
nuclear power, the United States. 22 Declassified documents of
the U.S. State Department reveal that India had an underly-
ing interest in nuclear explosions as early as January 1954.23
At that time Bhabha inquired from U.S. officials whether the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and other concerned agencies
would accept cooperation of the Indian Atomic Energy Comxriis-
sion in 'collecting observational data' on atomic explosion-
s. 24 He further explored whether the U.S. AEC would like to
enter into a cooperative arrangement with the Indian AEC or
the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research to establish an
installation in India, manned by Indian personnel, to record
airborne fragments ejected by atomic explosions. 25 It is
difficult to believe that Bhabha would have approached U.S.
authorities on such a sensitive subject without seeking
20	 S. Khe ra, INDIA' S DEFENCE PROBLEMS (New Delhi,
Orient Publishers, 1968), p. 317.
21 J.P. Jam, NUCLEAR INDIA, PART II (New Delhi, Radiant
Publishers, 1974), p. 153.
22 The concept of plowshares was developed after the mid-
1950s to explore the use of nuclear explosions for underground
engineering and construction purposes.
23 Department of State, Central Decimal File, 891.2546 /




permission from Nehru. It suggests strongly that Bhabha's
attention was focussed upon gaining access to the technology
associated with nuclear weapons.
It might not be unusual for Bhabha to make such a
query from U.S. officials. India and the U.S. began close
cooperation in the atomic energy field in 1950. As a part of
its policy to eliminate trade between India and the communist
bloc in strategic materials, and to assure adequate supplies
of such materials for itself, the U.S. made a cooperative
arrangement with the government of India on beryl and thorium
nitrate. It entered into an agreement with India on 1st
October 1950 to buy 25 percent of the Indian production of
beryl ore for a period of 5 years, with an option for 5 year
extensions. 26 A memorandum of commitment with regard to the
purchase of thorium nitrate was concluded in 1954, and on 14
December 1955, the U.S. negotiated a contract with India to
purchase 230 tons of that material. 2
 India made a secret
commitment not to supply these materials to any country in the
communist Bloc. 28
 The possibility of India's sale of these
materials to China led the U.S. to a make pre-emptive purchase
of the Indian production of the above nuclear materials. 29
 This
arrangement also took into account that Indian nuclear exports
policy did not violate the provisions of the Battle Act, which
required that all U.S. military, economic and financial
assistance be terminated to any country trading embargoed
strategic materials to the Soviet Union, its satellites and
China. 30
 India was therefore, allowed to receive U.S. finan-
26 FRUS 1955-57, Vol. VIII, South Asia, p. 276.
27 ibid.
28 ibid, p. 294.
29 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1696.
30 ibid.
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cial, military and nuclear assistance, on the contrary, Nehru
believed that, 'the offer of thorium and uranium by India to
the United States had been an especially handsome gesture' .
A close friend of Bhabha, Sir John Cockcroft
recalled at a commemoration lecture after Bhabha's death that
the later had become a central figure in discussions on the
issue of India's acquisition of nuclear weapons. 32
 He further
disclosed that in his later years, at small closed meetings,
Bhabha, 'appeared to be in favour of making bombs for a plow-
shares programme' Lord Blackett, who was also a close friend
of Bhabha, confirmed the later's keenness for nuclear wea-
pons. 34
 In fact, Bhabha had eagerly announced to an informal
meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Indian Parliament
on Atomic Energy on 16 December 1959 that, "India is now in a
position to manufacture atomic bombs and atomic weapons
without depending on any outside help". 35
 Retrospectively, it
appears a rather tall claim in view of the state of India's
nuclear development at that time. 3' The announcement might have
been made for domestic political consumption.
Bhabha often opined that nuclear weapons were not
prohibitive for India from an economic point of view because
' Department of State, Central Decimal File, 891.2546 /
2-2053, dated 20 February 1953, p. 2.
32 Sir John Cockcroft and M. G. K. Menon, HOMI JEHANGIR
BHABHA: 1909-1966 (London, The Royal Institution of Great
Britain, 1967), p. 15.
ibid.
Lord Blackett referred in, Bhatia, p. 114.
Message from the Office of the High Commissioner for
the United Kingdom, New Delhi, to Commonwealth Relations
Office, TC. 66/5/5. British Forei gn Office Records, FO 371 /
149591, dated 23 January 1960, (London, Public Record Office,
1990). Bhabha's announcement was reported by the newspapers.
36 See end of the next section (2) of this chapter and
Chapter Seven on India's Nuclear Weapons Capability.
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of its large conventional military expenditure." It was an
additional reason for Bhabha to favour the development of
nuclear weapons. In a meeting with John A. McCone, the
Chairman of the United States AEC in September 1959, a Soviet
atomic energy official, Professor V. S. Emelyanov, stated that
Bhabha was interested in developing nuclear weapons. 38 He
further noted that India could make weapons from the pluto-
nium that could be produced in the natural uranium reactors
Bhabha sought from the Soviet Union. 39 Emelyanov professed to
have shown a lack of support for Bhabha's demand to acquire
natural uranium, heavy-water nuclear reators from the Soviet
Union.
Bhabha believed that the terms peaceful and military
were value-laden, indistinguishable and referred to intent
rather than technology. 40 The point he did not acknowledge was
that intentions could be masked and a nuclear weapons program-
me could be advanced under a policy of ambiguity. Bhabha's
choice for dual-purpose technologies indicates that he might
be following such a course of action in the pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability. Therefore, one has to explore the
development strategy and technological direction of the nuc-
lear programme of a country such as India to assess the
credibility of its claim about the peaceful versus military
employment of nuclear energy.
" Bhatia, p. 4.
38 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES OF JOHN A. McCONE, Office of
the Chairman, United States Atomic Energy Commission, 2nd
October 1959, p. 3, (Washington DC, National Security Ar-
chives, 1989). Professor Emelyanov later on served as Chair-
man of the Committee on Scientific Problems of Disarmament,
the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.
ibid.
40 Kapur, 'India and the Atom', pp. 27-28.
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2. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION
Nehru and Bhabha demonstrated remarkable foresight
by emphasizing the imperative of self-sufficiency as an
essential feature of its nuclear development strategy. It was
from the beginning, and remains, the central premise and
fundamental objective of India's nuclear planning. It seems
to originate from the realization that no long-term techni-
cal and financial support, commensurate with the political
aims of the Indian nuclear programme, would be available if
a weapons option was openly proclaimed. Development strategy
also took into account the fact that India had limited sources
of uranium, but very vast reserves of thorium. 4' In view of
these considerations, Bhabha worked out complete policy blue-
print for the Indian nuclear programme in 1954 and the
guidelines for its implementation. His plan envisaged a three
stage development strategy that remains effective until
today.42
At the first stage, it was decided to install the
pressurized heavy water (PHW), natural uranium reactors
because of their convenient availability, technical suita-
bility and economic feasibility in the early phase of its
nuclear development. 43
 The choice of this system took into
account the fact that natural uranium was easily available
and India could fabricate it in a short period of time. 44
 More
importantly, while generating electric power for different
41 See Chapter Seven, section 2.e. on Nuclear Fuel, pp.
287-89.
42 NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM-INDIA (U), The U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, Directorate • for Scientific and Techni-
cal Intelligence, No. ST-CS-02-268-74, dated 1 July 1974, pp.
2-3. (Washington DC, National Security Archives, 1989).
Nuclear India, 24 (2), 1985, p. 2.
" ibid.
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agro-industrial purposes, the PHW reactors would produce
plutonium as a by-product, which after reprocessing, is a
weapons-grade material. So, the civilian and military uses of
nuclear power were indivisibly integrated by opting for dual-
purpose technologies and denying the verification of its
potential military use by refusing to allow the application of
international safeguards.
Second stage of the development strategy was based
upon the plan to utilize the plutonium recovered as a by-
product from the operation of PHW reactors through recycling
it as a fuel. 45
 This entailed the development of plutonium
reprocessing plants. Reprocessed plutonium would then be used
as a fuel in the fast breeder reactors (FBR) and it would
simultaneously irradiate thorium to produce fissile Uranium-
233 (U-233)." So far, India has only been able to design,
construct and operate a fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) at
its Reactor Research Centre (IGCAR) at Kalpakkam, three
decades after the development strategy was planned. 47 The FBTR
achieved criticality on 18 October 1985 and soon ran into
difficulties but the DAE authorities expressed confidence that
it could be restarted with an expanded core. 48 It would take a
long time before India could construct and install commercial
scale fast breeder rectors. Simultaneously, India needed
reprocessing plants to purify plutonium from the radioactive
waste recovered from the PHW reactors for use in the FBRs at
the second stage (1980s). However, India actually completed
the construction of its first reprocessing plant in 1964 at
Trombay when it had not installed even a single PHW power
ibid. pp. 2-3.
46 ibid.
' Annual Report 1986-1987: Department of Atomic Enerv
(Bombay, GOl, 1987), p. 2.
48 ibid.
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reactor from which it could reprocess the by-product, (except
CIRUS) . The first use of plutonium, recovered from CIRUS
reactor and reprocessed at the Trornbay plant, was for carrying
out the 1974 nuclear test.5°
The third stage of the development strategy en-
visaged the use of U-233 as a fuel in the FER thermal reac-
tors, an element which would be produced in abundance during
the operation and implementation of the second stage. Uran-
ium-233 fueled reactors, while generating electric power,
would breed more Uranium-233 than they would consume through
the irradiation of thorium. 51
 India has the world's largest
reserves of thorium. 52
 Indian atomic energy officials claim to
have perfected the technology to convert thorium into U-233 in
the mid 1970s. 53
 A U-233 fuelled research reactor, KANINI,
designed at BARC, is reported to be near completion at
Kalpakkam. 54
 The successful completion of the third stage will
ultimately shift the focus of India's nuclear programme on
thermal reactors fuelled by U-233 which would be abundantly
available from Indian reserves of thorium.
The P11W reactor system is now fully indigenous in
terms of construction and operation of nuclear power sta-
tions, although the basic design is of Canadian origin. Bhabha
realized that uranium enrichment was be yond India's tech-
nological and financial capacity at the first stage and would
See pp. 74-81 below for details about CIRUS reactor.
50 A detailed discussion of the 1974 Indian nuclear test
is provided in Chapter Four, section 5.
' NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM-INDIA (U), Defense Intelligence
Agency, p. 3.
52 ibid. p. 15.




have caused significant delays in the Indian nuclear program-
me. Importing enriched uranium, like the Tarapur reactors (the
only exception in its nuclear programme, acquired from the
U.S. because it offered specially favourable terms), entailed
the prospects of accepting international safeguards which
India opposed. The Indian scientific community believes that
the difficulties developed in the case of Tarapur reactors
vindicates the efficacy of their development strategy.55
The formulation of this strategy has made availa-
ble large quantities of plutonium to India from the operation
of PHW reactors at the first stage. While plutonium is
considered essential for the conversion of thorium into U-
233 at the second and third stages of the Indian nuclear
programme, it is also a weapons-grade material after repro-
cessing. So, the development strategy was formulated by
keeping in mind the dual-track function of the Indian nuclear
programme, i.e. to generate nuclear power for a wide range of
civilian purposes and to provide weapons-grade material for a
nuclear option with a routine civilian justification. It also
helped avoid undue alarms which could have been raised about
Indian nuclear military objectives in the early phase of the
programme.
The PHW reactors at Kalpakkam and Narora are free
from safeguards and form the basis of India's weapons-grade
plutonium. 5' The development strategy was devised to provide
an indigenous foundation so that a weapons option would not
get scuttled once it became evident. In addition, to fully
utilize the indigenous reserves of thorium for the develop-
ment of Indian nuclear capability, India seems to have
foreseen the technological problems when it wanted to pursue
Nuclear India, Vol. 24 (2), 1985, pp. 2-3.
' NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM-INDIA (U), Defense Intelligence
Agency, p. xii. Also see Chapter Seven on the Indian nuclear
weapons capability.
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a nuclear weapons capability. The development strategy took
into account the problem of freeing India from reliance on
foreign supplies and the attendant politico-economic pres-
sures at the time when India might opt for a public nuclear
force. Bhabha had conceived and designed a nuclear weapons
option within the civilian structure in a way that the weapons
capability would expand automatically with the development of
the civilian nuclear programme. The two other important con-
siderations for the choice of this strategy were: acquisition
of nuclear technology from abroad which could not be developed
locally; and its gradual indigenous development to save the
Indian nuclear programme from the application of international
safeguards so that potential military employment could not be
verified. According to Kapur, Nehru wrote a note on Bhabha's
memo which read, 'somewhat as follows: "Apart from building
power stations and developing electricity, there is always a
built-in advantage of 'defence use' if the need should
arise". 57
 It indicates the priority attached to a nuclear
weapons option which was pursued at the same time while
planning for the generation of nuclear power in the Nehru era.
Since a nuclear weapons option was designed within the
framework of the civilian nuclear power programme, it would
automatically expand with the growth of the power programme.
The technical design and lay out of the development
strategy designed in the Nehru era is provided in figure-I on
the next page to illustrate its full application, covering all
the three stages of the Indian nuclear programme. It is
effective until today and caters for the future expansion of
the power programme as well as the weapons capability.
" Kapur, INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION: ATOMIC DIPLOMACY AND
DECISION MAKING, pp. 193-94. Kapur's information is based on
confidential interview in New Delhi and he does not cite a
public evidence in this case.
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INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY


























Source: Nuclear Energy Qg(U), The U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency.
Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence,
No. SC-CS-02-268-74, dated 1 July 1974, p.2
(Washington DC, National Security Archives, 1989).
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The technological evidence suggests that the
direction of the Indian nuclear programme under Nehru was
contrary to his professions of "peaceful uses only". His
government accorded special priority to the establishment of
two nuclear facilities, the CIRUS Reactor and the Trombay
Reprocessing Plant. Both the facilities had an immediate
military oriented potential and could be employed for civil
use only after a long time when the related facilities for
their use could be ready.sa The construction work on CIRUS
started in 1956, and the Trombay Reprocessing Plant in 1961.
Both the facilities were pivotal for carrying Out the Indian
nuclear test in 1974. CIRUS was commissioned on 10 July 1960
for which Canada provided the complete design, equipment and
assistance in installation under an agreement signed in April
1956.60 It is a natural uranium-fuelled, 40 MW Ce) research-
cum-power reactor, with a capacity to produce 9.4 k.g.
plutonium per year.' 1
 Although the agreement did not contain
inspection provisions, it explicitly stated that CIRUS would
be used for 'only peaceful purposes'.' 2
 Canada also agreed to
supply fuel for the reactor.
When Canada supplied only one half of the loading
" See pp. 68 -73 above.
BHABHA ATOMIC RESEARCH CENTRE, Department of Atomic
Energy, (Bombay, GOl, 1985), see section, MILESTONES.
'° RESEARCH REACTORS AT TROMBAY, (Trombay-Bombay, BARC -
DAE, GOI, 1987), Document No. 400 085, July 1987. Details
are also available in Annual Report 1960-61: Department of
Atomic energy (Bombay, GOI, 1961), pp. 64-66.
61 ANALYSIS OF SIX ISSUES ABOUT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF
INDIA, IRAO, LIBYA AND PAKISTAN, Subcommittee on Arms Con-
trol, Oceans, International Operations and Environment;
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th
Congress, 1st Session (Washington, U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1982), p. 2.
62 ibid.
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of the first core of fuel, India substituted it with locally
fabricated (Indian) uranium.' 3 The Indian justification to load
their own fuel, which was not originally programmed, was based
upon the plea that the Canadian fuel was low-grade.' 4 On the
contrary, the above noted U.S. source suggests: 'they [In-
dians] may have wanted to get the Canadian fuel and the
attendant safeguards out of the way as soon as possible' 65
Under the apprehensions that India might misuse the facility
for non-peaceful purposes, Canada insisted and obtained the
right to inspect the Canadian supplied fuel." India did not
agree on the inspection for the fuel of Indian origin because
it was not within the terms of the agreement. Canada did not
object to the Indian view. Most probably, Canada might have
felt assured by Nehru's ambiguous pledges and did not ask for
the application of rigid inspection provisions. The interna-
tional environment at that time (].950s) did permit such a
latitude because general apprehensions about the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons were not yet profound. The technologi-
cally advanced countries such as Canada and the U.S. were
liberal to provide nuclear technology to the underdeveloped
countries like India. In fact, India was the principal
beneficiary.
The U.S. provided heavy-water for the CIRUS reactor
on the undertaking that it would be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes.'7
 Like Canada, the U.S. too did not insist
63 
'India Reactor Inspection [Canadian Inspections of
CANDU Reactor],' Memorandum of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, U.S. AEC, 3 November 1965 (Washington DC, National
Security Archives, 1989).
64 ibid.
' ibid, p. 2.
66 ibid.
67 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 30 August 1976, p. S14919.
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on inspection provisions. According to the U.S. Central
Intelligence agency (CIA), the CIRUS reactor had been 'oper-
ated in a manner which favours the output of plutonium
suitable for weapons' Although there could be civilian uses
of that fissile material for R & D, the Indian nuclear
programme was not advanced enough to use it. It has also been
established that the U.S.- supplied heavy water was in use in
the CIRUS reactor during the period in which India recovered
the plutonium for its 1974 nuclear test, something it then
denied. 69
India's first plutonium reprocessing plant capable
of producing weapons-grade material was designed and com-
pleted in the Nehru era. Design work for the plant began in
the late 1950s on the basis of information declassified by
the U.S. Government. According to a report in THE WASHINGTON
POST, the U.S. Government was not only aware of the Indian
plan to construct the plant but also provided 'some training
assistance to the Indian nationals in this regard' .'° At that
time, the reprocessing facilities, which also have civilian
uses, were not seen by the U.S. Government as a proliferation
problem. According to the above report, the documents released
by the U.S. .AEC after the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974
stated that VITRO International, a subsidiary of VITRO CORPS,
contributed to the design of the reprocessing plant without
permission from the U.S. government. 71
 According to the DAE
68 Memoranda for Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Staff Member NSC,
from Donald F. Chamberlain, Director of Scientific Intelli-
gence: Subject; The Indian Nuclear Wea pons Capability , Central
Intelligence Agency, SC No. 11794 / 65, dated 18 October 1965,
p. 3 Lyndon, B. Johnson Library, Texas.
69 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, p. S14919.
70 Don Oberdorfer, 'U.S. Training Aid in Indian A-Blast
Cited', THE WASHINGTON POST, 19 July 1976, p. Al.
71 ibid.
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sources, the construction of the plant started on 27 March
1961 at BARC, Trombay.' 2
 The U.S. AEC demanded details from
VITRO International during the final stages of construction of
the plant in January 1963 but the firm refused, allegedly
under direction from Indian Atomic Energy officials. 73
 There is
no evidence of further follow-up. It does not seem likely that
the U.S. government hadany objections to the construction of
the plant but they might have been interested in its details.
According to the report, U.S. AEC memoranda suggest that
various US. acrencies also aareed to oorar anti finan,-
training facilities for Indian officials at the U.S. AEC
production works at Hanford in the plutonium recycling process
leading to the making of weapons-grade materials and reusable
fuels
India also acquired the services of Dr. G.A. Welch
from the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority under a Technical
Cooperation Scheme of the Colombo plan.' 5
 The plant was likely
to go into operation in early 1963 at the cost of Rs. 3.7
crores ( 2,750,000) It began initial test runs in March
1964 (about three months before Nehru's death), and by october
1964, the first run using irradiated fuel from CIRUS had been
completed. 7' The plant was formally inaugurated after Nehru's
72 BHABHA ATOMIC RESEARCH CENTRE, see section, MILES-
TONES.
Don Oberdorfer, p. Al.
' ibid.
Beaton and Maddox, pp. 139-40. For information on
Colombo Plan see note 106 below.
76 ibid.
" Memoranda for Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Staff Member NSC,
from Donald F. Chamberlain, Director of Scientific Intel-
ligence, p. 2.
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death by P.M. Shastri on 22 1965 January.'° The plant is
safeguards-free and was established with unusual speed and
urgency, despite the fact that India had no civilian facility
for the use of plutonium for the next three decades. Theoreti-
cally, plutonium was important for India's three stage nuclear
developmental strategy. In practice, India's fast breeder
reactor programme, for which plutonium was needed has not been
underway until today except the test reactor (FBTR) . No other
atomic energy facility was accorded such a top priority as the
reprocessing plant. From then onward, it was believed on the
basis of technical evidence that, 'India is now in a position
to proceed with a nuclear weapons research and development
program at minimum cost and delay'
The unusual urgency and secrecy with which the work
on these facilities began aroused suspicions about India's
nuclear objective. According to Dr. Ambler, 'U.K. A.E.A.
Headquarters in London did mention to me that there was some
reason to believe that India was developing nuclear weapons
and said they would be glad if I would let them know any
relevant facts I might come across' . Dr. Ambler met Dr. Welch
at Trornbay many times but did not ask him 'any leading
questions' in order to avoid embarrassment for him. 92 Dr. Welch
did say to Ambler that, 'if anything of this kind were afoot
he would not be told about it and he could only form opinions
by putting two and two together' .° This was the time when
' BHABHA ATOMIC RESEARCH CENTRE, see section, MILES-
TONES.
' See pp. 70 to 73 above.
°° See note 68 above.
81 British Forei gn Office Records, FO 371 / 149591, p. 1.
82 ibid.
83 ibid, pp. 1-2.
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Bhabha had announced to the Consultative Committee of the
Indian Parliament that India could produce nuclear weapons
without any foreign assistance. 84 These developments indicate
that Nehru and Bhabha were on course to pursue a nuclear
weapons option. The amount of expenditure incurred on the
nuclear development programme is yet another indicator of
their military oriented motives. According to a U.S. study,
India spent around $ 220 million on its nuclear development
from 1954 to 1964 and an additional $30-40 million were
thought enough for the production of a 'crude low-yield
plutonium device' •85 suggests that a nuclear option was
realized in the Nehru era, earlier than the facilities for the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. Therefore, technological
determinism indicates a weapons oriented direction in addi-
tion to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Indian claim
of an exclusively peaceful use of its nuclear programme in the
Nehru era is untenable.
After the 1962 conflict, Bhabha became vocal in
favour of India's development of a nuclear deterrent against
China. In his oft-quoted paper read at the 12th Pugwash
Conference on Science and World Affairs in January 1964, he
suggested 'recourse to nuclear weapons to redress the im-
balance' against China's military dominance." He stated that
nuclear weapons alone could enable a relatively weaker state
to acquire 'what we may call a position of absolute deter-
rence even against another having many times greater destruc-
See note 35, pp. 67-68 above.
85 BACKGROUND PAPER ON FACTORS WHICH COULD INFLUENCE
NATIONAL DECISIONS CONCERNING ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(Sanitized); December 1964, NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Commit-
tee File - Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, India (Box 1),
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Texas, p. 4.
86 Homi J. Bhabha, 'Safeguards and Dissemination of
Military power' Disarmament and Arms Control, Autumn 1964,
pp. 433-40.
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tive power under its control' He further stated that the
opponent's overkill capability did not matter if one posses-
sed nuclear weapons oneself . ee
 Bhabha accepted the value of a
nuclear security guarantee in principle but did not consider
it adequate for India's specific position, and preferred an
independent nuclear deterrent." He stated that the economic
cost of Indian nuclear deterrent would be small if spread over
a period of 10 to 15 y$•o
 Although personal preferences of
policy-makers should not be overrated in ascertaining gover-
nment policy intent, Bhabha's inclinations assume signifi-
cance when viewed in the light of the ambiguity pervading the
Indian nuclear policy. Moreover, Bhabha's statement was made
when Nehru was in power and there was no repudiation of
Bhabha's views by the government.
Beaton and Maddox' s skepticism about Nehru' s nuclear
policy of "only peaceful uses" is noteworthy. It originates
from the two trends in the Indian nuclear programme. They
point out that the significance attached to the achievement of
self-sufficiency in all the nuclear technologies and consis-
tent opposition to the application of International safe-
guards suggest, 'an anxiety to have the option on producing
a bomb' They further state that the Indian atomic energy
programme proceeded urgently at a heavy cost despite scarce
resources and therefore, conclude that, 'The most reasonable
inference is that Mr. Nehru, advised by Bhabha, has decided to
give the country the option to produce a nuclear device in
1963 in case it should become politically or militarily
ei ibid.
" ibid. pp. 435-37.
89 ibid.
90 ibid.
Beaton and Maddox, p. 136.
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necessary'. 92
 Kapur's observation that, 'Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru had sanctioned work towards a PNE develop-
ment before his death' appears logical, although he does not
offer conclusive evidence. 93
 The foregoing indicates that Nehru
and Bhabha were not only on course to develop a nuclear
weapons option, but the option was in fact realized by the
completion of two safeguards-free dual-purpose facilities,
CIRUS reactor and Trombay Reprocessing Plant.
3. NEHRU' S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY
Since independence, India has stayed in the fore-
front of nuclear diplomacy within and outside the United
Nations. It has consistently projected itself as a champion
of general and complete disarmament at international forums,
but has denied its application in any form to India so long
as the great powers demur. As seen in Chapter two, it has
consistently rejected unilateral nuclear disarmament. India
presents an image through a coherent nuclear diplomacy that
it not only supports the principles of disarmament and non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, but is among the architects
of these principles. Yet, as will be discussed in the subse-
quent paragraphs, India in practice undermines the applica-
tion of those principles when it comes to modalities in which
they are to be applied.
India's first noteworthy position on international
safeguards against nuclear proliferation was its rejection of
Baruch Plan. The plan proposed the establishment of an Inter-
national Atomic Development Authority (IADA) to supervise the
atomic energy activities which were considered potentially
92 ibid, p. 141.
Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation: Multi-
lateral Di plomacy and Regional Aspects, p. 184.
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dangerous to international security. 94
 Since then, India has
opposed the imposition of any form of international safeguards
which might inhibit the development of its safeguards-free
nuclear programme unless they were applied universally and
without discrimination. Nehru stated explicitly that India
would only accept international safeguards: 'provided we are
assured that it is for the common good of the world and not
exercised in a partial way, not dominated over by certain
countries, however good their intentions might be' . He
expressed serious doubts about the nature, purpose and format
of the agency proposed in the U.S. President Eisenhower's
"Atoms for Peace" proposal presented in the U.N. General
Assembly on 8 December 1953 and saw it as a deliberate move to
control the strategic raw materials of developing states, like
India. A close scrutiny of the Eisenhower proposal and Nehru's
response to that bears out an impression that Nehru had an
apprehensive attitude regarding that proposal. President
Eisenhower proposed that,
The Governments principally involved, to the extent
permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and
continue to make joint contributions from their
stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable
materials to an International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy. We would expect that such an agency would be set
up under the aegis of the United Nations. The Atomic
Energy Agency could be made responsible for the im-
pounding, storage and protection of the contributed
fissionable and other materials.96
Nehru responded to the Eisenhower's proposal in a
Documents on Disarmament: 1945-59, (Washington DC,
Department of State, 1960), p. 7.
" India: Parliamentary
 Debates-Official Reports, Lok
Sabha, Sixth Session, 10 May 1954, Cal. 7038.
' Text of The Address Delivered B y
 The President of The
United States Before The General Assembly of The United
Nations, 8 December 1953, pp. 7-8.
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detailed analysis during a policy debate in the Lok Sabha on
the uses of atomic energy. He said,
President Eisenhower's speech was, if I may say so
with all respect, a fine speech, with generous
sentiments and with a proposal which deserves our
attention. But the proposal was a vague proposal;
it is a vague indication of which way one should
look; not exactly a specific proposal.97
After this brief and guarded appreciation, Nehru did not
restrain for long his apprehension about the concept of an
atomic energy agency which might exercise some form of control
in the field of atomic energy. He expressed his sensitivity by
saying that,
It is probably a loose talk, this talk of control.
Who is to control it internationally?... President
Eisenhower refers to some agency of the United Na-
tions. . . "An international control agency shall be
set up by the United Nations. It shall here after
be an independent body outside the control of the
Security Council and of the United Nations".99
Nehru quoted at length from an earlier U.N. proposal on the
subject and attempted to establish a linkage between the U.N.
and the Eisenhower proposals. He thought it might ultimately
result in an international control on atomic energy and
associated materials of the developing countries. His misgiv-
ings about the nature and scope of the proposed agency are
reflected from his view:
This is a far-reaching provision, namely, that all
our raw materials and our mines would be owned and
controlled by that independent body, which is even
independent of the United Nations after it is cre-
ated.99
" Text of The Prime Minister's S peech on the Uses of
Atomic Enercw, dated 10 May 1954, p. 3.
" ibid. pp. 7-8.
" ibid. p. 9.
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Nehru believed that it was undesirable for a country
like India that the great-powers should control its atomic
programme and raw materials. He said, 'I submit it would not
be right to agree to any plan which hands over even our raw
materials and mines, etc. to any external authority.' 100
 In his
concern against any probable control on India's atomic raw
materials, Nehru disregarded a part of the Eisenhower proposal
where it stated that, 'the proposal has a great virtue that it
can be undertaken without irritations and mutual suspicions
incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable
system of world-wide inspection and control' .'° As a follow-
up to the proposal, the U.S. AEC requested President Eisen-
hower to approve an allocation of 20,000 kilograms of U-235
for distribution to other countries under Section 41 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.102 After the approval, the U.S. AEC
distributed that material to other countries. It offered to
donate additional 1,000 kg (U-235) to the IAEA when duly
established.'03
It is noteworthy that amongst developing countries,
India was the first beneficiary from the Eisenhower's "Atoms
For peace Proposal" not only on a unilateral basis from the
U.S., but also internationally. In February 1955, the U.S. AEC
granted an Indian request for ten tons of heavy water for use
100 ibid. pp. 10-11.
101 Text of The Address delivered b y the President of the
United States at the United Nations, 8 December 1953, p. 8.
102 Memorandum from Lewis Strauss, Chairman, United States
Atomic Energy Commission to the President, the U.S. AEC, dated
20 Feb 1956.
103 Memorandum from lewis Strauss, Chairman, United States
Atomic Energy Commission, to Herbert Hoover Jr., Under
Secretary of State the U.S. AEC, dated 31 May 1956.
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in a research reactor (CIR) 104 India's gratitude to the U.S.
for the provision of heavy-water was acknowledged by renaming
that reactor from CIR (Canada-India Reactor) to CIRUS (Canada-
India-US) Reactor. The U.S. AEC Chairman, Lewis Strauss,
explained the U.S. decision:
I hope the sale of this heavy water to India is only
a first important step in a broader collaboration in
this field. It is in keeping with the program of the
United States in developing arrangements with
friendly nations to promote the peaceful uses of
atomic energy as announced by President Eisenhower
in his United Nations speech.105
The cooperation continued and India acquired more
heavy-water and other nuclear materials from the U.S. under
____	 2.. aot
a 1956 agreement. As w&--b' seen in section bw, CIRUS
was acquired as a Colombo Plan facility from Canada. 10' Before
that, India had established a research reactor, ASPARA, with
technical and financial assistance from Britain in August
1956.107 All these facilities had been acquired under the
framework of international cooperation in the field of atomic
energy which made India the largest recipient of atomic energy
technology and materials. Therefore, Nehru's apprehensions
about the Eisenhower proposal and similar international
efforts which led to the formation of the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency) may be justified in principle, but did
not dissuade India from taking advantage of internationally
104 United States Atomic Ener gy
 Commission, Press Relea-
se (No. 598), dated 12 February 1955 (Washington DC, Nation-
al Security Archives, 1989)
105 ibid.
106 The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development
in South and Southeast Asia went into effect on 1st July 1951
and was intended to stimulate long term development in the
region, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. VIII. p. 276.
107 Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, see MILESTONES.
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provided nuclear technology.
It appears that Nehru was preparing a case that
while India would benefit from the international cooperation
in the field of atomic energy by receiving technology and
financial assistance, it could still refuse any form of
international safeguards through objections about the nature
and scope of any agency created to exercise the safeguards.
India raised strong objections to the proposed statute of the
IAEA and opposed its safeguards system after the agency was
established. The entire exercise from the 'Atoms for Peace'
proposal to the creation of IAEA, was looked upon with ap-
prehension as an attempt to legitimize international control
over the atomic energy programmes of countries like India.'08
It seems that Indian nuclear diplomacy focussed upon the
rejection of international safeguards with obvious security
motives in sight, so that an option could be kept open if the
need arose for India to develop nuclear weapons at a subse-
quent stage. The Indian objection were not merely because of
any intrinsic deficiencies in the proposed forms of IAEA.
India possessed strategic raw material like thorium and
beryllium, and its political and scientific elite was aware of
their potential role for the development of nuclear power.
They did not want to accept limitations on how it could be
used.
Dr. Bhabha was a staunch opponent of the IAEA
safeguards system from its inception because he believed it
was discriminatory in nature. During negotiations on the draft
statute of the IAEA, Bhabha stated: 'The problem of securing
the world against atomic peril is too big and grave a problem
to be solved merely by inspection and the type of safeguards
'° Nehru, INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: SELECT SPEECHES, pp.
192-192.
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contained in this draft statute' •b09 He continued that the
safeguards were 'discriminatory' against the new states
because they were applicable to their establishments which
were entirely peaceful but not applicable to the establish-
merits of the nuclear weapon states which were military-
oriented..'10
 He lamented that the Agency's primary function
ought not to be a police body but a positive and creative
force for good." 1
 It is well known that he openly defended
India's right to carry out nuclear explosions for 'peaceful'
purposes but frankly admitted that the technology of a PNE was
indistinguishable from a military device. He tended to exploit
the weaknesses and loopholes of the non-proliferation regime
to secure Indian interests in nuclear explosive technology and
avoid the application of safeguards on the Indian nuclear
programme. He concealed his opposition to the international
safeguards in their 'discriminatory' nature by demanding their
reciprocal application on the nuclear establishments of the
nuclear weapon states. Indian nuclear diplomacy in the Nehru
era became a guidepost for successor governments which mostly
adhered to Nehru's fundamental precepts by adjusting to the
international environment, but without effecting any major
changes.
A countervailing but less significant influence on
Nehru in this regard was from his chief foreign policy spokes-
man, Mr. Krishna Menon. Unlike Nehru, he was unequivocally
against India's acquisition of nuclear weapons. He believed
that nuclear weapons have "absolutely no military utility
either in war or defence" and regarded them only as "weapons
'° Bhabha in, J.P. Jam, NUCLEAR INDIA PART I (New Delhi,
Radiant Publishers, 1974), p. 28
110 ibid.
" ibid. pp. 71-75.
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of mass extermination".. 112
 Michael Brecher considered Menon's
views a 'rigid posture', and a 'facile dismissal of all
options to safeguard India's security'.' 13
 Jam noted Menon's
influence on Nehru about nuclear weapons: 'It would, indeed,
be futile on the part of any one, including Krishna Menon, to
assert that Nehru would not have given any thought whatsoever
to making the bomb for all times to come'. 114
 Nehru's disarma-
ment thinking was no doubt influenced by Krishna Menon, but
Bhabha's influence appears more decisive. A close look at the
decision-making process indicates that Menon's influence was
restricted to disarmament policy. Bhabha, on the other hand,
had exclusive access to Nehru on the atomic energy programme.
As will be seen in the subsequent section, Bhabha's position
was unique in this matter.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF INDIA'S
NUCLEAR PROGR.A1E IN THE NEHRU ERA
A brief survey of the administrative set up of
India's nuclear programme is essential in order to appreciate
the development strategy employed by Nehru and Bhabha to
create a nuclear weapons option. In its formative years,
India's nuclear programme enjoyed the supervision of Bhabha.
He was a person of exceptional scientific competence and
leadership calibre. He laid the technological foundation of
the programme and is generally acknowledged as the father of
112 Michael Brecher, INDIA AND WORLD POLITICS: KRISHNA
MENON'S VIEW OF THE WORLD (New York, Praeger, 1968), p. 228
& 329.
m ibid. pp. 230-232
114 Jam, NUCLEAR INDIA, PART I, pp. 183-84.
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India's nuclear industry. 115 He was personally instrumental in
persuading the Dorab Tata Trust and the Indian government to
manage financial support for the establishment of Tata Insti-
tute of Fundamental Research in 1944.116 According to Dr.
Srinivasan, construction of the solid foundation of India's
nuclear industry owes a lot to 'Bhabha's seminal personal
contribution' •h1 From an administrative point of view, the
Indian nuclear programme enjoyed a unique patronage. As noted
earlier, the priority which Nehru's government attached to
nuclear energy matters is also evident from the fact that it
introduced the Atomic Energy Act in the Constituent Assembly
within 8 months of independence.' 8
 After its passage on 15
April 1948, the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was set
up on 10 August 1948, with Bhabha as its first Chairman, Dr.
S.S. Bhatnagar as member-secretary and Dr. K.S. Krishnan as a
member." 9
 The Indian AEC was assigned the responsibility of
protecting Indian national interests in the field of atomic
energy, of surveying nuclear minerals and developing them in
the form of industrially usable products, fostering fundamen-
tal research and development on nuclear technology, training
of nuclear scientists and developing expertise in the field of
nuclear technology.' 20
 The Atomic Energy Act of 1948 gave the
115 Dr. M.R. Srinivasan, 'Reminiscences of Homi Bhabha',
Nuclear India, Vol. 25, No.5-6 (Bombay, Department of Atomic
Energy, Government of India, 1987), p. 12. DR. Srinivasan
later became the Chairman, Indian AEC and the Secretary, DAE.
116 ibid.
117 ibid.
11$ Constituent Assembl y (Legislative Debates-Official
Records), Second session, Vol. V (1), 6 April 1948, p. 3315.
119 Ten Years of Atomic Energy in India: 1954-1964 (Bom-
bay, DAE, GOl, 1964), p. 4.
120 ibid.
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Indian government an exclusive control over atomic energy
matters. The government embargoed the export of strategic raw
materials for commercial reasons except in exchange for
nuclear materials required for the development of its nuclear
programme.'2' The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was set up
on 3 August 1954 under the direct supervision of Nehru as the
Minister-in-charge of atomic energy and with Bhabha as its
Secretary.
The AEC and DAE are India's premier institutions
for the management of its nuclear industry, entrusted with
full responsibility for planning and implementation. The
Indian AEC has mostly performed the role of policy formula-
tion and setting guidelines for the DAE to implement nuclear
planning in the wider national perspective.'22
 According to
official Indian view, the strategic nature of atomic energy
and its political and international significance justified
the creation of Indian AEC.'23
 The DAE is the chief executive
organ of the Indian nuclear programme. Its original function
has been and remains, the development of nuclear power and to
promote its various uses. In 1962, the Atomic Energy Act was
amended to provide more authority to the central government to
cope with the expanding atomic energy programme.' 24
 The member-
ship of the AEC was enlarged from three to five.'25
The present organization of the atomic energy prog-
ramme in India is managed primarily under the 1962 Atomic
Energy Act. It provides overall control of the nuclear
121 Department of State, Central Decimal File, 891.2546-
I. 5-1154, dated 11 May 1954.
122 Annual Report 1957-1958: Department of Atomic Energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1958), pp. 25-30.
123 ibid.
124 Nuclear India 24 (5 & 6), 1985. pp. 1-2.
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programme to the DAE. The Indian P.M. being the ex-officio
Minister-in-charge of the DAE is advised by the AEC on policy
matters. The programme is solely financed by the government of
India through the DAE and has been a top priority of the
Indian Government despite financial difficulties. The external
financial and technological support comes through agreements
with the central government in the form of credits and loans.
Bhabha as the AEC Chairman and Secretary of the DAE
was only and directly responsible to Nehru. The wide range of
his responsibilities illustrated the enormous extent to which
he might have exercised a corresponding influence on Nehru and
exclusive authority over the atomic energy affairs. The fact
that Bhabha simultaneously held four key positions, Chairman
AEC, Secretary DAE, Director TIFR and Director of the Atomic
Energy Establishment at Trombay (renamed as Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre, fully illustrates Nehru's confidence in him.
The DAE enjoys so much administrative and financial autonomy
that it has been described as a 'state within a state'.12'
Bhabha continued to enjoy that status until his death in an
air crash on 24 January 1966 at Mont Blanc. 127
 His vigorous
personality proved the driving force in the Indian nuclear
programme in its formative phase.
Innate secrecy was the hallmark of the decision-
making process in the field of atomic energy. There were
strict guidelines that no government functionary other than
Nehru could discuss the issue of nuclear weapons in public.
According to Michael Brecher, 'by Nehru's own admission', the
decision about Indian acquisition or non-acquisition of
nuclear weapons was never brought before the Indian cabinet
126 Marwah, p. 100.
127 Nuclear India, 23 (2), 1984, p. 7.
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from 1947 to 1963.129 A similar approach is reflected in
Krishna Menon's statement about India's acquisition of nuclear
weapons. He expressed the view that the debate on the issue of
nuclear weapons was prejudicial to the Indian interests.' 29
 It
is not clear how the debate would have proved prejudicial to
the Indian interests if India were not to acquire nuclear
weapons. It reflects a concern that the debate might divulge
information about the inherently secret process of decision-
making. The set up of the Indian nuclear programme was plann-
ed in a way that Prime Minister retained direct and full con-
trol. Except Nehru and Bhabha, nobody knew exactly the full
depth of the Indian nuclear programme.
5. DOMESTIC FACTOR IN THE NEHRU ERA
Domestic debate on nuclear weapons predates the
emergence of the Chinese nuclear threat to India, a threat
which remained conventional until 1962, but assumed nuclear
dimension after October 1964 test by China. The debate
gradually developed momentum in the immediate aftermath of
the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 and became intense after
China's first nuclear explosion. It developed along two
parallel processes: intra-governmental and extra-govern-
mental, without, at least initially, a recognizable inter-
action between the two. At the intra-governmental level, the
issue of nuclear weapons' development seized the attention of
the Indian officialdom immediately after independence. At the
extra-governmental level, the debate was largely originated
129 Michael Brecher, NEHRU'S MANTLE: THE POLITICS OF
SUCCESSION IN INDIA (New York, Praeger, 1968), pp. 126-27.
Brecher's information is based upon his interview with Nehru
which took place in 1963.
129 Brecher, INDIA AND WORLD POLITICS: KRISHNA MENON'S
VIEW OF THE WORLD, p. 228.
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after China's first nuclear test. At the intra-governmental
level, Nehru personally initiated the debate on the uses of
nuclear energy at the time when the Atomic Energy Bill was
introduced in the Constituent / Legislative Assembly in April
1948. He stated:
If we do not set about now, taking advantages of
the processes that go towards the making of atomic
energy, we will be left behind. That is not good
enough for any country, least of all for a country
with vast potential and strength like India' •130
In May 1954, Dr. Meghnad Saha, a well known nuclear physic-
ist and member of Parliament, urged the government during a
parliamentary debate on atomic energy to intensify nuclear
research and development by immediately increasing its
appropriations from the 'present Rs. 30,000,000 (about $
6,300,000) to at least Rs. 100,000,000 ($ 2l,000,000)'..'' He
stressed that atomic research was of particular interest to
India because its power potential was very limited.' 32
 Nehru
responded in a lengthy speech, and reiterated:
The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is
far more important for a country like India, that
is to say, in a country whose power resources are
limited, than a country like France, an industri-
ally advanced country .....It is important for a
power-starved or a power-hungry country like India
or like most of the other countries in Asia and
Africa.'33
Since the debate was being conducted in the context
130 Constituent Assembl y
 (Legislative Debates-Official
Reports), second session, Vol. V (1), 6 April 1948, p. 3315.
'' Department of State, Central Decimal File, 891.2546/.
5-1154, dated 11 May 1954.
132 ibid, pp. 1-2.
133 Text of The Prime Minister's S peech on the Uses of
Atomic Energy, dated 10 May 1954, pp. 6-7.
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of the use of atomic energy for peaceful uses only, there was
no reference to its military use or an indication of the
possibility of other than energy generating purposes. However,
Nehru did touch upon the broader issues in general terms as
under:
By August 1945, Hiroshima fell, -- the result of
the work from 1939 to 1945. Since then, of course,
tremendous progress has been made in this and the
world has been struck by it because it is a ter-
rible thing. Now, therefore, the human mind and
human efforts are unleashing tremendous powers
without quite knowing how to control them. You will
not control these by mere demands to ban this or to
ban that. Nobody can really control the human mind
from going on unleashing new things; they will go
on doing that way.'34
The point being made here does not concern Nehru's
motives regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful or
military purpose. It is meant to say that he proved his
leadership qualities by dominating the debate. In addition to
Nehru, many prominent politicians, civil servants and tech-
nocrats like Dr. Bhabha, Arthur Lal, Raj Krishna, V.C.
Trivedi, Krishna Menon and others were responsible for various
inputs in each phase of the evolution of the Indian nuclear
policy. However, not much was stated in public about the
intra-governmental process before the 1962 Sino-Indian
conflict. It was in the wake of the first intensive nuclear
debate (1964-1968) that the key figures involved in the
decision-making process expressed their views in public.
A review of the parliamentary debates during the
Nehru era indicates the absence of a serious discussion on
the substantive nuclear issues such as the acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Parliamentary discussions and inquiries dealt
essentially with matters such as international nuclear
disarmament and the superpower arms race etc. In fact, the
'- ibid. pp. 5-6.
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Parliament was used as a forum by the government to announce
its nuclear decisions and to give progress reports regarding
the civil uses of nuclear technology. An exception was
Bhabha's statement before the Parliament's Consultative
Committee on Atomic Energy in 1959.135 There is no further
evidence of any substantive issues raised. A discussion on
such issues in the public institutions might had been pre-
cluded by Nehru's rule of secrecy about nuclear matters.
It seems that India's nuclear strategy in the Nehru
era focussed on the development of a nuclear weapons option
within the framework of its civilian nuclear energy power
programme, but without making it too visible and without
formal acknowledgement. It was designed to remain secret until
complete self-sufficiency was achieved and political cir-
cumstances demanded making it visible. Technologically, it
continued to promote a nuclear weapons option based upon the
nuclear dual-use infrastructure. Politically, India maintained
a policy of not making nuclear weapons, but stressed its right
to do so if there was no progress in nuclear disarmament.
Morally, India claimed a high ground because of its policy of
not making nuclear weapons, and campaigned for nuclear
disarmament. On the diplomatic front, India continued to
refuse the acceptance of international safeguards and denied
verification of its claim about the "exclusively peaceful
uses" of its nuclear power programme. From a domestic point of
view, its refusal to accept the safeguards on the development
of a dual purpose nuclear capability enhanced the credibility
of Indian government that a weapons option was not abandoned.
It improved its prestige of strengthening national sovereign-
ty and its international image. This strategy allowed India
to escape the penalties of an open and declared nuclear
weapons programme. As a result, it continued to receive
s See note 35 p. 66.
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economic, technological and financial assistance from Western
sources, particularly Canada and the U.S. It also allowed
India to allay the apprehensions of the superpowers, given
their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, about the
Indian role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
However, in the light of the above evidence, the
validity of the findings that the genesis of India's nuclear
option lies in the post-Nehru era (around the first Chinese
nuclear test) becomes questionable. In fact, the foundation
of Indian nuclear weapons option was designed in the 1950s
under Nehru, and was almost complete by the time of his death.
Nehru generated calculated ambiguity about India's commitment
to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but the tech-
nological thrust of India's nuclear programme indicated a
priority for a weapons oriented direction over civilian uses.
It appears that, given his preoccupation for a 'Greater
India', Nehru had decided in favour of developing a nuclear
weapons option for a deterrent in extremis (distant future)
from a long term power perspective and strategic reassurance
of India. A nuclear power potential based upon the latest
scientific and industrial development also appeared as a
symbol of national status and pride to the Indian leadership
under Nehru. However, nuclear capability as a demonstration of
great power status appeared a more appropriate rationale.
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Chapter Four
INDIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY 1964 - TO- 1977
FROM NUCLEAR OPTION TO A WEAPONS CAPABILITY
This chapter examines the development of India's
nuclear option into a weapons capability under the govern-
ments of Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Indira
Gandhi. It analyses the impact of various determinants on
Indian nuclear policy during the period from 1964 to 1977,
which provided the stimulus for progress towards a weapons
capability. The most notable was the first nuclear test by
China on 16 October 1964. The chapter also evaluates the
diplomatic and domestic inputs in India's nuclear policy, like
the issue of nuclear security guarantees, Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 and the nuclear
debate in India. It further assesses the effects of these
developments on the decision-making process and the momentum
of development of a nuclear weapons capability. As noted in
the previous chapter, this study questions validity of the
traditional view that India's nuclear option was developed in
the post-Nehru era in response to the first Chinese nuclear
test.' On the contrary, it suggested that the option had in
fact materialized by the time China carried out its test. The
Chinese test proved a catalyst for the conversion of nuclear
option into a weapons capability. However, other developments
had their influence as well. These developments determined the
momentum of change but not the change itself. Indian nuclear
weapons capability gradually developed with the expansion of
the civilian nuclear programme within which it was incor-
porated. The 1974 Indian nuclear test appears a logical,
albeit delayed, outcome of the nuclear policy formulated in
1 See previous chapter (Three), pp. 57. Pran Chopra holds
the same view, interview with Pran Chopra on 23 November 1988
at Wilton Park, England.
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the Nehru era which was followed by his successors according
to the circumstances of their time and political suitability.
1. IMPACT OF CHINA AND THE INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE
$HASTRI PERIOD: MAY 1964 TO JANUARY 1966
Mr. Shastri succeeded Nehru as Prime Minister at a
time (May 1964) when India had not yet fully recovered from
the trauma of defeat in the 1962 conflict with China. On 16th
October 1964, China carried out its first nuclear test which
added further complexities to the Indian security dilernnia.
That development exacerbated the Indian perceptions of a
threat from China which was conventional in nature before, but
acquired a nuclear dimension after the test. It proved the
raison d'etre for an intense debate in India over its acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons in response to threat from China.
Shastri's government came under considerable pressure to
develop nuclear weapons. Since Shastri did not operate from a
position of strength comparable with Nehru, he appeared to
appease critics in the debate within the Parliament and
outside. In a policy statement in the Lok Sabha on 27 Novem-
ber 1964, he stated, 'I cannot say that the present policy [of
nuclear pacifism] is deep-rooted, that it cannot be set aside
and that it would not be changed' •2 Shastri's statement had
two obvious policy implications. First, he implicitly ack-
nowledged that the policy of 'only peaceful use' of nuclear
energy was not 'deep-rooted', and second, he underlined the
new orientation of his own policy. He favoured development of
nuclear explosives for "peaceful purposes" and indicated the
possibility of India carrying out a PNE (peaceful nuclear
explosion) in the near future. 3
 In fact, Shastri sanctioned




the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion (SNE) Project on Bhabha's
recommendation almost the same time he made the statement.4
This was the first public manifestation of a
decisive step forward in India's nuclear weapons development.
In K. Subrahmanyam's view, the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion
Project was a peaceful nuclear explosion but would give India
the same technology as a weapon test. 5
 According to Dhirendra
Sharma, Shastri's decision provided Bhabha the latitude to
conduct R & D on a bomb design and its non-nuclear com-
ponents. 6
 Immediately after the Chinese test, Bhabha an-
nounced at a press conference that India could produce a
nuclear bomb within 18 months. 7
 Later, he went on to add that
India could develop an arsenal of 50 nuclear weapons and 50
two-megaton hydrogen bombs.B It was a tall claim in view of
India's state of technological (nuclear) development at that
time. However, Shastri's government demonstrated an urgency to
deal with the crisis created by China's nuclear tests. A U.S.
report assessed the prevailing situation as follows: 'the
political feeling in India at the present time is influenced
by the warlike nature of the act required and problem posed by
atmospheric or even underground testing'. 9
 An official U.S.
Wohlstetter, p. 109.
The decision about the SNE project was confirmed by K.
Subrahmanyam during an Interview on 22 November 1988 at Wilton
Park, England. Subrahmanyam has formerly served in the Indian
Ministry of Defence from where he was deputed as Director of
the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses [IDSA], New
Delhi.
6 Dhirendra Sharma, pp. 88-91.
.' HINDUSTAN TIMES, 19 October 1964.
$ Bhatia, p. 114.
W.W. Rostow, A Wa y
 of Thinking
 About Nuclear Prolifer-
ation; NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Committee File - Committee on
Nuclear Proliferation, India (Box 1), November 1964, Lyndon B.
Johnson Library, Texas.
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source further stated, 'following the CHICOM [Communist China-
's] nuclear detonation, the Indian military services were
directed to prepare a study and recommendations [top secret]
on its military implications for India' The study was repor-
tedly completed and submitted to the Indian government but no
further information is available about its nature and con-
tents .j
Notwithstanding Bhabha's claim to produce a bomb
within 18 months, an immediate resumption of a full-scale
nuclear weapons programme after the Chinese test was not
possible because India's capacity to produce weapons-grade
plutonium was very limited. As noted in the previous chapter,
the only source of fissile-plutonium was CIRUS, commissioned
in 1960 with a capacity to produce 9.4 kg plutonium per year
and the reprocessing plant that had just been completed.12
There was no immediate possibility of producing nuclear
weapons. A nuclear test was thought to be feasible within 18
months, but it would have only provoked China's acceleration
of its nuclear weapons programme without helping India in any
way. However, the Indian nuclear capability had reached a
level of development from where the pursuit of a nuclear
weapons programme could be realized on a long-term basis.
Therefore, Shastri's emphasis on change cannot be dismissed as
an attempt to placate the intensity of domestic political
pressure to go nuclear as some accounts of his policy sug-
10 INCOMING MESSAGE: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, STAFF
MESSAGE BR.NCH, AF IN: 11932 (7 DEC 64) C/ptl to DIA (Defe-
nge Intelligence Agency) declassified NLJ 90-214 dated 11-
29-90, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Texas.
' ibid.
12 See previous chapter, section, 2, pp. 74-81.
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gest.'3
 His policy statements about change were backed by the
decision to undertake the SNE Project. The existing accounts
of Shastri's nuclear policy are imprecise either because of a
lack of proper information about his decision on the SNE
Project or through ignoring his period as a brief interlude.'4
He only rejected the pressure to commit India to develop a
nuclear deterrent against China as a short-term measure which
he thought would be economically prohibitive and strategically
inadequate. Inaugurating the plutonium reprocessing plant at
Trombay on 22 January 1965, Shastri declared: 'We cannot
afford to spend millions and millions over nuclear arms when
there is poverty and unemployment all around us' However,
his declaration looks perfunctory in view of his decision in
favour of the SNE Project.
Once the initial trauma was over, P.M. Shastri's
government evaluated the Chinese nuclear ee-t as a potential,
but not immediate and so relegated it in severity.' 6
 It also
considered that an Indian nuclear weapons capability would be
inadequate at that time for a credible deterrent against
China. 1' It could not produce sufficient number of nuclear
weapons because India did not possess enough quantities of
plutonium and it had not yet laid the basis for an adequate
13 Ernest W. Lefever, NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE THIRD WORLD:
U.S. POLICY DILEMMA (Washington, Brooking Institution, 1979),
p. 28-30; and Shelton L. William, THE U.S., INDIA AND THE BOMB
(Baltimore, The John Hopkins press, 1969), pp. 38-40.
' ibid.
' Lal Bahadur Shastri, SPEECHES OF PRIME MINISTER LAL
BAHADUR SHASTRI: JUNE 1964-MAY 1965 (New Delhi, Government of
India GOI, 1965), p. 17.
16 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 15, 6-13 Febru-
ary 1965, p. 20567.
' Maj. Gen. D. Som Dutt, INDIA AND THE BOMB, Adeiphi
Paper No. 30 (London, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, November 1966), pp. 5-6.
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delivery system.'8
 There is no reliable evidence that it had
adequate experience of technology to fabricate nuclear weapons
at that time. Bhabha's statement that India could produce a
number of atomic and hydrogen bombs was based upon a long-
term perspective and he might have wanted India to embark upon
the process. Shastri and Bhabha both died in January 1966. It
was a serious blow to the SNE Project. The momentum for the
development a nuclear weapons capability was severely dis-
rupted.
2. INDIA, CHINA AND THE NUCLEAR SECURITY GUARANTEES
Shastri's interim strategy to ward off the Chinese
nuclear threat to India and its implications for the public
at large was to highlight India's interest in a unilateral or
multilateral nuclear security guarantee. Shastri met the
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on 4 December 1964 and
in a press conference after the meeting urged the nuclear
weapon states to consider the ways in which they could
guarantee the security of non-nuclear nations.' 9
 He said: "I
think it would be important for the nuclear powers to con-
sider how they can guarantee the safety and security of non-
nuclear countries. It would be vital on their part to give
serious thought to the problem". 2° On a question, whether he
thought it desirable and useful for India to obtain guaran-
tees against a nuclear attack, the Premier replied that it
'° CIRUS reactor was commissioned on 10 July 1960 and has
a capacity to produce 9.4 kg plutonium per year. That means
India had approximately 37.6 kg of plutonium by 1964. Given
the Indian R & D requirements, it was not enough for the
development of a small nuclear deterrent.
' INDIA, NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Committee File -
Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, India (Center Folder -
Box 6), Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Texas, p. 19.
20 ibid.
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was not only for India that such guarantees were needed but
for all non-nuclear countries. 2' On a further question that
how a non-aligned, non-nuclear India could defend itself
against an attack by a nuclear country, Shastri replied, 'each
country needs to devise its own ways and means of defence' 22
He continued, "we should not think on selfish lines. I hope
that, if all the non-nuclear countries combine, they can
create the necessary climate in the world for the non-use of
nuclear weapons" 23
Britain appeared sympathetic to the Indian concerns
but provided only informal assurances. The Indian Minister of
External Affairs, Mr. Swaran Singh, later clarified that the
obligation of nuclear powers was considered "moral and not a
specific guarantee for India". 24
 The U.S. response to the
Chinese nuclear test and threat it posed to the security of
the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) was declared by President
Lyndon B. Johnson. He stated: "The nations that do not seek
national nuclear weapons, can be sure, if they need our strong
support against some threat or nuclear blackmail, then they
will have it". 25
 However, U.S. officials believed that the
'generalized assurances of security against nuclear blackmail'
provided in President Johnson's statement seemed to have no
real effect on the Indian leaders about the adequacy of the
security guarantee. 2' The U.S. seemed unwilling to go beyond
21 ibid, p. 20.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 TIMES OF INDIA, 9 December 1964.
25 U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 2 November 1964.
26 R. Murray, PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OUTSIDE
EUROPE (PROBLEM 2); December 1964, NATIONAL SECURITY FILE,
Committee File - Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, India,
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Texas, p. 14.
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that position and provide a specific nuclear security guar-
antee to India. An indication of that is reflected from a U.S.
government paper on the subject:
We believe we have already reinforced Indian leaders
in their present policy by providing the general as-
surances which were included in the President's
statement of October 16 and his speech of October
18. For the present, we believe these assurances are
adequate for our purposes.27
Three nuclear weapon states (NWS), the U.S., the
U.S.S.R. and the U.K. shared India's perception of a nuclear
threat from China to varying degrees. The possibility of a
joint guarantee from all the three appeared remote on the eve
of detente when the cold-war paradigm was still intact. India
seemed well aware of the superpowers' unwillingness to provide
iron-clad formal guarantees against China. According to
Shastri's admission in the Lok Sabha, his government did not
receive an encouraging response on the issue of nuclear
security guarantees. 2° As a matter of fact, Indian search for
a nuclear security guarantee was paradoxical. It was incom-
patible with its continued penchant for non-alignment and
irrevocable renunciation of a nuclear military option.
Shastri's statement in London bear out quite clearly that he
was evasive on the issue of a nuclear security guarantee for
India. There was disagreement as well as confusion within
Shastri's government itself about a security guarantee as a
final policy choice in view of its perception of the long-
27 BACKGROUND PAPER ON FACTORS WHICH COULD INFLUENCE
NATIONAL DECISIONS CONCERNING ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(Sanitized); NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Committee File - Commit-
tee on Nuclear Proliferation, India, Lyndon B. Johnson
Library, Texas, pp. 7-8.
28 Lok Sabha Debates, 1965, Vol. LXVIII, p. 4295.
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term nuclear threat from China. 29
 The Indian Foreign Minister
stated, 'there is an increasing awareness that nuclear protec-
tion to non-nuclear weapon states is difficult to imple-
ment' 3O He further said, 'the only effective guarantee against
a nuclear threat would lie in the elimination of nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems' .'
However, India took an active part in demanding
undertakings through the United Nations to safeguard the
security of the NNWS which might be threatened by nuclear
weapons states. 32 Such an undertaking was also demanded against
the states which were likely to develop a nuclear weapons
capability. 33
 The Indian concern about China' growing nuclear
weapons capability seemed to govern its policy on nuclear
security guarantees. It supported a multilateral security
guarantee as a NNWS which perceived a nuclear threat from
China.34
The initiative for a nuclear security guarantee
within the U.N. framework came from the NNWS as an alterna-
tive security option if they were to forego nuclear weapons.
Under consistent demands from the NNWS, the three NWS, the
U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. reached an agreement to
introduce a tripartite draft resolution in the U.N. Security
29 A. G. Noorani, 'India's Quest for a Nuclear Security
Guarantee', Asian Surve y, 3 (7), July 1967, pp. 490-502.
° ibid.
31 ibid.
32 Disarmament Commission, Official Records, 75th Meet-
ing, 1966-67, p. 4.
Ibid.
Documents of Disarmament: 1967 (Washington, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, 1968). p. 204.
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Council containing nuclear security guarantees. 35
 The guaran-
tees were in the form of unilateral but identical declara-
tions by the above three NWS and offered as an adjunct to the
NPT. General Assembly endorsed the NPT vide Resolution 2373
(XXII) on 12 June 1968.36 On 17 June 1968, the U.S., the
U.S.S.R. and the U.K. submitted the draft resolution to the
U.N. Security Council which was approved on 19 June 1968 as
'Resolution 255', by ten votes with none against but five
abstentions: Algeria, Brazil, France, India and Pakistan.37
Resolution 255 states that the U.N. Security Council:
Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or
the threat of such aggression against a Non-Nuclear
Weapon State will create a situation in which the
Security Council, and above all, its Nuclear Weapon
State permanent members, will have to act immedia-
tely in accordance with their obligations under the
United Nations Charter,
and the Security Council;
Welcomes the intention expressed by certain states
(the USA, the USSR and the UK) that they will
provide or support immediate assistance, in accor-
dance with the Charter, to any Non-Nuclear Weapon
State Party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act or an
object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear
weapons are used.38
India not only questioned the conceptual premises
and procedural adequacies of the Resolution 255, but also
rejected the security guarantees contained in that resolu-
tion. The Indian Ambassador, G. Parathasarthi spoke at length
Joseph Goldblat, 'The U.N. Security Council Resolution
of 19th June 1968 and Security of Non-Nuclear Weapon States',
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS (Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell
for SIPRI, 1974), p. 236.
36 ibid.
ibid. p. 237.
38 ibid. pp. 240-41.
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against the Resolution. He said,
I should like to emphasize that any security
assurances that might be offered by the nuclear
weapon states could not and should not be regarded
as a quid ro quo for the signature of a non-
proliferation treaty. A non-proliferation treaty
should be judged by itself and on its own merit."
He continued that the nuclear threat to the NNWS arose
directly from the possession of nuclear weapons and would
remain until the nuclear menace had been eliminated altoge-
ther. 40
 In this later objection, Ambassador Parathasarthi
raised a fundamental question which indicated that India was
not interested in rectifying the procedural inadequacies in
Resolution 255 in order to make it acceptable, but questioned
the very basis of the assurances. His successor, Ambassador
V.C. Trevedi's statement further clarifies Indian rejection of
the validity of security guarantees. He said,
So far as the non-aligned nations are concerned,
security is not synonymous with protection, no
matter how powerful the protector or how sincere.
Real security lies in the elimination of the threat
than in offering protection after the threat has
been translated into actual aggression.41
The foregoing suggest that India's diplomacy aimed at seek-
ing a nuclear security guarantee gradually drifted away and
it rejected that option as an inadequate framework to provi-
de protection to the NNWS.
However, the lack of credibility or precision of
the nuclear security guarantees cannot be assigned to the
superpowers alone. The application, credibility and precision
of the superpowers's guarantees have to be examined in
relation to the specific country. President Johnson's as-
U.N. Document S/PV. 1433, 1967-68.
40 ibid.
41 Disarmament Conference Document ENDC/PV. 240.
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surance to those who felt threatened by China's nuclear test
in 1964 is quite explicit on the issue. The prospective
recipient had to forego the development of national nuclear
weapons in order to benefit from the security guarantee
offered. India was not a legitimate candidate because it was
not willing to forego its nuclear weapons option. It is
equally important to appreciate that Shastri's government was
unwilling to accept that the Indian security would be a
function of the superpowers' politics, given that self-
reliance and non-alignment were the highest Indian priori-
ties.
Subsequently, the Indian policy on this subject
underwent a significant change. The change was precipitated
not only by the divergent approaches of the NWS and the NNWS
on the fundamental and Contentious issues about the credi-
bility of security guarantees but also because of India
gradually shifting from its nuclear option to the development
of a weapons capability. India reaffirmed in public its policy
of not making nuclear weapons but actually worked to develop
nuclear explosives technology. The Indian position reflected
a dual orientation on the issue of nuclear security assuran-
ces, and Indian decision-makers demonstrated a unique am-
bivalence in this regard. In the period immediately after the
1964 Chinese nuclear test, India seemed to be interested in
the nuclear security assurances. Its interest gradually
diminished as the trauma of that nuclear test receded and the
expansion of its own nuclear weapons capability continued.
However, India's mistrust in the validity of nuclear security
guarantees from the great-powers contributed to its adherence
to the long-term objective of developing a nuclear weapons
capability.
Mrs. Indira Gandhi did not hide her mistrust of
nuclear security guarantees. 'In the final analysis, the
effectiveness of a nuclear shield will depend not on the
109
spirit in which protected powers accepted it, but on the vital
national interests of the givers', she said. 42
 India's Mini-
ster for External Affairs lamented the lack of credibility of
nuclear security guarantees by saying that India might be
destroyed before the Security Council could even convene a
meeting. 43
 He questioned the credibility of a prompt, reliable
and adequate action, as there were likely to be serious
differences on the very definition of nuclear threat or what
constituted nuclear blackmail. 44
 In fact, India had already
embarked on the course towards developing a nuclear weapons
deterrent in line with maintaining an independent foreign
policy. It was therefore, not interested in a security
guarantee. Summarizing the Indian arguments for a nuclear
weapons policy, Peter Lyon stated as follows:
The independent ability to escalate a conflict
confers flexible deterrent capability, the only way
for India to have a credible deterrent and to escape
the discomforts and uncertainties of an alliance
policy and! or of nuclear guarantees offered by
another Power or Powers is to develop her own
independent capability; to possess nuclear weapons
oneself is the only way to possess the ultimate
deterrent, if such there be.45
At the end, India decided not to accept security guarantees
due to its long-term objective of developing a nuclear weapons
capability. Although there were genuine flaws in the guaran-
tees offered, that was not the exclusive reason for which
Indian Ambassadors at the ENDC and various disarmament forums
questioned the credibility of a nuclear security guarantee.
42 Asian Recorder, 30 July - 5 August 1967, p. 7833.
A.G. Noorani, op. cit. p. 497.
ibid.
Peter Lyon, 'The Foreign Policy of India', in F.S.
Northedge (ed.), THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE POWERs (London,
Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 283.
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3. INDIA AND THE NPT (TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF 1968)
Before analyzing Indian diplomacy with respect to
the NPT, it is appropriate to say that the Indian NPT policy
has already been well documented. In order to avoid undue
repetition, it will be very briefly reviewed to bring into
focus the overall Indian nuclear diplomacy. India's initial
attitude on evolution of the NPT was supportive, but it
gradually hardened into rejection. Mrs. Gandhi was the Prime
Minister when both superpowers were pushing towards an early
conclusion of the NPT through a concerted diplomacy in the
ENDC. The Indian policy on the NPT gradually evolved into the
opposite direction to what the superpowers intended.
The concept of the NPT originated from an Irish
proposal introduced in the U.N. General Assembly in 1958
through a resolution on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons. 4' In 1961, the General Assembly established the ENDC
which played a crucial role in the conclusion of the NPT. 47
 In
November 1965, the General Assembly called upon the ENDC for
an early conclusion of the treaty on "Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons" with an acceptable balance of mutual obliga-
tions between the NWS and the NNWS as a step towards general
and complete disarmament. 48
 In August 1965, the U.S. presented
46 U.N. Document A/C. ]./L. 206 (Official Records of the
U.N. General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Agenda items no.
64, 70 and 72)
The U.N. General Assembl y Resolution No. 1722 (XVI).
General Assembl y Official Records, Sixteenth Session, Supple-
ment No. 17 (Al 1500), p. 7.
48 The U.N. General Assembl y Resolution No. 2028 (XX),
General Assembly Official Records, Twentieth Session, Supple-
ment No. 14 (A/6014), pp. 6-7.
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a draft treaty in the ENDC; 49
 and in November 1965, the Soviet
Union presented a similar draft in the General Assembly.5°
Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet draft was compatible with the
principle of balance of mutual obligations set forth in
General Assembly Resolution 2028. Both the drafts focussed
upon arms control measures to stop the further dissemination
of nuclear weapons by the NNWS.
Indian Ambassador at the ENDC, V.C. Trevedi, who
was the architect of India's NPT policy, expressed the view
that the proposed treaty drafts aimed at imposing all obli-
gations on the NNWS not to seek nuclear weapons while leav-
ing the NWS free to increase and improve their nuclear
arsenals. 5' He deplored the approach of the NWS aimed at
retaining their nuclear monopoly and preventing additions to
the nuclear club. 52
 He advocated a global approach to genuine
nuclear disarmament without discrimination and based upon the
principles of sovereign equality and mutual benefit. 53
 How-
ever, after six years of intensive negotiations within the
ENDC, prolonged debates in the General Assembly and con-
tinuous revisions, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. submitted a final
Joint Draft Treaty on 31 May 1968 to the General Assembly.54
The Assembly endorsed it as the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons in Resolution 2373 (XXII) by 95 votes, with 4
Disarmament Conference Document ENDC/162.
° U.N. Document A/5976.
Si Disarmament Conference Document ENDC/240, pp. 10-20.
52 ibid, pp. 12-15.
ibid, p. 20.
The U.N. General Assembl y
 Resolution 2373 (XXII),
General Assembly Official Records, Twenty Second Session,
Supplement No. 16 (A/6716/add.1).
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against and 21 abstentions.55
India and other non-aligned NNWS continued to oppose
the NPT on the plea that it lacked a balance of obligations to
be undertaken by the NWS in Article I and the NNWS in Article
II. They demanded to rectify the imbalance. Article I of the
NPT states:
Each Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient what-
soever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way
assist, encourage, or induce any Non-Nuclear Weapon
State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or con-
trol over such devices.56
Article II of the NPT states:
Each Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer or what-
soever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.51
India's primary objection to the NPT was reitera-
ted by Ambassador Trevedi. He said that it imposed far more
stringent limitations on the NNWS in Article II than those
imposed on the NWS in Article I and therefore, lacked a
balance of responsibilities. 58
 He also stated that the NPT
" ibid.
56 Text of the NPT, U.N., TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (New York, United Nations, 1969), Article I.
' Ibid. (Article II)
58 v•c Trevedi, 'Vertical Versus Horizontal Prolifera-
tion',	 in James E. Dougherty and J.F. Lehman Jr. (eds.),
ARMS CONTROL IN THE LATE SIXTIES (Princeton, D. Van Nost-
rand, 1967), pp. 195-96.
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addressed the 'hypothetical question of future proliferation'
while legitimized the 'actual proliferation' by the s•5 He
further elaborated that the real issue was not horizontal
proliferation by the NNWS, but vertical proliferation by the
NWS:
India believed and continues to believe that the
real problem is in fact of the existing or verti-
cal or intra-spatial proliferation. Further or
horizontal or extra-spatial proliferation is only
the consequence and not the cause of the present
armament tension in the world. Once the cause is
removed, the consequence is automatically elimina-
ted.60
India also expressed dissatisfaction with the
undertakings of the NWS in Article VI: 'to pursue in good
faith steps towards disarmament' because they lacked any
enforceable or juridical obligations and did not correspond
to the obligations undertaken by the NNWS in Article 11.61
Indian policy on the NPT heavily relied upon the General
Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) which emphasized that the treaty
should contain a balance of obligations between the NWS and
the NNWS. At a specially organized conference of the NNWS in
Geneva in August 1968, they expressed their dissatisfaction
over lack of balance of obligations in the NPT with regard to
vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. 62 The
NNWS also demanded that immediate steps be undertaken to
foster the development of peaceful nuclear technology in the
developing countries and urged the NWS to assume the main
responsibilities for financing the projects initiated by the
ibid.
60 ibid.
61 ibid, p. 197.
62 IAEA, A SHORT HISTORY OF NON-PROLIFERATION (Vienna,
ThEA, 1976), pp. 25.
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Another Indian objection to the NPT originated from
its policy on the question of international safeguards.
Article III of the NPT provides a system of inspections,
safeguards and verifications of the undertakings in Articles
I and ii." Article III states that each NNWS, party to the
Treaty, undertakes to accept safeguards, for the exclusive
purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations
under the Treaty with a view to prevent diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices." It also states that NNWS party to the
Treaty should conclude agreements with the IAEA to meet the
requirements of this article.' 6
 From India's point of view
which from the beginning was opposed to full-scope safeguards,
provisions of Article III imposed undue restrictions on the
"peaceful" nuclear programmes of the NNWS. It left free the
nuclear weapons programmes of the NWS and therefore, unfair
from India's point of view. Ambassador Trevedi's poignant
statement on the institution of safeguards in the Article III
reflects the Indian attitude on this issue:
Institution of controls on peaceful reactors and
power stations is like an attempt to maintain law
and order in a society by placing all its law-
abiding citizens in custody while leaving free its
law-breaking elements to roam the streets.'7
The IAEA safeguards system endorsed in Article III
63 ibid.




67 vc• Trevedi cited in J.P. Jam, NUCLEAR INDIA PART I,
p. 71.
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of the NPT is too extensive to be accepted by a country like
India which wanted not only to keep open a nuclear weapons
option, but intended to expand it into a weapons capability.
It could have also undermined the fundamental objectives of
independence and self-reliance on which Indian nuclear
capability was based. Otherwise, there is nothing in Article
III of the NPT which prohibits India or any other country from
developing a nuclear programme for entirely peaceful purposes.
On the other hand, Article IV affirms the rights of the NNWS
party to the Treaty to undertake research and development in
peaceful nuclear technology and to receive assistance from the
NWS in this regard.68
India also appeared sensitive to any potential
limitations on its right to carry out peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs). Article V of the NPT states that the NWS
should make available the potential benefits of peaceful
applications of PNEs to the NNWS. Implicitly, it restricted
the NNWS to carry out PNEs at their own. It also qualifies
that a peaceful nuclear explosion cannot be differentiated
from one for military purposes.' 9
 India argued that the
development of PNEs was within the field of peaceful activi-
ties. 7° Ambassador M. Hussain enunciated the Indian objection
to the NPT provision on the PNEs that it would perpetuate the
existing technological gap between the developed and under-
developed states. 71
 It would thereby, enhance the later's
dependence on the former. Since India had initiated a project
for the development of PNE technology, it did not want it to
be scuttled through the NPT. The NWS adopted quite a different
'° U.N., TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
Article IV.
' ibid, Article V.
° U.N. Document A/C.1/PV.1560.
" U.N. Document A/C.1/PV.1567.
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position on this question. In a response to the Indian
position on PNEs, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk
stated,
From the point of view of the United States, should
a state decide that it does not wish to accept a
treaty which prohibits the spread of nuclear
explosive devices, we will have to conclude that it
does not wish to accept a treaty which prevents the
spread of nuclear weapons.72
Mrs. Gandhi's government rejected the NPT because
it was "in-equitous", "discriminatory", and in the words of
Mr. Trevedi: "an instrument for non-armament of the un-
armed". 73
 India was apparently willing to accept the NPT if it
were concluded within the framework of the U.N. General
Assembly resolutions. In fact, Indian objections to the NPT
reflected its concern about the imperative of its national
security which it perceived under threat from China. The
Indian refusal to sign the treaty demonstrated exigencies of
its security interests. By rejecting the NPT, India also
established its right to develop nuclear weapons as and when
required. Mrs. Gandhi explicitly stated: "We for our part may
find ourself having to make a nuclear decision any moment, and
therefore, it is not possible for us to tie our hands".74
China loomed large in India's NPT policy. As
Ambassador Hussain stated at the ENDC, it was a matter of
great concern to India that China had not signed the Partial
Test Ban Treaty and continued to conduct nuclear tests in the
atmosphere. 75
 India's perception of a long-term Chinese nuclear
72 Cited by William, p. 60.
" Trevedi, p 195, (also see his remarks in the intro-
duction of the book at p. xxxv).
Mrs. Gandhi cited in, Ashis Nandy, 'Between Two
Gandhis: Psychological Aspects of Nuclearization of India',
Asian Surve y, November 1974, p . 976.
" Ambassador M. Hussain cited by Williams, pp. 49-50.
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threat played an important role in its rejection of the NPT
and symbolized its resolve to develop a nuclear weapons
capability. It indicates that not only the 'inadequacy' of
security guarantees and 'discriminatory' nature of the NPT
determined India's final attitude on these issues but China's
development of nuclear weapons also proved decisive. Since its
rejection of the NPT, India has refrained from participating
in the NPT Review Conferences and continued to lament it as
discriminatory. The 1979 annual report of the Indian Ministry
of Defence (MOD) states: 'While nuclear non-proliferation is
being preached to the world, additions to nuclear arsenals by
some of the supporters of this policy are being reported' •76 I
suggested that India's opposition to the NPT was not only
because of China's nuclear weapons capability but also based
upon the vertical nuclear proliferation. It reflected an equal
concern about general and complete nuclear disarmament. Above
all, it wanted to retain its option to develop nuclear weapons
as stated by Mrs. Gandhi and therefore, could not sign the
NPT.
4. THE FIRST NUCLEAR DEBATE: 1964-68 TO 1974
The first public nuclear debate on the issue of
India's acquisition of nuclear weapons was prompted by its
military defeat in the 1962 conflict. It developed an intense
momentum after the 1964 nuclear test by China and reflected
sharp divisions within and outside the governmental decision-
making echelons. It ranged from moderate to hawkish viewpoints
and from benign neglect to emotional concern. The most unique
position was taken by Krishna Menon who believed that the
" Annual Report 1979-80: Ministry of Defence, Government
of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1980), p.2.
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debate on India's acquisition of nuclear weapons was harmful.77
He stated, 'the lack of understanding is revealed by the very
debate which is now taking place on the atom bomb', and
described it as a debate of amass extermination". 7
 Menon was
known for his opposition to India's development of nuclear
weapons. The most articulate support for an open commitment to
the development of nuclear weapons came from the Atomic Energy
Establishment headed by Dr. Bhabha. He became vocal after the
Chinese nuclear test and openly advocated an Indian nuclear
deterrent. 79
 As noted earlier, he immediately called a press
conference after the Chinese test and pronounced that India
was capable of carrying out a nuclear explosion within 18
months
Bhabha might have been right only in terms of
mastering the technology of a nuclear explosion. But given
India's scarce accumulation of plutonium from its only
operational reactor, CIRUS, his statement was an exaggera-
tion. 81
 Bhabha also argued favourably about the economic
feasibility of an Indian nuclear deterrent in view of the
investment which had already been made on the Indian nuclear
programme. Shastri's government did not repudiate Bhabha's
economic argument but tried to distance itself from his stance
as a matter of official policy. 82
 Bhabha's successor, Dr.
Vikram Sarabhai, was initially less inclined towards India's
development of a nuclear deterrent and did not believe in
' Brecher, INDIA AND WORLD POLITICS: KRISHNA MENON'S VIEW
OF THE WORLD, p. 228.
ibid. pp. 228 & 313.
" See notes 7 & 8.
80 ibid.
81 See notes 12 and 18.
82 Lok Sabha Debates, 1964 Vol. XXXV, pp. 1546-50.
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continuing the SNE Project. 83
 He was skeptical about its
capability to do so in the immediate future as claimed by
Bhabha and believed it Itunwise lt
 to commit national resources
in that direction, as a matter of urgent priority. 84
 It indi-
cated that Bhabha's economic argument in favour of the
development of an Indian nuclear deterrent was questionable.
A survey of Parliamentary Debates indicates that
there was a lack of consensus within the Shastri government
on two central nuclear issues, the nature of the Chinese
nuclear threat and whether the development of nuclear wea-
pons was possible in the immediate future. The Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA) continued to raise concerns in the Lok
Sabha about the foreign policy implications of the shift in
Indian nuclear policy and a contradiction it would create with
its commitment to nuclear disarmament. 5
 However, the MEA did
inform the Lok Sabha in May 1966 that the policy on the
acquisition of nuclear weapons was under review. 86
 The Ministry
of Defence (MOD) was also against an immediate change in
nuclear policy since it was preoccupied with gradually
increasing conventional military expenditure. 87
 Existing
threats were entirely conventional at that time, and so, the
diversion of funds might have undermined the conventional
military capability. In short, the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defence both considered a nuclear threat to India
as distant and therefore, required a long-term response. May
TIMES OF INDIA, 2 June 1966. It was confirmed by K.
Subrahrnanyam in his interview on 22 November 1988.
84 ibid.
85 Lok Sabha Debates, 1965, Vol. XXXIV. pp. 1306-08, Vol.
XXXV, pp. 1546-54 and Vol. XXXVII, p. 5841.
$6 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. LV, 11 May 1966.
87 Lok Sabha Debates, 1965, Vol. XL, pp. 6319.
88 ibid.
120
be they felt that despite the threat, there was little they
could do in the short-term except explore security guaran-
tees. 89 The atomic energy establishment led by Bhabha, as noted
above, wanted an irnntediate commitment to the development of
nuclear weapons.
The nuclear issue remained largely dormant on the
agenda of Indian political parties before 1964. The only
exception was an orthodox Hindu party, Jan Sangh, whose
manifesto proposed acquisition of nuclear weapons because it
viewed India as a great power for which nuclear weapons were
essential. 9° After China's nuclear test, Jan Sangh vigorously
demanded an Indian nuclear deterrent. 91
 The Swantantra Party
was in favour of a nuclear security guarantee from the U.S.
In case this was not available, it recommended a recourse to
the development nuclear weapons. 92
 Its General-Secretary, who
was a member of Parliament, M.R. Masani, expressed his skep-
ticism over the viability of non-alignment and challenged non-
violence as a precept for a country like India whose approach
needed to be strategic. 93
 He refused to recognize the fun-
damental difference between nuclear and conventional weapons
by saying that both were violent and it was only a matter of
degree, not a principle. 94 The Praja Socialist Party, which
considered India as a potential great power, saw the acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons an imperative for achieving that
89 See Section 2 above.
° M.A. Kishore, JAN SANGH AND INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY (New
Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1969), pp. 125-135.
91 Mirchandani, p. 32.




potential." The party secretary emphasized the imperative of
acquiring self-reliance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons
to enhance India's national prestige and great power status."
He too, like Mr. Masani, questioned the relevance of Ghandian
philosophy of non-violence to the nuclear debate and demanded
a strategic approach.97
The Communist Party was against India's acquisition
of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear security guarantees from
Western states, but it was divided on the perception and
nature of nuclear threat from China. 98
 The pro-Soviet faction
castigated the Chinese nuclear test and acclaimed the Indian
government's restraint for not being driven towards the
development of nuclear weapons and for its overall stance on
nuclear disarmament. 99
 The pro-China faction believed that
China's nuclear test was meant to enhance its capability
against the U.S. imperialism, the Soviet imperialism, and not
against India. 100
 Therefore, there was no need for undue
apprehensions and change in the Indian nuclear policy. The
position of the Indian National Congress was much closer to
the government's line. However, in its session at Durghapur,
it demanded that the government's policy of not making nuclear
weapons should be reconsidered. Otherwise, its role remained
confined to mostly domestic political affairs.'°'
M.R. Dandavate, 'Chinese Nuclear challenge to Indian
Democracy' in, A.B. Shah (ed.), INDIAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN
POLICIES (Bombay, Manaktalas, 1968), pp. 133-35.
" ibid.
ibid, p. 134.
98 Mirchandani, p. 32 and Shah, PP. 166-67.
" ibid.
100 Shah, pp. 136-37 & 167-69.
'°' S.A. Kochanek, THE CONGRESS PARTY OF INDIA (Pri-
nceton, Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 9.
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India's strategic elite was divided into two lobbies
over the debate on nuclear weapons. A survey of the Indian
literature on nuclear debate reflects that majority of the
Indian strategic elite believed that India's foreign and
security policies lacked a strategic perspective which was
essential for a country of its size and power potential. Raj
Krishna, a former civil servant, was vocal in his demand for
an Indian nuclear deterrent against China. He openly advocated
the development of a limited nuclear deterrent by India.' 02
 He
recommended that India should seek nuclear security guarantees
from the superpowers for not developing strategic (nuclear)
deterrence but should still develop tactical deterrence.'° 3
 His
views were unique in the sense that he did not realize that
the two approaches might not be practicable at the same time.
Sisir Gupta also advocated the development of an independent
nuclear deterrent. 104
 He suggested that Indian diplomacy should
focus on persuading the great powers that a Sino-Indian
strategic balance was in their interests as well. He pleaded
for a nuclear weapons force capable of engaging targets easily
accessible in China, like oil and military installations in
Tibet and Sinkiang, without suggesting where such a nuclear
force would be deployed.105
A study written under the auspices of the Institute
of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) demanded a credible
posture against the Chinese nuclear threat. According to this
study, basic Chinese motivation in developing a strategic
102 Raj Krishna, 'India and the Bomb' India Quarterly,
April-June 1965, p. 122.
103 ibid.
104 Sisir Gupta, 'Indian Dilemma' in, Alastair Buchan




nuclear capability was to intimidate neighbours like India.'0'
K. Subrahinanyam rejected a nuclear umbrella for India by con-
tending that if the U.S. with its overwhelming strategic
capability did not feel secure, the Indian population or the
government is not likely to feel secure with security guaran-
tees.'°' He suggested a 'credible posture' which would require
nuclear and thermonuclear warheads, strategic bombers, a
missile-based delivery system including nuclear submarines,
and command, control and communication (c!) network to operate
the entire system.'°' This posture was to be a long-term
strategic plan for an independent nuclear deterrent rather
than an immediate programme 109
Many other vocal elements of the Indian strategic
community were demanding the development of nuclear weapons.
In fact, there were demands from various sections of the
Indian polity that India should respond to the Chinese
development of nuclear weapons by developing a nuclear
deterrent. In an opinion survey conducted in 1969-70, 80 % of
the Indian strategic elite was actively interested in the
nuclear debate."° According to the survey, 38 % of those who
were interviewed wanted India to develop a nuclear bomb, 58 %
were opposed and 4 % were indecisive. 11' However, the inter-
viewer found that those who opposed the development of the
'°' K Subrahmanyam, A STRATEGY FOR INDIA FOR A CREDIBLE
POSTURE AGAINST A NUCLEAR ADVERSARY (New Delhi, IDSA, 1968),
pp. 5-8.
107 ibid, p. 6.
108 ibid, 6-7.
109 ibid.
110 Nandy, pp. 967-68.
" ibid.
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bomb were 'amenable' •h12 According to the survey, 81 % opposed
India's adherence to the NPT."3
 He further observed that,
Given that a majority of these respondents opposed
nuclear armaments for the country and yet thought
rather poorly of the NPT, perhaps the only way the
Indian leadership could forge a national consensus
or for that matter a consensus within the ultra-
elite, was by flouting the NPT and, simultaneously
carrying with them the opponents of the bomb (by
stressing the peaceful aim of the explosion), by
drawing a line between nuclear powers and nuclear
weapon powers and by pledging not to produce nuc-
lear armaments .
The nuclear debate between 1964 and 1968 was intense and
emotional. At times, it lacked sophistication in strategic
argument and appeared devoid of hard-core thinking about the
nature of the nuclear deterrent being suggested and its
structure except in few cases. There was no indication of the
doctrines to govern the deployment of the deterrent force and
the probable implications of that deterrent in and outside the
region. However, the 1964 to 1968 debate appears as a period
of gestation which produced a strategic rationale for the 1974
nuclear test.
After the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the pro-bomb
lobby was divided into two schools of thought, one favouring
a crash programme for developing a nuclear force and the other
suggesting a moderate nuclear military response graduated to
the perceived threat. There were continuous shifts of opinion
within each of the two schools. The hawkish school was led by
Subramanian Swamy and it favoured more nuclear explosions
immediately after the 1974 test. Mr. Swamy recommended the
production of nuclear weapons on a crash basis. In an article





strategies for India to pursue for the development of a
nuclear force. 115
 First, it could set off more 20 KT nuclear
explosions immediately, and thereafter produce a medium size
force consisting of IRBMs (about 100 plutonium bombs) over the
next five years..'1' He proposed a simultaneous initiation of
research and development on ICBMs, H-Bombs, Satellites and
thorium technology. At the end of five years, he suggested a
reassessment in order to determine whether the 'weapons-mix'
needed to be shifted towards ICBMs and H-Bombs in hardened
sites. According to his second (alternative) strategy, he
advocated that India could straight away go for the develop-
ment of ICBMs and thermonuclear warheads even if it took ten
years to produce a force."7
The moderate school was initially led by K. Subrah-
manyam. He argued that there was no immediate nuclear threat
to India but perceived a long-term threat, to which he prefer-
red a measured response. After the 1974 test, he stated,
On the other hand the moment of decision (going for
the production of nuclear weapons) for India has not
yet come and it will only come in the next four to
five years when the necessary investment decisions
will have to be made. At the present, all that has
been done may amount to enlarging the Indian option
towards a weapons programme. There is no need to
superficially exercise that option till the coun-
try passes the experimental stage and will need to
invest on the production of nuclear warheads and
delivery vehicles
Subrahmanyam's opinion helps in understanding the official
" Subramanian Swamy, 'A Weapons' Strategy for Nuclear
India', Indian Ouarterl y XXX (4), October-December, 1974, pp.
272-275.
116 ibid, pp. 275-76.
" ibid.
118 K. Subrahmanyam, 'The Indian Nuclear Explosion and its
Impact on Indian Security', India Quarterly XXX (4), (October-
December 1974, p. 255.
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approach to manage the issue of India's acquisition of nuclear
weapons because of his close association with the decision-
making hierarchy in India. Subrahmanyam gradually became an
ardent advocate of India's acquisition of nuclear weapons in
the 1980s.119
The debate developed an element of openness which
was uncharacteristic of the Nehru era. The ascendancy of a
politico-diplomatic strategy without a comparable military
strength which was the hallmark of Nehru's approach, became
redundant. Thereafter the focus shifted to the development of
military capability as a preponderant element of national
power. Simultaneously, some information about the military
undercurrents of India's nuclear capability was divulged
during the debate on acquisition of nuclear weapons. It became
difficult to maintain Nehru's rule of secrecy on the nuclear
decision-making process because the debate was not merely
confined to the extra-governmental level. Various intra-
governmental groups became involved in the public argument. A
survey of this debate indicates widespread support for India's
development of nuclear weapons and against reliance on the
great-powers for India's security. Indian policies of self-
reliance in all the fields of national activity had always
enjoyed public support and the development of a nuclear
weapons capability was no exception. There was a broad
consensus in India about a Chinese nuclear threat which
gradually receded. The public mood shifted to India's assump-
tion of a role according to its size and power potential so
that it could counterpoise China's influence in South Asia.
From a long-term perspective, India had always viewed for
itself a leadership role in Asia which is comparable to China.
The fact, that India is a democratic polity as compared with
the authoritarian nature of the Chinese system, went to its
119 ibid.
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advantage in visualizing such a role. At the same time,
successive Indian governments had to take due notice of the
domestic public opinion because of their representative
character. They could not ignore the public pressure on
various issues related to the acquisition or non-acquisition
of nuclear weapons, like the nuclear security guarantees and
the NPT. In brief, the role of domestic pressure groups about
the nature of threats to India and demands for an adequate
response cannot be ignored. It equally played its due role on
the issue of development of nuclear weapons capability by
India. Indian governments have shown sensitivity about the
public pressure on this issue.
5. MRS. INDIRA GANDHI' S PURSUIT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CAPABILITY
It is generally contended that Mrs. Indira Gandhi
cancelled her predecessor's decision to carry out the SNE
Project, and the 1974 Indian nuclear test was the result of
her own ingenuity rather than a logical culmination of the
previous government's policy. On the contrary, this study
suggests that, given the continuity and coherence as essen-
tial hallmark of Indian nuclear policy since the Nehru era,
the 1974 Indian nuclear test was its logical, albeit delayed
outcome. The test did not take place until 1974 because Mrs.
Gandhi had no choice but to postpone the SNE project due to
political expediency, strategic imperatives and technologi-
cal constraints. She took over the government in early 1966
and needed time to reconsider the entire spectrum of India's
domestic, regional and international policies. Bhabha's death
slowed the technological momentum and the project was put on
the shelf until she could complete a re-evaluation and
organize a new team. The next Chairman of the AEC and Secreta-
ry of the DAE, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, was not amongst Bhabha's
128
close confidants and not a supporter of the pro-bomb lobby.'20
The pro-bomb lobbyists were not politically close to Mrs.
Gandhi, and her favourites from the bureaucracy like Dr.
Sarabhai and L.K. Jha were initially inclined to favour
nuclear security guarantees.'2'
The postponement of that project was also necessi-
tated by the dynamics of intra-governmental politics. Indian
political elite and bureaucracy at that time were divided on
two fundamental issues, whether to accept nuclear security
guarantees from the great-powers against the Chinese nuclear
threat or to develop an indigenous nuclear deterrent.'22
 The
bureaucracy at large and the Indian National congress were
against India's acceptance of nuclear security guarantees.'23
The intensity of domestic political pressure which resulted
from the nuclear test by China in 1964 had also subsided to
some extent.' 24
 Mrs. Gandhi was personally in favour of retain-
ing the nuclear option but in a way that would not alienate
her supporters at that stage of her political career. She
therefore, decided to postpone the project.
This leads to an obvious question: why the test was
not carried out between 1968 to 1970, or 1971 to 1973? There
are various political, strategic and technological reasons to
believe that it was not possible before 1974. First, as noted
earlier, Shastri and Bhabha died in 1966 which disturbed the
momentum of technological development and delayed the pro-
120 See notes 83 and 84.
121 Noorani, pp. 488-92.
122 These two issues are discussed in detail by Michael
Brecher, NEHRU'S MANTLE: THE POLITICS OF SUCCESSION IN INDIA,
pp. 110-130 and Kapur, INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION: ATOMIC DIPLO-




ject. Second, Mrs. Gandhi needed time to take stock of the
entire spectrum of India's domestic, regional and interna-
tional politics. It needs to be kept in mind that on 27 May
1964, when her father Pandit Nehru died, she had not yet es-
tablished her credentials as a candidate for succession. She
lacked experience in government and had not demonstrated that
charismatic dynamism and political acumen which she later dis-
played. She was nominated a member of the Working Committee
of the Indian National Congress at the time of Nehru's
death.' 5
 She became the Minister for Information and Broad-
casting in Shastri's Cabinet in 1964 and was elected to the
Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian Parliament). She was
the first Indian Prime Minister elected by the Parliamentary
Party of the Indian National Congress through a secret ballot
rather than the principle of consensus.' 2' Her election against
Mr. Morarji Desai was based upon political opportunism by the
party bosses to win the next elections in 1967 by exploiting
the Nehru legacy. Politically, the Indian National Congress
needed her badly in view of its tarnished image after the 1962
military defeat by China. The Congress won the elections in
1967 with a majority of 24 in the Lok Sabha but lost power in
five states. 127
 The party bosses also thought, though quite
erroneously, that Mrs. Gandhi could be more easily manipu-
lated than Morarji Desai.128
Despite Mrs. Gandhi's apparent decision to postpone
the SNE project in 1966, the continued concern by the U.S.
125 Nayantara Sahgal, INDIRA GANDHI: HER ROAD TO POWER
(London and Sydney, Mcdonald and Co, 1982), pp. 4-5.
126 ibid, p. 12.
127 ibid.
128 The details of the in-fighting in the Indian Nation-
al Congress at that time are described by Trevor Drieberg,
Indira Gandhi: A Profile in Courage (New Delhi, Vikas Publi-
cations, 1972), pp. 60-65.
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administration in 1966 indicated that in its perception the
direction of the Indian nuclear programme was moving towards
the development of a weapons capability. This is evident from
a Background Paper for the U.S. President, Lyndon B. Johnson,
on the visit of Mrs. Gandhi to the United States in March (28-
29) 1966.129 The Paper highlighted the possibility of India's
acquisition of nuclear weapons from the standpoint of securi-
ty, domestic politics and prestige.' 3° An additional note in
the memorandum for the President recommended that he suggest
to the Indian P.M. that if India perceived a serious nuclear
threat from China, 'she will frankly discuss the question with
us so that we could examine together possible means to meet
that threat without nuclear proliferation' rather than India
undertaking the heavy economic and other burdens of a nuclear
weapons capability. 13' In the 558th National Security Council
Meeting in June 1966, the U.S. President expressed his concern
about 'India favoring the nuclear route' under the growing
pressures and stressed that, 'its own economic progress and
the stability of the whole area depended on India not going
nuclear'.'32
 The Vice-President emphasized: 'how little
additional expenditure would be necessary beyond that already
invested for India to go nuclear' and suggested a U.N.
129 Visit of The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India,
March 28-29, 1966: Background Paper on The Indian Nuclear
Policy, dated March 16, 1966, NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, COUNT-
RY FILE - INDIA, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Texas.
130 ibid.
'' Memorandum for the President from Dean Rusk: Visit of
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India; a note on India's
Nuclear Policy , dated March 21, 1966, NATIONAL SECURITY FILE,
Country File -India, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Texas.
132 SUMMARY NOTES OF 558th NSC MEETING: The Problem of
Indian Nuclear Weapons, June 9, 1966 declassified NLJ 90-114
dated 7-16-90.
131
umbrella with private U.S. reassurances to India.' 33
 Given the
reliability of U.S. information collection systems, its
concerns about India's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capabi-
lity cannot be disregarded.
Mrs. Gandhi reiterated her government's interest in
the development of nuclear explosions in 1968. As noted in the
section on the NPT, the Indian government openly declared in
the late 1969 that the development of "peaceful nuclear ex-
plosives" was an important objective of Indian nuclear
programme. Mrs. Gandhi continued to criticize the NPT regime
and its sponsor states in a way which indicated the nature of
the issues at stake. She said,
The problem of insecurity cannot be solved by
imposing arbitrary restriction on those who do not
possess nuclear weapons, without any corresponding
steps to deal with the basic problem of limiting
stockpiles in the hands of a few powers. I-low can
the urge to acquire nuclear status be controlled so
long
 as this imbalance Persists (emphasis added) .'
It suggested that Mrs. Gandhi considered the acquisition of
nuclear weapons as a symbol of great-power status and belie-
ved that arbitrary limits were being imposed by the nuclear
weapon states. India's interest in the PNE5 seemed to be
motivated by its dual-use potential. George H. Quester aptly
described the Indian nuclear posture in the late l960s within
which a weapons capability was designed:
A project for a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (to
avoid seeming bellicose), underground (to avoid
violating the test-ban treaty which India did sign)
with plutonium as the fissile material (to avoid
great expenditure) thus may win whatever support it
needs among both scientists and politicians. Among
Indian public officials known to be opponents of
133 ibid.
' Indira Gandhi, INDIA: THE SPEECHES AND REMINISCENCES
OF INDIRA GANDHI; THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA (London, Hodder
and Stoughton, 1975), p. 127.
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nuclear weapons in 1968 almost none were prepared
to rule out peaceful explosive devices along with
explicit weapons
By 1970, it had become obvious that India was
involved in the process of developing nuclear explosives
technology. It launched an ambitious nuclear energy and space
research plan which emphasized the development of technology
for underground 'peaceful nuclear explosions' •136 With that
plan, the emphasis on the development of technology for
peaceful nuclear explosions became a recurrent theme in Indian
policy statements on atomic energy. In November 1970, the U.S.
administration sent an aide-memoir to the Indian government,
stating that it would consider the use of U.S. supplied
materials and assistance for the development of nuclear
explosive devices a contravention of the terms of the Indo-
U.S. Agreements of 1956 and 1963.137 It demanded formal as-
surances against the use of those materials for manufacturing
nuclear devices. 13' India informed the U.S. that it did not
accept in principle the American interpretation of the above
agreements.'" However, the U.S. was privately assured that
India would not use the materials provided under the above
Quester, THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, p.
72.
136 Atomic Energy and Space Research: A Profile for the
Decade 1970-80 (New Delhi, GOl, 1970), pp. 1-15.
' The details are discussed in the text of the State-
ment Before The House of Re presentative's Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Concerning Nuclear Exports to India,by James N.
Barnes and S. Jacob on Behalf of The Natural Resources Defense
Council, National Audubon Society, Union of Concerned Scien-
tists, Sierra Club, and Friends of The Earth, dated 23 July
1980, p. 6.
'" ibid.
139 Wohlstetter, pp. 118-19.
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agreements for producing nuclear devices.' 40
 Eventually, as
will be seen later, India actually used the U.S. supplied
material for its 1974 nuclear test.
The 1970 political crisis in Pakistan and the
immediately preceding period contributed to the delay in
carrying out the nuclear test earlier than 1974. The develop-
ments since the overthrow of General Ayub's government in
Pakistan in March 1969, the imposition of martial law and the
uprising in East Pakistan (now Bangla Desh) kept the Indian
government fully preoccupied with that crisis. It was only
after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war that Mrs. Gandhi could take
up the issue again. The victory in war against Pakistan
generated a power-psychosis and provided a stimulus to carry
out the test and demonstrate the development of a nuclear
weapons capability. According to Bhabani Sen Gupta,
India's military victory in the Bangladesh war of
1971 produced a paradoxical impact on the nuclear
debate. The image of India as a major or dominant
power whetted the appetite for the bomb.14'
In some circles, the 1970-71 victory rejuvenated the nostal-
gia of "Maha Bharata" (Great India). The urge to project a
great-power image was irresistible across the Indian polity.
A manifestation of that is apparent from a statement made
immediately after the 1971 Indian victory which indicates the
psychological frame in which Indian nationalist thinking was
cast. It says,
From now on it would be necessary to seek out
spheres of influence, to outflank and corner poten-
tial adversaries and to build a kind of political
and diplomatic thrust which tastes of a major power
status 142
140 ibid.
'' Gupta, p. 3.
142 ibid, p. 5.
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In all probability, the decision to carry out the
1974 nuclear explosion was made in April 1972, in the after-
math of the December 1971 victory. 143
 Mrs. Gandhi gave ap-
proval to the DAE for the preparatory work under the super-
vision of a committee which included Dr. Homi Sethna, the
Chairman of the AEC and Dr. Raja Ramanna, the Director of the
BARC. 144
 The technological base to carry out the theoretical
calculations for a nuclear explosion was laid through the
commissioning of a 10 MW research reactor (PURNIMA) in May
1972. By then India had also accumulated about 112.8 kg of
plutonium from CIRUS (India's only safeguards-free reactor
operational at the time except Tarapur reactors which are
under safeguards) .' After carrying out the requisite theore-
tical calculations, preparing the implosion mechanism and
calibrating the measuring instruments, the committee reported
to the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, in February 1974 that the
preparations were complete.' 46
 The completion of preparations
coincided with Mrs. Gandhi's sudden political downfall due to
infighting within the Congress Party, malfunctioning of the
economy and the country-wide railway strike. The exact timing
of the detonation on 18th May 1974 was therefore, most likely
determined by immediate domestic considerations which might
have prompted her to improve her image by fixing the D-day.
Before the test, the Indian government launched a well orches-
143 Stephen M Meyer, THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERA-
TION (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp 123-
24, and Bhatia, pp. 144-45.
Bhatia, pp. 144-45.
145 As noted earlier CIRUS reactor, operated in 1960, has
a 9.4 kg plutonium production capacity per year. By 1972, it
had produced approximately 112.8 kg of plutonium.
146 Mitchell Reiss, WITHOUT THE BOMB: POLITICS OF NUC-
LEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (New York, Columbia University Press,
1988), p. 228.
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trated publicity campaign to highlight the utility of a PNE.
According to a WASHINGTON POST report, quoting
Senator Henry M. Jackson, India tried unsuccessfully to
detonate a nuclear device in February 1974 (three months
before the May Test) The report stated that the abortive
attempt was detected by U.S. military seismic detectors but
U.S. authorities neither attempted to stop India from carry-
ing out the May test nor revealed the development which took
place in February.' 48
 As per another knowledgeable source, the
U.S. AEC and the ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
denied having any information about that development.'49
On 18th May 1974 at 08.05 hours, (Indian Standard
Time) India detonated a nuclear explosive device producing a
yield between 10 to 12 KT (the lower limit of the yield was
10 KT) The official Indian report stated that it was a
successful experiment, designed to harness the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy in the fields of subsoil engineering:
diverting rivers and digging canals; oil and mines explora-
tion; and blasting mountains.' 5' The architect of the explo-
sion, Dr. Raja Ramanna described similar objectives, stating
that it was a step towards studying the fracturing effects on
rocks, ground motion, containment of radio-activity and
'' Thomas O'Toole, 'Early Try of Indian Bomb Told',
WASHINGTON POST, 13 JULY 1974.
148 ibid.
149 Leonard S. Spector, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY, pp.
37-38.
'° R. Chidambaram and Raja Ramanna, 'Some Studies on
India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Experiment', in PEACEFUL
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (Vienna, IAEA, 1975), IAEA-TC-1-4/19, pp.
423-24 & 429. Raja Ramanna was head of the Indian team which
carried out the explosion and later became the Chairman AEC
and Secretary DAE.
'' Annual Report 1974-1975: Department of Atomic energy
(Bombay, GOI, 1975), p. 7.
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problems involved in post-shot access to the shot-point
environment. 152
 The explosion itself cost India $ 370,000 at
the 1974 price index, excluding the cost of fissile material
or the support infrastructure like running CIRUS, the PURNIMA
research reactor and other directly associated projects which
made the explosion possible. 153
 Therefore, to rely on the above
figure as a complete estimate of the 1974 nuclear explosion
is elusive.
5.a. OBJECTIVES OF THE 1974 NUCLEAR TEST
Many explanations have been assigned to Mrs. Indira
Gandhi's government for carrying out the 1974 nuclear test,
ranging from an attempt to create a nuclear weapons option to
the expansion of an existing option. Such explanations tend to
ignore the fact that an option had already been created during
the Nehru era which could have been expanded without carrying
out the test. The real objectives of the 1974 nuclear test can
be understood only if its precise status in terms of peaceful
versus military or strategic applications is assessed. Mrs.
Gandhi's interpretation of the 1974 test is noteworthy. In
response to a question on NBC's Meet the Press programme in
Washington that, "What is a peaceful nuclear explosion", she
said,
Actually the word I use is experiment, because
that's what it was. We wanted to see whether by such
an explosion or implosion---I don't know what the
scientific term is---whether this can be used for
purposes like making of dams up in the mountains or
roads or something which otherwise is a very long
152 R. Chidambaram and Raja Ramanna, pp. 423-25.
153 Nature, vol. 250, no. 5461, July 1974, pp. 7-8. Full
technical details of the 1974 explosion are discussed in, R.
Chidambaram and Raja Ramanna, pp. 421-36.
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and difficult process.'54
There are too obvious discrepancies in the official arguments
about the peaceful nature of the 1974 test. These become
evident from the Indian government's report (cited above),
statements of Mrs. Gandhi and the scientists who were in-
charge of the explosion. Dr. Sethna was uncertain when asked
a question after the explosion, "what peaceful application of
that experiment he has in mind"?' 55
 He replied, "It is too
early to give an indication, I would like to impress upon you
that we are looking into it".' 56 Dr. Raja Ramanna was relative-
ly coherent and straight forward in response to a similar
question, he answered in February 1981:
My personal view is that PNEs (for major construc-
tion projects) will not be useful for the next 20
years. But in the next century, if one wanted to
make a hole in 10 minutes or so, then there might
be a case for one.15'
These explanations not only differ from each other
but the 1974-75 official report discussed earlier.'58
 One may
ask whether this was the result India had hoped to achieve
from its nuclear test which was officially declared a suc-
cess?' 59 It indicated that neither the architects of that
experiment nor their political patron had any definite peace-
ful application in mind before carrying out the test. There is
no known project in India initiated before or after the 1974
154 Indira Gandhi, PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI: STATE-
MENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY (New Delhi, Ministry of External
Affairs, GOI, 1982), p. 67.
155 J.P. Jam, NUCLEAR INDIA VOL. 2 (New Delhi, Radiant
Publishers, 1974), p. 334.
'' ibid.
'' Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1981, p. 14.
158 See note 151.
'" ibid.
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nuclear test where the potential benefits from that experiment
have been applied. At no stage from 1974 until today, has any
Indian government been able to offer evidence of a project
undertaken to justify the application of that "successful"
experiment. In this case, Indian governments, which are
usually responsive to international criticism of their poli-
cies, are not in a position to go beyond the oft-repeated
rhetoric of a "peaceful explosion" to substantiate their claim
by evidence.
The credibility of explanations offered by Mrs.
Gandhi's government is undermined in view of the official and
semi-official assessments of the Indian nuclear explosion by
various governmental agencies of the United States and Canada
which supplied the relevant nuclear materials to India. The
official U.S. view was stated by U.S. Secretary of State, Dr.
Henry H. Kissinger, during testimony before the Senate Commit-
tee on Government Operations in 1976. He stated,
We deplored it strongly and we made it clear to
India that we do not see the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy in India that would justify the
doubts and insecurities that have been raised (by
the explosion) •160
However, according to M. Brenner, the State Department propos-
al to condemn India for carrying out the test and apply
immediate sanctions on nuclear exports to India was ruled out
by Dr. Kissinger. 161
 The U.S. administration came to the
conclusion that contrary to its promises, India used the U.S.
160 The response by Dr. Kissinger is contained in a
Department of State letter written on his behalf by Robert J.
McCloskey, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Congres-
sional Relations, to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman,
Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate,
dated June 2, 1976 (Washington DC, National Security Archives,
1989)
161 M. Brenner, NUCLEAR POWER AND NON-PROLIFERATION: THE
MAKING OF U.S. POLICY (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1981), pp. 68-70.
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supplied heavy water in CIRUS reactor to produce weapons-
grade plutonium for the 1974 nuclear device. Dr. Kissinger
confirmed that conclusion in a letter to the Chairman, Senate
Committee on Government Operations (which carried out the
investigation about the use of U.S. supplied material in 1974
test), Mr. Abraham Ribicoff. He wrote,
As a result of your inquiry, I directed that there
be a thorough review of earlier staff estimates.
This review establishes that in earlier efforts the
previously indicated heavy water loss rate and
certain related calculations were incorrect. Conse-
quently, there is high probability--- because of In-
dia's practice of co-mingling heavy water---that
some U.S. heavy water remained in the CIRUS reactor
during the period in question.162
There was also a widespread feeling of betrayal in the U.S.
Congress. Many Congressmen believed that in contravention of
its obligations for only peaceful uses, India used the U.S.
supplied material for carrying out the nuclear explosion.
During the course of investigation by the Senate Committee on
Government Operations into the Indian nuclear explosion,
Ribicoff noted,
Furthermore, the underground testing of PNEs by the
United States was completed in 1973, a year before
India's explosion, by which time we had adopted the
policy that nuclear explosions had no commercial,
and therefore, no peaceful application.163
The U.S. Plowshares Project which originated in 1957 to study
162 Letter from Henry H. Kissinger, Secretary of State,
Government of the United States of America, Washington D.C.
to the Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman, Committee on Government
Operations, United States Senate, dated August 2, 1976.
(CONGRESSIONAL RECORD), August 30, 1976, p. 514919).
163 Indian Nuclear Explosion; Committee on Government
Operations, United States Senate, Washington D.C., Press
Release dated 1]. June 1976, pp. 1-4.
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the applications of PNE5 had ended in 1970.164 On the basis of
those experiments, the U.S. concluded that PNEs were not a
viable proposition. 165
 The Indian government, which had shown
interest in data about atomic explosions as far back as 1954
through Bhabha's queries to U.S officials, was aware of the
U.S. results of the PNEs. A well documented study discloses
that a confidential paper relating to "various affirmations
of Indian interest in developing the technology of peaceful
nuclear explosions" was handed over by the United States to
the government of India on 18 November 1970.166 In the period
between 1970 and 1973, the United States and India held
intensive negotiations on the peaceful and military scope,
utility and implications of PNEs in the light of U.S. ex-
periments. 167
 The possibility that in 1973-74 India might be
unaware that PNEs were not useful for civilian purposes is a
remote one. However, India had a right, in principle at least,
to disagree with the U.S. on the issue of PNE5.
According to the U.S. interpretation, India vio-
lated the Indo-U.S. Agreements of 1956 and 1963 in which it
had undertaken that no material or equipment transferred to
it by U.S. would be used for research and development of
nuclear weapons, including a nuclear explosive device.'" The
164 Frank Banarby, THE NUCLEAR AGE (Cambridge Mass: MIT
Press, 1974) . pp. 105-110.
165 ibid.
166 N. Ram, 'India's Nuclear Policy: A Case-Study in the
Flaws and Futility of Non-Proliferation' prepared for the 34th
Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Chicago,
2-4 April 1982, (unpublished). Please see Notes Part 1, note
6, p.1.
167 ibid.
168 Text of The Agreement For Cooperation Between The
Government of The United States of America And The Government
of India Concerning Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at Washing-
ton on 8 August 1963 and entered into force on 25 October
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U.S. did not accept the Indian interpretation that its nuclear
explosion had any peaceful applications. 169
 It applied quiet
pressure after the explosion by holding up further export
licensing of fuel for the Tarapur atomic reactors in July
1974, pending satisfactory reassurances that the plutonium
produced in these reactors would not be employed in the Indian
nuclear explosives programme.'10
 Initially, India refused to
accept the U.S. demand. Dr. Homi Sethna wrote to his U.S.
counterpart, Mr. Dixie Lee Ray, Chairman of the U. S. AEC on
10 July 1974, stating that,
The Government of India regrets that it is unable to
share the understanding of the United States
Government expressed recently that, the use in or
for any nuclear explosive device, or any material or
equipment subject to United States Agreement for co-
operation in Civil Uses of Nuclear Energy, is pre-
cluded .
However, through protracted negotiations, the U.S. was able
to obtain an understanding from India in 1980 that the U.S.
fuel supplied to India would be used at Tarapur for the needs
of the power station only, and not for any nuclear explosive
device.112
The Canadian government's assessment of the 1974
1963. See Article 6.
169 See notes 160 to 163.
110 Details of the Correspondence are provided in the
Statement of James N. Barnes and S. Jacob Scherr on behalf of
the Natural Resources Defense Council, before the House of
Representative's Committee of Foreign Relations on 23 July
1980, pp. 6-7.
111 ibid.
172 Text of The Testimony of Warren Christopher, Deputy
Secretary of State Before The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and Senate Government Affairs Committee, dated 19
June 1980, p. 2. (Washington DC, National Security Archives,
1989)
142
Indian nuclear test also refuted the possibility of any
peaceful application and considered it a functional equiva-
lent of a weapon test. In a statement before the House of
Conunons, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Honou-
rable Allan J. MacEachen said,
India's detonation of a nuclear explosive device in
1974 made it evident that Canada and India have
taken profoundly differing views of what should be
encompassed in the peaceful application of nuclear
energy by non-nuclear weapon states. Canada is one
of the earliest and most vigorous proponents of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A basic element of
the Treaty, which guides Canadian policy in the
field of nuclear exports and safeguards, is that it
recognizes no technical distinction between nuclear
explosives for peaceful and non-peaceful pur-
poses .
The termination of Indo-Canadian nuclear cooperation in 1976
and Indo-U.S. in 1985 illustrates the profound differences
between India and its two principal nuclear suppliers about
the nature, scope and dimensions of the 1974 test. It also
indicated their differences about the nature of the Indian
nuclear programme in terms of peaceful versus military uses.
A meticulously researched study by the Natural
Resources Defense Council concluded: 'the Indian statement
that its 1974 device was entirely indigenous and peaceful,
sought to mask twenty years of U.S. and Canadian assistance
to the Indian development of nuclear power'	 The label
173 Nuclear Relations With India; Statement by the Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allen J.
MacEachen, in the House of Commons, 18 May 1976, pp. 1-2.
(Washington DC, National Security Archives, 1989).
174 Text of the Statement of James N. Barnes and Jacob
Scherr on Behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council
before the House of Representative's Committee of Foreign
Relations on 23 July 1980, p. 4. The Council was one of the
petitioners in the hearing before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for licencing nuclear fuel for the Indian Tarapur
atomic reactors.
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"peaceful" was intended to make it appear a low-risk measure
and to appear less provocative to all the concerned parties.
The policy was designed for the U.S. and Canada in particu-
lar whose material had been used in the test. Mrs. Gandhi's
statement appears misleading and meant to conceal the true
intentions underlying the explosion. Following Nehru's rule
of secrecy, she also did not inform her cabinet about the
explosion, except the Defence Minister. What were the high
stakes if the test was a PNE, that she did not take her
cabinet into confidence?
The contention that India did not build a nuclear
arsenal after its 1974 nuclear explosion is often presented
to justify its peaceful intentions. In the first place, the
assertion has become doubtful in the light of a report which,
quoting U.S. intelligence sources (two unnamed Reagan Ad-
ministration officials and a State Department aide), claimed
that India manufactured an unspecified number of low-yield
nuclear devices between 1974 and 1977.175 The report stated
that Desai's government discontinued the process. There is no
further information for academic analysis whether the nuclear
weapons existed in a fully assembled form or as unassembled
components. However, it is usually overlooked that India's
stockpile of plutonium in the period (1974-1977) was too
limited to launch a large-scale nuclear weapons programme. The
only available source of plutonium was CIRUS, whose total
accumulated stockpile of plutonium was 131.6 kg by 1974 and
159.8 kg by 1977.176 The available plutonium stockpile there-
fore, could not sustain the large-scale production of nuclear
'" Richard Sale, 'India Said To Be Building 20 Nuclear
Weapons a Year', United Press International, 25 April 1988
(PM Cycle), Leonard S. Spector, THE UNDECLARED BOMB, p. 100,
also note 95 (p. 362)
'' It is worked out on the basis that the reactor CIRUS
began operation in 1960. See appendices I & II for details.
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weapons by India if its R & D requirements were taken into
account. Above all, there was no imminent threat to justify an
immediate production and deployment of nuclear weapons.
India's pressing requirement for plutonium became apparent in
1977, when (according to a U.S. expert), an IAEA Study known
as Special Safeguards Implementation Report (SSIR) identified
"material imbalances" at Tarapur atomic reactors, but the
diversions could not be pinpointed.1"
Additionally, a test alone could not be sufficient
to develop a credible nuclear weapons deterrent. India had
only mastered the technology to fabricate fissile-material
and detonate a nuclear device. Full militarization of a
nuclear weapons capability requires designing nuclear war-
heads, mating them with adequate delivery systems, and
developing reliable command, control and communication (C)
systems. India had not developed all of these sophisticated
technologies by 1974. K. Subrahmanyam pointed out the diffi-
culties in the Indian development of a full-scale nuclear
weapons programme at that stage. He said,
At the present all that has been done may amount to
enlarging the Indian option towards a weapons
programme. There is no need to specifically exer-
cise that option till the country passes the
experimental stage and will need to invest on the
production of nuclear warheads and delivery vehi
-
cles
Therefore, it is difficult to accept the explanation at its
face value that India did not produce nuclear weapons after
" Text of the Statement of Honorable Richard L. Otinger
Before the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, dated 23rd May 1978, 95th Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 2-3. The case was also reported in Amrita
Abraham, "Plutonium Missing from Tarapur Plant", SUNDAY
OBSERVER (Bombay) 16-23, October 1983.
178 K. Subrahxnanyam, 'The Indian Nuclear Explosion and Its
impact on Security', India Quarterl y, XXX (4), p. 255.
145
the 1974 test because it was meant for "only peaceful uses"
and India had no military utility in sight while planning the
test. It appears that the 1974 explosion was meant to test the
reliability of the nuclear device for a shift from a nuclear
option to a weapons capability. Testing the device was a
significant step forward in that direction. It underscored the
fundamental and long-term politico-strategic objectives as-
sociated with that capability. However, the capability could
still remain disguised by labelling the test as a PNE. A long-
term but primary strategic objective of the nuclear test was
to signal India's resolve to address its strategic concerns
vis-a-vis the great powers.
As stated earlier, the Chinese nuclear weapons
capability was perceived a long-term threat. Since the early
1970s, Indian government seemed to be seriously concerned
about the gradually expanding nuclear weapons capability of
China. 1" It took note of China's 11th nuclear test of ap-
proximately 3 megaton yield at Lop Nor on 14 October 1970 and
the Chinese emphasis on developing 'ballistic missiles with
nuclear warheads' 180 India estimated that China had a nuclear
capability of producing 40 weapons of 20 KT annually, with a
total stockpile of 150 nuclear and a small number of thermo-
nuclear bombs.' 81 The main Indian concern seemed to be medium
range Chinese ballistic missile (range up to 3200 km) which
were not operational at that time but considered potentially
'capable of reaching targets in India from the launching bases
in Tibet' •192 However, the MOD report also noted that,
'" Annual Report 1970-71: Ministry of Defence, Govern-
ment of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1971), pp. 1-2.
'o ibid.
181 ibid, p. 2.
192 ibid.
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While the nuclear capability of China, no doubt,
constitutes an important factor in the total
spectrum of threats to our security, its credibility
has to be judged by several criteria such as the
political or military advantages that may be derived
from such an attack, its repercussions on the world
situation, the reaction of other advanced nations
and nuclear powers etc. The belief that nuclear
weapons are an effective means of political black-
il does not at present appear to be well founded,
It reflects that India perceived the Chinese nuclear weapons
capability as a significant determinant of its long-term
security environment, but not of immediate political or
military implications. Therefore, there was no urgency for
India to produce nuclear weapons in the short-term period.
The threat required a long-term response of preparing a
credible nuclear weapons capability based upon a tested
device.
The 1971-72 Indian MOD report noted that 'China
occupied its rightful place' as permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council due to its strategic nuclear capability.14
China launched its second earth satellite on 3 March 1971
which gave a boost to its ballistic missile capability. It
carried further nuclear tests: 12th on 18 November 1971, 13th
on 7 January 1972, and 14th on 18 March 1972 which sig-
nificantly enhanced the capability of Chinese nuclear deter-
rent. 105
 The report pointed out that Chinese views with regard
to 'matters affecting the inter se relationship and internal
affairs of the countries of the sub-continent' were unduly
mentioned in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of
183 ibid.
184 Annual Report 1971-72: Ministry of Defence, Govern-
ment of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1972), p. 9.
Ibid.
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President Nixon's visit to China. 186
 It reflected India's
concern that the U.S. endorsing of China's membership of the
U.N. and letting its views reflected in the joint communique
was a recognition of China's great-power status. Conversely,
India felt being relegated to a lower status with the recogni-
tion of Chinese international and South Asian position. The
1972-73 Indian MOD report reiterated the concern about Chinese
'massive efforts to develop nuclear weapons and strategic
delivery systems', and pointed out its 'refusal to join the
preparatory Committee for World Disarmament' It further
pointed out the Chinese 'noticeable tendency to take interest
in the affairs of the Sub-continent to the detriment of the
peace and cooperation enshrined in the Simla Agreement' •188 I
indicated an Indian interest to compete with Chinese influence
in the region which India believed originated primarily from
its nuclear weapons capability. The 15th nuclear test by China
at Lop Nor on 27 June 1973 was seen by India as a further
advance in its capability of "compacting thermonuclear
warheads". 189
 These reports suggest that Mrs. Gandhi's govern-
ment was concerned about the gradually developing capability
of China's nuclear force which enhanced its international
power and regional status. That proved a significant impetus
for India to take the road. Security, power and status appear
as appropriate Indian rationale for an independent nuclear
weapons capability to counterpoise China's increasing in-
fluence in the region.
A nuclear threat perception from the U.S., like the
186 ibid.
187 Annual Report 1972-73: Ministry of Defence, Govern-
ment of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1973), p. 7.
ibid.
189 Annual Report 1973-74: Ministry of Defence, Govern-
ment of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1974), pp. 2-3.
148
one allegedly posed by the USS Enterprise in 1971 is also
reflected in the Indian concerns as a rationale for developing
a nuclear weapons capability. The 1971-72 MOD report stated,
In the course of the war, a task force of the US
Seventh Fleet consisting of USS Enterprise, the
largest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with
nuclear weapons on board, a helicopter carrier, a
missile destroyer and several other warships had
been despatched into the Bay of Bengal. The in-
structions to the task force are shrouded in
mystery; it is, nevertheless, clear that the intent
was far from friendly.1"
Admiral Shankar, Vice-Chief of Naval Staff and President of
the prestigious United Services Institution (USI) of the
Indian armed forces was more explicit:
The memory of "exercise Enterprise" in 1971 should
alert us to the danger that superpowers' nuclear
threats are not necessarily confined to mutual
deterrent postures; that in certain situations, that
can be directed against us too.'91
In 1973, the Indian government resented the presence of the
U.S Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean.' 92
 The 1974 nuclear test
signalled a low-key response that India had its own strategic
objectives in the region which it might address through the
development of a nuclear weapons capability. The test added
weight to the credibility of that response as well as the
capability.
An intermediate strategic objective of the 1974
nuclear test was to demonstrate a technological competence
and the attendant politico-strategic capability. According to
N. Ram, the success of the explosion was overstated to
190 Annual Report 1971-72: Ministry
 of Defence, Govern-
ment of India, p. 9.
'' 'Nuclear Shadow Over The Subcontinent' The USI (United
Services Institution), 9 April 1981, p. 2.
192 Annual Report 1973-74: Ministry of Defence, pp. 3-4.
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generate the desired political impact."3
 The Immediate
official Indian statement about the 1974 'peaceful nuclear
explosion experiment' stated a 15 KT yield but other versions
contradict it as an exaggeration.' 94 Actually, 2 kg of pluto-
nium did not fission out of a total of 8 kg used in the
device. However, irrespective of the officially stated
objectives and the yield produced, the test indicated India's
new politico-strategic ranking at home and abroad. Senator
Ribicoff noted the impact, 'India thus became the sixth member
of the nuclear weapons club because there is no technical
difference between a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion and
an atomic bomb."5 Mrs. Gandhi might have seen a nuclear
weapons capability based upon a tested device as an entry
ticket for the great powers club which would enhance India's
status in international and regional diplomacy.
The 1974 official Indian assessment recognized the
obsolescence of the old strategic framework as it did not
cater for the 'new realities of the subcontinent' ." India
enjoyed good relations with the Soviet Union. later's suppor-
tive role in favour of India in the 1970-71 war further
improved the relationship. The groundwork for that role had
been prepared through the conclusion of Indo-Soviet Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. Article IX
of the Treaty envisaged mutual consultations in the event of
'" N. Ram, p. 5.
" Annual Report of the Department of Atomic Energy:
1974-75, p. 7. As noted earlier, Raja Ramanna, the architect
of the 1974 test, stated the yield between 10 to 12 KT, "Some
Studies on India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Experiment", pp.
421 & 434.
195 Indian Nuclear Explosion, Committee on Government
Operations, United states Senate, 1-4.
196 Annual Report 1974-75: Ministry of Defence, Govern-
ment of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1975). p. 2.
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an attack or threat of an attack on either party. 197 However,
the management of the 1970-71 crisis with the Soviet support
could be expected as one time exception, and might not be
possible to repeat because of the volatile nature of world
politics. A desire to be independent from collective security
framework and India's own management of South Asian affairs to
the exclusion of the superpowers, cannot be ruled out as an
underlying objective of the 1974 test. It also reflected
India's determination that its opposition to the NPT was not
merely an exposition of an abstract principle but a practical
necessity dictated by the Indian national interests.
The decision to carry out the test in May 1974 also
appears to be closely associated with the dynamics of Indian
domestic politics. In the first place, the development of
Indian nuclear capability has operated within a supportive
domestic political environment. Its strongest base has been,
and remains, a well organized and articulate pro-bomb lobby.
The most significant components of the pro-bomb lobby came
from the nuclear establishment, retired and serving civil
servants and political parties. 198
 Its institutional base has
been officially cultivated and consistently patronized by the
Indian government, like establishment of the Institute of
Defence Studies and Analyses which is a premier think tank in
favour of India's acquisition of nuclear weapons. 199
 Since its
establishment, this Institute, as a matter of collective
policy and its staff members individually are the staunch
protagonists of the bomb.
An opinion survey of the Indian strategic elite
197 Annual Report 1971-72: Ministry of Defence, Govern-
ment of India, p. 5.
198 See Section 4 above on domestic nuclear debate.
199 This institute [IDSA] is financed and administered by
Indian Ministry of Defence. This information is based on
interviews and discussions with members of the institute.
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after the 1974 test compiled by THE HINDUSTAN TIMES reported
that 59.60 % of the respondents favoured India's development
of nuclear weapons, 30 % opposed it and the rest were in-
decisive. 200
 It was further reported that a majority of the
strategic elite believed that the nuclear test had enhanced
India's military and political position, and thereby streng-
thened its non-aligned status. 20' It also indicated that if the
Indian government moved in the direction of producing nuclear
weapons, the intelligentsia would support it. 202
 According to
the monthly PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, opinion polls conducted
immediately after the test reflected an upsurge in Mrs.
Gandhi's personal popularity as well as her government and the
Indian nuclear establishment. 203
 The 1974 nuclear explosion
partially satiated the pro-bomb lobby and ultra-nationalist
elements who were critical of inaction on the nuclear front.
By exploding the 1974 nuclear device, Indian government went
a step ahead of the moderate faction of its strategic elite,
but under a posture of ambiguity. An American official's
comment on the policies of ambiguities followed by countries
like India is noteworthy. He states,
Though public opinion may be strong, the govern-
mental military elite in some countries (e.g. India,
Japan) is far ahead of the public. A nuclear
decision may be made and advanced under the guise of
a peaceful program while public opinion is shift-
ing.204
200 THE HINDUSTAN TIMES (New Delhi), 24 November 1975.
201 Ibid.
202 ibid.
203 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, June 1974, pp. 4-6.
204 R. Murray, Problems of Nuclear Weapons Outside Europe
(Problem 2), NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Committee File - Commit-
tee on Nuclear Weapons: INDIA, 7 December 1964, p. 3. Lyndon
B. Johnson Library, Texas.
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What the elite recommended publicly, the government of India
appeared to reject in public, but adopted privately.
The texture of ambiguity surrounding the nature of
the 1974 nuclear test was skillfully orchestrated to project
an image of a nuclear capable India which could still deny
the military application of the test. K. Subrahmanyam provi-
des an indication about the objectives of the 1974 test:
While India could maintain that it was a peaceful
nuclear explosion, the overall significance of the
test could not be lost on the big powers. Part of
objective was to leave the future intentions of
India ambiguous and thereby enlarge the country's
options 205
The Indian nuclear option created in the Nehru era was in fact
exercised in 1974. By declaring it peaceful, Mrs. Gandhi's
government wanted to disguise its overt military manifes-
tation. It was because of India's promises of "only peaceful
uses" of the materials it received from the United States and
Canada and actually used that material in the 1974 nuclear
test.
A secret CIA Memorandum prepared in the immediate
aftermath of the Indian nuclear explosion categorized India
among the countries involved in attempts towards "weapons
acquisitions". 2" It assessed the Indian status as a nuclear
capable state; something functionally close to a nuclear
205 K. Subrahmanyam, 'Indian Nuclear Explosion and Its
Impact on Security', p. 257.
206 Prospects For Further Proliferation Of Nuclear
Weapons: A Secret CIA Memorandum No. DCI NIO 1945-74, dated
9/4174 (S/NFD); declassified and transmitted under the Freedom
of Information Act to Mr. S. Jacob Scherr, Attorney, Interna-
tional Project, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington
D.C. by the Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central
Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C. vide letter dated 19




 The 1974 Indian nuclear device had two
remarkable military oriented features, its design was based
upon the implosion technique and its triggering package had
a military connotation. 208
 In the implosion technique (in
contrast to the explosion technique), a hollow sphere of
fissile plutonium is surrounded by a conventional high
explosive specifically shaped in a way that when it detona-
tes, it crashes inward or, in the technical language, "imp-
lodes" symmetrically and instantly, compressing the core of
fissile plutonium to form a solid critical mass of explosive
material. Additional spheres of natural uranium and beryllium
are placed between the core and surrounding explosives
(conventional). These explosives smash into the core during
the process of implosion and reflect the neutrons back to
improve the efficiency of nuclear reaction. According to a
U.S. Congressional study, the 1974 Indian nuclear test
demonstrated a capability which suggest a compactness and
configuration close to a usable nuclear weapon. 209
 A subse-
quent Congressional study (Up-date) on India's nuclear weapo-
ns capability established the same conclusion.210
The foregoing suggests that the 1974 nuclear test,
based upon a dual-purpose technology, was a step towards the
development of a nuclear weapons capability. It was actually
planned by Prime Minister Shastri's government immediately
after the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 as SNE Project, but
could not be carried out because Shastri and Bhabha both died
207 ibid.
208 Anal ysis of Six Issues: Nuclear Capabilities of India,
Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, p.36.
209 Ibid.
210 Mark Martel and Warren Donnelly, INDIA AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS; Environment and Natural Resources Policy division,
Issue Brief Update 09/12/86, order code lB 86125 (Washington
DC., Congressional Research Service, 1986).
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in January 1966. That led to the breakdown of political and
technological momentum for carrying out the test. Mrs. Indira
Gandhi could not continue the technological momentum due to a
wide range of political, strategic and technical variables af-
fecting its progress. She resumed work on the SNE project
after establishing her political credentials, and appraising
the regional and international environment. She decided to go
ahead with the test in the immediate aftermath of the victory
in 1971 war with Pakistan. In April 1972, she gave permission
to the DAE for making necessary preparations for the test.
According to a WASHINGTON POST report, first attempt for the
test failed in February 1974.211 On 18 May 1974, India success-
fully carried out its nuclear test. As a result, it trans-
formed the Indian nuclear option into a nuclear weapons
capability.
211 See note 147 above.
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Chapter Five
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY AND ITS STRATEGIC
INPUT INTO THE INDIAN NUCLEAR DECISION-MAKING
Pakistan's nuclear policy has proved a decisive
input into the Indian nuclear decision-making process since
the early 1980s. It has accelerated the development of Indian
nuclear weapons capability and to a large extent, the strategy
governing its possible employment. Conversely, Indian nuclear
weapons capability, particularly the 1974 nuclear test, had a
catalytic impact in generating a drive in Pakistan's for a
nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan perceived a nuclear
threat from the Indian nuclear weapons capability since the
mid-1960s, but it was intensified by the 1974 nuclear test.
Its threat perception was articulately expressed by Prime
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the National Assembly of
Pakistan. 1 He described the Indian nuclear test as a 'fateful
development and a threat to Pakistan's security', and added:
"A more grave and serious event has not taken place in the
history of Pakistan. The explosion has introduced a qualita-
tive change in the situation between the two countries".2
Mr. Bhutto dismissed Indian assurances provided in
a letter from Mrs. Indira Gandhi that it had no military or
political intentions in carrying out the 1974 nuclear explo-
sion. 3 He argued that the real issue was not the intentions
but the capability, particularly when a peaceful nuclear
1 Z.A. Bhutto's statement in the National Assembly of
Pakistan on 7 June 1974, THE PAKISTAN TIMES (Rawalpindi), 8
June 1974, p. 1.
2 ibid.
For details see, Dilip Mukerjee, 'India Nuclear Test
And Pakistan', India Quarterl y, XXX (4), October-December
1974, p. 262.
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explosion (PNE) was not technologically different from a
weapon test. 4
 Mr. Bhutto emphasized to Mrs. Gandhi,
Pakistan has a reason for unique anxiety because no
two among the five nuclear-weapon states have ever
been involved in the kind of confrontation and
unresolved disputes which have bedeviled India-
Pakistan relations.5
The perception of an Indian nuclear threat was not
confined to political circles but the bureaucracy and scien-
tific elite shared it with equal intensity. It triggered
disturbing reactions in all sections of the body-politic in
Pakistan. The Chairman Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
(PAEC), Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan, described the Indian nuclear
explosion: 'A great blow, perhaps a fatal one to all the
international efforts for containing and preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons' 6 He further stated that if India had jus-
tifiable economic or engineering reasons for a PNE, it could
had been planned and conducted under the IAEA ausoic.7
Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Mr. Agha Shahi, underlined the
possible spill-over effects of the Indian nuclear test at the
Geneva Disarmament Conference in June 1974 by stating, 'The
road has been thrown open for the emergence of a seventh and
an eighth nuclear power' .
From a theoretical standpoint, Pakistan's nuclear
response to the Indian nuclear test was immediately antici-
pated. A known nuclear specialist, James E. Dougherty dealt
at length with the implications of the Indian nuclear test on
ibid.
ibid, pp. 262-63.
6 THE PAKISTAN TIMES (Lahore), 29 September 1974, p. 1.
' ibid.
8 Full text of Agha Shahi's statement at the Geneva
Conference is provided in THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 13 June 1974.
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proliferation of nuclear weapons. 9 He indicated its probable
regional impact:
Proliferation by reaction is a phenomena associa-
ted with pairs of conflict-parties or historic
rivals rather than a chain-reaction involving in-
definitely long series of countries. In 'Prolifer-
ation by reaction model', if one country acquire
(nuclear weapons),the traditional foe feels itself
under compulsion to acquire (nuclear weapons) for
the sake of protective equilibrium.'0
Dougherty contended that in reaction to the Indian nuclear
test, Pakistan would feel compelled to develop its own nuclear
weapons capability because of continued hostility with India."
In fact, Mr. Bhutto had already stated in 1965 while he was
foreign minister in President M. Ayub Khan's government that,
if India developed an atomic bomb, Pakistan too would develop
one, "even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain
hungry".'2
 This statement was a reaction to nuclear development
in India when P.M. Shastri decided in November 1964 to
sanction the Subterranean Nuclear Explosive (SNE) Project and
inaugurated the Trombay Reprocessing Plant in January 1965.
After the Indian nuclear test, Indo-Pakistani
nuclear competition became intense. Since 1974, Indian and
Pakistani nuclear programmes and policies have become inex-
tricably linked into an 'action-reaction syndrome'. After the
James E. Dougherty, 'Proliferation in Asia', Orbis,
Fall 1975 (Special Issue), p. 926.
10 ibid.
" ibid.
12 Z.A. Bhutto, AWAKENING THE PEOPLE: SPEECHES OF ZUL-
FIQAR ALl BHUTTO 1966-1969 (Rawalpindi, Pakistan Publica-
tions, 1970), p. 21. Bhutto's statement is also cited by a
former Minister for Information and Broadcasting in his
cabinet, Mr. Kausar Niazi, in his book (in Urdu language),
AUR LINE CUT GAEE [AND THE LINE WAS CUT] (Lahore, Jang
Publications, 1987), p. 77.
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Indian nuclear test, government of Pakistan lost no time in
indicating its intentions, as to how it would respond to the
nuclear threat it perceived. In an immediate reaction, the
Chairman of the PAEC, Munir Khan categorically stated the
Pakistani response:
We have clear-cut policies and a programme which
takes into account the interests of our country. Our
policies are based on national requirements which
take into account the Indian intentions. We need
nuclear energy for our economic development, indeed
for our very survival.'3
For a better understanding of Pakistan's influence
on the Indian nuclear decision-making process and nuclear
weapons capability, it is relevant to explore Pakistan's nuc-
lear programme and policy from historical perspective.
1. PAKI STAN' S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
Contrary to India, which initiated its nuclear
programme immediately after independence, Pakistan could not
begin a well organized nuclear programme until the mid-1960s.
The primary reason for such a late start was the early death
of Mr. M.A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, in 1948. Pakistan
plunged into a perennial state of political instability after
his death. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was es-
tablished as a semi-government organization in 1955. Its
primary functions were spelled out by the first Chairman, Dr.
Nazir Ahmad:
i) planning and development of peaceful uses of
atomic energy through the selection and training of
personnel;
ii) establishment of atomic energy and nuclear
research institutes;
iii) installation of power and research reactors,
" Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1974, pp. 14-16.
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iv) survey and procurement of nuclear materials;
and,
v) application of radio-isotopes in agriculture,
health and industry.14
However, the PAEC remained an ineffective and ill-planned body
for almost a decade, due to a lack of political and economic
support by the leadership, bureaucratic corruption and
ineptness. Pakistan's nuclear programme showed a modest growth
in the 1960s. Dr.I.H. Usmani became the Chairman of the PAEC.
Its administrative structure was reorganized in 1965 and made
a statutory institution. Throughout Ayub's regime, the PAEC
remained committed to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and
its programme was geared to that end alone. Until then, all
the Pakistani nuclear facilities were placed under IAEA
safeguards.
Pakistan's premier nuclear research establishment
is PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and
Technology). Since its establishment in 1965, PINSTECH has
grown into a multi-disciplinary institution and developed a
firm technological base for various PAEC projects. Its major
objectives are fourfold; research in nuclear science and
technology, development for various applications of atomic
energy, training in nuclear sciences and production of
sophisticated equipment and special nuclear materials.15
Through a sustained momentum of research and development and
higher emphasis on self-reliance, PINSTECH has brought
Pakistan closer to the goal of attaining full nuclear fuel
14 Dr. Nazir Ahmad, 'The Atomic Energy commission',
PAKISTAN QUARTERLY, X (2), Autumn 1957, pp. 14-16.
15 PINSTECH 1965-1985, (Islamabad, Pakistan Institute of
Nuclear Science and Technology, 1985), p. 3.
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cycle capability. 1' It is one of the best nuclear research and
development institutes in the Third World, like India's BARC,
though the scope of its activities and support infra-structure
is relatively smaller than the BARC. In the 1960s, PINSTECH
sought collaboration from the U.S. Oak Ridge Nuclear Laborato-
ry under a "Sister Laboratories" programme to acquire equip-
ment and technological literature.17
Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor (PARR-i) is the
centre-piece of the PINSTECH experimental facilities. It ws
commissioned in 1965 at Nilore near Islamabad, with an initial
capacity of 5 MW capacity which could be updated to 10 MW
without any major structural changes. 18
 It is a swimming pool-
type reactor established with the U.S. technical and financial
assistance, uses demineralized water as a coolant and 90 %
enriched uranium as a fuel. 19
 It is under the U.S.-IAEA
safeguards. 2° A number of instrumentation and control modific-
ations have been recently carried out in PARR-i by the PAEC
experts to update its functions. 21
 It has a wide range of uses,
from R & D to the production of radio-isotopes for industrial,
agricultural and medical purposes.22
16 ibid.
17 Warren H. Donnelly, Anal ysis of ERDA Information on
U.S. Nuclear Assistance to Pakistan (Washington DC, CRS
Memorandum, 27 December 1977), pp. 3-7.
18 Annual Report 1973-74 (Islamabad, Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission, Government of Pakistan [hereafter GOP],
1974), p. 13.
19 Office of Technology Assessment, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
AND SAFEGUARDS, Appendix II, Part I, June 1977, Table B-i, p.
229.
20 ibid.




Pakistan installed its first nuclear power station
in 1972 at Karachi: Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANtJPP), with
a 137 MW Ce) gross and 125 MW Ce) net output capacity. 23
 Canada
provided financial assistance and the Canadian General
Electric Company (GEC) built the reactor. 24 In the first two
years of its operation, KANUPP achieved 70 to 75 % (per cent)
availability factor and contributed 600 million KWH annually
to the grid of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation raising the
cumulative generation figure to 1.54 billion KWH. 25
 It is a
CANDU type heavy water reactor fuelled with natural uranium.
The reactor is under the Canadian-IAEA safeguards and is
capable of producing 30 kg of plutonium per year as a by-
product. 2' When Canada terminated nuclear cooperation agreement
with Pakistan in 1976, KANUPP suffered occasional stoppages
due to various technological and spare parts constraints. The
PAEC experts have been able to fabricate and commercially
produce fuel for the KANUPP to ensure its continued operation
after Canada stopped the supply in 1976.27 However, the overall
performance has not been good.
The search for nuclear fuel seems to be one of the
major concerns of the PAEC. It maintains an Atomic Energy
Minerals Centre at Lahore for this purpose. The main es-
tablishment at Lahore consists of five divisions: i) Plann-
ing and Development, 11) Prospecting, iii) Evaluation, iv)
23 SIPRI YEAR BOOK, (Stockholm, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 1976), p. 30.
24 ibid.
25 Annual Report 1974-75 Clslamabad, PAEC, GOP, 1975), p.
4.
26 Frank Banarby, THE NUCLEAR AGE (Stockholm, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, 1974), pp. 70-71. The
PAEC literature is silent about the plutonium production
capacity of KANUPP.
27 Annual Report 1985-86, pp. 1-4.
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Drilling, and v) Mining. 28
 It is supported by two outstation
divisions; Mineral Sands Programme at Karachi and Hard Rock
Division at Peshawar. 29 The PAEC annual reports indicate the
existence of five major formations of uranium ore at: D.G.
Khan, Hazara, Swat, Northern areas (Gilgit), and Kashmir
(Pakistani part). It considers these deposits reasonably
assured for the country's requirement.3°
However, despite heavy emphasis on publicity of its
efforts for uranium exploration and prospecting, reports of
the PAEC are inexplicably silent on the quantum of uranium ore
deposits in the country. Pakistan is not listed by the INFCE
(International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation) among the
countries with "reasonably assured" or "estimated additional"
uranium sources. According to an independent source, its main
reserves located at D.G. Khan are in the range of 100,000
tons. 31
 In 1978, Pakistan reportedly acquired 100 tons of
uranium oxide "yellow cake" from Niger through the Libyan
connection and an additional consignment directly. 32
 However,
there is no accurate information about the quantity acquired
from Niger directly. There is no mention about this in the
PAEC's annual reports or any other relevant literature. (For
further data on Pakistan's nuclear programme and its weapons
capability, see appendices IX to X).
2$ ATOMIC ENERGY MINERALS CENTRE, LAHORE, a Hand Book of
the PAEC, undated, Islamabad, p. 2.
29 ibid.
30 Annual Reports of the PAEC: 1973-1974 to 1975-1976 and
1980-1981 to 1986-1987.
31 Nature, 18 September 1980, p. 181.
32 Nuclear News, February 1980, p. 91.
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l.a. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PLANNING IN THE 1970s
When Pakistan launched its major nuclear programme
in the mid-1970s, it ranked as one of the poorest and most
underdeveloped countries of the world in terms of energy use.
Its annual per capita energy consumption was equivalent to 150
KWH of electricity which was one-tenth (1/10) of the world
average. 33
 At that time, the world average of per capita energy
consumption was 1500 KWH of electricity per year, the U. S.
average was 10, 000 KWH per year and the average in Asian
Countries was 300 KWH per year. 34
 In 1975, a joint IAEA and
PAEC study proposed a minimum per capita energy consumption of
800 KWH of electricity for Pakistan by the year 2000, and
recommended an increase in Pakistan' s installed power capacity
up to 23,000 MW (e) by that time. 35
 The study concluded that
Pakistan's conventional sources of energy were expensive as
compared with nuclear power and therefore, unsuitable. 36
 On the
basis of the IAEA-PAEC study, Pakistan undertook an ambitious,
"Optimum Power Generation Plan" as a long-term objective to
meet the anticipated per capita energy demand of 800 kwh; 26
% of the country's total energy requirement. 3' It was to be
generated by the installation of eight 600 MW nuclear power
plants during 1981-90, and another sixteen 1100 MW plants
during 1991_2000.38
Nuclear Power For Pakistan (Islamabad, Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission, GOP, 1976), p. 1.
ibid, p. 1.
Market Survey
 For Nuclear Power In The Developing
Countries (Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1975),
pp. 6-7.
36 ibid.
" Annual Report 1974-75, p. 4.
36 ibid.
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However, with its assessment of the Indian nuclear
explosion as a 'weapon test', and the attendant perception of
a nuclear threat or blackmail, Pakistan scrambled for the
acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. As noted ear-
lier, Mr. Bhutto had vowed in 1965 that Pakistan too would
acquire nuclear weapons if India produced an atomic bomb." A
study claimed in 1981 that after assuming power in 1971,
Bhutto had called a secret meeting of the Pakistani nuclear
scientists at Multan, and asked them to deliver the so-called
"Islamic Bomb". 4° Bhutto had no doubt decided to embark on the
process of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, but no body
new how he was going to acquire: whether through the plutonium
reprocessing route or the uranium enrichment technique. He
kept his secrets well guarded so that his planning was not
jeopardized.
1.b. NUCLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT
In 1976, Pakistan signed an agreement with SGN of
France to acquire a commercial scale plutonium reprocessing
plant. 41
 It was to be installed at Chashma in D. G. Khan
district under international safeguards agreement signed by
Pakistan, France and the IAEA. 42
 The agreement was not only
approved by the IAEA's Board of Governors, but also included
the most stringent safeguard provisions in the history of
nuclear technology transfer. Under the terms of the agree-
" Please see note 12 above.
40 Herbert Krosney and Steve Weissman, THE ISLAMIC BOMB
(New York, Time Books, 1981), pp. 44-46.
41 Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976
Between France, Pakistan and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, IAEA, INFCIR/239, 22 June 1976 (Washington DC,
National Security Archives, 1989)
42 ibid.
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ment, government of Pakistan undertook that none of the equip-
ment provided by France would be used to manufacture nuclear
weapons or nuclear explosive devices, or for any other
military purpose. 43
 The agreement imposed additional obliga-
tions that none of the following materials or technology
provided to Pakistan would be used for the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices or to further any
other military purposes. It stated:
Any other reprocessing facility or specified
equipment for reprocessing which is designed,
constructed or operated on the basis of or by the
use of relevant technological information trans-
ferred from the French Republic;44
Special fissionable or other nuclear material,
including subsequent generations of special f is-
sionable material, which has been produced, pro-
cessed or used on the basis of or by the use of any
item referred to in this article or any relevant
technological information transferred from the
French Republic;45
Either the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan or the Government of the French Republic,
after consultation with the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, shall inform the
Agency (IAEA) of any other reprocessing facility and
specified equipment for reprocessing in Pakistan
which is designed, constructed or operated on the
basis of or by the use of relevant technological
information transferred from the French Republic.
Without limiting the generality of the preceding
sentence, any reprocessing facility using solvent
extraction or any specified equipment for reproce-
ssing, designed, constructed or operated in the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan within a period agreed
upon between the Government of the French Republic
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan and to be communicated to the Agency, shall
be deemed to be designed, constructed or operated on
Text of the Agreement, Article 1.
" Text of the Agreement, Article 2 (C).
Text of the Agreement, Article 2 (d).
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the basis of or by the use of relevant technological
information transferred from the French Republic.46
The purpose of this lengthy quotation is to point out that
under the terms of this agreement, not only the reprocessing
plant supplied by France and any material processed in it
would have been under the safeguards but any plant built by
Pakistan on the basis of the French technology of "purex-
solvent extraction" would have been placed under the similar
safeguards.
France wanted to make it explicit through such
additional safeguards that there would not be any diversion
from peaceful uses of the plant and its technology towards
military purposes. Despite such stringent provisions, the
Franco-Pakistan agreement caused an uproar in the interna-
tional press about the possible military employment of the
plant. France and Pakistan both came under intense interna-
tional pressure, particularly from the U.S. to abrogate the
agreement. It was despite the fact that the U.S. had approved
the agreement, being a member of the ThEA's Board of Governors
and without casting a negative vote.
On 9 January 1978, French government announced that
it had proposed a modification of the reprocessing plant in
the form of a co-processing technique which would avoid the
production of weapons-grade plutonium. 47 France took the plea
that Pakistan would not require reprocessed plutonium for
civilian uses before 15 to 20 years when she might install
fast-breeder reactors. 4' Pakistan rejected the modified
proposal and demanded implementation of the agreement 'as
46 Text of the Agreement, Article 5 (C).
THE PAKISTAN TIMES (Rawalpindi), 10 January 1978, p.1.
ibid.
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signed' . It argued that it a heavy investment had already
been made on the work site, including the import of materials
from France, and the safeguards instituted in the agreement
were stringent enough to ensure that there was no diversion
for military purposes. 5° Ultimately, France cancelled the
agreement in late 1978, reportedly on the basis of fresh
evidence provided by the U.S. that Pakistan might misuse the
plant to make nuclear weapons. 5
 However, before France
cancelled the aqreement, the construction at Chshm w
nearing completion and about 90 % of the plans had been
delivered. 52
 Pakistan's response to the objections against the
reprocessing plant deal was not convincing. It stated that
the plant was required because Pakistan hoped to become a
centre for regional reprocessing in the future and not to make
the bomb. 53
 The PAEC's explanation was equally untenable that
acquisition of the plant was essential for development of
breeder technology in the future. 54
 No ground work existed in
Pakistan at that time for the breeder technology and do not
exist even now.
The various elements of that controversy and the
attendant complexities which blocked a mutually acceptable
solution raised questions which have not been fully answered
and merit a serious consideration. In the first place, it is
" THE PAKISTAN TIMES (Rawalpindi), 11 January 1978, p. 1.
50 ibid.
' 'U.S. Says Evidence Shows Pakistan Planning the Bomb',
WASHINGTON POST, 21 September 1980.
52 Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of
India, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, 17.
THE SUN (Lahore), 15 May 1976, p.1.
Munir A. Khan, NUCLEAR ENERGY IN PAKISTAN (Islamabad,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, GOP, 1979), pp. 9-
11.
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important to know why the U.S. retrospectively stepped in with
strong pressure on France and Pakistan to cancel the repro-
cessing agreement, while it had previously approved it as a
member of the IAEA's Board of Governors. The U.S. AEC had also
been involved in the negotiations along with the IAEA, France
and Pakistan. As stated earlier, the apparent rationale
offered was that the U.S. found fresh evidence after the deal
that Pakistan intended to misuse the plant for military
purposes
However, the evidence did not answer the question:
how Pakistan would have misused a plant under trilateral
safeguard measures, superimposed with additional French
provisions? Pakistan had only one nuclear power generation
plant, Karachi Nuclear Power Project (KANUPP), as a source of
plutonium production which was under the IAEA-Canadian
safeguards. 5' That meant Pakistan had to violate two separate
international agreements pertaining to two different instal-
lations in order to misuse the facilities for making nuclear
weapons through the reprocessing technique. This was con-
sidered as Mr. Bhutto's most preferred route for making
nuclear weapons. 5' Spector believes that Bhutto followed both
routes to produce nuclear weapons, though he initially relied
on the plutonium reprocessing method until difficulties forced
a shift to the uranium enrichment technique.se This view is
supported by Ashok Kapur with reservation. He believes that
Bhutto followed both routes to the bomb, but he preferred the
See note 51 above.
' See appendix IX on Pakistan's nuclear reactors.
' Ashok Kapur, PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT (London.
Croom Helm, 1987), p. 3.
Spector, GOING NUCLEAR, pp. 101-105.
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plutonium reprocessing method.59
The possibility of Pakistan violating two interna-
tional agreements at the expense of its future relations with
the West has not been carefully weighed by those who suspected
it to acquire a bomb through the plutonium route. The option
for Pakistan to construct an identical plant, say in 10 to 15
years, but refusing to put it under international safeguards
would have been an equally serious violation of the Franco-
Pakistan Agreement.'° It suggests that if the Franco-Pakistan
agreement had not been terminated, the possibility of a
plutonium route to the bomb for Pakistan was non-existent.
Pakistan's clandestine nuclear operations to acquire a uranium
enrichment plant began earlier than the reprocessing con-
troversy. 61
 It indicates that Pakistan had no intention of
misusing the reprocessing plant by violating the agreement
with France.
The real issue at stake in that deal was not only
the possibility of its misuse for military purposes, but the
rigid postures of the U.S. and Bhutto governments. Despite
intense pressure from the U.S., particularly during the visit
of Henry Kissinger to Pakistan in August 1976, Bhutto refused
to cancel or even accept modification of the reprocessing
plant agreement. 62 On the other hand, he and his scientific
advisers failed to provide a plausible explanation for
Pakistan's acquisition of the plant. It had no justifiable
Kapur, p.15.
60 The period agreed upon between France and Pakistan
under the terms of the agreement was 20 years. If Pakistan
had constructed any reprocessing plant using French techno-
logy or a plant similar to that in 20 years, it had to be
under the French-IAEA safeguards.
61 See section 1, C below on uranium enrich plant.
62 
'Kissinger Meets Pakistani Leader On Nuclear Issue',
NEW YORK TIMES, 9 August 1976.
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peaceful use of reprocessed plutonium in the immediate future.
The U.S. position was equally rigid, given the comprehensive-
ness of the safeguards applicable to the plant. it is often
quoted from Bhutto's memoirs, written in his death cell in
1979, that Pakistan was at the threshold of becoming a nuclear
power before his government was overthrown. 63
 The only thing
needed was a reprocessing plant, he said. Bhutto's statement
was misleading. By 1979, Pakistan had purchased most of the
equipment necessary for establishment of Kahuta Uranium
Enrichment Plant. He himself was the political architect of
Kahuta plant, but wanted that to remain a secret until
completion. 64
 An apparent reason might be that disclosure about
the plant at that stage would have jeopardized the culmination
of the operations still underway. He also might not have liked
to associate himself with the large-scale network of espionage
and smuggling operations through which the plant was being
acquired.
1. C. URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT AT AHUTA
New evidence reveals another aspect of Bhutto's drive
for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability which
contradicts some of the prevailing fallacies about his
development strategy, like the belief that he preferred a
plutonium reprocessing route to produce nuclear weapons.' 5
 This
63 Z.A. Bhutto, IF I AM ASSASSINATED, (New Delhi, Vikas,
1979), p. 118.
64 Niazi, pp. 86-88.
65 Niazi, pp. 77-90 and Zahid Malik, DR. ABDUL OADEER KHAN
AND ISLAMIC BOMB, (Islamabad, Hurmat Publications, 1989). This
publication is also in the Pakistani national language, URDU
under the title DR. ABDUL OADEER KHAN AUR ISLAMI BOMB. Kausar
Niazi was the only minister (Information and Broadcasting)
whom Bhutto had taken into confidence about his nuclear
pursuits in the period 1974-77. Zahid Malik is a retired Joint
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evidence suggests that Bhutto used the issue of plutonium
reprocessing plant as a gimmick to cover-up a wide network of
clandestine operations which his government had secretly
undertaken to acquire the uranium enrichment plant and other
nuclear infrastructure." He had instructed Kausar Niazi to
launch a special publicity campaign to keep the Western
attention focussed on the reprocessing issue while the
enrichment plant's acquisition was in progress.' 1
 It was a
calculated deception to keep attention diverted through
orchestrated misinformation and at times deliberate, but
costly provocation. After being confident about the success
of the his plan, Bhutto was exalted to say: 'I WILL SEE THE
HINDU BASTARDS NOW'."
The U.S. pressure which resulted in cancellation of
the reprocessing plant deal proved counterproductive in terms
of the wider objective of Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear
weapons technology. Since then, Pakistan is known to have
constructed a small scale commercial reprocessing plant at
PINSTECH, which is a scaled down version of the main incom-
plete plant at Chashma, and another pilot reprocessing plant
at Sihala." There is little doubt that Pakistan will even-
tually be able to commission the main plant, because most of
the work was completed and nearly all the plans delivered
Secretary of the government of Pakistan and a very close
friend of Dr. A.Q. Khan. His work is a biography of Dr. Khan.
66 Niazi, pp. 84-88.
67 ibid.
Niazi, p. 84 and Malik. p. 95.
69 
'Pakistan Building Secret Nuclear Plants', WASHINGTON
POST, 23 September 1980.
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before France cancelled the deal. 7° There does not seem to be
any urgency to complete it because Pakistan does not possess
safeguards-free plutonium by-product to reprocess. If France
had not cancelled the deal, all these plants would be under
international safeguards because of the obligations under-
taken in the Franco-Pakistan agreement. But the agreement is
not in force. On the other hand, Pakistan had paid a very
heavy price in the field of peaceful nuclear technology,
particularly nuclear power generation. It has not been able to
install another nuclear power generation plant after KANUPP so
far.
It also indicates that, given the intensity of a
threat perception and motivation to seek a credible response
to that threat, it is difficult to stop a country from
pursuing a nuclear course in the absence of an alternative,
like an extended nuclear guarantee. Pakistan undertook to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability despite its limited in-
dustrial and technological base. The suspension of economic
and military aid to Pakistan (including cancellation of
agreements for the supply of sophisticated weapon systems like
100 F-7 aircraft) in 1977 by the Carter Administration to seek
its compliance with the U.S. non-proliferation objectives did
not compel it to stop or even slow its nuclear course. In the
period between 1977 to 1979, momentum of Pakistan's nuclear
development was at its peak. Most assessments of Pakistan's
nuclear potential concluded that in view of the speed of its
nuclear development in that period, Pakistan would have
acquired nuclear weapons by 1981_1982.1 On the contrary, it is
equally relevant to note that with the augmentation of its
conventional military capability through a limited force
° Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of
India, Iraq , Libya and Pakistan, p. 17.
" ibid. Some other U.S. Congressional estimates and
independent studies have similar conclusions.
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modernization programme with the U.S. assistance in the period
1980-88, (backdrop of the Afghan conflict), Pakistan demonstr-
ated a willingness to slow down its nuclear drive, if not stop
it altogether. The Pakistani case highlighted an other tech-
nological and financial aspect of the non-proliferation
problem. There is a huge international nuclear black market
which any potential proliferating state can successfully
exploit if it has the requisite resources.
Pakistan eventually succeeded in operating a gas
centrifuge uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. The plant was
established through a series of covert purchases of equipment
and material from Western countries, which included: electri-
cal inverters from Britain and Canada; stainless steel vessels
from Italy; aluminum rods and vacuum pumps from West Germany;
and vacuum valves, and evaporation and condensation systems
from Switzerland. 72
 It was the work of Bhutto regime. It is
born out from Dr. Khan's observation that without Bhutto,
there would have been no Kahuta.'3
There are different and often conflicting estima-
tes of the number of centrifuges operating at Kahuta and its
output capacity. In June 1984, Senator Alan Cranston wrote
that Pakistan had completed 1,000 centrifuges at Kahuta by
1983, which would give it a capability of producing 45 kg of
enriched uranium per year. 74
 In early 1986, FOREIGN REPORT
stated Kahuta's capacity at 14,000 centrifuges, but worked
out a relatively small annual output of 10 kg of enriched
uranium per year.' 5
 In August 1986, a Pakistani source repor-
72 FOREIGN REPORT, 18 June 1980, pp. 2-3.
' Malik, p. 24.
' Alan Cranston, 'Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. Na-
tional Security Interests', CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 21 June
1984, p. S7901.
" 'Inside Kahuta', FOREIGN REPORT 1 May 1986, p. 1.
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ted that Kahuta was "rumoured to have 1,000 centrifuges,
against a planned capacity of 2,000 - 3,000 centrifuges"." Yet
another Pakistani publication has described Kahuta's centrif-
uge capacity at 10,000, capable of producing 150 kg of
enriched uranium per year which is estimated to be enough for
6 to 7 nuclear weapons." A similar assessment by David Hart
concluded that Pakistan had enough centrifuges to produce
enriched uranium for six weapons annually.' 8
 An Israeli letter
distributed at the U.N. corroborates the above assessment of
seven nuclear weapons per year, once all 10,000 centrifuges go
into operation.' 9
 The disparity of estimates about Kahuta's
output capacity is due to a lack of precise information about
the exact centrifuges which operate at the Kahuta plant.
In an apparently more reliable assessment based upon
U.S. government sources, David Aibright estimates that
Pakistan has installed between 1,000 to 14,000 centrifuges at
Kahuta, but it has difficulty in operating more than 1,000•e0
According to Aibright, Pakistan could produce 50 kg of
weapons-grade uranium per year.°' A Carnegie Report which
relied on Aibright's study, took 1,000 centrifuges as an
'acceptable assessment' of Kahuta's operational capacity and
21 to 63 kg of weapons-grade material as lower and higher
" THE MUSLIM (Islamabad), 09 August 1986.
Malik, p. 121.
" David Hart, NUCLEAR POWER IN INDIA (London, George
Allen & Unwin, 1982-4), P. 134.
" Israeli Letter distributed at the U.N. General Assernb-
ly. A/36/298, p. 3, cited by Kapur, p. 210.
°° David Aibright, 'Pakistan's bomb-making capacity',
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS June 1987, pp. 30-31.
(David Aibright is a staff scientist at the Federation of
American Scientists in Washington, D.C.).
ei ibid.
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estimates of its output capacity.°2
Since the production of 45-50 kg of weapons-grade
material per year is a common numerator in Senator Cranston's
study, Aibright's assessment, the Carnegie Report and the
Pakistani source, its accuracy appears more reliable. Accord-
ing to Malik, the Plant was completed at a cost of 200 million
dollars from 1976 to 1988.' It appears an under-estimation of
the cost incurred on Kahuta plant in view of the highly
expensive modern technology and widespread network of interna-
tional operations involved in the process of its acquisition.
There is no official denial or confirmation of these estimates
from the government of Pakistan. It has maintained a complete
secrecy about Kahuta's output capacity and the approximate
date of its operation. Dr. Khan spoke about the imperative of
secrecy in its formative phase: 'When towards the end of 1976,
the foundation for the project was laid, it was decided that
the project would be kept secret until such time when we had
produced the necessary equipment for the project' 84
2. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY: AN ASSESSMENT
There has been a controversy since 1980 about the
timing of Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capa-
bility. Dr. Khan confirmed for the first time in 1984 that
Pakistan had mastered the process of uranium enrichment
technology and the Kahuta plant was processing low-grade, non-
82 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY: Report of
the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian
Security (Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 1988), p. 16.
83 Malik, p. 129.
84 Dr. A.Q. Khan's interview with a Pakistani Weekly,
HURMAT, 14 March 1985, pp. 1-5.
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weapons uranium. 85
 When asked how soon Pakistan was capable of
producing nuclear weapons, he added that if in the interest of
the country's solidarity, the President of Pakistan felt an
extreme emergy and gave the team of scientists an important
mission, it would not disappoint the nation. 86
 In August 1984,
FINANCIAL TIMES reported that Pakistan had succeeded in the
indigenous development of precision engineering capability at
Karachi where it could make stainless steel spheres for
encasing uranium in an implosion type atomic bomb, and curved
steel plates used to surround the conventional explosive which
triggers the bomb. 8
 Pakistan attempted to import these
components in 1983 but was stopped by Western countries. 88
 In
March 1986, it was reported that Pakistan had achieved a
capacity to enrich 30 % uranium at Kahuta. 89
 In November 1986,
WASHINGTON POST, citing classified U.S. intelligence reports,
wrote that Pakistan had started producing weapons-grade
uranium (over 90 %) at Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Plant."
This was considered the most significant tech-
nological landmark which Pakistan had crossed in its quest
for a nuclear weapons capability. After that time, General
Zia's persistent rhetoric about the entirely peaceful nature
of Pakistan's nuclear programme subsided. In March 1987, Zia
85 
'Scientist Affirms Pakistan Capable of Uranium Enrich-
ment, Weapons Production', NAWA-I-WAQT (Lahore), 10 February
1984, p. 1, and 'Pakistan's Nuclear Chief Say It Could Build
The Bomb', WASHINGTON POST, 10 February 1984.
86 ibid.
Simon Henderson, 'Why Pakistan may not need to test a
nuclear device', THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 14 August 1984.
88 ibid.
89 
'Pakistan Persists', FOREIGN REPORT, 27 March 1986,
pp.1-2.
° Bob Woodward, 'Pakistan Reported Near Atom-Arms Produc-
tion', WASHINGTON POST, 4 November 1986.
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acknowledged for the first time that Pakistan had acquired a
nuclear weapons capability. He stated, "Pakistan has the
capability of building the bomb. You can write today that
Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes".'1
 However, Zia
hastened to add that Pakistan had no intention of making
nuclear weapons.'2
 The denial appeared diplomatic. It had been
reported earlier that Pakistan was involved in R & D techni-
ques since 1982 for manufacturing nuclear-weapons components;
before it finally mastered the enrichment technology for
weapon-grade material.' 3
 It had established a Weapons Design
Directorate at its Wah Munitions Factory in l98O.' In July
1985, John Scali reported in ABC's 'Good Morning America' that
Pakistan had successfully test-fired a non-nuclear trigger-
ing package."
On 17 August 1985, FINANCIAL TIMES reported that
Pakistan had unsuccessfully attempted to acquire Flash X-ray
machines from the U.S. Hewlett-Packard company." These
machines are used to take split-second photos of very rapid
processes through solid materials and to observe dummy nuclear
cores as they undergo compression following the detonation of
a triggering package.' 7
 The report admitted that the machines
91 
'Knocking at the Nuclear Door', WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE,
30 March 1987, pp.42-44.
92 ibid.
' 'Zia's Road to Bomb', FOREIGN REPORT, 26 August 1982,
pp. 1-2, and BBC's documentary PROJECT 706 "ISLAMIC BOMB".
' ibid.
" John Scali, 'Good Morning America', American Broad-
casting Company, 11 July 1985; referred in NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY, pp. 17-22.
96 'U.S. Halts High-Tech Camera Sale To Pakistan',
FINANCIAL TIMES, 17 August 1985.
" ibid.
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sought by Pakistan were too small to be used for nuclear
purposes, and that Pakistan intended to calibrate conventional
artillery pieces with the machines. However, the U.S. off 1-
cials became concerned because the techniques for operating
the small machines were the same as the larger flash X-Ray
apparatus which Pakistan had acquired from Sweden in 1982.98 In
December 1985, Pakistan acquired a consignment of six flash X-
Ray machines from the Swedish firm, Scandiflash, using fake
company names to disguise the involvement. 99
 It was further
reported that Pakistan was exploring alternatives to flash X-
Ray machines for verifying the effectiveness of nuclear
weapons triggering package. 10° In late 1986, the WASHINGTON
POST reported that Pakistan had achieved the capability to
produce nuclear weapons in a matter of two weeks.101
Indian sources suspect that Pakistan' s rapid nuclear
development is a result of extensive nuclear co-operation
between Pakistan and China. It is alleqed that the later
helped Pakistan with technical assistance in the installation
of the uranium enrichment plant, a nuclear weapons design
including nuclear test data and reprocessing technology.' 02
 It
was also indicated that China might have made available to
Pakistan a nuclear test-site, or be involved in a joint
exercise for the detonation of its nuclear device. 103 To
98 ibid.
Christer Larsson and Jan Melin, 'Third World Countries
Buy Swedish Nuclear Weapons Technology', NY TEKNIK, 2 May
1986, p. 1, translated in JPRS/NPD, 30 July 1986, p. 1.
'°o ibid.
101 
'Pakistan Reported Near Atom-Arms Production',
WASHINGTON POST, 4 November 1986.
102 P.K. S. Namboodiri, 'Pakistan Links: Axis with
China', World Focus, No. 55, July 1984, p. 17.
103 IDSA Review, 18 (11), November 1985, p. 877.
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further substantiate their claims, Indian sources generally
allude to Bhutto's statement made during his trial under the
Zia regime about his endeavour to promote Pakistan's nuclear
capability before his government was overthrown. The statement
was smuggled Out of jail and published in his book from New
Delhi in which Bhutto indicated about nuclear cooperation with
China: 'In the present context, the agreement of mine,
concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achieve-
ment and contribution to the survival of our people and our
nation' 104
Pakistan was thought to have made significant
progress to acquire a nuclear weapons capability by 1988. This
view was strengthened in early 1988 when U.S. President,
Ronald Reagan determined under Section 670 (a) (1] of the
Foreign Assistance Act that the material, equipment or
technology being acquired by Pakistan was to be used in the
manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.' 05
 However, he
further determined that ending U.S. assistance to Pakistan
"would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United
States nonproliferation objectives and otherwise jeopardize
the common defense and security".° 6
 He therefore, waived the
prohibition of assistance required by the Act. 107
 On 18th
November 1988, he again certified to Congress that Pakistan
did not possess a nuclear device, but added that his judge-
104 Bhutto, IF I AM ASSASSINATED, p. 203. Bhutto was
referring to a nuclear cooperation agreement signed between
China and Pakistan in 1976.
The U.S. Presidential Documents, Presidential Deter-
mination No. 88-5 of January 15, 1988, FEDERAL REGISTER, 53




merit was based upon a strict interpretation of the law.'° 8 It
only meant that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive
device and not that it was not attempting to develop or has
already developed the relevant capacities.'° 9
 Later, he
expressed concern that if Pakistan's nuclear capabilities
continued to grow and evidence of its activities accumulated,
a Presidential certification may be difficult or impossible to
make with any degree of certainty." 0
 He also emphasized his
apprehension that the U.S. was extremely concerned by the
continued risk of a nuclear arms race in the South Asian
Subcontinent in view of the indications that India might also
be stepping up its own nuclear weapons programme and delivery
•hhl
According to FOREIGN REPORT, Pakistan's nuclear
ambitions became "conclusive" towards the end of 1988 with
the development of a "deliverable" bomb when Pakistani
scientists perfected the bomb-design and the detonation
mechanism.' 12 A concern was expressed that China might arrange
a nuclear test for Pakistan at Lop Nor." 3 The Report believed
that the bomb was designed to be delivered from beneath the
wing of an F-16 aircraft, and the possibility of flight
training could not be entirely ruled out." 4 The Report is
generally not that reliable. However, its validity about
ioa FEDERAL REGISTER, 6 December 1988, p. 49111 and
'Reagan Avoids Pakistan Nuclear-Weapons Issue', Far Eastern
Economic Review, 5 January 1989.
109 ibid.
110 NEW YORK TIMES, 29 January 1989, p. 13.
" ibid.
112 





Pakistan was partially substantiated in 1989 when the Director
of CIA, William Webster, informed the U.S. Congress that
Pakistan was "engaged in developing a nuclear capability".'15
In October 1990, U.s. President, George Bush, refused to
certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons and
Congress Cut off the economic and military aid for the
financial year 1990_1991.h16 More recently, FINANCIAL TIMES has
reported the possible illegal export of sensitive computer
material with nuclear application to Pakistan by a Norwegian
computer firm, Norsk Data, which had previously sold six NOR
5400 ND computers to it." 7
 As Pakistan is known to have been
producing weapons-grade material since late 1986, its total
stockpile of such material could be around 250 kg, worth 10 to
15 nuclear weapons by late 1991." Pakistan has about 37 to 38
F-16 aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons after re-
quisite modifications. Pakistan has also two types of locally
developed surface-to-surface missiles, Ha ft-I and Ha ft-Il with
a range of 80 km and 300 km respectively."9
 The guidance
system for the missiles was designed and developed by Dr.
Khan, the head of the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment plant.' 2° There
is no evidence as yet that the missiles have a nuclear
capability.
" 'CIA Says Pakistan Is working To Gain Nuclear Capa-
bility', INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 21 May 1989.
116 'Pakistan "Secretly enriching uranium", THE INDEPEN-
DENT, 6 November 1990.
'U.K. inquiry renews fear on Pakistan N-Plans',
FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 July 1991.
See Appendices IX to X.
" 'Pakistan in missile build claim', Janes Defence
Weekly , 18 February 1989.
120 
'Pakistan develops missiles', Flight International,
15 April 1989.
182
3. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY UNDER Z.A. BRUTTO
From 1947 to 1958, Pakistani leaders, unlike their
Indian counterparts, showed a remarkable lack of understand-
ing about the potential role of nuclear energy in the indust-
rial and scientific development of the country. Pakistan also
lacked a scientist of Dr. Bhabha's calibre to develop plans
for a nuclear energy programme. Unlike Dr. Bhabha, his Pakis-
tani counterpart, Dr. Nazir Ahmad, never enjoyed a comparable
access to government. The PAEC neither had the requisite
administrative autonomy nor financial support to plan and
execute the development of a nuclear power programme. Pakis-
tan Army demonstrated a complete lack of interest in the
nuclear programme despite the fact that it had a considerab-
le say in the country's foreign and strategic polIcy since the
early 1950s. It was neither interested in it as a technologi-
cal capability nor a political option. Pakistani Foreign
Office and the Ministry of Defence had the same attitude.
Pakistan's nuclear history actually begins with the
takeover of General Ayub Khan's military government in 1958.
Though the PAEC was established in 1955, it was revitalized as
an effective statutory organization in 1965. While Ayub's
government demonstrated an eagerness to promote the use of
nuclear energy for civilian purposes, it was sharply divided
on its role for military employment. Ayub himself and the
Chairman of the PAEC, Dr. I.H. Usmani were committed to "peac-
eful use only".' 21 Bhutto and his supporters favoured the
development of a nuclear capability that had a potential for
an eventual nuclear weapons option.' 22
 Bhutto recommended to
develop a nuclear weapons capability without regard to its
121 zalmay Khalilzad, 'Pakistan', in Joseph Golciblat
(ed.), NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE WHY AND WHEREFORE (London,
Taylor & Francis, 1985), p. 133.
122 ibid.
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economic viability. On the other hand, Dr. Usmani stressed the
peace-bound objectives and economic viability of Pakistan's
nuclear programme. Ayub seemed to accept Usmani's view by
rejecting Bhutto's suggestion. If Ashok Kapur's opinion can be
believed, Ayub's strategic thinking appears naive about the
nature of nuclear weapons when he reportedly stated, "We will
buy the bomb off the shelf if India goes nuclear".' 23
 However,
Kapur's finding is questionable for two reasons: first, he
offers no evidence in support of such a controversial remark
and second, Ayub's public image of being an experienced
General defies that impression. However, Ayub unequivocally
rejected pressure from Bhutto and his group to develop a
nuclear weapons capability.
The genesis of Pakistan's aspirations for a nuclear
weapons capability date to the mid-1960s. Bhutto stated for
the first time in 1965 that Pakistan would acquire a nuclear
weapons capability because of the threat India's nuclear
capability posed to the Pakistani security. He said, 'If India
developed an atomic bomb, we will too develop one even if we
have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry because there
is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb' 124 Bhutto's
statement was widely endorsed by cross-section of Pakistani
elite, particularly the press which made frantic calls for
making nuclear weapons in view of India's nuclear develop-
ment 125
However, Bhutto's statement is generally misunder-
stood by overlooking its two aspects. First, the catch-
phrase, 'to eat grass' to make the bomb is usually consider-
123 Kapur, p. 26.
124 Z.A. Bhutto, AWAKENING THE PEOPLE, p. 21. Also see
Niazi, p. 77.
125 
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ed independently, or is detached from its original context of
responding to India's quest for a nuclear weapons capability
after the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964. Many Pakis-
tanis like Bhutto were doubtful about the peaceful uses of
nuclear explosives programme initiated by Shastri's govern-
ment. 12' To presume that Bhutto being a foreign minister did
not has any knowledge of the direction and depth of India's
nuclear is not tenable. The evidence suggests the contrary. In
his book published in 1969, Bhutto demonstrated his awareness
of Indian nuclear intentions and believed that India would
follow China and detonate a nuclear device.' 2
 He anticipated
India going nuclear for reasons of power and security.' 28
 He
spoke about the inadequacy of a conventional force posture and
advocated the development of nuclear technology, not as a
short-term military end but a long-term security objective.'2'
After leaving Ayub's government in early 1967, Bhutto became
more explicit about the Indian nuclear threat to Pakistan. He
added, 'Pakistan's position is entirely different because, for
us, the nuclear threat is real and immediate as India is
reported to be on the threshold of becoming nuclear' •130
Second, it should not be ignored that the statement to eat
grass to make the bomb was made in an emotionall y
 charad
environment immediately after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict.
Bhutto's statement was integral to the issue of Indian nuclear
weapons capability and therefore, cannot be detached from its
126 See Chapter Four, section 1 on Shastri's nuclear
policy.
127 Z.A. Bhutto, THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE (Karachi, Oxford
University press, 1969), pp. 152-156.
128 ibid, pp. 153-56.
129 ibid.
'° Bhutto, AWAKENING THE PEOPLE, p. 19.
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original context.
It is relevant at this point to discuss Bhutto's
personal traits, which were intrinsic components of Bhutto's
personality and would help in understanding his nuclear
policy. As a young foreign minister, he was known to be
flamboyant, emotional and verbose person with a penchant for
grandiose. 3' He had a natural proclivity for rhetoric,
insinuation and use of metaphors in expression, like; 'We will
fight for thousand years', and 'We will make nuclear weapons
even if we have to eat grass.' 32
 On the other hand, it is
noteworthy that after he left Ayub's cabinet, he promoted his
political career through nuclear nationalism. It is not being
suggested that Bhutto did not harbour ambitions to pursue a
nuclear course. Bhutto was undoubtedly the sole architect of
Pakistan's nuclear programme in the period 1965-1977. He had
been chiefly responsible in setting up nuclear institutions
like PINSTECH and Centre for Nuclear Studies.' 33
 Pakistan's
only research reactor, Pakistan Research Reactor (PARR-i) and
power reactor, KANUPP, were established under his super-
vision. 134
 After assuming power on 20 December 1971, he
convened a meeting of the Pakistani nuclear scientists on 20
January 1972 at Multan where he reportedly asked them to
deliver him the so-called "Islamic Bomb". 135
 This story
contradicts the cautiously worded official statement which
Bhutto personally made at the inaugural session of the meeting
'' Oriana Fallaci, INTER VIEW WITH HISTORY (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 185,
132 Z.A. Bhutto, RESHAPING FOREIGN POLICY: 1958-19966
(Rawalpindi, Pakistan Publications, 1972-77), p. 224.
133 PINSTECH 1965-1985, (Islamabad, Pakistan Institute of
Science and Technology, 1985), pp. 3-5.
' Annual RePort 1973-74, (Islamabad, PAEC, 1974), p. 13.
' Krosney and Weissman, pp. 44-46.
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at Multan:
Nuclear Energy is essential for the progress of
mankind, for the progress of our people. We need
nuclear energy, nuclear knowledge and nuclear
research in Pakistan perhaps more than anywhere
else.136
That meeting is usually cited to substantiate the
argument that Bhutto's decision to go nuclear preceded the
first Indian demonstration of a nuclear weapons capability in
1974.137 This argument ignores that Mrs. Indira Gandhi also
made-up her mind to detonate a nuclear device in the immediate
aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. 138
 It is probable that
neither leader knew about the exact date of the other's
decision. However, there were public reports in 1970 that
India had decided to go ahead with the development of nuc-
lear explosives and it was expected to detonate the first test
within two years. 1" Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, Secretary of the DAE
and Chairman of the Indian AEC, indicated that possibility in
less than two years by saying, 'It is just a question of
putting the bits together' •140
The 1974 nuclear test provided Bhutto an evident
rationale to pursue a nuclear weapons capability and he became
more vocal about the urgency to meet the Indian nuclear
threat. He stated, 'Nobody will be able to stop us from
pursuing this course of action now'.' 4' Bhutto's government
2	
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137 Kapur, p. 137 & 141.
138 See Chapter Four, Section 5.
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140 ibid.
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appeared certain that the Indian nuclear explosion was a
weapon-test and professed to know the precise quantity of
fissile material available to India for producing nuclear
weapons. During a debate on a Pakistani resolution seeking
assurances for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) at the Islamic
Foreign Minister's Conference in Kuala Lumpur on 24 June 1974,
Pakistani Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Aziz Ahmad, told a closed session that India possessed
material for 17 plutonium bombs and claimed that the estimate
had been confirmed by Canada.'42
Bhutto's statements were also self-contradictory.
For example, on a visit to Tehran in 1976, he was asked
whether Pakistan intended to produce a response to India's
"Smiling Bhudha" (code name for the 1974 nuclear test)?'43
Bhutto retorted: 'Back home, we have the statue of a starv-
ing Bhudha' .'" Another exposition of his contradictory nuclear
policy is reflected in an interview in which he conceded that
Pakistan had no military advantage in nuclear weapons but he
would like to have the nuclear weapons technology, 'So that
all options would be open to Pakistan, though we would not
exercise the military option'
Pakistan never really recovered from its security
dilemma after independence and it became worse after 1970-
71. Pakistan suffered a humiliating defeat in 1971 and the
morale of its armed forces was at a low ebb. The maintenance
of a power equilibrium with India seemed out of question be-
cause of its larger economy, geography and demography. The
142 'India Can Make 17 A-Bombs', DAILY TELEGRPPH, 25 June
1974.
143 Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July 1976, p. 37.
'" ibid.
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imbalance was exacerbated by India's strong industrial base,
technological superiority and greater defence production
capacity. Still worse was the U.S. arms embargo imposed during
the 1970-71 war. Bhutto not only saw the development of a
nuclear weapons capability as psychologically reassuring for
the armed forces and the population at large, but also a
diplomatic leverage against friends and foes alike. Addition-
ally, he intended to use a potential nuclear weapons capabi-
lity as a bargaining chip with the U.S. to have the arms
embargo lifted. In an interview with Walter Schwarz, Bhutto
stated:
We must have a conventional deterrent. If not, then
we'll say we can't do anything but explode some sort
of nuclear device... .We are not racing for the bomb.
If we get even a modest contribution, we shall not
find it necessary to proceed.'4'
Similarly in a statement reported by the PAKISTAN TIMES, he
said, 'Ultimately, if our backs are to the wall and we have
absolutely no option, in that event, this decision about going
nuclear will have to be taken' .' On her return to Pakistan in
April 1986, Benazir Bhutto admitted that the immediate
objective of her father's nuclear programme was a trade-off
for seeking conventional weapons.'48
The U.S. initially considered Bhutto's nuclear
policy as a melodramatic attempt to pressure Pakistan's
Western allies into underwriting its security by lifting the
arms embargo and provide modern arms. 149
 Therefore, there was
no immediate inclination to reward him. Ultimately, Bhutto
146 THE OBSERVER, 1 December 1974.
' PAKISTAN TIMES (Rawalpindi), 27 December 1974, p. 1.
'° 'We Want to Bring The Popular Rule', India Toda y, XI(9), 1 May 1986, p. 15.
' 'Pakistan bids for a nuclear niche', The Christian
Science Monitor, 18 October 1974.
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succeeded in getting the embargo lifted. An agreement was
signed for acquiring A-7 fighter-bombers and phoenix missiles
from the U.S.'5° However, by that time, he had already run into
controversy about the nuclear reprocessing plant deal and the
newly elected Carter Administration cancelled the arms agree-
ment.
However, it is unrealistic to say that Bhutto's
nuclear policy was 'ad hoc' and 'unplanned' It was not
cost-effective from economic and commercial standpoint as he
acted in a great hurry to acquire a nuclear weapons capabi-
lity. Above all, he could not offer an acceptable justifica-
tion for the use of reprocessed plutonium from the plant he
sought. It is equally unrealistic and sweeping to say, "Ehut-
to's determination to go ahead with the nuclear reprocessing
plant and the bomb may have cost him his life" because, as he
claimed in his memoirs, Dr. Kissinger threatened to make a
'horrible exarrthple of him' if he did not abandon the repro-
cessing deal.' 52
 Such observations reflect a lack of under-
standing of the dynamics of domestic politics in Pakistan in
the 1970s, particularly the rift between Pakistan Peoples
Party's (PPP) leadership which was deposed from power and the
military government. The underlying presumptions of such
observations give the impression that General Zia and his as-
sociates killed Bhutto at the U.S. behest for making the bomb.
This contradicts Zia's record in the field of Pakistan's
nuclear development. Zia not only kept the development of a
nuclear weapons capability intact, but increased the speed. He
was nearly two years in government when in April 1979 the U.S.
suspended all economic and military assistance to Pakistan for
seeking a nuclear weapons capability. The available evidence
150 ibid.
'' Kapur, pp. 144-145.
152 ibid, p. 145.
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does not permit to establish a linkage between Zia's trial of
Bhutto, his eventual execution, and the implied threat by
Kissinger to Bhutto.
Bhutto's problem was his inflexible attitude and
contradictory objectives. If he wanted to bargain a potential
nuclear weapons capability for a conventional military
capability, he failed to create an impression after the U.S.
arms embargo was lifted, that he was willing to negotiate
about the reprocessing plant or nuclear pursuits. In fact, he
was full of contradictions, and of which he was not aware of.
He had fallen out of favour in Washington because of his
controversial economic policy of nationalization and social-
ism, but pressurized the U.S. for arms supplies. He also
failed to develop a rapport with the Soviet leadership due to
his opposition to the Tashkant Declaration.'" During his visit
to Moscow in 1972, he did not succeed in improving Pakistan-
Soviet relations. He could do business with Mrs. Gandhi by
signing the Simla Agreement, but she too regarded him as
"unbalanced" and therefore, unreliable.'54
It is also not a sound judgement that Pakistan
sought the devolution of international power through the
development of a nuclear weapons capability.' 55
 Pakistan's
nuclear objectives during the Bhutto period were not to seek
changes in the international power structure. Its primary
motivation was to enhance its security vis-a-vis India. Bhutto
wanted to compensate for Pakistan's conventional military
weakness through the development of a nuclear weapons capa-
bility. A nuclear capability was considered, in addition to
'" The declaration was signed at Tashkant in the Soviet
union on 31 December 1965 by President Ayub and Prime Mini-
ster Shastri.
154 Fallaci, p. 145.
'" Kapur, p. 13.
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its quest for a security equilibrium with India in the region,
as an instrument for bargaining with the allies and adver-
saries. Generally speaking, he thought it a trump card in his
foreign policy. 15' However, contrary to India, Pakistan did not
challenge the international non-proliferation regime. But it
did refuse to join, until India did the same.
4. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY UNDER GENERAL ZIA AND
INDIA-PAKISTAN ACTION-REACTION NUCLEAR PARADIGM
Despite the fact that Bhutto's pursuit of a nuclear
weapons capability became public in 1975-76, no apprehensions
were expressed in India by the government, media, or the
public. India's leadership did not take seriously the probable
Pakistani response to its 1974 nuclear test. Dr. Homi Sethna,
Chairman of the Indian AEC, contemptuously dismissed the pos-
sibility of a Pakistani nuclear response to the Indian nuclear
test by saying that Pakistan neither had the technology nor
the capable men to produce nuclear weapons. 15' Although there
was an on-going diplomatic row between Pakistan and the U.S.
about the former's nuclear intentions in relation to the
Franco-Pakistan reprocessing plant, the possibility does exist
that the precise information about the uranium capability
acquired by Pakistan might not be fully known. A U.S. Congres-
sional study suggested that there was a considerable under-
estimation of Pakistan's nuclear capability when it had
virtually acquired most of the equipment for the Kahuta
156 Suleiman Taseer, BHUTTO: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
(London, Ithaca, 1979), p. 154.
'' Dr. Sethna's observation is cited in THE MUSLIM
(Islamabad), 1st March 1987, in its report on DR. A.Q. Khan's
controversial interview to an Indian journalist, Kuldip
Nayyar. The interview was also published in THE OBSERVER, 1st
March, 1987.
192
Enrichment plant. It stated, 'All in all, there is little
solid public information to show that Pakistan now has the
capacity to independently produce nuclear weapons material
without foreign aid' •158 Such assessments might have con-
tributed to India's disregard of a Pakistani response. Overall
India-Pakistan relations were also moving towards normaliza-
tion under the framework of Simla Agreement.
In contrast to Bhutto, General Zia proved more adept
in managing Pakistan's nuclear policy. He deliberately
generated ambiguity, took calculated risks, and skillfully
exploited the international environment. He took advantage of
the loopholes in U.S. non-proliferation policy. During the
first two years of his regime, Zia presided over the most
rapid development of a nuclear weapons capability for which
much groundwork was already laid by Bhutto. In 1978-79, the
Carter Administration terminated economic and military
assistance to Pakistan on the basis of the Symington Amend-
ment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The
NNPA mandated termination of the U.S. aid to any country
pursuing a nuclear weapons development, including the pro-
duction of weapons-grade material, development of a nuclear
device or a nuclear explosive capability. 159
 In the assessment
of U.S. officials, Pakistan's efforts to acquire a uranium
enrichment plant were directed at achieving such a capability
and they demanded full-scope safeguards if aid were to be
renewed 160
Anal ysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Ca pabilities of
India, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, p. 18.
' Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas R.
Pickering before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy,
Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services, Committee on
Government Affairs, 1 May 1979; in, Hearin g on Nuclear
Proliferation: the Situation in India and Pakistan (Washing-
ton DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 10.
160 ibid.
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Initially, Zia took exception to the criticism of
Pakistan's nuclear pursuits and rejected the allegations of
underlying military intentions. Speaking in Rawalpindi on 27
July 1979, he stated that international pressure had been
directed against Pakistan despite assurances that the objec-
tives of its nuclear programme were entirely peaceful. 161
 He
added that in view of the paucity of energy resources in
Pakistan, there was no other option but to acquire nuclear
technology. 162
 He refused to accept full-scope safeguards and
vowed to remain steadfast stating, 'We shall eat crumbs but
will not allow our national interest to be compromised in any
manner whatsoever' •163 On 28 October 1979, TASS reported Zia's
statement that he reserved the right to detonate a nuclear
explosive device if it was considered essential for the
further development of Pakistan's nuclear programme, which he
insisted was peaceful. 164
 This was an obvious departure from
the previous policy, under which a PNE was considered to be
indistinguishable from a weapon-test.
Zia reduced the intensity of his criticism of inter-
national objections about Pakistan's nuclear policy after the
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.
By then, the prospects of renewal of the U.S. economic and
military assistance to Pakistan had become obvious. But he was
shrewd enough to reject an offer of 400 million dollars from
an administration which remained in office only a few weeks
more, dismissing it as "peanuts't . In January 1981, he reiter-
ated that Pakistan's entire nuclear programme was geared to
161 THE PAKISTAN TIMES (Lahore), 28 July 1979, P. 1.
162 ibid.
163 ibid.
'" WORLDWIDE REPORT: NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERA-
TION, No. 20, December 1979, p. 15.
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fulfil the country's energy requirement. 165
 He said that there
was no justification to continually deprive it of nuclear
technology for being a Muslim, developing and non-aligned
state. While negotiating the economic and military aid package
with the U.S., Zia deliberately fostered ambiguity and
refrained from providing verifiable assurances that Pakistan
would not produce nuclear weapons. Mr. James L. Buckley, the
U.S. Under Secretary of State, testified to Congress that
General Zia gave "absolute assurances" on one hand that
Pakistan had no plans to develop nuclear weapons. But on the
other, he refused to promise that Pakistan would not conduct
a nuclear explosion if his scientists considered that neces-
sary for the country's nuclear programme, which he insistd
was "peaceful" •166
Under General Zia' s military regime Pakistan emerged
as the most significant factor in the determination of the
momentum of Indian nuclear weapons development. The renewal of
military and economic assistance to Pakistan by the Reagan
Administration, which invoked exemption to the Symington
Amendment, caused much apprehension in India. Mrs. Gandhi, who
returned back to power in 1980, suspected American connivance
in Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons capability, and often
spoke against American support to Pakistan. In an interview in
April 1982, she openly criticized the U.S. 'acceptance' of
Pakistan's nuclear capability. She said,
The knowledge we have gained purely from the tem
sources, American and otherwise, is that they (Paki-
stan) are going in for a bomb. Now, America has ac-
cepted that situation, so far as we can make out.'67
" MORNING NEWS (Karachi), 30 April 1981, p. 4.
166 'Pakistan Seen Nearly Capable of Atom Bomb', INTERNA-
TIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 9 December 1981.
167 Indira Gandhi, PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI: STATE-
MENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY; APRIL SEPTEMBER 1982 (New Delhi,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982), p. 9.
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The traditional hostility and suspicion between the two
neighbours surfaced again after limited improvement under the
Simla Agreement. Now it spilled over to the nuclear field and
added further complexities to the intricate dynamics of
nuclear proliferation in South Asia. India-Pakistan nuclear
policies became interlocked in an action-reaction syndrome,
triggered by distorted perceptions and historical animosity.
Any move by one motivated suspicion by the other, who respond-
ed by escalating its own nuclear development.
Given the history of Indo-Pakistan relations,
India's apprehension of a Pakistani nuclear threat is under-
standable. Nothing could have been more disturbing for India
than a Pakistani nuclear force. However, there was little that
India could do to stop it. It could not mobilize interna-
tional diplomatic pressure on Pakistan because of its own
rejection of the NPT, full-scope safeguards, and other
elements of the non-proliferation regime. It could only modify
Pakistan's nuclear policy by demonstrating a willingness to
accept corresponding limits on its own nuclear programme. But
Mrs. Gandhi seemed to rule out that option.
In December 1982, a WASHINGTON POST correspondent,
quoting U.S. intelligence sources, reported about Indian
contingency plans to launch pre-emptive strikes against
Pakistani nuclear installations, particularly Kahuta, as a
last resort. 1" In response, Zia immediately signalled that
such an attempt by India would be considered an act of war,
against which Pakistan would retaliate with all the available
means. Press accounts about the possibility of pre-emptive
strikes against Kahuta by the Indian Air Force surfaced again
Milton R. Benjamin, 'India Said to Eye-Raid Pakistani
A-Plants', WASHINGTON POST, 20 December 1982.
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in 1984 during a CIA briefing to the U.S. Senators.' 69
 Accord-
ing to this account, Indian military experts thought that the
only way to stop Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme was to
destroy its capability.'70
Indian perceptions of a Pakistani nuclear threat
increased in June 1984 when press reports based on U.S.
intelligence sources revealed Chinese assistance to Pakistan
in mastering the uranium enrichment process.' 71
 As noted
earlier, it was reported that China also provided Pakistan
the weapon design of its 4th nuclear test carried out in
1966 . 172
 China and Pakistan denied the reports. According to
Senator Alan Cranston, Reagan Administration officials
believed that Pakistan was engaged in designing nuclear
weapons and the acquisition of related technological infra-
structure.'73
 However, the Administration refused to support
proposed legislation to cut off aid to Pakistan. A cut off
was considered detrimental to U.S. security interests because
of the Afghanistan conflict.' 74
 Unhappy over the Administration
decision, Congress enacted the Pressler amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act, which instituted an annual certifica-
tion by the President that "Pakistan does not possess a
169 NUCLEONICS WEEK, 25 (38), 20 September 1984, p. 4.
170 ibid.
" Leslie H. Geib, 'Pakistan Links Peril U.S.-China
Pact', NEW YORK TIMES, 22 June 1984.
172 Leslie Geib, 'Peking Said To Balk At Atomic Pledges',
NEW YORK TIMES, 23 June 1984.
'" Senator Alan Cranston, 'Nuclear Proliferation and U.S.
National Security', CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 21, 1984, p.
S7901.
174 United States Securit y
 Interests in South Asia: A
Staff Report, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
(Washington DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).
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nuclear explosive device" for the aid-package to continue.175
Mrs. Gandhi described the Pakistani nuclear threat
as a "qualitatively new phenomenon in our security environ-
ment". 1" Under the spectre of a Pakistani nuclear threat, she
accelerated the enlargement of India's nuclear weapons
capability until her death in October 1984.177 India speeded
up work for the reprocessing of safeguards-free plutonium from
MAPS I & II reactors at the Trombay Reprocessing Plant which
was refurbished to increase its output capacity from 30 to 100
metric tons per year. 178
 Reprocessing of plutonium also started
at the Tarapur reprocessing Plant (PREFRE)
Pakistan also speeded up the development of its
nuclear weapons capability to cope with the Indian nuclear
threat. According to Dr. Spector's assessment, based upon
interviews with the official U.S. sources, there was a growing
support for "all components available characterization" of
Pakistan's nuclear programme in mid-1986.' 8° These reports put
India under considerable pressure not to let Pakistan take a
lead in the nuclear field. In late 1986, he further reported
about Pakistan's acquisition of "the essentials of a rudimen-
tary nuclear deterrent of perhaps three to six nuclear
devices" which was considered to have caused a change of
175 The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act 1961 Section 620E(e),
1985.
176 INDIAN EXPRESS, 15 October 1984.
177 Nuclear India: De partment of Atomic Ener gy , Govern-
ment of India, 24 (5 & 6), Bombay, 1986. For details, see next
chapter (Six), section 2 on Mrs. Gandhi's nuclear policy.
178 'India's Supply of Unsafeguarded PU Grows As Repro-
cessing of MAPS Fuel Begins', NUCLEAR FUEL, 11 August 1986,
p. 3.
179 ibid.
'o Spector, GOING NUCLEAR, p. 101.
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"historic proportions" in the Indian security process. 181
 At
that time, India commissioned its long-term project (R-5),
renamed DHRUVA, one of the world's largest Safeguard-free
research reactor with a plutonium production capacity of 25 kg
per year.'° 2
 It gave a significant boost to its capacity to
produce safeguards-free plutonium at a larger rate. Indian
nuclear capability received a stimulus from DR. Khan's
interview in THE OBSERVER about Pakistan's nuclear weapons
capability when he stated, "America Knows it. What the CIA has
been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is
the speculation of some foreign newspapers".' 83
 General Zia's
interview in March 1987 with the WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE was
equally serious from the Indian point of view, though his
style was less provocative than of Dr. Khan.'84
India perceived an official hand behind the inter-
views. It believed that Pakistan sought to publicize its
nuclear weapons capability during an unprecedented and large
Indian military exercise, BRASS TACK, which occurred in winter
1986-87 on Pakistan's Southern border along the troubled
province of Sind. 15
 India felt under pressure to neutralize
the impact of Pakistan's projection of its nuclear capabili-
ty. An opinion poll published by INDIA TODAY after Dr. Khan's
interview showed that 69 % of those interviewed believed that
181 Spector, THE UNDECLARED BOMB, p. 88.
182 RESEARCH REACTORS AT TROMBAY (Bombay, Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre, GOl, 1987), pp. 1-2.
183 Kuldip Nayyar, 'We Have the Bomb, Says Pakistan's Dr.
Strangelove', THE OBSERVER, London, 1 March 1987. The same
story was also carried by a Pakistani Daily, THE MUSLIM
(Islamabad), 1 March 1987. The Editor of The Muslim, Mr.
Mushahid Hussain, who was primarily instrumental in arrang-
ing the interview, was also present.
184 'Knocking At The Nuclear Door', pp. 42-44
India Toda y, 31 March 1987. (cover story).
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Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons and therefore, India must
also acquire nuclear weapons.'" It is quite possible that the
Pakistani military, or at least Generals, Zia and Arif, might
have deliberately sought to generate ambiguity to compensate
for Pakistan's military inferiority in the midst of that
exercise.'' The timing of both the interviews may not have
been a coincidence with the climax of the confrontation
between the armed forces of the two countries.
There were simultaneous reports of Pakistan improv-
ing its weapons design. According to a source, Pakistani
scientists developed a detonation mechanism and bomb casing
that can withstand the buffeting of high-speed flight.'"
Progress was reported on the development of a fusing mecha-
nism which keeps the bomb safe while in storage and flight,
but causes proper detonation after released from the air-
craft.' 9° Pakistan was also known to have pursued the im-
plosion technique instead of explosion, as the former is
considered more suitable for producing nuclear weapons.191
However, there is no fundamental difference between the two.
Zia proved a shrewd bargainer, an introvert and
deliberately ambiguous. He demonstrated a high degree of
brinkmanship in his handling of the Afghan conflict. He
186 ibid.
187 This was the impression I elicited during an inter-
view with Mr. Kuldip Nayyar in New Delhi on 16 July 1988. Mr.
Nayyar was the journalist who interviewed DR. Khan. He was
later on appointed India's High Commissioner in Britain during
Mr. V.P. Singh's government. General K. M. Arif was Vice-
Chief of Army Staff, directly under Zia in that period.
188 For Indian response to Pakistan's nuclear development
at this stage, see next chapter (Six), section 3.
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deflected occasional threats from the Soviet Union on one hand
and India on the other, with a skillful employment of U.S.
support. He successfully orchestrated a limited but propor-
tional restraint in developing nuclear weapons in exchange for
continued U.S. military and economic aid. He was incongruous
about the stated objectives of Pakistan's nuclear programme.
He took a line similar to India's posture that a PNE and a
weapon test were not distinguishable. He often stated that any
nuclear programme whether peaceful or otherwise was conver-
tible into a non-peaceful one. 192
 Like Indian leaders, he also
sought refuge in ambiguity to avoid provocation.
Despite India and Pakistan adopting ambiguous
nuclear postures, the nuclear capabilities of both states
appeared so advanced that an elementary form of implicit
nuclear deterrence was virtually operative by 1987-88. Talking
to the participants of an International Conference on Regional
Security and Stability in South Asia, jointly organized by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, and
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad-Pakistan, Zia claimed the
existence of an undeclared state of nuclear deterrence between
India and Pakistan. 193
 He gave a similar impression to a
delegation of the visiting U.S. officials before that con-
ference.' 94
 Later on, in an interview with a member of the
delegation (conference), Mr. Selig Harrison, he stated:
192 Defence Journal (Karachi), VIII (4), 1982, pp. 8-9.
193 
was personally present on the occasion as member of
the IISS delegation when President Zia made the statement. For
a detailed account, see, Report of the Visit to India and
Pakistan by
 a Delegation of the Carne gie Task Force on Non-
Proliferation and South Asian Securit y, June-July 1988
(Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1988), pp. 7-10.
194 Report of the Visit to India and Pakistan b y the
Delegation of the Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation
and south Asian Securit y, p. 8.
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With respect to their (India's] nuclear capabili-
ties, if they create ambiguity, that ambiguity is
the essence of deterrence. The present programs of
India and Pakistan have a lot of ambiguities, and
therefore, in the eyes of each other, they have
reached a particular level, and that level is good
enough to create an impression of deterrence.195
Even without such an explicit statement, the existence of an
elementary form of implicit nuclear deterrence between India
and Pakistan appears to be operative on the basis their
nuclear programmes, the level of capabilities developed, and
their mutual perception that each could deploy nuclear weapons
in any future conflict. The Indian response to Zia's posturing
was less explicit. Without clearly stating that India pos-
sessed nuclear weapons or unassembled components, Indian
government seemed prepared as a matter of contingency to
counter the nuclear threat from Pakistan by alluding to the
advancement and sophistication of its nuclear weapons capabil-
ity.'9' Simultaneously, India continued to advance its nuclear
weapons capability without publicity. Indian nuclear policy
continued to highlight the "reconsideration" of the previous
policy of not making nuclear weapons, but still denied that it
had produced nuclear weapons. The Indian response appeared
carefully articulated to avoid provocation not only to Pakis-
tan, but also the great powers. Indian policy was vague and
ambiguous enough to convey different meanings to different
parties so that India's national interests were not jeopar-
dized either by overstating or under-estimation of its nuclear
weapons capability. However, its nuclear technological
development remained ahead of Pakistan.
195 Ibid.
196 See statements of the late P.M. Rajiv Gandhi, his
Defence Minister K.C. Pant and Minister for External Affairs,
N.D. Tiwari in Chapter Six, section 3.
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5. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE POST-ZIA PERIOD
On her return to Pakistan from political exile in
April 1986, Miss Benazir Bhutto stated that the Zia regime
was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme that jeopardized
Pakistan's relations with the U.S., for which the country was
paying a heavy price.'" She therefore, demanded that the
policy be reconsidered. Soon afterwards, in an interview with
the INDIAN EXPRESS, she stated,
We only want nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
and we are prepared to set all doubts at rest on
this score because it has undermined our relations
with other countries and has complicated matters
for Pakistan.'90
Her assurance was interpreted in various circles as a will-
ingness to permit inspection of Pakistan's nuclear facilities
if she came to power. She reiterated her opposition to a
Pakistani bomb, but not a willingness to sign the NPT.'99
 She
apparently pointed out to the U.S. officials that if the CIA
could detect Pakistani efforts to "enrich uranium and acquire
bomb components", it would be able to verify her pledge not to
acquire nuclear weapons. 20° She became Prime Minister in
December 1988 as a result of elections held after Zia's death
in an air-crash.
However, the crucial question was not Benazir
Bhutto's willingness to stop pursuing a weapons course, but
197 'Benazir for Recognizing Karmal and Abandoning Nuclear
Research', THE PAKISTAN TIMES OVERSEES WEEKLY, 20 April, 1986.
' 'Indian Express Interviews Benazir Bhutto', INDIAN
EXPRESS, 30 July 1986, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service / South Asia, 14 August, 1986, p. F2.
199 Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containin g
 the
Threat; A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate (Washington DC, USGPO, 1988), p. 17.
200 ibid.
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her ability to influence the nuclear decision-making process
in Islamabad. She headed a minority government and faced a
serious challenge to her authority from two opposition-run
provincial governments. Her executive powers as Prime Minis-
ter had been significantly restricted because of the 8th
amendment in the Constitution which the Parliament enacted in
1985 under Zia's military government. She did not enjoy a
majority in the new Parliament to undo the 8th amendment.
Additionally, she did not seem to control the reportedly
secret 'Nuclear Weapons Programme Coordinating Committee'
which was still chaired by President Ghulam Ishaq khan.201
Reportedly, the other members of that committee were: Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan who is the Head of Kahuta plant and Munir
Ahmad Khan, the former Chairman of the PAEC, whose Directo-
rate of Technical Development carried out the essential R &
D for the militarization of the country's nuclear weapons
capability. 202
 Ishaq Khan had made a great contribution to the
development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme before he
became the President. Under the present constitutional order,
President is the Supreme Commander of Pakistan Armed Forces
and bears responsibility for national security. He seems to
have full control over Pakistan's nuclear programme. Benazir
Bhutto was reported to have admitted that she did not know
whether Pakistan had nuclear weapons because she had not been
fully acquainted with the state secrets. 203
 She was apparently
cooperative with the Army Generals, but known to have private-
ly advocated restraint on the nuclear issue. 204
 According to
Spector, there is evidence that Benazir Bhutto had slowed down
201 'Pakistan's Atomic Bomb', p. 2.
202 ibid.
203 'Bhutto in Dark', THE INDEPENDENT, 3 January 1989.
204 THE INDEPENDENT, 7 August, 1990.
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'certain narrow aspects' of Pakistan's nuclear programme in
1989 when the U.S. President issued the certificate that it
did not "possess a nuclear device".205
Benazir Bhutto was sacked as Prime Minister on 6
August 1990 because of corruption charges by President Ghulam
Ishaq Khan under the constitutional authority drawn from the
8th amendment. Given that the wide-spread corruption in
Pakistan is not a product of Bhutto's short-lived government
alone, not many people were convinced about the validity of
the corruption charges. The possibility of a co-relationship
between her moderate nuclear stance and the dismissal of her
government cannot be dismissed altogether. Soon after her
dismissal, Pakistan's advances in nuclear weapons technology
led to the suspension of U.S. aid for the financial year 1990-
91 when President George Bush refused to issue a certificate
to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive
device 206
The new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz
Sharif, is an enterprising businessman and skillful power
broker, but known to be a protégé of the army. He is known to
have been groomed by the Inter-Services Intelligence agency
under the Zia regime. In his first address to the National
Assembly on 7 November 1990, (where his party along with the
Islamic Democratic alliance [Islami Jamjoori Itehad], com-
mands a two-thirds majority), he echoed the establishment view
on nuclear policy. 20' During the elections, he attacked Benazir
Bhutto's nuclear policy as "pliable" under U.S. pressure.
However, it is not clear whether his attacks were meant for
political expediency alone or he is personally committed to
acquiring nuclear weapons. He faces increasing pressure from
205 Spector with Smith, p. 89.
206 See note 116 above.
207 DAWN (Karachi), 8 November 1990.
205
his alliance partners in the National Assembly, on whom his
government depends along with Army support, not to compromise
on the nuclear weapons programme. President khan also em-
phasized in a keynote address to the joint session of the
newly elected Parliament on 8 November 1990 that Pakistan
would not compromise its nuclear policy as a qutd pro qijo for
renewal of U.S. aid.2oe
However, P.M. Sharif appears keen to restore the
aid linkage with the U.S. because Pakistan faces an acute
economic crisis due to suspension of aid and financial
implications of the Gulf war. Nevertheless, he is facing an
acute dilemma. To his disadvantage, the U.S. policy-makers
are so far determined to demand that Pakistan satisfy the re-
quirements which led to the suspension of aid. Pakistan Army
is in dire need of U.S. military equipment and the requisite
financial credits to buy various weapon systems. He might
attempt to convince the nuclear hawks in the Pakistani
establishment to arrive at some settlement with the U.S. on
the nuclear issue in view of the pressing financial and
security crisis. However, the task is not easier because the
President and the military are deeply committed to the
development of a nuclear weapons capability so long as India
does not concede to accept reciprocal limitations. He has
already initiated a proposal for a five nation conference on
nuclear weapons in South Asia to be held as soon as possible
in which the United States, the Soviet Union, China, India
and Pakistan participate to resolve the issue. 209
 However,
India immediately rejected the Pakistani proposal, calling it
208 DAWN (Karachi), 9 November 1990.
209 
'Pakistan Seeks Talks On Nuclear Curbs', INTERNA-
TIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 June 1991.
206
a propaganda pioy in which there is 'nothing new' 210
Pakistan's nuclear development in the ].980s had a
strong influence on the Indian nuclear decision-making process
and its weapons capability. It engendered a threat perception
which caused a sense of urgency in India to accelerate its
nuclear weapons development. The top Indian leadership has
occasionally indicated a possible "reconsideration" of their
policy of not making nuclear weapons. Even at face value, it
means that Indian nuclear policy would shift from a peaceful
to military orientation. Actually, the available evidence
suggests that India has moved much ahead in the development of
its nuclear weapons capability 2fl Public pressure has gradual-
ly grown in India for the development of nuclear weapons to
preempt the dangers originating from Pakistan's nuclear
weapons programme. Indian governments are not only sensitive
to public pressure, but also vulnerable. In brief, Indo-
Pakistan nuclear competition has defied a mutually acceptable
solution. It is imperative that Pakistan remains below the
threshold and does not produce nuclear weapons to avoid
providing a rationale for India for a full-fledged and overt
nuclear weapons response which would unleash an open ended
nuclear arms race in the Subcontinent.
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'Pakistan's atom plan rejected', THE INDEPENDENT, 08
June 1991.
211 See the policy changes in the next chapter and an




INDIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY 1977 TO 1991
EXPANDING THE WEAPONS CAPABILITY
India's nuclear weapons capability gradually
expanded from 1977 to 1991, except for a brief period of tech-
nological inaction during the first Janata government under
Mr. Morarji Desai. It pursued the objective of advancing the
weapons capability within the framework of its civilian
nuclear programme. Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability appeared an obvious rationale for that objective,
but the growing sophistication and advancement of the Chinese
nuclear capability also contributed. India kept on question-
ing the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime and the
right of great-powers to manufacture nuclear weapons while
denying it to the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). It
rejected all the proposals for a regional solution to the
issue of South Asia's nuclearization offered by Pakistan. The
domestic nuclear debate in the 1980s generated further
pressure on successive Indian governments to accelerate the
development of a nuclear weapons capability from the stand-
point of security, power and prestige. A relatively rapid
expansion took place under the governments of Mrs. Indira
Gandhi (1980-1984) and her son, Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989) . A
brief period of political instability followed from 1989 to
June 1991 when India had two more Janata governments. However,
in contrast to 1977-1980, the governments of Prime Ministers
V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekar continued R & D in the field of
nuclear weapons technology, though in a more subtle way than
Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. A lot of evidence about India's
involvement in the acquisition of various elements of a
nuclear weapons capability became public during this period.
India would continue to pursue a nuclear weapons course after
the installation of Congress Party's government in June 1991
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under Mr. Narsima Rao because of its consistent nuclear policy
in this regard.
1. INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY UNDER THE FIRST JANATA GOVERNMENT:
(1977-1980)
The government of Mr. Morarji Desai in 1977 sus-
pended work on the further development of "peaceful" nuclear
explosions (PNE) programme initiated by Mrs. Gandhi, and
reportedly disbanded the team that carried out the 1974
nuclear test.' Mr. Desai stated that Indian scientists had
failed to convince him that a PNE would serve any economic or
peaceful technological objectives. 2
 That is too obvious con-
tradiction of Mrs. Gandhi's repeated rhetoric on the utility
of PNEs, including the 1974 test, for non-military purposes.
However, before analyzing Indian nuclear policy under Desai's
government, it needs to be born in mind that Mrs. Gandhi had
not planned more PNEs immediately after the first test. By
suspending the work on the PNEs and disbanding the team, Desai
demonstrated that he would not pursue the development of
nuclear weapons. Some specialists believe that the restraint
exercised by Desai's government was not only inspired by his
own initiative, but was also the result of pressure from the
United States.3
'Shadow of an Indian H-Bomb', Foreign Report,	 13
December 1984. pp. 1-2.
2 Rodney W. Jones, 'Dilemma Without Anguish: India,
Morarji and the Bomb', in T.T. Pouloose, PERSPECTIVES ON INDIA
NUCLEAR POLICY (New Delhi, Young Publishers, 1978). The point
was clarified with Rodney Jones during a discussion with in
Washington DC on 19 April 1989 in which he confirmed Desai's
statement. He was a consultant in the State Department at the
time of discussion.
See for example, Paul F. Power, 'The Indo-American
Nuclear Controversy', Asian Survey 19, (6), June 1979, pp.
582-583.
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Nonetheless, there is no evidence that Desai's
government was ever willing to surrender what had already been
achieved by carrying out the 1974 test. During a visit by the
U.S. President Jimmy Carter to India (1-3 January 1978), Desai
rejected the U.S. demand for signing the NPT unless all five
nuclear weapon states signed a comprehensive test ban treaty.4
He also refused to accept application of full-scope safe-
guards on the Indian nuclear programme. 5
 He only promised a
restraint, not to develop nuclear weapons. President Carter
was surprised by Desai's point blank refusal on the issues of
NPT and the safeguards because he had been led to believe that
the Indian government would be willing to discuss its ad-
herence to the NPT, and might be amenable on the issue of
full-scope safeguards.' It appears that by misjudging Desai's
conditional softness on full-scope safeguards, President
Carter pushed too hard too soon, and so provoked an early
refusal.
Desai's general call to renounce nuclear weapons
was opposed by his own allies in the Janata Government.' The
Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, who
had been a vocal bomb lobbyist as a political leader in the
Jan Sangh Party, exercised considerable influence on Desai
against signing the NPT and accepting full-scope safeguards.°
Before becoming Prime Minister, Desai was a well known
opponent of the development of nuclear weapons but favoured
the retention of a nuclear option until and unless the nuclear
weapon states (NWS) accept corresponding limits on their
THE GUARDIAN, 15 January 1978.
ibid.
6 ibid.




 There is no evidence of a change in his
nuclear thinking after he became the Prime Minister. The text
of Delhi Declaration signed by President Carter and Prime
Minister Desai in January 1978 reflects an equal emphasis on
horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. It reads:
'Existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons must be reduced and
eventually eliminated, and the danger of proliferation of
nuclear weapons must be arrested'
In fact, Desai attempted to bargain with the U.S.
on the issue of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur atomic reactors
by pledging to refrain from producing nuclear weapons but not
on the question of India signing the NPT. He clearly stated
that if the U.S. did not send the shipment of enriched uranium
for the Tarapur reactors, "then all ways are open to us, even
the processing of used fuel will be open to us".' He also
indicated that India might unilaterally refuse to provide
rhesus monkeys to the U.S. under a 23 year old agreement,
alleging that contrary to the agreement, the U.S. used the
monkeys for R & D in the military field.2
Subsequently, it was reported that Desai did agree
conditionally to accept full-scope safeguards in his meeting
with the British Prime Minister James Callaghan. 3
 The Desai-
M.J. Desai, 'India and Nuclear Weapons', Disarmament
and Arms Control, 3, (2), Autumn 1965.
'° Text of The Delhi Declaration Si gned By The U.S.
President Jimmy
 Carter And India's Prime Minister Mprarii
Desai, dated 3 January 1978 (Washington DC, National Secur-
ity Archives, 1989)
u Text of The Statement of Honorable Richard L. Ottinger
Before The Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, dated 23 May 1978, 95th Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 5 (Washington DC, National Security Archives,
1989)
12 ibid.
' THE GUARDIAN, 15 January 1978.
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Callaghan understanding appeared as a compromise formula under
which India would accept the full-scope safeguards provided it
would not be pushed to sign the NPT and at least three nuclear
weapon states; the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K. signed a
comprehensive test ban treaty.' 4
 India's relaxation of its
condition for China to adhere to the prospective agreement
appeared as a concession given by Desai's government. The
matter was followed up during the visit of the U.S. Deputy
Under Secretary of State, Mr. Joseph Nye, in November 1978.
India accepted 'in principle' a proposal for establishing a
'Committee of scientists' to look into the question of what
safeguard options were available to the non-signatories of the
NPT and its impact on their indigenous nuclear programmes.' 5
 It
was also agreed to explore whether an arrangement could be
worked out which would meet the requirement of putting all the
nuclear facilities of non-nuclear weapon states under safe-
guards without interfering with their civilian nuclear
development programmes.'6
 The proposal eventually failed in
1979 because the differences on fundamental issues could not
be resolved, including the membership of the Committee.
The general misunderstanding about the Desai govern-
ment's nuclear policy by the U.S. policy-makers is aptly
described by an American specialist:
U.S. leaders in the late 1970s gambled too heavily
on unrealistic hopes (that the Indian leaders would
accept full-scope safeguards out of the goodness of
their hearts and that Pakistani leaders would accept
economic arguments as sufficient reason to dispense
with the reprocessing or enrichment), mistakenly saw
progress in equivocation (such as believing that
14 ibid.
' N. Ram, 'India's Nuclear Policy: A Case Study in the
Flaws and Futility of Non-Proliferation', a paper prepared
for the 34th Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies,
Chicago, 2-4 April, p. 13, and note 51.
16 ibid.
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Prime Minister Morarji Desai's conditional state-
ments against peaceful nuclear explosions were a
promise), and found themselves hobbled by the in-
flexibility of U.S.laws (principally, the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978)
The controversy in the Indo-U.S. nuclear relations
became more complex with the enactment of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 by the United States, for
which India had provided the stimulus by its 1974 nuclear
test. The NNPA provided that after a 2 years grace period from
1978, any recipient of U.S. nuclear exports must have all of
its nuclear facilities under full-scope international safe-
guards as a condition for continued supply. 18 The NNPA provi-
sion runs contrary to the Indian nuclear safeguards doctrine;
that India will accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear
facilities only if all other states, including the nuclear
weapon states, do the same.
Desai's successor, Prime Minister Charan Singh, lost
no time in reversing Desai's nuclear policy and made a public
statement that India would neither sign the NPT nor accept the
full-scope safeguards. 19 He reiterated the traditional Indian
nuclear policy pursued by Nehru and followed by Shastri and
Mrs. Gandhi. His reversion to India's previous policy also
owes a great deal to domestic pressure because Desai's nuclear
policy was generally assailed by the Indian press, media and
also within the Parliament as a sell-out or a "Nuclear
Munich". However, his government proved too short-lived to
make further practical contribution to Indian nuclear policy.
' Richard K. Betts, 'U.S. Policy Choices: India, Pakis-
tan and Iran', Yaeger (ed.), NON-PROLIFERATION AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (New York, Brooking Institution, 1981), pp.
323-324.
1978.
' Text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of
19 Betts, p. 331.
213
Desai's government did not perceive any threat from
Pakistan, conventional or nuclear. However, it viewed with
concern Pakistan's search for sophisticated arms, which was
regarded as something 'not in consonance with the pro-cess of
normalization of relations between the two countries' 20 China
remained conspicuously absent in Indian threat perceptions in
that period. Sino-Indian relations improved despite a lack of
any fundamental change in their mutual differences on the
boundary dispute. Indian assessment of its overall security
environment underlined 'paradoxical developments' 21 On one
hand, there was an admission of growing international efforts
to ease tensions but on the other, it reflected an indignation
that neither SALT II nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
could be concluded. 22
 The Regional security environment was
seen to be unstable and uncertain. It therefore, decided that
the maintenance of absolute defence preparedness at all times
had to remain one of the imperative of its national policy.23
The 1979-80 Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of Defence
emphasized the dangerous implications of the likely transfer
of Western military technology to China, and Pakistan's
efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability needed
'constant and close vigil'. 24 It was the first time that the
Pakistan's nuclear pursuits were viewed with concern. Since
there was no tangible evidence of any significant achievement
in the nuclear field by Pakistan at that time, it did not
20 Annual Report 1977-78: Ministr y
 of Defence, Government
of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1978), p. 2.
21 Annual Report 1978-79: Ministr y
 of Defence, Government
of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1979), p. 1.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 Annual Report 1979-80: Ministry of Defence, Government
of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1980), p. 2.
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appear as a threat in the Indian perception.
In brief, the first Janata government's nuclear
policy, particularly under Desai, can be described as a short
lived aberration from continuity of the development of a
nuclear weapons capability pursued by Mrs. Gandhi. However,
the discontinuity was confined to the technological develop-
ment alone. From a political viewpoint, Desai conceded nothing
of substance, but he indulged in a serious dialogue to resolve
the Indo-U.S. differences on the issue of nuclear prolifera-
tion. As evident from the Delhi Declaration of January 1978,
the Indian government emphasized the linkage between horizon-
tal and vertical proliferation which was the fundamental
premise of India's NPT policy. Desai appeared equally unwill-
ing to accept full-scope safeguards unless the nuclear weapons
states accepted a comprehensive test ban. His restraint on the
issue of India's development of nuclear weapons and a willing-
ness to negotiate a solution of the nuclear proliferation
problem generated an impression of a moderate stance.
2. INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY DURING MRS. INDIRA GMDHI' S
SECOND-TERM: 1980-1984
On her return to power in 1980, Mrs. Indira Gandhi
reaffirmed her government's policy in the Rajya Sabha on 13
March 1980: 'India is committed to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy but will not hesitate to undertake nuclear explosions
or implosions if such were in the national interest' •25 Only a
month later she expressed concern about Pakistan's pursuit of
a nuclear weapons programme and the expansion of China's
nuclear weapons capability. 2' She stressed, "India must make an
25 
"Gandhi Says National Interest May Require Nuclear
Blasts", WASHINGTON POST, 14 March 1980
26 Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Prolifera-
tion, No. 37, 3 April 1980, p. 21.
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in-depth study of programmes in the neighbouring countries.
Moreover, it was imperative that India keep ahead of the
latest nuclear developments". 27
 Shortly afterwards, she
reiterated in the Lok Sabha that her government was not
considering a nuclear explosion, but 'We shall go ahead with
it if it is believed to be necessary' •28 I was typical
exposition of the previous policy of ambiguity under which her
government had carried out the 1974 nuclear test. She also
reassured the Rajya Sabha on 27 March 1980,
Since uranium enrichment programmes are proceeding
in India and general preparation to strengthen the
defence of the country is a continuing process,
overreaction to the reports of Pakistan acquiring
the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium is
unnecessary. And, there is no need to have a sense
of insecurity.29
Apparently, Mrs. Gandhi's nuclear policy was to
emphasize India's right to carry out more PNEs and be ready
to explode one if India's security interests so demanded.
However, the protracted Indo-U.S. nuclear negotiations
produced an understanding that the Indian government would
not go beyond Mrs. Gandhi's statement that India intended to
use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, 'which does
not exclude the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosive
experiments' in principle. 30
 Practically, she refrained from
carrying out another PNE. The existence of such an under-
27 ibid.
28 Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Ca pabilities of
India, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, p. 25.
29 Worldwide Report: Nuclear Development and Prolifera-
tion, No. 40, 25 April 1980, p. 41.
30 Text of The Testimony
 of Warren Christopher, Deputy
Secretary
 of State Before The Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations and Committee on Government Affairs, dated June 19,
1980, p. 4.
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standing is confirmed from an Indian source as well. The
Indian Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs under
Mrs. Gandhi, Mr Eric Gonsalves, provided a confidential
assurance to the State Department's officer-in-charge of
Proliferation, Mr. James L. Malone, that India would not carry
out a 'PNE in a current time-frame'
	 The assurance was
conditional on the efficacy of the U.S. efforts to stop
Pakistan from acquiring various elements of a nuclear wea-
pons capability.32
The Indo-U.S. understanding did not last long when
it was reported in 1983 that India was maintaining the nuclear
test site at Pokharan in a state of readiness. 33
 In 1984, it
was reported that Mrs. Gandhi's government had reassembled the
team which carried the 1974 nuclear explo-sion (disbanded by
P.M. Desai in 1977) under the supervision of Dr. Raja Ramanna
and that India had accelerated work on its nuclear weapons
capability. 34
 It was further stated that India had initiated
work on a scientific technique known as Inertial Confinement
Fusion (ICF) at BARC, in which LASERS were being used to
achieve a high compression of deuterium or tritium, the
isotope of hydrogen used in a fusion bomb. 35
 In addition, it
was also reported that Mrs. Gandhi had authorized work on the
improvement of nuclear weapons design and the fabrication of
components. 3 ' Pakistani sources also concluded that henceforth,
India had to be taken as an adversary who can deploy nuclear
3' "U.S. Was Given Assurance Against Nuclear Blast",
HINDU, 22 February 1982.
32 ibid.
WASHINGTON POST, 23 June 1983.




weapons in any future conflict. 37 Therefore, Pakistani nuclear
planning focussed upon this development as a fundamental
premise of its strategic calculations.
The Indian security environment in the early 1980s
was characterized by a perception of Pakistan being massive-
ly armed "as a front-line state" by the West. The U.S. led
the process because of the Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan and Pakistan becoming a 'part of the so-called
strategic consensus'." The transfer of sophisticated arms to
Pakistan was deemed far beyond its 'legitimate defence
needs'." India believed it would result in a significant
qualitative and quantitative augmentation of Pakistan's
overall military capability, and tilt the 'delicately poised
balance in the region' in favour of Pakistan. 4° The U.S
economic and military aid package of $ 3.2 billion to Pakis-
tan was considered a demonstration of the later's renewed
strategic importance for the U.S. 41 The provision of sophis-
ticated weapon systems in addition to the aid package, like
the F-16s were described as 'patently offensive' and which
constituted a 'threat to peace' •42 Pakistan was seen to have
taken full advantage of the continued Soviet presence in
Afghanistan by projecting its role as front-line state and
" Stephen P. Cohen, PAKISTAN ARMY (Berkeley, University
of California Press, 1984), p. 153.
° Annual Report 1981-82: Ministry of Defence, Government
of India, (New Delhi, GOl, 1982), p. 1.
" ibid.
° ibid.
' Annual Report 1982-83: Ministry of Defence, Government
of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1983), p. 1.
42 Annual Report 1983-84: Ministry of Defence, Government
of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1984), p. 1.
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thereby acquiring new and sophisticated weapon systems.43
Reports of Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons
capability further intensified the Indian perception of a
nuclear threat from Pakistan. 44
 The Indian government ex-
pressed the urgency to undertake 'utmost vigilance' in view
of the reports that Pakistan was attempting to acquire nuclear
weaponry. 45
 Due to its perception of a deteriorating security
environment, the Indian government was determined to take
'appropriate measures' to maintain full defence prepared-
ness. 46
 It also felt that India was surrounded by two nuclear
weapon states in its immediate neighbourhood, China and the
Soviet Union. 47
 In addition to that, the U.S. was believed to
have deployed powerful task forces in the Indian Ocean which
also carried nuclear weapons. 4° However, its main concern
focussed upon the understanding that 'Pakistan's relentless
pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability with the assistance
and connivance of certain countries has added a new dimension
to our security environment'."
Mrs. Gandhi continued to concentrate on the emer-
gent Pakistani nuclear threat during the last months of her
government. Addressing a group of senior army officers shortly
before her death, she described the Pakistani nuc-lear threat
as a 'qualitatively new phenomenon in our security environ-
ment', and emphasized the urgency of a 'new dimension to the
Annual Report 1984-85: Ministr y
 of Defence, Government
of India (new, Delhi, GOl, 1985), p. 1.
" Annual Report 1981-82, p. 2.
" Annual Report 1982-83, p. 2.
46 Annual Report 1983-84, p. 2.




Indian Defence Management' While India's apprehensions about
a Pakistani nuclear threat appeared genuine, it is worthwhile
asking what could be this 'new dimension' to the Indian
Defence Management? Did she consider making the Indian air
defence so impregnable that no nuclear-capable Pakistani
aircraft could penetrate, or to update the Indian nuclear
capability to provide a sufficient deterrent against any
Pakistani nuclear threat? The subsequent Indian upgrading of
its air defence systems and expansion of the nuclear weapons
capability under Mrs. Gandhi suggest that she had simulta-
neously focussed on both the strategies. Her government was
engaged in the advancement of a nuclear weapons capability
until her assassination in October 1984. She accelerated the
momentum of development of nuclear weapons capability. Work at
two safeguards-free nuclear power reactors: MAPP I and MAPP II
was up-dated. The reactors were commissioned in 1983 and 1985
(MAPP II achieved criticality shortly after her death) . The
Tarapur Reprocessing Plant began operating at full capacity in
1983-84 and Trombay Reprocessing Plant was refurbished at the
same time to increase its output capacity. A comprehensive
study by an American specialist concluded that India clandes-
tinely obtained heavy water and used it to run the safeguards-
free nuclear powe reactors (MAPP I & II) with the ostensible
purpose was to expand its nuclear weapons capability. 52
 The
foundation of this expansion programme of the Indian nuclear
wapons capability was laid by the government of Mrs. Indira
Gandhi and followed by the late P.M. Rajiv Gandhi in the
1980s.
° INDIAN EXPRESS, 15 October 1984.
NUCLEAR INDIA, 24 (5 & 6), Department of Atomic Energy,
Bombay, 1986.
52 Gary Milholin, Heavy
 Water in India (Washington D.C.,
The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 1986), un-
published, pp. 1-20.
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3. INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY UNDER MR. BAJIV GANDHI: 1984-1989
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was relatively less equivocal than
his predecessors about the ambiguity pervading the Indian
nuclear policy. He often spoke about the shift in policy
caused by the nuclear threat from Pakistan. His first six
months in office reflected a preoccupation with a Pakistani
nuclear bomb. He repeatedly emphasized the 'reconsideration'
of India's nuclear policy to meet the Pakistani nuclear
threat. In April 1985, he stated that the Indian nuclear
policy of not making nuclear weapons is being reconsidered in
view of the nuclear threat from Pakistan. 53
 He reiterated
within a month that India would review its nuclear policy to
meet the challenge posed by Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear
weapons capability. 54
 In a well publicized interview with
MONDE, Gandhi indicated the possibility that India might have
manufactured the components of nuclear weapons and could
assemble them rapidly in case of an eventuality [of a nuclear
threat]. 55 He further highlighted, 'If we decided to become a
nuclear power, it would take a few weeks or a few months' 56 On
24 March 1987, he again stated that India would meet Pakis-
tan's nuclear challenge. 57 In April 1987, he stated that to
meet the Pakistani nuclear threat, "the Indian people will not
FINA11CIAL TIMES, 4 April, 1985.
'India to Review Nuclear Policy, Says Gandhi', WASHING-
TON POST, 5 May 1985.
"Le Monde Interview", LE MONDE, 5 June 1985; trans-
lated in, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service / South
Asia, 5 June 1985, p. E-1.
56 ibid.
" Foreign Broadcasting Information Service / South Asia,
25 March 1987, p. E-1.
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be found wanting". 58
 There were many similar statements from
various Indian cabinet ministers about review of the Indian
policy of not making nuclear weapons. 5' However, the statements
appeared carefully articulated and never went beyond the
reiteration of a stipulated policy review. The general line of
argument focussed on the point that India had a superior
capability than Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons.
A purely political response was considered to be
insufficient to alleviate apprehensions of the Indian public
about the rapid development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
capability. The significance of Mr. Gandhi's statements could
not be dissociated from the Indian announcement of comniis-
sioning its long term project R-5, renamed as DHRUVA: one of
the world's largest safeguards-free reactor research with a
plutonium production capacity of 25 kg per year.'°
In the period 1985-1986, Pakistan's quest for
nuclear weapons capability continued to dominate Indian threat
perceptions.'1
 India was determined in stating, 'For our part,
we must be cognizant of the fact that Pakistan has moved
closer to acquiring the capability to make nuclear weapons,
which has an obvious bearing on our security' •62 By 1987, India
appeared certain that Pakistan was on the brink of acquiring
nuclear weapons capability.'3
 This perception worsened by
' "India Announces Review of Nuclear Policy", REUTERS,
27 April 1987, in FBIS / South Asia, 27 April 1987, p. E.l.
' ibid.
60 RESEARCH REACTORS AT TROMBAY (Bombay, Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre (GOl), 1987), pp. 1-2.
61 Annual Report 1985-86: Ministry of Defence, Government
of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1986), p. 3.
62 ibid.
63 Annual Report 1986-87: Ministry of Defence, Government
of India (New Delhi, GOl, 1987), p. 2.
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Pakistan's acquisition of sophisticated weaponry which India
considered, 'beyond its needs' and carried 'the most serious
consequences for India's security'. 64
 India seemed disturbed
that U.S. was considering the possible sale of AWACS (airborne
warning and control system) to Pakistan in 1986-87. It was
seen to have minimal use against Afghanistan but a 'substan-
tial force multiplier effect against India' •65 AWACS was seen
not just as a new weapon system, but a command post in the sky
with ability to detect, track and keep under surveillance the
Indian Air Force operations along the Indo-Pakistan border.66
However, the sale of AWACS to Pakistan did not materialize.
India perceived a 'sharp deterioration' in its
security environment in this period. 67
 The interaction of
global and regional developments at the time when India was
believed in a 'complex phase of its growth', appeared to
generate new security threats. 68
 China's force modernization
programme was considered to have obvious military overtones
and security implications for India.' 9
 India was appzehensive
that China might deploy its nuclear forces in Tibet. 7° Sino-
Indian relations suffered a set-back due to India's grant of
statehood to Arunachal Pradesh which China regards as a
disputed territory. It led to hardening of Chinese stance on
the border issue. 71








Annual Report 1986-87, p. 2.
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cated weapons and the possibility of transfer of technology
to Pakistan was seen as a threat to Indian national securi-
ty. 72
 The Indian assessment reflected a realization that
external forces could interact with internal forces of dissent
in the political and economic spheres to exacerbate its
security problem and therefore, demanded a credible response."
Under the spectre of a Pakistani nuclear threat,
India made significant advances in its nuclear weapons
capability under Rajiv Gandhi. Leonard Spector reported a
change of 'historic proportions' in the Indian security
environment in 1986 due to reports of Pakistan's acquisition
of the 'essentials of a rudimentary nuclear deterrent of
perhaps three to six nuclear devices'. 74
 At this time, India
further expanded its nuclear weapons capability with special
emphasis on nuclear military infrastructure. In late 1986, it
announced the development of technology to enrich uranium to
any level, including weapons-grade." It was significant, given
India's interest in the development of H-bomb technology,
because uranium is considered preferable to plutonium in
thermonuclear weapons.
In early 1987, India accelerated the development of
its nuclear weapons capability, particularly the production of
weapons-grade plutonium. 76
 The Indian government reiterated its
72 ibid, p. 3.
" ibid.
' Leonard S. Spector, THE UNDECLARED BOMB, p. 88.
" Evan Fera and Kannan Srinivasan, 'Keeping the Nuclear
Option Open', Economic And Political Weekl y, 6 December 1986,
p. 2119.
76 
'India's Supply of Unsafeguarded PU Grows As Reproc-
essing of MAPS Fuel Begins', Nuclear Fuel, 11 August 1986, p.
3. Also see Section on reprocessing plants in Chapter Seven
and Appendix VI.
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determination to maintain technological superiority over
Pakistan in the nuclear field, and to counter the Pakistani
nuclear threat. India's cabinet ministers often repeated P. M.
Gandhi's theme of "reconsideration" of Indian nuclear policy.
Defence Minister K. C. Pant, declared during a policy statement
in the Lok Sabha, "The emerging threat to us from Pakistan is
forcing us to review our options"." Similarly, speaking in the
Rajya Sabha on the same day, Minister for External Affairs,
Mr. N.D. Tiwari stated that India would safeguard its national
security by taking all necessary measures against the Pakis-
tani nuclear threat.'8
 The emphasis on "reconsideration" of the
traditional policy of not making nuclear weapons appeared
carefully articulated to focus attention on Pakistan's nuclear
development and divert it from the advancement of their own
nuclear weapons capability. However, it is not intended to
say that the Pakistani nuclear threat to India is imaginary
and Pakistan is not attempting to develop a nuclear weapons
capability.
India's repeated assertions that it had the capa-
bility, but did not produce nuclear weapons appear invalid in
view of extensive evidence to the contrary. There were many
reports about India's involvement in nuclear weapons research
and development. In April 1988, Washington-based press reports
citing U.S. officials and intelligence sources disclosed that
India was producing nuclear weapons. One report specifically
stated that India began producing nuclear weapons in late
1986. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 25 April 1988 after
Pakistan test-fired its first missile (SSM Haft-1), Mr. Pant
" FINANCIAL TIMES, 27 April 1987.
78 ibid.
" Richard Sale, "India Said to Upgrade Nuclear arsena-
l", United Press International, 25 April 1988, cited in
Spector, p. 100.
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assured the House that there was "no vulnerable window" in
India's defence preparedness and its armed forces would not
find themselves at a disadvantage in the event of a nuclear
attack by Pakistan. 8° According to K. Subrahmanyam: 'In plain
language, this would mean that India has a few bombs in the
basement and Pakistan is not being left in any doubt about
it' In April 1989, the WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE reported an
official source from close to the late P. M. Gandhi, that
India could produce a nuclear bomb "overnight". 82
 As reported,
"Indian scientists and engineers are immersed in nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles". 83
 In testimony on 18 May 1989
to the Senate Committee on Government Operations, the CIA
Director, Mr. William Webster, stated that there were many
indications that India was involved in the work on nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons. 84
 Even if the accuracy of some of these
reports might be questionable, no one doubted India's capab-
ility to fabricate and deploy nuclear weapons in any future
conflict after its 1974 nuclear test, and its continued
efforts to expand that capability.
The period under Mr. Gandhi also saw the develop-
ment of a powerful conventional military capability. India
augmented the strength of all the branches of its armed forces
under various forms of domestic, bureaucratic and political
rationales. It maintained the world's third largest army,
fourth largest air force and fifth largest navy, while the
80 K. Subrahmanyam, 'Indo-Pak Nuclear Stand-Off: A
Challenge And Opportunity', An unpublished paper, November
1988.
81 ibid.
82 WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, 3 April 1989, p. 16.
83 ibid, p. 11.
84 NEW YORK TIMES, 19 May 1989, p. A7 and WASHINGTON POST,
19 May 1989, p. A29.
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sum-total of its armed forces ranked India as the fourth
largest military power after the United States, the Soviet
Union and China, in quantitative terms. 85
 It planned to build
a blue-water navy with the induction of a second aircraft
carrier (HMS Hermes purchased from Britain and renamed Virat),
refurbished the first one (Vikrant) and was locally develop-
ing a 30,000 tons third carrier. 86
 The navy was equipped with
a nuclear-powered submarine acquired on lease from the Soviet
Union in January 1988. The submarine, a Charlie 1 class of the
1960s vintage, renamed CHAKRA, has the capability of long-
range cruising and launching conventional or nuclear mis-
siles. 87
 However, it is not equipped with nuclear missiles.
Four additional nuclear powered submarines were scheduled to
be delivered to India by the Soviet Union. There was some
revision in the schedule, but no precise information is
available so far.
It was the first ever example where a nuclear weapon
state had transferred a nuclear-powered weapon system to a
non-nuclear weapon state. It was the first of four nuclear-
powered submarines which the Soviet Union agreed to provide.
These submarines are usually fueled with highly enriched
uranium (weapons-grade), and according to a leading U.S.
nuclear specialist, they would provide India access to
additional amounts of nuclear-weapons material free from non-
proliferation restrictions. 88
 However, the apprehension appears
85 This conclusion is based upon a comparative assessment
from MILITARY BALANCE 1989-1990 (London, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989).
86 This data is compiled from the MILITARY BALANCE 1989-
1990, p. 161, and Defense and Forei gn Affairs, XVI (12),
December 1988, pp. 28-29.
87 The U.S. Department of Defense, SOVIET MILITARY POWER
(Washington, USGPO, 1988), p. 26
88 Spector, p. 101.
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an extreme view in the light of restrictions the Soviet Union
imposed on the use of the submarines, like periodic inspec-
tions, custody over spent fuel, and generally strict Soviet
adherence to the objectives of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime. India has enough quantities of weapons-grade pluton-
ium for a modest weapons programme." It is more probable that
India is interested in acquiring the design of nuclear-
powered submarines, and experience in their operation and
maintenance. A Pakistani source suggested that India started
an indigenous project for developing nuclear-powered sub-
marines in 1976 which failed despite large sums of money
spent. 9° The source pointed out differences between the DAE and
the Indian Navy about the reactor design for the submarine,
and technological difficulties as major reasons of failure.91
However, naval military acquisitions under Rajiv Gandhi's
government equipped the Indian Navy with a long-range, blue-
water and offensive capability.
The development of a strong military force was not
limited to the navy. The Indian air force was also equipped
with a large number of sophisticated aircraft such as,
Jaguars, Mirage-2000s and MIG-29s, all of which can be made
nuclear-capable after necessary modifications. 92
 During Mr.
Gandhi's government India added 4 more to its 34 divisions
army and had a total of 1.2 million men under arms." In
See Chapter Seven, section 3 on weapons-grade mater-
ial and appendix VI.
" Lt. Col. (retd.) E.A.S. Bokhari, 'Defence Notes: Some
Facets of Indian Nuclear Military Nuclearization', THE DAILY
JANG (London), 7 August 1989.
91 ibid.
92 MILITARY BALANCE 1988-1989, pp. 155 & 160-162.
" ibid.
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addition to induction of new weapon systems, like BMP-2 and
155mm Bofor howitzers, indigenous production of weapons
systems such as MBT (main battle tank) Vijayanta was speeded
up. 94
 India test-fired an intermediate range ballistic missile,
AGNI (fire) in May 1989, which is potentially capable of
carrying nuclear warheads.95
The Indian defence budget rose up to $ 9.89 billion
in 1988_1989.96 According to an assessment by the Internation-
al Institute for Strategic Studies, neither the financial
allocations for re-equipment nor the cost of the IPKF (Indian
Peace Keeping Forces) in Sri Lanka were included in that
budget. 97
 The Indian Defence Research and Development Organi-
zation spends $ 1 billion annually, and employs 25,000
scientists and engineers. 98
 The rapid expansion of Indian armed
forces under Mr. Gandhi was unprecedented. According to a
report, India's real rate of military growth from 1983 to 1988
'dramatically outstrips the real rate of defense growth in
NATO countries in the same period'. 99
 With two aircraft
carriers, a fleet of 30 guided missile frigates and sub-
marines, an air force consisting 870 aircraft, and an IRBM
capability, India is projecting military power well beyond the
South Asian region.
Indian conventional military power supplemented by
a nuclear weapons capability was not only geared by its
ibid.
Fore details, see section 5. C, on India's ballistic
missiles capability, in Chapter Seven.
96 THE MILITARY BALANCE 1988-1989, p. 160.
ibid, p. 155.
98 WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, 3 April 1989, p. 15.
Gregory R. Copley, 'India: A New Great Power Arri-
ves', Defense and Foreign Affairs, XVI (12), December 1988,
p. 28.
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security and foreign policy objectives to counterpoise the
Chinese military power and the Pakistani threat, but intended
to demonstrate its role as a regional great-power. A Western
diplomat in New Delhi believed that India wanted to be taken
seriously: 'It wants to be viewed as a world power. That is an
end itself' An Indian naval officer who helped plan the
Navy expansion programme, said that one of its goals was to
make it too risky by the year 2000 for either superpower to
act in a hostile manner to India in the northern Indian
Ocean.'° 1
 This indicates that under Mr. Gandhi, India aspired
to play a great power role. His government concentrated on
building conventional military power and expanded various
elements of a nuclear weapons capability to support that role.
4. INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE POST-RAJIV GANDHI
PERIOD: 1989-1991)
The installation of another Janata government under
Mr. V.P. Singh in November 1989 did not result in any major
change in India's nuclear policy. Rather, the personal style
of Prime Minister Singh was different in its conduct from
Rajiv Gandhi's. Mr. Singh avoided, in public at least, being
always concerned about Pakistan's development of a nuclear
weapons capability. He did not over-emphasize the 'recon-
sideration' of Indian nuclear policy, which was a hallmark of
Gandhi's policy. He demonstrated adeptness in dealing with
political pressure from his coalition partners like the BJP
(Bhartia Janata Party), which is a fundamentalist Hindu party
and favoured an open and immediate nuclear weapons programme
'Co 
'Superpower Rising', WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, 3 April
1989, p. 13.
'°' ibid, p. 17.
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in its election manifesto. 102
 Mr. Singh seemed inclined to
initiate talks with Pakistan on the nuclear issue but also
warned that India would be forced to change its nuclear policy
of not producing nuclear weapons if Pakistan manufactured such
weapons .
However, Mr. Singh appointed a nuclear expert, Dr.
Raja Ramanna (who was head of the 1974 explosion team and the
Chairman AEC for years) as Minister of State for Defence for
his "undoubtedly hawkish nuclear credentials". 104
 Dr. P.K.
Iyengar (who designed the triggering mechanism for the 1974
device), was appointed Chairman of the AEC. 105
 These appoint-
ments were looked upon by experts as an indication of further,
but undeclared advancement of weapons programme by Mr. Singh's
government. 10' In late 1989, the West German authorities
discovered that 250 metric tons of heavy-water was clandes-
tinely exported to India by a West German nuclear smuggler,
Alfred Hempel. 107
 In April 1990, Romania's President announced
that the former communist government of Nicolai Ceausescu had
provided 12.5 tons of Norwegian heavy-water to India.'0'
According to Spector and Smith, these two men, 'almost
certainly were involved in India's apparently illicit heavy-
102 
'India Should Produce Nuclear Weapons', Defense And
Foreign Affairs Weekly 2-8 October 1989, pp. 2-3.
103 Foreign Broadcasting Information Service / NES, 21
February 1990, p. 48.




"Heavy-Water Transferred", DIE TAGESZEITUNG, 7 October
1989, translated in JPRS-TND, 6 November 1989.
'°' Michael Gordon, 'Romania is Reported in Nuclear Deal
with India', NEW YORK TIMES, 30 April 1990.
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water acquisitions' They further noted that India has
demonstrated 'persuasively to have relied on clandestine
nuclear purchases to expand its nuclear weapons capability',
and therefore, 'New Delhi has lost claims to transparency and
has created deep grounds for suspicions about its inten-
tions'
The most significant development under Mr. Singh's
government was that the DAE allocated $ 1.4 billion for heavy-
water during 1989-1990 to meet deficiencies caused by domestic
production shortfalls." During the period 1989-1990, India
was in dire need of heavy-water free from international
safeguards for the continued operation of its safeguards-free
nuclear reactors, like MAPP I & II and DHRtJVA. It also started
operating a new 235 MW Ce) safeguards-free power reactors,
NARORA I in 1990 and planned to operate NARORA II in 1991.112
Each of these reactors has a plutonium production capacity of
60 kg per year, which would augment India's stockpile of
safeguards-free plutonium for further expansion of its nuclear
weapons capability. 113
 India was reported to be continuously
producing large quantities of fissile plutonium in 1989 which
significantly enhanced its weapons capability." 4
 Further
reports suggested that Mr. singh's government was preparing
the second test of the AGNI (fire), Intermediate-range
ballistic missile, to be followed by large-scale production of
109 Spector and smith, p. 78.
"° ibid, p. 73.
'' Rita Manchanda, 'Heavy-Water Drought', Far Eastern
Economic Review, 31 August 1989. p. 1.
112 World Nuclear Industry
 Handbook (Sutton-Surrey,
Nuclear Engineering International, 1990).
" See Appendix II.
" 'Kalpakkam Nuclear Power Plant Set for Production',
TIMES OF INDIA, 12 October 1989.
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the missiles. But no second test has yet taken place.'15
Since early 1990, normalization in Indo-Pakistan
relations reached imminent collapse with the upsurge of the
freedom movement in the Indian-held Kashniir which increased
the prospect of an other war over the Kashmir dispute."6
Strong fears were expressed that if a war broke out, both the
parties might have ready access to nuclear weapons.' 1' Former
Chief of Staff of Indian Army, General (retd.) K. Sundarji
indicated the possibility that India might have 'usable
nuclear weapons' if required."8
V.P. Singh was replaced by Mr. Chandra Shekar as
Prime Minister in early 1991, running a minority government
with parliamentary support from Rajiv Gandhi's Congress Party.
It had a short tenure because the Congress Party withdrew its
support apparently over the provision of refuelling facilities
to the U.S. aircraft during the Gulf war. No significant
development was reported in the nuclear field which could
affect the process underway for the expansion of a nuclear
weapons capability. The Shekar government was too short lived
and politically instable to take any important decisions. As
a result of the new parliamentary elections held in June 1991,
the Congress Party could not win a majority, but was able to
form a government with support from small groups. During the
process, the Congress Party suffered a great loss in Mr. Rajiv
Gandhi's tragic death in a terrorist's suicidal bomb blast.
The party was able to agree on the nomination of Mr. Narsima
" 'India Prepares New Agni Tests, Production', Defense
and Forei gn Affairs Weekly , 26 February - 4 March 1990, p. 1.
116 
'Growing Fears of Clash Over Kashmir,' FINANCIAL
TIMES, 30 January 1990.
" Spector with Smith, p. 79.
" General K. Sundarji, 'The Nuclear Threat' India Today,
30 November, 1990, p. 94.
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Rao as Prime Minister. The prospects of Congress Party being
able to remain in government are better than any other because
it is the single largest parliamentary party. Given Mr. Rao's
long and close association with Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv
Gandhi, there is a greater possibility that he would follow
the nuclear policy of expanding the weapons capability under-
taken by their governments. 119
 Being a Minister for External
Affairs, he had continuously defended India's right to carry
out more PNEs if considered necessary for Indian national
interest and rejected proposals for the application of full-
scope safeguards on its nuclear programme.
5. SECOND NUCLEAR DEBATE (1980s)
Since the early 1980s, Pakistan's pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability has provided a rationale to the
pro-bomb lobbyists in India to intensify their campaign in
favour of the development of nuclear weapons. A large number
of officials, defence specialists, and members of the media
and political elite have demanded that India must develop an
open nuclear weapons programme.' 2° Some believe that India, in
fact, already possesses nuclear weapons and official denials
are only diplomatic in nature.' 2' Others staunchly support the
view that a nuclear Pakistan is potentially dangerous to
Indian national security and therefore, India must develop
nuclear weapons.' 22
 The division within the Indian polity has
" Mr. Rao was initially the Minister of External
Affairs, but then became the Minister for Home Affairs under
Rajiv Gandhi.
120 An entire issue of an Indian periodical, World Focus,
2(6), 1981, is dedicated to the nuclear debate.
121 P.C. Lal, 'We probably Have the Bomb', World Focus, 2
(6), June 1981, pp, 14-15.
122 Ibid.
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gradually coalesced in favour of India's development of
nuclear weapons. There are some shifts within the pro-bomb
lobby about the urgency of acquiring nuclear weapons.
K. Subrahxnanyam, who used to represent the modera-
tes, is now leading the hawkish component of the pro-bomb
lobby. His association with Indian government circles also
make his views more credible. He has described the current
debate on the acquisition of nuclear weapons as an "Indian
Dilemma" buried under an 'enormous overburden of myths' •123
According to him, it is a myth that nuclear weapon states,
'especially the US is committed to non-proliferation, if not
in the sense of their own proliferation of nuclear weapons
but at least to other countries' •124 He stated that the record
showed the U.S. and Western powers had been conniving at
selective proliferation even while they were negotiating the
so-called Non-Proliferation Treaty.' 25
 Israel, South Africa and
Pakistan are cited as example of selective cases. To him, it
is another myth that nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of
nuclear weapon powers, their allies and clients but not in the
hands of others. He argued,
In the current global strategic environment in
which, against our opposition, nuclear weapons have
been made an international currency of power and
surrounded by three nuclear weapon powers of the
world, it is absurd for a country of India's size,
population and resources to talk of non-alignment
and keeping her options open by renouncing nuclear
weapons 126
Subrahmanyam believes that a 'non-nuclear India
123 K. subrahmanyam (ed.), NUCLEAR MYTHS AND REALITIES:
INDIA'S DILEMMA (New Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1981), p. i.
124 ibid, p. ii.
125 ibid.
126 ibid, p. vi.
235
cannot have even a regional role, let alone a global one' .''
He believes that India's acquisition of nuclear weapons would
not be in violation of Gandhian non-violence. According to
him, 'No doubt Gandhiji expressed himself against the atom
bomb but that was long before the nuclear weapons became the
legitimate international currency of power' •28 He believed
that the NPT highlighted the technological hegemony imposed
upon the developing nations by the nuclear-weapon powers, who
are continuously attempting to legitimize their 'monopolis-
tic' nuclear arsenals and assist 'clandestine' proliferation
to their clients like Israel and South Africa. A retired
Indian Admiral, Krishan Nayyar's opinion reflects the inten-
sity of pro-bomb sentiment. He stated, 'The world has learned
to live with U.S power, Soviet power, even Chinese power, and
it will have to learn to live with Indian power' •12Q
With the gradual development of nuclear weapons
capability by Pakistan, Indian public opinion has further
swayed in favour of India's development of nuclear weapons.
An opinion poll for the SUNDAY OBSERVER suggested that 82 per
cent of the respondents wanted India to produce nuclear
weapons and 45 per cent favoured a pre-emptive strike on
Pakistan's nuclear facilities.' 30
 It further indicated that 32
per cent of the respondents believed that India already had
atomic weapons and 70 per cent believed that Pakistan too
possessed nuclear weapons.' 3' It is important to note that the
opinion poll was carried out just after the interview of the
12? ibid, p. vii.
121 ibid, p. ix.
129 
'Superpower Rising', WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, 3 April
1989, p. 13.
130 
'Atom bomb programme favoured in Indian poll',
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Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, to THE
OBSERVER. Dr. Khan reportedly stated that Pakistan possessed
the atomic bomb.'32
 The likelihood of Indian respondents being
influenced by that report and its impact in favour of the
atomic bomb cannot not be ignored.
However, it is a reflection of India's democratic
character that the anti-nuclear lobby has not entirely dis-
appeared. A group of distinguished Indian scientists, parlia-
mentarians, authors, academics, journalists and elder states-
men has been formed under the name of a Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy (COSNUP). Professor Dhirendra Sharma is
convener of the Committee. It may not be able to influence the
final outcome of the nuclear debate as a majority of the
Indian decision-making elite seems determined to reconsider
the official policy of not acquiring nuclear weapons. Howev-
er, it might contribute to redress the prevailing imbalance in
the nuclear debate in India. The following paragraph from the
manifesto of COSNUP provides an insight into its thinking:
It is presumptuous to claim that India, the pre-
eminent state in the Sub-continent, is being driven
to go nuclear by Pakistan. Where does our respon-
sibility lie in directing the course of history of
our unfortunate region?* * * [W]e believe that the
onus rests with us for the decision whether this
region should go nuclear or not.* * * Along with
Pakistan we should seek ways of ensuring that India,
Pakistan, and the whole of South Asia and the Indian
Ocean remain a nuclear free zone.'33
The Indian nuclear establishment is coming under increasing
pressure from various organized and vocal environmental groups
after nuclear accidents the world over, like Chernobyl in the
132 Kuldip Nayyar, 'Pakistan has the A-Bomb, Says Dr.
Strange Love', THE OBSERVER, 1st March 1987.
'" Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containing the
Threat; A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 100 Congress, 2nd Session (Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 17.
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U.S.S.R. There were many demonstrations against the establish-
ment of two power reactors at Narora Atomic Power Project
(NAPP) near Delhi. 134
 The demonstrators demanded their scrapp-
ing. 135
 Dr. Sharma suggested its conversion into an electric-
ity producing centre by natural gas. 136
 There were also
protests against the Kaiga Atomic Power Project by the members
of another anti-nuclear group, CANE (Citizens for an Alterna-
tive to Nuclear Energy) .'" Kaiga is located only 15 km from a
wildlife sanctuary and less than 100 km from known seismic
faults. CANE members believe that radio-active contamination
from Kaiga would endanger the environment and the fragile
ecology of the surrounding forests.13a
6. REGIONAL NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY (1980s):
There was no significant interaction between India
and Pakistan in the field of nuclear diplomacy before the 1974
Indian nuclear test. Both countries signed the Partial Test
Ban Treaty in 1963 immediately after its conclusion, but
Pakistan did not ratify until 1988.139 No official explanation
has been offered by Pakistan for withholding ratification for
so long time. Most probably, it was due to future uncertain-
ties in view of India's lead in the field of underground
nuclear explosion technology, and its interest in carrying out
more such explosions. A fundamental differencece between India
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and Pakistan on the issue of a PNE is that Pakistan considered
it indistinguishable from a weapon test.' 4° General Zia
departed to some extent from this view.' 41
 Pakistan was behind
India in its nuclear programme to the extent that it had not
established even a single nuclear installation by then. As
noted in the previous chapter, its first nuclear research
organization, known as PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear
Science and Technology) was established in 1965.142 Its first
research reactor, PARR-i (Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor),
was also completed in 1965.'
India and Pakistan adopted different approaches to
the NPT, although neither signed it. Pakistan actively par-
ticipated in the NPT negotiations, but unlike India, it hailed
its conclusion and expressed hope that all the potential
nuclear-weapon states would join it.' 44
 In an apparent response
to the Indian objections against the NPT that it was a
"discriminatory" treaty, Pakistan thought that it was not
"realistic to impose obligations on the nuclear powers similar
in all respects to those which the treaty placed on the non-
nuclear weapons states".' 45
 However, despite its general
support for the NPT and the associated objectives, Pakistan
'° THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THE NPT (Stockholm,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1972), pp.
25-2 6.
141 See General Zia's nuclear policy in the previous
chapter.
142 PINSTECH 1965-1985, (Islamabad, PINSTECH-PAEC, Govern-
ment of Pakistan, 1985), p. 3.
143 Annual Report 1873-74, (Islamabad, PAEC, 1974), p. 13.
144 DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT: 1968 (Washington DC, U. S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1968), p. 317.
145 ibid, pp. 318-319.
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did not sign it because of India's refusal. 146
 The official
explanation offered by Pakistan for not signing was stated as
follows:
In the final analysis, the position of Pakistan with
regard to signing the treaty will turn on considera-
tions of its enlightened national interest and na-
tional security in the geo-political context of the
region in which Pakistan is situated.'4'
Pakistan accepted international safeguards on all
its nuclear installations until 1974 when India carried out
its nuclear test. All of its three nuclear installations by
then, PARR-i, KANUPP (Karachi Nuclear Power Project) and the
controversial reprocessing plant to be installed under the
Franco-Pakistan agreement of 1976 were under safeguards.' 48
 It
was only after the 1974 Indian nuclear test that Pakistan
decided to develop a nuclear weapons capability and refused
to accept full-scope safeguards. India on the other hand, had
sought nuclear technology from Canada and U.S. in the 1950s
under ambiguous terms and refused to accept international
safeguards on most of its nuclear installations. After India's
nuclear test, Pakistani Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto desperate-
ly sought a nuclear security guarantee against the Indian
nuclear threat or blackmail. He instructed the Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmad, to explore the pos-
sibility with U.S. officials at the CENTO Ministerial Meeting
at Washington which was coincidentally scheduled immediately
after the Indian test.'49
 Reportedly, the U.S. was not inclined
to provide such a guarantee. Bhutto visited Moscow in early
146 THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THE NPT, 26.
'' ibid.
' See previous chapter and Appendices IX & X for
details.
' "Test Puts India in Firing Line", GUARDIAN, 24 May
1974.
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October 1974 to seek Soviet support for a proposal to decla-
re South Asia a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ), but the
Soviet leaders showed a lack of support for his fears about
the Indian nuclear threat to Pakistan and did not support the
proposal 150
In the absence of a security guarantee, the lack of
support for his nuclear-weapons free-zone proposal, and
Pakistan's week conventional military capability, Bhutto's
alternatives were indeed extremely limited. He proposed at
the U.N. General Assembly session on 28 October 1974 to
declare South Asia a Nuclear-Weapons Free-Zone.' 51
 The Politi-
cal Committee of the General Assembly endorsed the Pakistani
proposal by 82 votes in favour to 2 against (India and Bhutan)
with 36 abstentions. 152
 India opposed the proposal on the plea
that the initiative for the proposal should come from the
countries of the region and not the U.N.' 53
 However, despite
the endorsement of the Pakistani proposal, there was a general
skepticism about its eventual success in view of Indian
opposition. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union showed any
enthusiasm. 154
 India remained opposed to the Pakistani proposal
for a NWFZ. In August 1980, Mr. Swaran Singh as India's chief
delegate to 23rd Session of the General Conference of the IAEA
again rejected Pakistan's proposal to establish a nuclear
weapons free zone in the South Asian region.' 55
 In the follow-
'° "Moscow Bars Bhutto Bid on A-Free Zone", NEW YORK
TIMES, 27 October 1974.
'5' 
"Pakistan Urging Atom-Free Zone", NEW YORK TIMES, 29
October 1974.
152 NEW YORK TIMES, 21 November 1974.
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155 International Atomic Energy Agency, 23rd Regular
session (GC XXIII) OR. 215, August 1980, p. 17.
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ing General conference, Dr. Sethna reiterated Indian view that
the non-proliferation regime was discriminatory, and said,
'vertical and horizontal proliferation should be approached
simultaneously and in the same way' 156
During General Zia's regime, Pakistan offered India
a wide range of nuclear arms control proposals, such as:
creation of a nuclear-weapons free-zone in South Asia;
simultaneous signatures to the NPT by India and Pakistan;
mutual acceptance of the IAEA safeguards; bilateral inspec-
tion of each other's nuclear facilities; joint declarations
to renounce the development of nuclear weapons; and signing
a regional test ban treaty.'5' The NWFZ proposal was Bhutto's
while the remaining five originated during Zia's rule. In 1981
Zia offered Mrs. Gandhi a proposal for mutual inspection of
each other's nuclear installations, but she never responded to
that.'5' After the inception of Rajiv Gandhi's government in
October 1984, Zia launched a "peace offensive" to improve
Indo-Pakistan relations and resolve the nuclear issue. He
reiterated his proposal of mutual inspections to P.M. Gandhi
in November 1984 at a press conference in New Delhi and
complained about the lack of Indian response despite three
years of its initiation.'" He received a response from Mr.
Gandhi, who promised to pursue nuclear negotiations with
Pakistan.' 6° The Zia-Gandhi initiative provided a temporary
relief in the deteriorating nuclear competition between India
and Pakistan. In a joint communique on 17 December 1985, they
'' International Atomic Energy Agency, 24th Regular
Session (GC XXIV) OR. 220, February 1981, p. 12.
157 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 5 August 1988, p. S11005.
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announced a verbal understanding that India and Pakistan would
not attack each other's nuclear installations.' 61
 However, the
understanding could not be formalized into a written agreement
during Zia's lifetime due to worsening of mutual relations and
allegations of interference in each other's internal affairs.
The Pakistani nuclear arms control proposals were
reiterated by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo in 1986. He
offered to accept binding obligations if India recipro-
cated.' 62
 In September 1987, while addressing the UN General
Assembly, Junejo not only repeated the earlier offers but also
proposed that India and Pakistan should have a mutual agree-
ment on a regional test ban.' 63
 India rejected these proposals
on the plea that they failed to address its perception of a
Chinese nuclear threat and treat India and Pakistan as
relative equals, thereby, elevating Pakistan's importance
despite India's far greater size and economic-cum-military
power."4
 India also rejected the proposed regional test ban by
saying that it could await the adoption of a comprehensive
test ban by the nuclear weapon states." 5
 It believed that the
Pakistani proposals were meant to isolate India in the non-
proliferation forums and therefore, lacked credibility. Indian
decision-makers considered these proposals as part of an
161 THE PAKISTAN TIMES (Rawalpindi), 18 December 1985.
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"insincere diplomatic offensive" by Pakistan.'6'
India's refusal to test the credibility of Pakis-
tani non-proliferation initiatives marred progress of nuclear
arms control between the two states. In October 1987, during
his visit to Washington, Rajiv Gandhi rejected President
Ronald Reagan's appeal that India enter into a dialogue with
Pakistan on the nuclear issue." 7
 On the contrary, Gandhi
demanded that the U.S. should apply pressure on Pakistan to
stop the advancement of its nuclear weapons programme."8
During Gandhi's government, Indian nuclear diplomacy focussed
on containing the further development of the Pakistani nuclear
programme through pressure from the West, particularly the
U.S., and refused to negotiate on a bilateral basis. It was
obvious that accepting Pakistani proposals or any similar
measure based upon a regional arms control approach would lead
to reciprocal limits on its nuclear weapons capability. It was
not acceptable to India. Relying on U.S. pressure meant that
India would not have to make parallel concessions through
bilateral negotiations with Pakistan.
Instead of addressing regional nuclear issues at a
bilateral level with Pakistan, India has continued to advo-
cate comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In the late 1980s,
Indian nuclear diplomacy focussed upon drawing global atten-
tion on the issues of nuclear proliferation through a Five
Continent Peace Initiative. This initiative was jointly
proposed by India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden, and
Greece." The Five Continent Peace Initiative entailed
66 ibid.
167 "India-Pakistan Talks Urged", WASHINGTON POST, 21
October 1987.
168 ibid.
169 Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containing the
Threat; A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
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periodic summits, expert's meetings, and publicity efforts.
It primarily focussed on general and complete disarmament.
The initiative was ignored by Western arms control experts,
but viewed favourably by many Third World countries.'70
 Those
who did not appreciate the initiative believed that it could
not be taken seriously unless two of its members, India and
Argentina, were willing to address their nuclear program-
mes.'71
 Until then, it would be an eye-wash in the nuclear
diplomacy.
In 1987, Mr. Gandhi proposed a three-tier approach
to nuclear disarmament during his visit to Washington. This
approach categorized three types of states: Ci) the super-
powers (the United States and the Soviet Union); ( ii) the
great powers (China, France, and U.K.); and (iii) the near-
nuclear nations ( India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Israel,
South Africa) •172 According to the proposed approach, each tier
would have different obligations. The superpowers would be
obliged to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In this connection,
the INF Treaty and any such prospective agreements were viewed
by India as an improvement in the non-proliferation environ-
ment. 173
 The second-rank nuclear powers would be obliged to
freeze their arsenals at current levels. However, for Britain
and France, such a freeze would have to be accompanied by an
agreement to redress the East-West imbalance of conventional
forces in the European theatre. Finally, the near-nuclear
states would agree to remain non-nuclear.174
United States Senate (Washington DC, USGPO, 1988), p. 21.
170 ibid.
" ibid.
172 ibid, pp. 21-22.
173 ibid, p. 22.
174 ibid.
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On the basis of available information, the three-
tier approach appeared a unique and positive step. However,
there is no evidence of any interest shown by the states
mentioned in the proposed approach except India. Its basic
assumption of three categories of nuclear states contradic-
ted India's traditional policy on the NPT, which divided the
world into nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and India
regarded as "iniquitous" and "discriminatory".' 75
 The proposal
lacked any institutional framework to translate the recommen-
dations into practice. No provisions for verification and
inspection arrangements were suggested. Despite these funda-
mental questions, three-tier approach deserved to be further
explored. It appeared as a fundamental departure from India's
traditional nuclear policy on the issue of nuclear prolifera-
tion. How far this change in the Indian nuclear policy would
be translated into practice is yet to be seen? However, viewed
in the light of other determinants of Indian nuclear weapons
capability, it appears that India might be buying time through
such proposals to ward off pressure for adhering to some form
of non-proliferation. There is no further evidence of India's
interest in the three-tier approach after Rajiv Gandhi's
tenure of government ended in 1989.
In late December 1988, encouraging steps for nuclear
restraint in South Asia were undertaken. At the fourth SAARC
(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Summit in
Islamabad, India elicited a call from the SAARC leaders for an
early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty to be
proposed at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.' 76 However,
more encouraging development of the Summit was the formaliza-
" See Chapter Four, section 3 on India's NPT policy.
176 Text of the Islamabad Declaration, issued at the end
of the fourth SAARC Summit concluded in Islamabad on 31
December 1988; Strategic Studies (Islamabad), XII (2), Winter
1988, pp. 95-97.
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tion of Indo-Pakistan understanding reached between General
Zia and P.M. Gandhi in December 1985 (not to attack each
other's nuclear installations) into a binding agreement.17'
This development was possible due to a better personal under-
standing between Benazir Bhutto, who assumed power in early
December 1988 and Rajiv Gandhi. The main provision of the
agreement is that:
Each Party shall refrain from undertaking, en-
couraging or participating in, directly or indirec-
tly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of,
or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility
in the other country.1"
The agreement is a significant step towards further con-
fidence building measures between the two countries once it
is ratified.
Another proposal between India and Pakistan was
under discussion in 1988 through U.S. mediation. According to
the proposal, India and Pakistan would each place one of its
safeguards-free nuclear facility of the other's choice under
safeguards. 1" The verification of the postulated arrangement
could be by either the ThEA or bilateral safeguards monitored
by inspectors from the other country. This proposal has
certain attractions for both countries. Conceptually, it would
alleviate a long standing Pakistani grievance of discrimina-
tion vis-a-vis India. In practice, Pakistan would have to be
prepared to put under safeguards its only source of fissile
material, Kahuta uranium enrichment plant which would be an
obvious Indian choice. India might have to put one of its
premier R & D establishments, like BARC (Bhabha Atomic
'' Text of the Agreement Between India and Pakistan on,
"No Attack on N-Plants", Article I, Strategic Studies, pp.
98-99.
178 ibid.
179 Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containin g the
Threat, p. xi.
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Research Centre), or PREFRE (Power Reactors Fuel Reprocessing)
under the safeguards. However, India would not be deprived of
its sources of safeguards-free fissile material, because it
has many other facilities for the production and reprocessing
of plutonium. 18° Despite obvious advantages of the proposal to
India, its response was described as 'lukewarm', while Pakis-
tan's attitude was 'favourable' 181
 India showed limited
interest without any commitment. P.M. Gandhi personally found
the proposal to be "an idea worthy of further exploration",
but other Indian officials' attitude was non-committal.'82
The U.S. sources appeared optimistic because of the
potential advantages to India of a proposal that 'effective-
ly caps Pakistani nuclear programme' but preserved India's
capability, and therefore, indicated the possibility that
India might accept the proposal. 183
 The fact that India would
still be in a position to continue its nuclear weapons
programme to develop a limited deterrent against China seemed
to be the basis of that optimism. Nonetheless, certain diffi-
culties were overlooked for the proposal to succeed in view of
the complexities of nuclear deadlock in South Asia. The
proposal did not address existing stockpiles of safeguards-
free fissile material present in both states' inventories.
Pakistan is thought to have enough material for several
devices and India can launch a limited nuclear weapons
programme on the basis of existing stockpile of plutonium.184
'° See Chapter VII on Indian nuclear reactors and
reprocessing plants.




184 Spector and Smith, for India, pp. 63-88, for Pakistan
pp. 89-117.
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Both countries would be able to develop a limited number of
nuclear weapons, though India's capability would be greater
than Pakistan's. Given the prevailing state of hostility and
suspicion between the two nations, neither would find the
proposal an effective solution to the nuclear threat.
Moreover, the proposal is likely to be ineffective
in view of India's capability to install more safeguards-free
nuclear reactors and plutonium reprocessing plants. Pakistan
can also build more facilities. In fact, available press
reports suggest that Pakistan is already building a second
enrichment plant at Golra near Islamabad.'° 5
 By the time the
proposal might become operative in some institutional form, it
might be out of date. This leads to the conclusion that any
proposal aimed at building technological barriers is likely to
fail unless it addressed the fundamental political questions
which generate such technological and military momentum.
Therefore, the proposal might fall short of even a temporary
confidence building measure.
India's hesitation to endorse the proposal is under-
standable. India's nuclear programme is based upon an integ-
rated fuel cycle. Indian officials are bound to be concerned
that placement of one nuclear facility under safeguards would
affect the integrity of complete nuclear cycle. Placing one
sensitive nuclear facility under safeguards requires full
monitoring of that facility and the nuclear material process-
ed in that facility. Under this proposal, the plutonium
reprocessed in a safeguarded plant would become subject to
safeguards. 1" If the safeguarded material would be trans-
ferred to another facility, the safeguards would follow and
apply to the material at the new facility. However, once the
' Simon Henderson, "Pakistan Builds Second Plant to
Enrich Uranium", FINANCIAL TIMES, ii. December 1987.
106 Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containin g the
Threat, op. cit. pp. 23-24.
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safeguarded material left, the safeguards would not be
applicable on that facility.187
Another proposal being explored by the Indian,
Pakistani and U. S. non-proliferation experts is a "Greater
South Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone".' 08
 This proposal is in
response to Indian objections against the Pakistani proposal
for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. India
opposed Pakistani proposal because it did not incorporate
Indian concerns about nuclear threats it perceived from China
and the U.S. deployment in the Indian Ocean.'89
 The Greater
South Asian NWFZ proposal sought an agreement to ban nuclear
weapons from the Subcontinent, their deployment in Tibet and
other parts of China adjacent to India, and from the Indian
Ocean.' 9° It appears a comprehensive proposal which took into
account the entire spectrum of nuclear threats to India and
meets the requirements of the Pakistani South Asian NWFZ.
However, discussions are confined to diplomatic
circles so far and there is no public information available.
The official responses of China, India, Pakistan and the
superpowers are not available for analysis. Nonetheless, some
of the likely responses may be speculated. The Chinese nuclear
threat to India is a low intensity one because its nuclear
capability was primarily directed against the Soviet Union.
Non-deployment of Chinese nuclear weapons in Tibet would
certainly minimize the nuclear threat to India, but not
eliminate it. There cannot be a credible guarantee that China
187 ibid.
ibid, p. 24.
Captain Zafar Iqbal Cheema, 'South Asia as a Nuclear-
Weapons Free-Zone', Strategic Studies (Islamabad), 4 (2),
Winter 1981, pp. 32-46.
190 Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containin g the
Threat, p. 24.
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has not or will not deploy nuclear weapons against India in
other territories. India may not be willing to foreswear its
nuclear deterrent for any such incredible assurances against
a nuclear threat. It might be potentially attractive for China
to assure non-deployment of nuclear weapons in Tibet in lieu
of a non-nuclear India on its southern borders. It might not
entail any major reorientation of its strategic policy,
because China has already made a "no-first use" declaration
against the NNWS which includes India. But it may not be
willing to forego its option to deploy nuclear weapons in
Tibet against the Soviet Union. The process of determining the
possible direction and targets of Chinese nuclear deployment
there would be extremely tedious because of technological com-
plexities involved in such a determination. China may not be
willing to let an extensive verification and inspection system
be instituted which might affect the credibility of its deter-
rent against the Soviet Union. Any Chinese assurances with-
out a verification system would not be acceptable to India.
A similar proposal originating from India with semi-
official recognition is a triple-zero option for Asia. 191 It
stipulates: i) elimination of all medium to short-range weapon
systems (5,000 to 500 km range) and battle-field (less than
500 km range) land, sea and air-launched nuclear weapons from
the continental land mass of Asia, the Pacific and Indian
Ocean up to a distance of 5,500 km; ii) corresponding commit-
ment by nations of Asia not to develop or acquire nuclear
weapons; iii) strategic nuclear weapons in Asia and elsewhere
to be brought within the framework of negotiations in progress
between the two superpowers at present; iv) an assurance by
the nuclear weapon states to the signatories of a triple-zero
191 Jasjit Singh, 'Southern Asia and the Nuclear Thre-
at', Strategic Anal ysis, New Delhi, XII (1), April 1988, pp.
10-11. Jasjit Singh is a retired Air Commodore and presently
the Director of the IDSA.
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option that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to
be used against them, pending the elimination of strategic
weapons; v) all states to agree not to attack the nuclear
installations of states party to the triple-zero option; and
vi) mutual verification and inspection mechanisms to ensure
compliance with non-deployment and non-development of nuclear
weapons by every state.' 92
 The proposal not only coversfar
broader ground than any of the known initiatives,including a
comprehensive test ban treatybut is also full of contradic-
tions and complications.' 93
 Therefore, it can hardly be accep-
table for serious negotiations.
It is noteworthy that India did not reject the
proposals about general nuclear disarmament. The Indian policy
on every meaningful nuclear arms control and disarmament
solution reflects an inextricable linkage to its claim for
general and complete nuclear disarmament. A U.S. expert
believes that because of the elusiveness of general and
complete disarmament as an attainable objective, India's
linkage of non-proliferation to disarmament has been a
"smokescreen for inaction on the nuclear issue".'94
Recently, Pakistan has proposed a five nation
conference to resolve the issue of the nuclearization of South
Asia in which the Unite States, the Soviet Union, China,
India and Pakistan would participate.'95
 Pakistan's Prime
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, has called upon the three great powers
to sponsor urgent negotiations between the two South Asian
rivals on the nuclear issue. While the U.S. and China sup-
192 ibid.
193 ibid.
194 Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containin g the
Threat. p. x.
195 'Pakistan Seeks Talks On Nuclear Curbs', INTERNA-
TIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 7 June 1991.
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ported the Pakistani proposal, India rejected it immediately
and said, 'We find nothing new in these suggestions' .' There
is no response from the Soviet Union.
India's nuclear diplomacy has failed to some extent
to cope with the non-proliferation issues stated above, and it
has not offered any viable alternative. It has rejected Pakis-
tan's bilateral initiatives aimed at regional non-prolifera-
tion, the acceptance of which would expose the inherent am-
biguity of Indian nuclear policy. Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy
appears comprehensive enough to incorporate regional as well
as international non-proliferation proposals. It seeks
regional denuclearization with India while hoping that general
and complete nuclear disarmament, whenever it comes, would be
compatible with any regional framework. India demands first
and foremost, international nuclear disarmament, and unless
that is achieved, it rejects regional disarmament. The above
argument does not impute any peaceful versus military motives
on either side on this issue. Both countries are pursuing
military programmes under the garb of peaceful development.
India's problem originates from the global orientation of its
nuclear diplomacy whereas Pakistan's advantage is that its
nuclear diplomacy is fundamentally Indo-centric and therefore,
has an advantage in negotiating a regional solution with
India. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been plunged into a
deadlock with the U.S. over linkage between its nuclear
programme and the continuation of economic and military assis-
tance.
India's covert nuclearization is gradually advanc-
ing under the doctrine of nuclear ambiguity. The doctrine of
nuclear ambiguity seems to be based upon certain perceived
advantages. India can continue to claim itself a non-nuclear
weapon state and thereby derive benefits from the ambiguity,
.96 
'Pakistan's atomic plan rejected', THE INDEPENDENT, 8
June 1991.
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like the availability of economic and sophisticated techno-
logical assistance from the West and the Soviet Union. Loss
of such assistance would seriously undermine the momentum of
India's technological and industrial development. Overt
riuclearization might activate deployment of China's nuclear
weapons against India, for which there is no evidence so far.
China might also consider withdrawing its no-first use offer
to India once it deployed nuclear weapons. In that case, India
would have to incur the economic cost of sustaining a nuclear
arms race with China which it might not win in the immediate
future.
As a counterpoise to the growing nuclear threat from
Pakistan, this strategy has many advantages over the open
development of a nuclear arsenal. It would provide sufficient
deterrence against Pakistan. In future conflict-situations,
Pakistani military planners, even by conservative assumptions,
would have to assume that given India's present state of
nuclear advancement, it can deploy nuclear weapons as a
retaliatory measure. Covert nuclearization helps to avoid
exacerbation of bilateral nuclear tensions and restrains an
open ended nuclear arms race between the two. Even if India is
certain to lead such an arms race against Pakistan due to its
large economic, industrial and technological base, it would be
impossible for it to escape a Pakistani nuclear deterrent of
some size. India's rejection of all the Pakistani nuclear arms
control proposals is motivated by its doctrine of nuclear
ambiguity. 1" This is considered the best strategy by the
Indian decision-makers until India is able to develop a
strategic triad on the superpower model, i.e. land based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers
and submarine-based ballistic missiles (SLBMs). As will be
discussed in the next chapter, India is already heading in
191 See section 6 above.
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that direction. Until then, covert nuclearization helps avoid
the high economic cost of the deployment of nuclear forces,
without the loss of opportunity for the clandestine research
and development of a strategic nuclear capability. Over the
years, Indian arguments for the acquisition and advancement of
its nuclear weapons capability have multiplied. New justifica-
tions are added without earlier ones being dropped. Under one
rationale or the other, India has refused to allow verifica-
tion of its claim that it has not been pursuing the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons.
The doctrine of nuclear ambiguity is deliberately
misleading to buy time for enlarging its existing capability.
According to the WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, a top Indian official
recently conceded that India deliberately fosters ambiguity
about its nuclear capabilities, but off-hand remarks suggest
that India has nuclear-weapons components on the shelf and a
special team ready to assemble them. 198
 An open declaration of
a nuclear deterrent would be the next inevitable step once the
nuclear weapons capability has advanced to a stage from where
nuclear weapons could be fully integrated into the armed
forces and military doctrines developed for their use. Selig
Harrison from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
noted that Indian scientists were facing problems in develop-
ing IRBM nose cones and guidance systems, but added, 'When
they overcome the technical problems and are in a position to
deploy IRBMs, they'll be looking for ways of going nuclear in
a public way' 199
The most significant determinant of Indian nuclear
weapons capability in the 1980s was its preoccupation with
the development of a comprehensive military capability, in
addition to a Pakistani nuclear threat. The imperatives of
198 WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, 3 April 1989, pp. 16-18.
199 ibid.
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security, strategic reassurance, great-power status and
domestic political pressure weighed heavily in the Indian
decision-making to expand its nuclear weapons capability.
Indian pursuit of strategic power leads to the conclusion that
a nuclear weapons capability would be an integral component of
its force posture. It is difficult to say precisely when India
would declare the existence of a public nuclear force, but it
can be expected around the turn of the century. Much depends
on the development of its missiles programme which is dis-
cussed in the next chapter. However, an Indian specialist in
nuclear science policy, Dr. Sharma, anticipates that given its
stockpiles of plutonium and 'massive investment in IRBMs',
India would publicly turn to the nuclear deterrent option
within the next five years, thereby proclaiming its great
power status. 20° Most probably, India would wait to develop
various ingredients of a strategic triad before declaring its
nuclear weapons capability, unless forced by Pakistan into an
earlier decision.
200 ibid, p. 17.
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Chapter Seven
INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY: AN ASSESSMENT
7lji Nuclear weapons capability of a country originates
from the size and sophistication of its nuclear industry,
availability of fissile material (weapon-grade plutonium or
uranium), expertise in nuclear military technology, and a
political conunitment to allocate the requisite economic
resources. Although actual development of nuclear weapons is
fundamentally a political decision, technological direction
of a state's nuclear capability is an important differential
of its peaceful or military intentions. This differential
assumes a special significance if that state deliberately
fosters ambiguity in its nuclear policy and pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability through the use of dual-purpose
technologies. It refuses to allow the verification of its
claim about an exclusively peaceful intent by rejecting the
application of international safeguards on its nuclear
programme. It is yet another criterion for the evaluation of)
its policy and weapons capability. Finally, the development
of adequate delivery systems, like ballistic missiles, poten-
tially capable of carrying nuclear weapons, indicate the
course a country might be taking towards the acquisition of
nuclear weapons.
India appears to be such a case. It maintains a
large-scale, well developed and self-sufficient nuclear
programme which provides it a solid basis for a nuclear
weapons capability. It is the leading Third World country with
a nuclear programme which has demonstrated a consistent growth
and technological progress. It employs dual-purpose nuclear
technologies. India is the sixth nation to carry out a nuclear
test, and ninth to achieve a complete nuclear fuel recycle
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capability. 1 It has indigenous expertise and technological
infrastructure to design, construct and operate nuclear power
stations. It has carried out extensive research, especially in
the field of reactor theory. It has large quantities of
weapons-grade plutonium free from international safeguards
which can be used to develop a sizeable nuclear force. Many
reports suggest that India has developed nuclear weapons
components and assembled several low-yield nuclear weapons,
but the Indian government denies the validity of those
reports. Indian Air Force has sophisticated aircraft to
develop an aircraft-based nuclear delivery system.
A similar policy applies to the Indian space
programme which is described as entirely peaceful, despite
launching ballistic missiles from installations established
with substantial foreign assistance and commitment for 'only
peaceful use'. India has test-fired an Intermediate-range
ballistic missile, Agni (fire) which has the potential for
adaptation as a nuclear delivery system. It has a rapidly
expanding space programme to enhance its IRBM capability in
the immediate future and provide the basis for an inter-
continental ballistic missile capability in the long-term.
There is no public evidence so far that India has integrated
nuclear weapons into its military structure or developed
explicit command, control and communication (C) systems for
the deployment of nuclear weapons. However, the contemporary
developments in the region may force India to do so. All these
issues are discussed in detail in the subsequent sections of
this chapter which assesses India's nuclear weapons capability
and delivery systems. This assessment is carried out in the
light of a wide range of recently available evidence.
1 Status of being ninth country to have achieved a full
nuclear recycle capability is claimed in, Annual Re port 1975-
1976: Department of Atomic Energy (Bombay, GOl, 1976), p. 26.
The other eight countries are: The U.S., the U.S.S.R., the
U.K., France, F.G.R., Japan, Canada and Sweden.
258
1. THE GENESIS O' INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAZ4ME
The genesis of the Indian nuclear programme pre-
dates independence. The establishment of Tata Institute of
Fundamental Research (TIFR) under Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha in
1945 marked the inaugural phase of the programme. 2
 An adequate
scientific base for it had already existed in the later years
of the British Raj. The University of Calcutta, a premier
scientific institution, was established in 1876. In the same
year, Indian Association for Cultivation of Science was
created. Bose Institute, founded in 1917, had demonstrated
significant achievement in natural science research. In 1942,
Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (ICSIR)
was commissioned to initiate and promote cooperation among
scientific institutions and the industrial sector. As noted in
Chapter Three, the Indian nuclear programme received the
supervision of Dr. Bhabha in its formative phase.
Dr. Bhabha was born in Bombay on 30 October 1909
and began his education at Elphinstone College and the
Institute of Science at Bombay. 3
 In 1927, he joined the
Cambridge University and studied at Gonville and Caius
Colleges. After doing a tripos in mechanical sciences in 1930,
he worked (1931-32) in the Covendish Laboratory where in 1932
Chadwick discovered the Neutron. 4
 In 1934, he won the Isaac
Newton studentship, completed his Ph.D. in 1935, and worked at
Cambridge until 1939 when he returned to India. 5
 The time in
2 Dr. M.R. Srinivasan, 'Reminiscences of Homi Bhabha',
Nuclear India, Vol. 25, No.5-6 (Bombay, Department of Atomic
Energy, Government of India, 1987), p. 12.
'Homi Bhabha: The Pioneer of India's Nuclear Program-




Europe proved significant for his personal development as an
accomplished nuclear physicist. He worked with outstanding
scientists like Pauli in Zurich, Fermi in Rome, Kramer in
Utrecht, and Sir John Cockcroft and Lord Blackett in Britain.'
He also had close associations with Albert Einstein and a
Nobel Laureate, Hideki Yukawa. Bhabha made an original contri-
bution to electron-position scattering, acknowledged as 'Bha-
bha Scattering' . At the beginning of World War II in 1939,
Bhabha was in India and could not return to Cambridge. In
1940, he undertook a research assignment in cosmic rays at the
Indian Institute of Science at Banglore as a professor. In
1944, Bhabha was successful in seeking financial support from
the Dorab Tata Trust and the government of India to set up the
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research which was commissioned
on 19 December 1945 under his supervision. 8
 He devoted the
rest of his life to build scientific institutions in India.
Initially, India drew an interim plan to promote
various uses of atomic energy. First 'four-year' interim plan
was unveiled by the Atomic Energy Commission in January 1953.
It envisaged the installation of various plants for processing
atomic minerals like uranium ores and producing uranium and
thorium compounds. 9
 These included a monazite processing plant
at Alwaye (constructed by the Indian Rare Earths Limited), a
uranium processing at Trombay and another such plant at
Bihar. 1° The plan was hailed by the Indian press as "a major
advance in the development of atomic energy with the implemen-
' Cockcroft and Menon, pp. 5-6.
'Homi Bhabha: The Pioneer of India's Nuclear Program-
me,' pp. 6-7.
S ibid.
Department of State, Central Decimal File 891.2546 /
1-1353, dated 13 January 1953.
10 ibid.
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tation of a four-year plan" drawn up by the Atomic Energy
Commission. 1' Further details about the plan were provided to
the Lok Sabha by the Minister of Natural Resources and Scien-
tific Research in March 1953. These were as follows: i) survey
of India for atomic minerals, ii) construction of atomic reac-
tors, iii) setting up a medical division in the AEC, iv)
setting up a biological division for the use of atomic
techniques, v) setting up a pilot plant for the extraction of
uranium from low grade ores and copper tailings, vi) setting
up a plant for processing uranium from the residual cake left
after rare earth chlorides and carbonates have been extrac-
ted from monazite, and vii) setting up a plant for processing
uranium to the "state of atomic purity".'2
In 1954, Dr. Bhabha prepared the long-term, three
stage nuclear development strategy.' 3
 Subsequent development
of the Indian nuclear programme took place within the frame-
work of that three stage development strategy. New plans were
introduced, but they did not alter the fundamental premise of
the development strategy. Initial legislative work on atomic
energy was carried out from 1948 to 1954 to provide legitima-
cy for administrative authority and organization.' 4
 Since then,
the set up of the Indian nuclear programme has developed into
a big organization and it has assumed diverse functions. A
study of all aspects of India's civilian nuclear programme is
beyond the scope of this thesis. An organizational chart is
provided on the next page for a complete description.
" TIMES OF INDIA (New Delhi), 10 January 1953, cited in
the Department of State file referred above.
12 Department of State, Central Decimal File, 891.2546/-
3-1453, dated 14 March 1953.
' See section 2 in Chapter Three.
14 The administrative framework of India's nuclear
programme during the Nehru era is discussed in Chapter Three,











































































































































2. NUCLEAR POWER PROGR*1E
Bhabha first concentrated on the primary tech-
nological objectives for the Indian nuclear programme in the
1950s. These objectives were: i) laying the foundation of a
fully self-reliant and long-term nuclear programme, ii)
training a large cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians
initially from abroad, but eventually at home, iii) acquisi-
tion of technical know-how for designing, manufacturing and
operating nuclear equipment and installations, iv) acquisi-
tion of manufactured technologies in the interim period, like
research reactors, nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel
technologies, v) undertaking nuclear fuel prospecting and
recovering, vi) shifting the technological thrust of the prog-
ramme from the acquisition and development of natural uranium
to plutonium-thorium, and then to uranium-233 (U-233) fuelled
reactors to generate nuclear power, and finally, vii) the
completion of all objectives within a period of 20 to 25
years '
Bhabha managed to train of a large number of nuclear
scientists from abroad and develop technological expertise to
start the programme by the time he started establishing
research and power reactors. Later, the training of nuclear
scientists and technicians shifted from foreign to national
institutions. Scientists trained in Britain, Canada, France,
Switzerland and other West European countries were large in
number, although no accurate figures are available. Several
Indian scientists attended the 'Isotope School' at Harwell in
Britain where they learned techniques for using radioactive
These objectives are collated from many documents:
Annual Reports (1960-61 to 1989-90), Department of Atomic
Energy, Government of India; Department of the State, Atomic
Energy Central Files 891.2546 / 1-1353, 891.2546/2-2053,
891.2546 / 3-1453, and 891.2546 / 4-253; and Nuclear India.
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materials." The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
trained 939 Indian nuclear scientists from the mid-1950s to
1960s.' While self-reliance and self-sufficiency remained
primary objectives of the Indian nuclear development strategy,
there was also a considerable degree of emphasis on economic
viability, fuel availability and early indigenization.
After carrying out the preparatory groundwork and
training essential manpower from abroad, Bhabha's attention
focussed on the installation of nuclear research and power
reactors. He first acquired research reactors to provide
operation and maintenance experience to a wide cadre of
nuclear scientists. Simultaneously he continued negotiations
for power reactors with Britain, Canada, the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. His priority was to install pressurized heavy-
water reactors fuelled with natural uranium under the first
phase of the nuclear development strategy. Despite his best
efforts, he could not install such a reactor in his lifetime
because of the protracted process of negotiations and the
prospective suppliers' demand for safeguards against the non-
peaceful use of the reactors. However, he succeeded in getting
safeguards-free research reactors and related technologies at
an early stage when apprehensions about proliferation of
nuclear weapons were not profound. Later on, it became diff i-
cult to acquire nuclear technology without acceptance of
international safeguards.
The central objective of India's nuclear programme
is the generation of nuclear power for agro-industrial
purposes, but simultaneously laying down the foundation of a
nuclear weapons capability. The entire programme is so in-
divisibly integrated that it is difficult to distinguish which
16 Department of State, Central Decimal File 891. 2546 /
1-1353, dated 13 January 1953.
' Don Oberdorfer, 'U.S. Training Aid in Indian A-Blast
Cited', WASHINGTON POST, 19 July 1976, p. Al.
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of the two objectives had precedence. However, as discussed in
Chapter Three, the completion of technological infrastructure
for a weapons option (CIRUS reactor and Trombay Reprocessing
Plant) earlier than the installation of nuclear power plants
indicates that developing a weapons option enjoyed priority
over the generation of electric power.
2. a. RESEARCH REACTORS
From 1956 onwards, India started establishing
research reactors. This endeavour complemented the initial
objectives to complete construction of research and techno-
logical establishments. It helped create Indian facilities
for the scientists to gain experience in reactor operation
and maintenance. India established three reactors in Bhabha's
lifetime, ASPARA in 1956, CIRUS in 1960 and ZERLINA in i96l.'
ASPARA's design, and technical assistance in its installation
was provided by Great Britain. 19
 Canada provided CIRUS. ZERLINA
was an indigenous effort. 2° These reactors were important to
train personnel for nuclear research with particular focus on
reactor concepts, new assemblies, and lattice investigations.21
It also promoted the development of reactor technology,
production of fissile plutonium (in the case of CIRUS),
manufacture of special materials and radio-isotopes. 22 ZERLINA
RESEARCH REACTORS AT TROMBAY (Trombay-Boxnbay, BARC-
DAE, GOl, 1987). Document No. 400 085, July 1987.
19 ibid.
20 Annual Report 1960-61: Department of Atomic Energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1961), pp. 3-5.
21 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS, (Washington DC,
Office of Technology Assessment, the United States Congress,
June 1977), Vol. II, Pt. 1 Appendix, Table B-i, p. 229.
22 ibid.
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was decommissioned in 1983 after 22 years of service in
studying reactor concepts and components. 23
 Three more research
reactors were established in the post-Bhabha period. Two of
these reactors, PURNIMA and DHRUVA, are located at the BARC
(Bhabha Atomic Research Centre). The third, KAMINI, is located
in Kalpakkam at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research
(IGCAR) 24 PURNIMA I was established in 1972, replaced by
PURNIMA II in 1985 and again replaced by PURNIMA III in 1987.25
DHRUVA is one of the largest thermal research,
safeguards-free reactors in the world with a 100 MW (t) and 25
kg Plutonium production capacity per year. 26
 Its construction
started in 1975 as the R-5 Project which was renamed DHRUVA on
29 september 1983. It was initially expected to be commis-
sioned in 1983-84, but delays postponed operation until Novem-
ber 1986.27 Initially, it began operating at 25 to 40 MW Ct)
capacity. 28
 No precise information is available whether it is
running at full capacity 100 MW (t). In addition to two
nuclear power reactors whose details are described after this
sub-section, DHRUVA is the third most important reactor for
India's nuclear weapons capability. 29
 KAMINI and PURNIMA-Ill
are both U-233 (plutonium oxide) fueled reactors meant to
23 Nuclear India, 22 (7 & 8), 1984, p. 2.
24 Annual Report 1986-1987: Department of Atomic Energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1987), p. 5.
25 ibid.
26 ibid.
27 RESEARCH REACTORS AT TROMBAY, and Annual Re port 1983-
1984: Department of Atomic ener gy (Bombay, GOl, 1984), p. 4
& 19.
28 Annual Report 1986-87: Department of atomic Energy , p.
5.
29 The other two are nuclear power reactors, MAPP I & II.
For details see section 2.b. below on nuclear power reactors.
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carry out research in fast breeder reactor technology and
neutron radiography. 3° All these reactors are free from
safeguards except ASPARA which is under British safeguards.
CIRUS was meant for only peaceful use but there were no
provisions in the agreement for the verification of the
peaceful use. 31
 These reactors proved extremely useful in
developing a solid foundation for the Indian nuclear progra-
mine and experimentation in new technologies. (See appendix-
I for complete data on India's atomic research reactors).
2. b. NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
As noted in the introduction, this study does not
question the legitimacy of Indian nuclear programme for
civilian purposes. Therefore, a lengthy discussion on this
issue is avoided to save space for substantive question of
its employment for a weapons capability which is the primary
focus of the thesis. However, an evaluation of Indian nuclear
weapons capability is not possible without an analysis of the
nuclear programme because they are fully integrated. There-
fore, essential aspects of the nuclear power programme are
discussed. One of the primary objectives of India from the
beginning has been to generate electricity from nuclear power
for agro-industrial, medical, commercial and many related
fields. Nuclear power was considered potentially unlimited in
view of India's vast reserves of thorium for which the
development strategy was designed to utilize. For full
utilization of its stipulated power generation output, India
developed the concept of Nuclear-power agro-industrial
30 Annual Report 1986-1987: De partment of Atomic Energy,
p. 5, and Nuclear India, 25 (7 & 8), 1987, p. 7.
31 Details are provided in Chapter Three, section 2.
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complex. 32
 The concept entailed use of electricity generated
in nuclear power stations by closely located consuming
industrial complexes like fertilizer, chemical and water-
desalination plants, and irrigation centres. 33
 Many of these
complexes are located or planned to be located in the Indo-
Genetic plains in Utter Pradesh and Kutch-Saurashtra region
in Western India. The objective was to economize the whole
system by connecting the production units with the consumer
units and thereby, secure the financial and technological
viability not only of the nuclear power stations but also
electricity consuming industrial complexes.
India's first atomic power station installed at
Tarapur (TAPS) has two uranium enriched reactors despite
Bhabha's preference for PHW reactors. India procured these
reactors on favourable terms from the U.S when the later
perceived Indian economic and industrial progress as a model
of development against communism. The reactors were provided
under the terms of the Indo-U.S nuclear agreement signed on
8 August 1963 on Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Ener-
gy. 34
 Both the reactors at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station
(TAPS I & II) were constructed by the U.S. General Electric
Company. TAPS I & TAPS II are both boiled-water reactors
fueled by enriched uranium, each with a 200 MWe (Gross) and
190 MWe (net) power generation capacity, and 60 kg Plutonium
32 NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAN-INDIA (U), The U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Scientific and Techni-
cal Intelligence, p.14.
ibid.
Text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the
Government of the United States and the Government of India
Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Ener gy , signed on 8 August
1963 at Washington.
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production capacity per year. 35
 Both the reactors require 21
tons of enriched uranium fuel per year and are under the IAEA-
U.S. safeguards.
After the 1974 Indian nuclear test and the diver-
gence of opinion about its aims between India and the U.S.,
the later demanded full-scope safeguards which India reject-
ed. 36
 Consequently, the supply of enriched uranium remained
disrupted until it was completely stopped in 1985, when the
U.S. abrogated the nuclear cooperation agreement. India was
forced to operate both the reactors at lower capacity (TAPS
I at 148 MWe and TAPS II at 160 MWe) .' In the same year
(1985), India concluded an agreement with France for the
provision of enriched uranium fuel for the TAPS reactors. The
U. S. approved the Indo-French agreement, and India accepted
the continued maintenance of the IAEA safeguards on the
reactors. However, there is a controversy between the U.S. and
India about the possible use of spent fuel recovered from the
Tarapur reactors from 1969 to 1985 because of the abrogation
of the original agreement.3e
As noted earlier, Bhabha's death in an air crash at
Mont Blanc in June 1966 was a serious blow to the Indian
nuclear programme. In addition to the technological setbacks,
international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear
weapons technology were also stepped up from 1966 onwards.
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN THE WORLD: 1986 Edition
(Vienna, IAEA, 1986), p. 26.
36 Ravindra Tomar, 'The Indian Nuclear Power Programme:
Myths and Mirages', Asian Surve y, XX (5), May 1980, p. 524.
For detailed U.S. assessment of the 1974 Indian nuclear test,
see Chapter Four section 5.a, pp. 136-54.
" NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN THE WORLD: 1986 Edition, p.
26.
38 A detailed discussion of this controversy is provided
in section 3 of this chapter on nuclear weapons material.
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Both the two superpowers undertook concerted diplomacy for an
early conclusion of the NPT. India's two main nuclear sup-
pliers, the U.S. and Canada put pressure on India to sign the
NPT. Lack of financial resources also slowed implementation of
the programme. From 1966 to 1970, there was no significant
progress in India's nuclear power programme except the
completion of two reactors at the Tarapur Atomic Power
stations.
NUCLEAR POWER PROGRMME IN THE 19703 (SARABHAI PROfILE)
Bhabha's successor, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai was also a
competent nuclear scientist. He undertook a reassessment of
the Indian nuclear programme to give it a new impetus and
recover from the setbacks. He worked out a 10 year nuclear
plan (1970-1980) which was known as Sarabhai Profile. 39
 In
comparison to Bhabha's primary focus on the nuclear program-
me, the new plan placed equal emphasis on the development of
atomic energy and space technology. This plan fixed specific
targets in the generation of atomic power and parallel
development in space technology. The essential features of
the Sarabhai Profile in the field of atomic energy were as
follows: 40
 i) 2,700 MW of electricity (atomic power) to be
commissioned by 1980, which meant an augmentation of the
previous target of 1,700 MWe by an additional 1,000 MWe
through installation of more atomic power stations, ii) design
and construction of advanced thermal reactors of 500 MW unit
size to lower the capital cost and produce enough plutonium
for fast breeder reactors and R & D purposes, iii) design and
construction of fast breeder test reactor (FBTR), iv) augmen-
ATOMIC ENERGY AND SPACE RESEARCH: A PROFILE FOR THE
DECADE 1970-1980, (New Delhi, Government of India, 1970).
40 ibid.
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tation of heavy-water production capacity up to 400 tons per
year to meet the increasing demand of India's PEW reactors, v)
early completion of Nuclear Fuel Complex at Hyderabad, vi)
augmentation of plutonium reprocessing facilities at cornmer-
cial scale, and vii) development of gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment technology.
Like Bhabha's nuclear development strategy, DR.
Sarabhai's original contribution was his strategy for laun-
ching a space research and development programme (which will
be discussed below in the section on India's nuclear delivery
systems). His contribution in atomic energy was an up-dating
of the targets fixed under Bhabha. The Indian government
endorsed the Sarabhai Profile and allocated Rs. 1,250 crores
for the nuclear programme and Rs. 105 crores for the space
programme. 4' This plan• was a remarkable endeavour at policy
planning, which undertook to augment the atomic power genera-
tion capacity by 1,000 MWe and develop related infrastructure
in nuclear technology. However, it proved too ambitious, and
has not been achieved even today.
Three nuclear power stations, each with two reac-
tors, achieved varying degrees of progress during the period
1970-1980. These stations are: Rajasthan Atomic Power Station
(RAPS I & II reactors), Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS I &
II reactors), and Narora Atomic Power Project (NAPP I & II
reactors) •42 Only one reactor became fully functional on a
permanent basis in that period. The establishment of RAPS I &
II was India's first venture in PEW reactors. It was expedient
because of Canada's generous financial and technological
support, and availability of domestic natural uranium. Both
reactors have a power output capacity of 202 MWe (net) and 60
' Annual Report 1970-1971: Department of Atomic Energy
(New Delhi, GOI, 1971), Appendices 1 & 5, pp. 159-60.
42 This data is compiled from Annual Re ports from 1970-
71 to 1980-81, Department of Atomic Energy, GOl.
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kg Plutonium production capacity per year. 43
 RAPS I and II were
planned to be commissioned in 1972 and 1974 respectively.44
RAPS I achieved criticality in May 1972 and com-
menced commercial operation in December 1973, but the reac-
tor never became fully functional after Canada withdrew its
assistance because of the 1974 Indian nuclear test. It -
perienced 251 outages (breakdowns) until the end of 1981 and
its performance has remained far below the target, achieving
an overall capacity factor of only 31 per cent. 45
 Immediately
after the resumption of operation in 1982, it again broke down
and remained closed until February 1985, and developed
leakages in May 1985.46 This has been India's most trouble
plagued reactor. It was put into operation again with fuel
assistance from France in 1988-89. It is under the IAEA safe-
guards. RAPS II progressively incorporated more indigeniza-
tion after the Canadian suspension of materials. It was
commissioned in October 1981, started commercial scale
operation in April 1982 and its performance has been quite
satisfactory with a capacity factor of 77 per cent. 47
 RAPS XI
was developed through indigenous efforts, but came under the
IAEA safeguards because India imported 456 tons of heavy-
water for its operation from the Soviet Union which insisted
for the application of safeguards.48
26.
	
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN THE WORLD: 1986 Edition, p.
" ibid.
Nuclear India, 23 (1), 1984, Special Issue, p. 6.
46 ibid.
" Nuclear India, 24 ( 5 & 6), 1986, p, 2.
48 William C. Potter, 'Soviet Nuclear Export Policy', in
J.C. Synder and Samuel F. Wells jr. (eds.), LIMITING NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION (Cambridge Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1985), pp. 213-252.
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The Indian nuclear programme suffered serious
setbacks in the period 1970-1980, particularly after its 1974
nuclear test. The key element in these setbacks was the
termination of nuclear cooperation and assistance by Canada
and U.S. Canadian reaction was more severe and immediate than
the U.S. Canada alleged India of violating the nuclear
cooperation agreement under which the CIRUS reactor was provi-
ded. After a special cabinet meeting, the Canadian Prime
Minister announced the suspension of all aid programme to
India except food supplies. 49
 After failing to seek Indian
adherence to the NPT or full-scope safeguards, Canada unila-
terally abrogated its nuclear cooperation agreement with India
in 1976. The U.S. also condemned the Indian nuclear test and
refused to accept the Indian interpretation that it was meant
for peaceful purposes. 5° The nuclear power stations nearing
completion, RAPS, MAPP and NAPP, and other major projects
suffered delays ranging from eight (8) to ten (10) years. An
Indian official acknowledged the delays and did not reject the
impact of the Canadian decision. 5' India only installed a
nuclear power capacity of 1100 MWe against the planned output
of 2,700 MWe.52
The entire Indian nuclear programme suffered varying
degrees of delays. The main reasons for the delay were the
Canadian and U.S. post-1974 nuclear policies vis-a-vis India
under which nuclear cooperation was terminated. India could
not visualize that while planning the 1974 test. The Sarabhai
" DAWN (Karachi), 24 May 1974, p. 1. An account of
Canada's interpretation of the 1974 Indian nuclear test is
provided in Chapter Four, Section 5.
° Details of the U.S. response to the Indian nuclear test
are discussed in Chapter Four, section 5.
' Raja Ramanna, 'A 15 Years Nuclear Programme for India',
Strategic Di gest, November 1984, p. 1291.
52 ibid.
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Profile was also an ambitious piece of planning which set up
targets that could not be achieved.
India's most successful experiment in establishing
atomic power stations is the Madras Atomic Power Station at
Kalpakkam near Madras, with two PHW reactors (MAPS I & II).
Based upon Canadian designs, each reactors has a power output
capacity of 220 MWe (net) and 235 MWe (Gross), with a 60 kg
plutonium production capacity per year. 53
 They became opera-
tional in July 1983 and August 1985 respectively. 54
 These are
also the first of India's nuclear power reactors free from
international safeguards because these were built by Indian
scientists locally, with 88 per cent indigenous components.55
India is known to have started extracting plutonium from these
reactors by 1985-86.' Another nuclear power station built
through totally indigenous efforts is Narora Atomic Power
Project (NAPP) installed at Narora in Utter Pradesh. It has
two PHW reactors (NAPP I & II), each with a power output
capacity of 220 MWe (net) and 235 MWe (gross), and 60 kg
plutonium production capacity per year. 5' NAPP I commenced
operation in 1990 and NAPP II was expected to begin operation
in 1991, but there might be some delay. 5' Both these reactors
will add significantly to the Indian stockpile of weapons-
grade material because they are free from international
safeguards.
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN THE WORLD: 1986 Edition, p.
26.
Nuclear India, 24 (5 & 6), 1982, p. 2.
Nuclear India, 24 (1), 1985, p. 11.
56 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY, p. 9.
' WORLD NUCLEAR INDUSTRY HANDBOOK (Sutton, Nuclear
Engineering International, 1990).
' Annual Report 1988-1989: Department of Atomic Energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1989)
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NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME FROM 1980 TO 1985:
From 1980 to 1985, India undertook additional
projects in all fields of atomic energy, without completing
the earlier ones. Four additional atomic power stations, two
more reprocessing plants, and many heavy-water units planned
in this period are in preliminary stages of development. Two
PHW reactors, RAPS III and RAPS IV, are planned for instal-
lation at Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, with power genera-
tion and Plutonium production capacities identical to RAPS I
& II, i.e. 220 MWe and 60 kg Pu per year. 59 India has also
started work for the fabrication of materials for Kaiga Atomic
Power Project at Kaiga in Karnatka with two PHW reactors,
KAIGA I & II, each with a 220 MWe power output capacity and 60
kg Plutonium production capacity per year.'° These reactors are
expected to be operational in 1994 and 1995 respectively.
Construction work was reported to be progressing at another
project, Kakrapar Atomic Power Project with two PHW reactors,
KAPP I & II, each with a power output capacity of 220 MWe
(net) and 235 MWe (gross) and a Pu output capacity of 60 kg
per year. 6' India intends to build its first plutonium fueled
fast breeder power reactor (FBR) of 500 Mwe by end of the
current century.' 2 Conventional systems and plant structure is
reportedly completed.'3 See appendix-Il for complete data on
India's atomic power reactors. A graph on the growth of
manpower in the 1980s (available figures) is provided in
figure -III on the next page to avoid lengthy description).
" Nuclear India, 24 (5 & 6), 1986. p. 3.
60 ibid.
61 Nuclear India, 25 (7 & 8), 1987, pp. 1-2.













82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88
Year (1980's)
Scientific & Tech.
	 Auxilliary & Admin.
SOURCE: NUCLEAR INDIA 23 (7 &
24 (3 & 6)1923. 26 (7).I9e7. SO (1 & 2)lose.
276
NUCLEAR POWER PROFILE (1985-2000 AD): A 15 YEARS NUCLEAR
PROGRANME FOR INDIA:
In 1983, the DAE carried out a detailed study of
the Indian nuclear programme and up-dated its targets. The
study titled, Nuclear Power Profile: A 15 Years Nuclear
Prperamme for India, determined that a total installed
capacity of 10, 000 MWe through atomic energy was feasible by
the end of the century.'4 To achieve that objective, it
envisaged installation of 12 standard PHW reactors of 235 MWe
(gross) output capacity and 10 larger size (500 MWe) output
capacity nuclear reactors. 65 In addition to nuclear power
generation, it sought augmentation of nuclear facilities and
technological development in most fields of atomic energy. It
stipulated an addition of 600 scientists, raising the techni-
cal manpower up to 29,000 by end of the current century,
expansion of reprocessing facilities, and increasing heavy-
water production up to 1530 tons per year. 6' The capital cost
of this new plan has been estimated about Rs. 13,940 crores
for developmental expenditure and Rs. 8,300 crores for 0 & M
(organization and management) expenditure at the 1983 price
index.'7 If the target of 10,000 MWe is achieved as stipu-
lated, it would contribute 8 to 10 per cent to the total
planned electric power generation capacity in India.'8
64 Annual Report 1984-1985: Department of Atomic Enerv
(Bombay, GOl, 1985), p. 16; Excerpts are also available in
Nuclear India, 23 (1), 1984, special issue, pp. 10-11 and
Nuclear India, 23 (7 & 8), 1985. pp. 4-5.
65 ibid.
66 ibid.
" ibid. Also see a graph on the projected capital
expenditure for the 10,000 MWe programme at the end of this
section in figure - IV.
68 ibid.
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On the basis of previous performance of the DAE to
achieve its targets in the generation of nuclear power, it
appears that the new plan is as ambitious as Sarabhai (1970-
1980) Profile, and its completion within the stipulated period
is very doubtful. The installed power capacity of 1230 MWe in
1986 was 1470 MWe less than the 1970-1980 plan expected to
achieve in 1980 . 69
 It seems that the DAE will be not be able to
meet the target set under the current nuclear profile.
However, if reviewed over a long-term perspective in the light
of technological limitations and the primary objective of
self-reliance, India has made reasonable progress in the
development of nuclear power and technology. The basic design
of its PHW reactors is Canadian in origin. India received the
full blue-prints in the 1950s and 1960s when Canada was
generously providing nuclear technology and financial assis-
tance under the impression that Nehru's assurances would
preclude their use for other than peaceful purpose. The very
fact that a developing country like India could independently
design, manufacture and install atomic power stations is
commendable. No other developing country have been able to
achieve such a capability. Bhabha's development strategy to
opt for PHW, natural uranium reactors at the first stage and
subsequent development for more advanced techniques like fast
breeder test reactors proved sound, despite the delay oc-
curred. The planning to shift the entire Indian nuclear fuel
cycle to thorium, of which India has the largest known
reserves, will not only be economical in future but allow it
to maintain its autonomy. In addition to generating electric
power, its safeguards-free nuclear power and research reac-
tors are providing large quantities of weapon-grade plutonium.
This capacity will continue to expand along with the develop-
ment of the nuclear power programme.
69 Nuclear India, 25 (7 & 8), 1987, pp. 1-2.
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The fact remains that the Indian nuclear programme
is far behind its schedule in terms of realizing its targets
for generation of nuclear power (electric). The main reasons
for not meeting the stipulated targets were the withdrawal of
Canadian and the U.S. nuclear cooperation. The planning and
setting up of targets was too ambitious. Administrative
inefficiency and technological handicaps were also pervasive.
According to 1983-84 figures, India's planned installed power
capacity (nuclear) was 5 % of the total output of electricity
as compared with South Korea's 6 % and by end of the current
century, the gap would be much larger. India's installed
nuclear power capacity (planned) would be 10 % compared with
South Korea's (planned) 41 %•70 It is noteworthy that India's
nuclear industry is far larger in size than South Korea. The
comparison shows that the size of a nuclear industry and
financial expenditure incurred on it is not a reliable index
of its efficiency or output capacity. Though no precise data
is available, the actual nuclear power (electric) output
capacity of India is much lower than installed or planned.
Projected capital and 0 & M (organization and
management) expenditure for the 10,000 MWe nuclear power
generation programme is given in figure-IV on the next page.
The figures provided are in the Indian rupees and not trans-
lated in dollars or pounds because the programme is not
effective so far due to delays, and future value of the Indian
rupee cannot be worked out. At present (15 August 1991), one
pound is equivalent to 43. 97 Indian rupees and one dollar is
equivalent to 25. 77 rupees. 71
 It is after India carried out
approximately 9 % devaluation of the rupee due to an acute
financial crisis. It is facing huge trade deficit at present
and is extremely short of foreign exchange.
° Raja Ramanna, p. 1283.










Figure - IV	 Projected capit4and 0 & M Expenditure
for the 10000 MWe Nuclear Power Programme
8 Expenditure Rupees (000's of Crores)
7381
6
Year (1984-85 to 2000)
Capital Expenditure	 0 & 11 Expenditure
SOURCE:Raj. Ramanna.A 15 —Year Programme
for Nuclear Power in India. STRATEGIC
DIGEST. Nov. 1984. p1289.
280
2. c. DEVELOPMENT OF' TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTWE
The premier Indian scientific institution in the
nuclear field is Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). Its
responsibilities have gradually grown into a wide range of
activities in R & D in nuclear technology. 72
 These activities
are as diverse as nuclear physics, radio-chemistry, radio-
metallurgy, reactor engineering and control, fuel reprocess-
ing, LASER applications and nuclear biology. 73 During 1975-
76, BARC was reorganized into the following divisions: i)
Physics Group, ii) Metallurgy Group, iii) Chemical Group, iv)
Analysis Group, v) Reactor Operations and maintenance Group,
vi) Isotope Group, vii) Bio-Chemical Group, viii) Electronics
and Instrumentation Group, ix) Engineering Services Group, and
x) Administrative Group.74
As noted earlier in the section (2.b.) on research
reactors, India's four nuclear research reactors are located
at the BARC, ASPARA, CIRUS, ZERLINA, and DHRUVA. It also has
a chemical separation plant for extraction and reprocessing
of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel, with an annual
capacity of 100 metric tons. 75
 It has additional facilities
for fuel fabrication, separation and reprocessing.
BARC has grown into one of the largest research
centres in the world, with 13,000 personnel, 3,000 of whom
are professional scientists and engineers engaged in R & D in
nuclear technology. 7' Nuclear expertise developed at the BARC
72 Annual Report 1975-76: Department of Atomic Energy,
(Bombay, GOl, 1976), pp. 11-12.
ibid.
ibid.
" NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM-INDIA (U), Defense Intelligence
Agency, p. 17.
" Nuclear India, 25 (1), 1986, p. 2.
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provided the basis for carrying out the 1974 nuclear test.
According to Onkar Marwah, a team of 56 scientists from BARC
directly coordinated the experiment. 77
 Both the technological
facilities which were employed by India for producing fissile
plutonium for the 1974 nuclear test are located at BARC: CIRUS
reactor and the Trombay Reprocessing Plant. 78
 One of the
world's largest safeguards-free research reactor, DHRUVA is
also located at the BARC. According to one source, BARC is not
only working on military R & D in nuclear technology but is
engaged in the development of hydrogen bomb technology." About
30 to 40 nuclear scientists at the BARC are working on a
scientific technique known as Inertial Confinement Fusion
(ICF) in which LASERS are used to achieve high compression of
deuterium or tritium - the isotope of hydrogen employed in a
fusion bomb. 8° The project was initiated under the supervision
of Dr. P.K. Iyengar, the man who developed the trigger
mechanism for the 1974 test. 81
 According to a U.S. Congres-
sional report, the BARC is one of the two facilities in India
which has a major significance for the production of nuclear
weapons •82
Another significant scientific institution which
has brought India a fairly high degree of self-sufficiency is
the Reactor Research Centre established at Kalpakkam for the
development of indigenous technology in reactor design,
" Onkar Marwah, p. 105.
78 Analysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of
India, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, p. 3.
" 'Shadow of an Indian H-Bomb', pp. 1-2.
00 ibid.
' ibid.
82 Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containin g the
Threat, p. 22.
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construction and operation. 83 A major achievement of this
centre is the designing, construction and operation of India's
first Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), which is a plutonium
fuelled, sodium cooled reactor. 84 The design and development of
the FBTR began in early the 1970s. The French Atomic Energy
Commission and various French companies provided not only R &
D assistance but helped in the fabrication of major compo-
nents. 85 The centre was renamed as Indira Gandhi Centre for
Atomic Research (IGARC) in her honour. 86
 This centre is also
engaged in the development of a 500 MWe prototype fast breeder
reactor. 87 It is going to be the centre of research and
development on fast breeder reactors which India has planned
to install in the future and fully utilize the Indian reserves
of thorium. Thereby, India would realize the long-term
objectives of its nuclear power planning. However, it would
take a long time to achieve the objectives.
The Indian nuclear industry is gradually expanding
and it might become one of the largest in the world, given
its large size at present. The Indian AEC and the DAE have so
many scientific installations and subsidiary bodies that it is
difficult to provide a description about all of them. It is
also not within the scope of this study. A map about the
atomic energy establishments is provided in figure-V on the
next page to provide a glimpse of its description and loca-
tion.
83 Annual Report 1986-87: Department of Atomic Energy,
pp. 2-6.
84 ibid.
85 Annual Report 1972-73: Department of Atomic energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1973), pp. 122-24.
86 ibid.
87 ibid.
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Since India opted for pressurized heavy-water
reactors in the first phase of its development strategy, large
scale quantities of heavy-water became a pre-requisite to
sustain the operation of these reactors. Initially (1954-60),
India imported heavy-water from the U.S. and Canada under the
Atoms for Peace Proposal and the Colombo Plan. The U.S.
supplied 21 tons of heavy-water for the operation of CIRUS.88
India installed its first heavy-water plant of 14 metric tons
(MT) capacity per year in 1962 at Nangal in Haryana with
technical assistance from two U.S. companies, Vitro Corps and
National Research Corps. 89
 Some equipment used in the assembly
of the plant was provided by a cartel of French, Italian and
West German firms." Sarabhai (1970-1980) planning profile
envisaged a production target of 300 to 400 metric tons of
heavy-water per year. 9' Five heavy-water plants were installed
in that period to achieve the target. The capacity and
location of these plants is as follows: 92
 i) Baroda, 45 MT; ii)
Kota, 85 MT; iii) Toticurin, 49 MT; iv) Taicher, 50 MT; and v)
Thal-Vaishent, 110 MT. Two more plants were planned to be
installed at Manugum (185 MT) and Hazira (110 MT), raising the
planned output capacity up to 650 MT approximately.
India's performance in domestic heavy-water produc-
88 Don Oberdorfer, 'U.S. Training Aid in the Indian A-
Blast Cited', p. Al and "Public Hearing on the U.S. Nuclear
Cooperation: India's Atomic Blast; Extent of Foreign Aidt',
DAWN (Karachi), 18 August 1976, p. 7.
89 ibid.
" ibid.
91 Annual Report 1973-1974: Department of Atomic Energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1974), pp. 130-32.
92 Nuclear India, 25 (5 & 6), 1987, p. 11.
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tion was and remains dismal. Despite appropriation of large
financial resources and efforts, heavy-water production is the
most trouble-plagued sector of the Indian nuclear industry.
Actual production has lagged far behind due to design flaws in
the plants, operating difficulties and successive disasters.93
According to a former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Professor Gary Milholin, India's public record
revealed that it never produced more than 50 tons of heavy-
water per year by fiscal year 1984-85 against its planned
capacity of 300 to 400 tons. 94
 In a statement before the Indian
Parliament in 1986, the Secretary DAE, Dr. Srinivasan,
admitted that the domestic heavy-water plants operated far
below the planned capacity. 95
 In another in-depth study of
heavy-water in India carried out under the auspices of the
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Milholin concluded
that India has obtained large quantities of heavy-water
through clandestine means and uses it to run its safeguards-
free nuclear reactors (MAPP I & II and DHRtJVA) in an apparent
violation of its international obligations. 96
 The study
indicated that India never produced or publicly imported
enough heavy-water to run all its reactors at the same time.
According to the study, India needed 1,239 tons of heavy-
water to run its reactors in 1985 but had only 1,038 tons in
its public records, leaving a shortage of 201 tons which was
'Waiting for Heavy-Water', India Toda y, 31 January
1982.
Gary Milholin, 'Dateline New Delhi: India's Nuclear
Cover-up', Forei gn Policy No. 64, Fall 1986, pp. 163-64.
ibid.
96 Gary Milholin, Heavy-Water in India: A Study (Washing-
ton DC, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 28
January 1986), pp. 1-2, Unpublished.
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met by secret imports. 97
 Milholin contended that the clandes-
tine imports would give India a chance to build a nuclear ar-
senal .
Since the conclusion of Milholin's study, a number
of reports have appeared which substantiate its reliability.
On 3 January 1989, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL carried a detail-
ed report about clandestine shipment of heavy-water from Oslo
to Bombay via Basel (Switzerland) .' The report stated that a
West African chartered plane airlifted about 15 metric tons of
"Ic' 1w
heavy-± from Oslo, which according to the paperwork, was
destined for Frankfurt but instead landed at Basel. At Basel
another 6.6 tons of the Soviet-origin heavy-water was loaded
and it was carried to Bombay.'°° The report added that the
illicitly imported heavy-water was meant for use in India's
three safeguards-free nuclear reactors. 101
 However, noteworthy
primary evidence of India's clandestine imports of heavy-
water was leaked from the 1988 annual report of the Indian
Comptroller and Auditor General. 102
 He concluded that Indian
heavy-water plants produced less than a third of the material
required to operate the three safe-guards free reactors, MAPS
I & II and DHRUVA.'° 3
 This validates the reports of India's
illegal imports of heavy-water to operate the three reactors
' ibid.
ibid.
" John J. Fialka, 'Out of Control: How "Heavy-Water"
Seeps Through Cracks of Nuclear Regulation', The Wall Street
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to recover safeguards-free plutonium. India was already
recovering plutonium from the Tarapur reactors (TAPS I & II)
and RAPS II, but that material was under safeguards. It could
only be used for peaceful purposes like R & D and fuel for the
FBTR. Its diversion for military use was verifiable under the
IAEA safeguards. The illegal imports suggest that India needed
heavy-water to operate safeguards-free reactors for recovering
plutonium for possible weapons use. It could not be available
from the operational reactors because of the safeguards
applicable on them. (See appendix-Ill on heavy-water).
2... NUCLEAR FUELS
According to available estimates, various uranium
ore reserves totalling up to 73,000 tons have been identified
in India.'04
 The DAE authorities believed that approximately
49,000 tons of these ore reserves contain 0.015 to 0.07 per-
centage of Uranium Oxide and are considered commercially
exploitable. 105
 As reported by the International Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), about 30,000 tons of Indian uranium
are reasonably assured for use at $ 80 per kg, while another
30,000 tons are usable at $ 130 per kg.'°' The global total of
reasonably assured uranium is estimated as 1.8 million tons at
an average of $ 80 per kg and an additional 2.6 million tons
at $ 130 per kg. 107
 Indian annual production capacity was
estimated at 270 tons for 1980 and 230 tons for 1985.'°' Most
104 Nuclear India, 23 (1), 1984, Special Issue, p. 7.
105 ibid.
106 Fuel and Heavy-Water Availability : Report of the
Working Group 1, International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation,
(Vienna, IAEA, 1980), p. 154.
107 ibid.
109 ibid, p. 180.
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of the Indian reserves are located in Singhbhum in Bihar,
Madhya Pradesh, and Karnatka. These reserves are insufficient
for India's large nuclear programme and long-term require-
ments.
India is known to possess the largest reserves of
thorium in the world which are estimated at 500,000 tons.'"
Thorium is found in the form of mineral monazite and located
in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Bihar. About 200,000 tons are
located along the coast, while another 300,000 tons are
located on the Ranchi Plateau (in Bihar) .,, Abundant quan-
tities of thorium was the primary factor for which Bhabha
shifted the Indian nuclear fuel cycle to U-233 (which is
recovered from thorium through fast breeder reactors at the
second and third stages of the development strategy). The
Indian Rare Earth Limited prospects and develops these
reserves into an industrially usable form. India has a Nuclear
Fuel Complex at Hyderabad to fabricate nuclear fuel for its
atomic reactors. At the initial stage, India sought technical
assistance from U.S. firms in R & D in the field of thorium
technology. 11' India is operating commercial scale repro-
cessing plants to acquire fissile plutonium. It has mastered
the technology of breeding U-233 from the irradiation of
thorium.'12
 It is operating U-233 fueled research reactor PUR-
NIMA and a fast breeder test reactor (FBTR) ." As a result,
India has established a complete nuclear fuel cycle capabi-
109 NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM-INDIA (U), the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, p. 15.
110 ibid.
" Annual Report 1960-1961: Department of Atomic Energy,
p. 70.




lity except in certain highly sophisticated fields like
thermonuclear fissile materials. However, as will be descri-
bed in section 3 on weapons-grade materials, India is in-
volved in acquiring lithium and tritium which are used in
thermonuclear weapons. The completion of nuclear fuel cycle
capability has enabled India to withstand international pres-
sures to put its nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguar-
ds because it is no more dependent on external assistance in
this regard. It is a commendable achievement for a developing
country like India. No other country in the developing world
has demonstrated such a remarkable growth in the field of
nuclear fuel technologies. Even amongst the various fields of
the Indian nuclear programme, this is a significant progress
as compared with heavy-water production or generation of
nuclear power for electricity purposes.
2.f. NUCLEAR REPROCESSING CAPABILITY
India began to establish a safeguards-free pluto-
nium reprocessing plant in the late 1950s at Trombay and com-
pleted in 1964.114 It was a part of Nehru's strategy to develop
a nuclear weapons option. At that time, India had not in-
stalled a single power reactor except CIRUS (research-cum-
power). These two facilities were used to carry out the 1974
nuclear test. The Trombay plant, which had an initial capacity
of 30 tons, was refurbished to increase its reprocessing
capacity up to 100 tons per year. 115
 A commercial scale plant
for reprocessing the plutonium recovered from power reactors,
named PREFRE (Power Reactors Fuel Reprocessing) became
operational in 1979 at Tarapur with a 100 tons reprocessing
114 See Chapter Three, Section 2, pp. 74-81.
" NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAN-INDIA (U), the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, p. 17.
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capacity per year.' 16
 It was an indigenous effort by Indian
scientists and therefore, like the first reprocessing plant,
it is also free from international safeguards. However, the
plant is supervised by the IAEA when it undertakes reprocess-
ing of plutonium recovered from reactors under safeguards. A
third reprocessing plant, KARP (Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant)
of 125 tons capacity per year was expected to be operational
in 1990-91 at Kalpakkam." 7
 It is designed to reprocess pluto-
nium recovered from MAPP I & II and FBTR, all of which are at
the same site."8
 India plans to install two more large scale
plants each with a capacity of 400 tons per year but their
sites have not yet been earmarked."9
 (See appendix-IV for
details).
3. WEAPONS-GRADE (NUCLEAR) MATERIAL
Reliable availability of weapons-grade material,
either fissile plutonium or highly enriched uranium is an
essential pre-requisite to embark upon a nuclear weapons
programme. According to a U.N. Report, 25 of kg highly
enriched uranium or 8 kg of reprocessed (fissile) plutonium
is adequate to produce a 20 KT (Kiloton) nuclear bomb.' 2° India
has large quantities of plutonium recovered from its power and
research reactors. It has reprocessing plants to transform
116 Nuclear India, 21 (6 & 7), 1983, p. 2.
" Nuclear India, 23 C].), 1984, special Issue, p. 9; and
Annual Report 1986-1987: Department of Atomic Energy, pp. 6-
10.
" ibid.
" Raja Ramanna, p. 1289.
120 The Report is cited by J.C. Hopkins, 'Nuclear Weapons
Technology', in a SIPRI publication, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
PROBLEMS (Stockholm, The MIT Press for SIPRI, 1974), pp. 114-
116.
291
that plutonium into weapons-grade material free from any
international safeguards. As is evident from the data colla-
tion in appendix-V 1
 the Indian stockpile of total accumulated
safeguards-free plutonium from its research and power reactors
in the year 1991 is 1025 kg. These figures are likely to rise
to 2445 kg in 1995, and 5570 kg in the year 2,000 AD.'2'
It is now widely known that nuclear weapons can be
produced with reactor-grade plutonium without reprocessing.'22
For employing reactor-grade plutonium for weapons production,
it is kept in storage for a longer period of time and about 30
per cent of it reacts automatically by absorbing an additional
neutron and produces fissile plutonium (Pu-240) 123 According
to an assessment in the SIPRI YEARBOOK 1972, reactor-grade
plutonium can be used for 'primitive but still effective
nuclear weapons' 124 However, larger quantities of reactor-
grade plutonium is required to achieve the required explosive
yield and the weapon's size becomes too large in this case.
Indian nuclear reprocessing technology is too
advanced and large to rely on such primitive techniques. As
stated above, India is already operating two reprocessing
plants, each with an output capacity of 100 metric tons per
year (Trombay and PREFRE). With these reprocessing plants in
operation, India has no problem in converting large quan-
tities of plutonium into weapons-grade material. As noted
earlier, India has been converting safe-guards free plutonium
recovered from MAPP I & II into fissile material since 1986-
'' See appendix-V. The plutonium recovered from CIRUS is
not included in the data collation in this appendix.
122 J.K. Miettinen, 'Nuclear Mini-weapons and Low-Yield
Nuclear Weapons', NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, pp. 123-
24.
123 ibid.
124 SIPRI, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEAR-
BOOK 1972 (Stockholm, SIPRI, 1973), p. 366.
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87.125 Including DHRUVA, these three facilities provide India
enough plutonium for a sizeable nuclear force.'26
India also has large stockpiles of plutonium
available from its power reactors which are under safeguards
like TAPS I & II and RAPS I & II. Each of the four reactors
have 60 kg plutonium production capacity per year. That
plutonium is reprocessed under international safeguards and
used for civilian requirements, like R & D and fuel for the
FBTR. That leaves India free to devote its safeguards-free
plutonium for weapons use. According to the INFCE report,
India was expected to possess 7.25 metric tons of plutonium
by 1990 and up to 36.49 metric tons by the year 2,000 127
However, it needs to be pointed out that these are elusive
figure because the report does not differentiate between the
material which is safeguards-free and which is under safe-
guards. It is therefore, not an adequate assessment of the
material India could divert to weapons use.
It is noteworthy that various assessments of the
fissile plutonium available to India for potential weapons
use differ and at times the discrepancy is significant. The
1988 Carnegie Report estimates that India would have enough
material for more than 100 Hiroshima size nuclear weapons by
the end of 1991.128 On the other hand, an Indian analyst opined
that India would not be able to successfully produce even a
minimum deterrent force within a period of five to ten
years.'29
 However, this study is now outdated because more
125 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY, p. 9.
126 See appendix-VI for number of nuclear weapons which
India can produce.
127 INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION: Report
of the Working Group 1, 198.
128 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY, p. 2.
129 Gupta, pp. 10-13.
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Indian power and research reactors have become operational
since its publication. They are safeguards-free and add to its
nuclear weapons capability. According to another estimate by
the NUCLEONICS WEEK, India would be able to produce around 600
kg of safeguards-free Plutonium annually by the early 1990s
which it considers enough for 100 nuclear weapons per year.'3°
This source is generally reliable but it is difficult to
assess the authenticity of the estimate because it does not
provide the criteria on which the annual plutonium production
capacity is worked out. However, notwithstanding the varia-
tions of estimates, it can be argued that India possesses
large stockpiles of safeguards-free plutonium and the quan-
tity is rapidly expanding as more power reactors are becoming
operational. Current stocks would enable India to manufacture
about 128 nuclear warheads (8 kg size), or 102 (10 size kg) or
about 51 (20 Kg size) by 1991.131 It would rise to 305 warheads
(8 kg size), or 244 (10 kg size), or 122 (20 kg size) by 1995,
and further expand to 696 (8 kg size), or 557 (10 kg size) or
278 (20 kg size) by the year 2000 AD.132
This capability may be significantly enhanced after
the expiry of the Indo-U.S. agreement in 1993 on the Tarapur
Reactors if the Indo-U.S. controversy over safeguards issue is
not resolved. India contends that the application of safe-
guards after 1993 on the material recovered between 1969 to
1985 from TAPS I & II reactors should lapse. According to
Milholin, India, by an 'implausible and stubborn reading of
the expiration clause of the Tarapur Agreement' contends that
after 1993 the two reactors and all the plutonium in their
130 Nucleonics Week, 15 August 1985, p. 1.
131 See appendices V and VI.
132 ibid.
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spent fuel will be 'free for use in the bombs'. 133
 Milholin
estimated that it would provide India about 1800 kg of
safeguards-free plutonium which will be enough for 225 atomic
bombs (8 kg size) •134 Paradoxically, Milholin believes that if
the international controls were used vigorously and in league
with India's other suppliers, its nuclear programme could be
restricted to peaceful purposes. This belief appears an
unrealistic optimism because India has other safeguards-free
reactors which provide it enough fissile material for a modest
nuclear weapons capability. In fact, in view of the existing
stockpile of safeguards-free plutonium, it is very unlikely
that India would need to use the plutonium recovered from
Tarapur reactors for weapons purposes.
According to a recent report, India is also enga-
ged in the acquisition of material for thermonuclear weapons
technology. Quoting a U.S. administration source, it stated
that, Degussa AG, a major West German chemical company,
illegally exported two shipments of beryllium to India.'"
Beryllium is used for the production of lithium or tritium
for use in thermonuclear weapons and to enhance the yield of
nuclear weapons. The West German company purchased the
material (beryllium) from the U.S. on the condition that it
would obtain prior U.S. permission to export the material
outside Germany 136 During the investigations, Degussa AG ack-
nowledged both shipments of beryllium to India, totalling 209
133 Gary Milholin, 'Stopping the Indian Bomb', American
Journal of International Law, July 1987, pp. 594-610. Full
details of the Indo-U.S. controversy are available in this
article.
134 ibid.
135 INTERNATIONAL HER?LD TRIBUNE, 1 February 1989.
136 ibid.
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pounds. 13' According to the West German official sources, 'the
material which enhances nuclear bombs by halving the amount of
plutonium needed in their production, was sent to India's
Bhabha research center, the country's chief research facility
for nuclear weapons'.'3° It further demonstrates India's
interest in nuclear and thermonuclear weapons material.
4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
Another essential pre-requisite for a nuclear
weapons capability is the development of technology to design
and fabricate nuclear weapons. Before focussing on India's
capability, it is relevant to note three terms which are often
used interchangeably but denote different meanings: a nuclear
device, nuclear explosive, and nuclear weapon. A nuclear
device is an assembly of parts and equipment which could be
set up at a test site for an experiment and may or may not be
reliably transportable, or until tested, predictable in
performance or explosive yield.'" A nuclear explosive is more
sophisticated and portable, but still requires time to
assemble and prepare for detonation, like the "Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion" (PNE5) developed by the U.S. and the Soviet
Union in the 1960s.' 4° The superpowers demonstrated considera-
ble interest in exploring the efficacy of PNE5 for subsoil
engineering and underground construction operations. Two
categories of PNEs were experimented at that time, excavation
'' Thomas F. O'Boyle, 'West German Export Controversy
Grows With Confirmation of Shipments to India', The Wall
Street Journal, 1 February 1989.
138 ibid.
'" Anal ysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Ca pabilities of
India, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, p. 34.
140 ibid.
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explosions and contained explosions.' 4' Excavation explosions
were experimented for earth moving operations, like construc-
tion of canals and reservoirs, diversion of rivers and
uncovering of mineral deposits from under the upperstrata of
the earth.'42
 Contained explosions were tried for deep under-
ground engineering experiments for R & D purposes.' 43
 However,
the practical utility of a PNE of either category has never
been established and there are many unanswered questions about
their dangers to health and environmental conditions.'44
A nuclear Weapon implies further refinement in design
and fabrication to produce a reliable or predictable bomb
capable of being delivered by an adequate delivery system.'45
It is a weapon on which a head of a government or military
commander could rely upon. The first U.S. test at Alamogordo
in July 1945 was a nuclear explosive, while the bombs dropp-
ed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were crude nuclear weapons.'46
Although it is possible nowadays to develop first generation
of nuclear weapons without testing, a test is usually consi-
dered an assurance of their reliability. However, with the
increasing sophistication of technology, it is becoming
possible for a country to either simply avoid testing nuclear
weapons or adopt computer simulation techniques for testing
its reliability.'47
 Computer simulation techniques are consi-
' IAEA, A SHORT HISTORY OF NON-PROLIFERATION (Vienna,




' Anal ysis of Six Issues About Nuclear Capabilities of
India, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, pp. 34-35.
'' ibid.
K.C. Hopkins, 'Nuclear Weapons Technology', pp. 114-
120.
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dered an acceptable substitute for field testing of nuclear
weapons for states who want to avoid unfavourable internation-
al reactions. Israel is reported to have undertaken computer
simulation tests for the development of nuclear weapons.149
Nuclear weapons technology is well within the
competence of Indian nuclear scientists. India's nuclear test
in 1974 demonstrated that its capability to design and
fabricate nuclear devices was beyond doubt. According to the
official Indian report, 'the successful underground nuclear
experiment' at Pokharan in Rajasthan on 18 May 1974 was
conducted as a part of the DAE's efforts to find ways of using
underground explosions for construction purposes. 149
 However,
subsequent evidence suggests that the 1974 nuclear test was
neither based upon the excavation nor contained explosions'
techniques. As noted in Chapter Four, the 1974 Indian nuclear
test was based upon the implosion technique which is more
suitable for experimenting a weapon test.' 5° It had military-
oriented features and its triggering package had a weapons
significance. According to Marwah, the policy at the techni-
cal level (labelling the test a PNE) was 'calculated to
present a routine facade' Notwithstanding the difference
between the two types of techniques, the 1974 test provided
India the technology to fabricate reliable nuclear devices.
Since then, it has continued research and development on the
nuclear weapons technology With such an experience, India
would have no problem at all in producing the nuclear war-
heads.
148 Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, pp.
100-101.
149 Annual Report 1974-1975: Department of Atomic Energy
(Bombay, GOl, 1975), p. 7.
'° See Chapter Four, section 5. a, p. 153.
151 Marwah, p. 105.
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5. NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS
The development of a credible nuclear deterrent
requires adequate delivery systems, reliable modes of corn-
mand, control and communication (, and explicit strategies
governing their deployment or actual employment in crisis-
situations. Conventional military capabilities in the field
of surveillance, reconnaissance and guidance for target
acquisition have some preliminary utility to provide a support
infrastructure for nuclear delivery systems. They need to be
specifically adapted to nuclear delivery missions if a country
opts for a credible nuclear deterrent. It is easier to modify
an aircraft for the development of a nuclear force as compared
with the adaptation of conventional missiles for carrying
nuclear warheads and developing accurate guidance system.
Ballistic missile systems are more difficult because their
technology is complex and beyond the means of most developing
countries. Therefore, a state which aspires to develop nuclear
deterrent might first opt for an aircraft-based delivery
system and only later develop a missile-based nuclear force.
However, much depends on the state of technological develop-
ment of a country that intends to develop nuclear delivery
systems, the availability of scientific expertise, and the
nature of threats to its security. India's case is unique in
the sense that it has demonstrated a priority for long-term
planning and development of technologies which have a civilian
or a conventional military use but can also be employed for
nuclear military purposes. This appears to be a deliberate
policy choice rather than a logical sequence of its tech-
nological development. It has a range of advanced military
aircraft for conventional roles, but which can be adapted to
nuclear missions. It has developed missile technologies for
conventional military purposes which can be used for the
development of a missile-based nuclear force.
299
5. a. AIRCRAFT-EASED DELIVERY SYSTEM
Indian interest in a nuclear-capable aircraft coin-
cided with its 1974 nuclear test. 152
 Indian Air Force is
equipped with the latest versions of high-performance and
multiple-role aircraft. It can adapt any of its aircraft
amongst the MIG-27, MiG-29, Jaguars and Mirage-2000.' 53
 At
present, it has 5 squadrons with 80 Jaguars, 5 squadrons with
80 MiG-27, 3 squadrons with 50 NIGs-29 and 3 squadrons with 46
Mirage 2000.154 The MiG-27 is a versatile, high-performance
bomber with a combat radius of 600 miles and suitable for
targets all over Pakistan. 155
 A more obvious choice could be
the Anglo-French Jaguar because of its high-speed, low-flight
and deep-penetration capabilities with a combat radius of 650
miles. India had about 80 of these aircraft by 1990.156 None of
the strategic installations in Pakistan would be beyond the
strike capability of Jaguar aircraft. Although these aircraft
have a long combat radius suitable enough against Pakistan,
their range can be further extended through additional fuel
tanks so long as India cannot develop a mid-air refuelling
capability. The IAF is also equipped with two squadrons of
MIG-25 Foxbat, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft which
demonstrates its interest in strategic surveillance. 157
 Any
suitable combination from this wide range of aircraft can be
selected for surveillance, interception and bombing missions
152 David Van Praegh, 'India's Nuclear Delivery system',
Asian Affairs, July-August 1974, pp. 360-64.
'	 MILITARY BALANCE 1990-91 (London, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 162.
154 ibid.
155 MILITARY BALANCE 1986-1987, p. 155.
156 See note 153.
157 MILITARY BALANCE 1986-1987, p. 155.
300
for an adequate nuclear delivery system, after necessary
modifications •151
However, reliability of aircraft-based delivery
systems for a credible nuclear deterrent remains question-
able. Aircraft no matter how sophisticated, are vulnerable to
high precision anti-aircraft missile systems from the ground
and air. Indian air defence system is not impregnable against
aircraft like F-16 which Pakistan possesses. In addition,
Pakistan Air Force is equipped with superior missile systems
of Western origin like the U.S. Sidewinder (air-to-air),
French Crotail (surface-to-air) and exocet (air-to-surface) as
compared with the Soviet systems which India has acquired.1"
Notwithstanding India's overall military superiority, an
aircraft-based nuclear delivery system would be vulnerable to
the superior interception capability of Pakistan Air Force.
The efficacy of Indian aircraft-based nuclear delivery system
against China is more doubtful because many Chinese strategic
installations are far beyond the combat radius of Indian Air
Force. It is not equipped with a long-range strategic bombers
which could engage targets deep in China. Therefore, an
aircraft-based nuclear delivery system against China is more
vulnerable than Pakistan. See appendix-Vu for precise data.
5.b. MISSILE-BASED DELIVERY SYSTEM
India is the leading Third World country with a
highly developed space programme which has enabled it to
develop an IRBM capability. Compared with its nuclear pro-
gramme, the Indian Space programme started late, but made
steady progress in the 1970s and 1980s. Initial Work on the
158 See appendix-Vu.
159 MILITARY BALANCE 1988-89 and 1989-1990, pp. 154-155 &
161-162.
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development of space technology was carried out through the
Space Science and Technology Centre (SSTC) and the Indian
Space research Organization (ISRO). The stated objectives of
India's space programme are peaceful uses of various space
technologies, their development, and the achievement of
national self-reliance in this field.'6°
A full-fledged space research and development
programme was initiated by the DAE under the supervision of
Dr. Sarabhai within the framework of a ten years joint
planning profile (1970-1980). Its technological objectives
were as fol1ows:' 1) provision of facilities for research and
development at the Space Science and Technology Centre (SSTC)
for building scientific and communication satellites; ii) to
create facilities for the development of inertial guidance
systems and on-board miniature computers; iii) construction of
high performance missile tracking radars and communication
systems at Shar and Andamans for the satellite programmes; iv)
construction of large solid propellant blocks and facilities
for their testing on ground and high-altitude simulated
conditions; v) completion of rocket fabrication facilities at
Trivandrum; vi) development of a Scout-type propellant by
1973-74, capable of putting into orbit a satellite of about 40
kg payload and to be followed by more advanced rocket systems
capable of putting into orbit 1200 kg payload; vii) fabrica-
tion of communication satellites by 1975; and, viii) develop-
ment of in-flight guidance systems, sensors and remote-
sensing techniques and capabilities. India allocated Rs. 105
crores for its space programme as an initial investment..162
160 Atomic Energy and Space Research: A Profile for the
Decade 1970-1980, (New Delhi, GOl, 1970)
161 ibid.
162 Annual Report 1970-1971: De partment of Atomic Energy,
p. 159.
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In 1972, an independent Space Commission and Depart-
ment of Space were set up. Indian Space Commission was
assigned the responsibility for policy formulation, whereas
the Department of Space took over executive responsibility to
administer the space programme through its various subsidiary
organizations like the SSTC and ISRO. In 1973, ISRO started
work on satellite launch vehicles.' 63
 However, it did not wait
to launch satellites until India developed its own launch
vehicles and placed two satellites into orbit from the Soviet
launch vehicles. 164
 The objective seems to be the simultaneous
development in both fields rather than to delay satellite
development until launch vehicles were developed. The first
Indian satellite, Aryabhata, weighing 360 kg, was launched in
April 1975 from a Soviet rocket. The second, Bhaskara,
weighing 444 kg, was launched from the Soviet Intercosmos
spacecraft. 165
 Since then, India has launched a series of
satellites from facilities in the Soviet Union, the U.S. and
the European Space Agency.
India's first experiment to launch a satellite with
its own satellite launch vehicle (SLV) on 10 August 1979 from
a site at Sriharikota in Andhra Pradesh, proved unsuccess-
ful." The second attempt succeeded on 18 July 1980 and placed
a satellite, Rohini-I, weighing 35 kg, into a low orbit.167
India became the seventh nation to achieve a satellite
163 David Velupillai, 'ISRO: India's Ambitious Space
Agency', Flight International, 28 June 1980, pp. 1466-70.
164 Ragu G.C. Thomas, 'India's Nuclear and Space prog-
rams: Defense or Development?', pp. 335-36.
165 ibid.
" MISSILE PROLIFERATION: SURVEY OF EMERGING MISSILE




launching capability, other six are: the Soviet Union, the
United States, France, Japan, China and Britain. On 31 May
1981, India carried out its third (SLV-3) successful experi-
ment by placing a satellite (Rohini-Il) into orbit. 16
 On 17
April 1983, it carried out another successful experiment of
SLV-3 by launching into orbit a 42 kg satellite. India is
using a building-block approach to develop launch vehicles.'69
SLV-3 is the core of the ASLV (Augmented Satellite Launch
Vehicle) programme, and the ASLV will serve as the core of the
PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) programme.'" Upgraded
technologies are being progressively added to the next and
tested with each successive step." The ASLV will test the
operation of strap-on-booster technology and locally developed
guidance system for feeding data on spatial positions and
velocities into an on-board computer which creates steering
commands for the vehicle.' 72
 ASLV weighs 40 tons and is design-
ed to lift a 150 kg payload into a 240 miles (400 km) high
circular orbit. So far two attempts to launch the ASLV proved
abortive, first on 24 March 1987 and the second on 13 July
1988.'"
ASLV is a forerunner to the next launch vehicle,
PSLV, which is being designed to undergo four launches between
168 ibid.
169 Defense Estimative Brief No. SDEB 69-86, the United
States Defense Intelligence Agency, dated November 1986, p.








1990 to 1994.' However, it has not yet been tested. PSLV is
designed to have two solid and two liquid propellant stages
along with the six SLV-3 rocket boosters. According to Indian
sources, its second stage has been test-fired successfully.175
Planning is also underway for the successor to the PSLV, which
is known as GSLV (Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle). It
will be used to place satellites into geostationary orbit at
approximately 22,000 miles (36,000 km) above the equator. 176
 To
be launched in the late 1990s, the GSLV will place into orbit
a payload of 5,500 pounds (2,500 kg) ." The GSLV is considered
to have the range of an ICBM once it has been successfully
test-fired.
5.c. CONVENTIONAL AND BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY
India has initiated an Integrated Guided Missile
Development Programme (IGMDP) since the early 19805.178 There
are five categories: two ballistic and three conventional mis-
siles under various stages of development; i) a short-range
surface to surface ballistic missile, Prithvi (earth), ii) an
intermediate-range ballistic missile, Agni (fire), iii) a
short range SAM, Trishul (arrow), iv) a long-range SAN, Akash
(sky), and v) anti-tank missile, Nag (cobra). India has spent
$ 300 million on its missile research and development program-
174 ibid.
175 'Launch Vehicle Engine Tested Successfully', TIMES OF
INDIA (Bombay), 3 November 1987.
176 Jerrold F. Elkin and Brian Fredericks, 'Military
Implications of India' s Space Program', Air University Review,
May-June 1983, p. 58.
ibid.
178 MISSILE PROLIFERATION: SURVEY OF EMERGING MISSILE
FORCES, p. CRS-70-73.
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me in the 1980s.'79
 However, it was the SLV-3 which laid the
foundation of India's sophisticated ballistic missile capabi-
lity.
India successfully test-fired its first ballistic
missile, Prithvi, on 25 February 1988.'° An official Indian
spokesman claimed after the test that the missile was fired
up to 93 miles, but its range could be extended much beyond
that limit and it was highly accurate. 18' Subsequent reports
suggest that the missile is capable of carrying 2,200 pounds
payload (]., 000 kg), and its range has been extended up to 150-
200 miles with the provision for further extension if the
payload could be reduced.' 82
 It is a supersonic missile with
single a stage rocket and inertial guidance system which
includes an on-board computer to monitor its flight course and
direct it to the target. It is small in size (one meter in
diameter and seven meters long), mobile and potentially
capable of carrying both types of warheads, nuclear and
conventional.'83 A report in THE INDEPENDENT suggested that
India has developed a nuclear warhead for use on the surface
to surface missile with a range of 200 miles.' 84
 Although the
report does not name the missile as Prithvi, there is no other
missile of this capability which India is known to have
developed. The report has not been confirmed by any other
" 'India Poised to Test-Fire Missile', THE TIMES
(London), 19 April 1989.
'India Succeeds in Missile Test Launching', WASHING-
TON POST, 26 February 1988.
'' 'Shooting Ahead', Indian Toda y, 31 March, 1988, p. 96.




'India 4has nuclear arsenal"ç THE INDEPENDENT, 22 March
1988.
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source. The Indian government dismissed the report as a
"figment of imagination". 185
 A Defence Ministry source stated
that the Indian Army has placed large orders for the missile
and it is likely to begin deployment in 1990_91.b86 It is
extremely suitable against targets in Pakistan. India has
recently carried out another test (fifth) of Prithvi on 7
August 1991.187 Indian Defence Minister, Sharad Pawar, told
press reporters that the test was successful and Prithvi's
technology matched with some of the most advanced missiles of
its class.188
On 22 May 1989, India successful test-fired an
intermediate-range ballistic missile, Agni (fire), after two
initial failures. Launched from Chandipur in Orissa into the
Bay of Bengal, it achieved a range of 1500 miles (2,500 km)
and 2,000 pounds (around 9,000 kg) payload capacity.' 89
 Agni
has a twin microprocessor-based missile guidance system. After
the test, an Indian official source described the missile as
a "technology demonstrator"..' 90
 The late P.M. Rajiv Gandhi
claimed, "Agni is an R & D vehicle, not a weapon system", but
went on to qualify, "Agni is not a nuclear weapon system".'9'
185 ibid.
186 'Indian Prithvi and Trishul Deployment "within two
Years", Defense and Foreign Affairs, 17-23 April 1989. The
MOD source is referred as highly placed.
187 'India test-fires ballistic missile', THE NATION
(Lahore-Pakistan), 8 August, 1991.
'° ibid.
189 'India Tests Mid-Range "Agni",' WASHINGTON POST, 23
May 1989, p. Al.
'° 'Indian missile launch prompts nuclear fears',
INDEPENDENT, 23 May 1989.
191 Gary Milholin, 'India's Missiles- With A Little Help
From Our Friends,' The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Novem-
ber 1989, pp. 31-35.
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Afterwards, he added, "What Agni does is to afford us the
option of developing the ability to deliver non-nuclear
weapons with high precision at long ranges". 192
 Although India
claims that Agni is a purely conventional military system, its
authenticity is dismissed by a wide range of international
opinions. A report published by THE TIMES a month before the
test stated that Agni was being developed with an option to
carry a nuclear warhead.' 93
 After the test, it again reported
that Agni is capable of carrying nuclear weapons after adapta-
tion.' 94
 A Carnegie study also concluded that, 'the missile's
substantial payload would enable it to carry nuclear warhead
easily' 195
Agni is a copy of the U.S. Scout, with a design and
technological data similar to that. Agni's architect, Dr.
Abdul Kalam, received four months training in 1963-64 at
NASA's Langley Research Centre in Virginia (where the U.S
Scout rocket was designed) and the Wallops Island Flight
centre on the Virginia coast (where the Scout was flight-
tested) p196 In 1965, Indian government sought NASA's assis-
tance to develop the Indian version of scout and obtained
technical reports on its design and development.' 9' In 1987,
NASA's Office of Munitions Control sought commodity jurisdic-
tion from the State Department to export rail clamps, wheels
192 ibid.
193 
'India Poised to Test-Fire Missile', THE TIMES
(London), 19 April 1989.
' 'Gandhi denies nuclear application as India launches
ballistic missile', THE TIMES, 23 May 1989.
195 Spector with Smith, p. 74.
196 Milholin, p. 32. Milholin's study is based upon the
documentary evidence, like the exchange of letters between
NASA and the Indian AEC.
'' ibid.
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and truck assemblies for use in a mobile service tower at Shar
Space Research Centre in India.' 98
 Although the commodities
under discussion were to be provided for only civilian use,
NASA knew that the end use of this hardware could contribute
to the development and launch of ballistic missiles.' 99
 Mu-
holin's observation in this regard is noteworthy:
The story of the development of India's first
strategic missile shows how difficult it is to
separate civilian and military uses of technology,
and how futile may be the recent attempts to stop
the spread of missiles' 200
Once it becomes operational, Agni's 2,500 km range
(IRBM) would enable it to engage targets as far in China as
Beijing and Canton if deployed in the Eastern parts of India.
If deployed in the north-east, it is capable of engaging
targets deep in central China. From North-western India, it
can reach a wide range of targets in southern China. It also
would have utility against targets in the western parts of
Pakistan near the Iranian border. The range of the missile
would also enable India to engage targets as far as Turkey in
the West and Indonesia in the East. Therefore, its implica-
tions go far beyond the immediate vicinity of the South Asian
region. There is no precise information whether Agni is being
produced at this stage, but given the urgency attached to the
development of ballistic missiles by the Indian government, it
is likely to go in production in the near future. India can
convert its launch vehicles into ballistic missile in a
relatively short period, given the time and commitment. If
India succeeds in keeping the scheduled progress of its future
190 Memorandum from Acting
 Chief, International Program
Support Office, NASA to the Department of State, NASA,
commodity case CJ 009-87 dated 19 February 1987. (Washington
Dc, Files of the National Security Archives, 1989).
199 ibid.
200 Milholin, p. 31.
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space projects, like the ASLV, PSLV and GSLV, it might achieve
an ICBM capability by the end of this century. However, if the
current delays persist, it might not be possible within the
above time frame. (See appendix-Vill on India's ballistic mis-
siles capability).
To conclude, it is argued that no Indian government
has ever acknowledged the initiation or existence of a nuclear
weapons programme. However, with the continual growth of a
sizeable nuclear weapons capability, the gap between evident
military form of India's nuclear programme and the official
denials about its existence has become much wider. It there-
fore, highlights the underlying contradictions. India's
denials that it has never initiated a nuclear weapons program-
me appear more diplomatic than real in the light of its
capability. As noted in the previous chapter, India delibera-
tely fosters ambiguity about its nuclear weapons capability
for certain perceived advantages. A rapidly increasing volume
of evidence substantiates that India is developing nuclear
weapons. Press reports citing U.S. officials and intelligence
sources disclosed that India has been producing nuclear
weapons since late 1986.201 In March 1988, THE INDEPENDENT,
citing U.S. National Security Council officials, reported
that, 'India has built several highly sophisticated low-yield
atomic bombs, which could be used with combat aircraft' •202 In
April 1989, another report disclosed an official source from
close to the late P. M. Rajiv Gandhi that India could produce
a nuclear bomb "overnight". 203
 It pointed out that 'India has
201 Richard Sale, "India Said to Be Building 20 Nuclear
Weapons a Year ", United Press International, 25 April 1988
PM Cycle), in Spector, THE UNDECLARED BOMB, p. 106.
202 "India has nuclear arsenal", THE INDEPENDENT, 22 March
1988.
203 WEEKLY TIME MAGAZINE, 3 April 1989, p. 16.
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nuclear-weapons components on the shelf and a special team
ready to assemble them.'204
The evidence about India's development of nuclear
weapons is gradually increasing. In May 1989, the Director of
CIA, Mr. William Webster, disclosed to the U.S Senate Commit-
tee on Government Operations that there were 'several in-
dicators' about India's development of enhanced nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons. 205
 He told the Committee that India is
working on the separation and purification of lithium-6, which
can either be used in thermonuclear weapons or in the produc-
tion of tritium to enhance the yield of nuclear weapons.20'
Webster's testimony confirmed the previously available
evidence about India's involvement in developing nuclear
weapons. In June 1989, David Aibright and Tom Zamora con-
cluded that the nuclear weapons programmes in India and
Pakistan were far more advanced that suspected. 207
 In November
a former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General (retd.) K.
Sundarji stated, 'The Indian citizen has every right to expect
that India, having mastered the technology in 1974, is in the
year of grace, 1990', and 'he would expect India, very short
order, to have usable nuclear weapons also, if required' •a
Given the fact that General Sundarji was the Chief of Staff of
204 ibid.
205 NEW YORK TIMES, 19 May 1989, p. A7 and WASHINGTON
POST, 19 May 1989, p. A29.
206 ibid.
207 David Albright and Tom Zamora, 'India, Pakistan's
nuclear weapons: all the pieces in place', Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, June 1989, pp. 20-26. To assess the respec-
tive capabilities of India and Pakistan, Albright relies on
his interviews with the former designer of U.S. nuclear
weapons, Theodore Taylor.
General K. Sundarji, 'The Nuclear Threat' India Today,
30 November, 1990, p. 94.
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Indian Army in 1986-87, the period when first reports of
India's development of nuclear weapons components began to
come out, his assertions cannot be easily ruled out. Recently,
a Carnegie study suggested that India has produced a limited
number of nuclear weapons based upon an aircraft delivery
system and likely to deploy an IRBM capability in the im-
mediate It further indicated that the Indian nuclear
force would consist of 40 to 60 weapons deliverable by
aircraft 2O
Whether India has actually integrated nuclear
weapons into its armed forces at this stage is not known.
There is no public evidence as yet to identify the support
mechanism for their immediate assembly in crisis situations,
deployment strategy or target acquisition alternatives. All
this requires elaborate procedures, and a command, control
and communication infrastructure (C ) which may not escape
international scrutiny in an era of satellite reconnaissance.
On the other hand, it is also difficult to dismiss the pos-
sibility that, given its oft-repeated fears of a Pakistani
nuclear bomb and the intensity of hostile relationship between
the two, India would not have taken necessary measures to cope
with an extreme eventuality. A retired Indian Army General
indicated the modus operandi governing the formulation of
Indian nuclear strategy when he stated,
India has developed a large-calibre gun, a medium
range missile, and satellite launching capabili-
ties. India has conducted a nuclear explosion and
can, therefore, secretly fabricate a nuclear warhead
for use in the missile or gun. India may opt for a
"last-wire't
 strategy in which it secretly manufac-
tures nuclear weapons and ____ should an aggressor
threaten India ____ it can connect the last wire and
209 Spector with Smith, pp. 78-79.
210 ibid.
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can have a nuclear deterrent ready for use.211
Similarly, discussing the possible development of a small
nuclear force (SNF) by India, Thomas Blau rejects the vali-
dity of Indian denials by saying:
While Indian declaratory policy denies plans for a
SNF, all the ingredients for such a force have been
acquired, and the means for strategic refinements of
a SNF are prefigured in India's space and high-
technology development programs •212
The available evidence and a large body of opinions
substantiates that Indian nuclear strategy is based upon the
secret development of various elements of a limited nuclear
deterrent, with pre-designated modes for their immediate
deployment in a conflict-situation. At present, it has an air-
craft-based delivery system currently available. It might add
a ballistic missile (IRBM) nuclear delivery system to that
capability in the near future. It has a choice of opting for
a short-range ballistic missile system, Prithvi, which has
undergone many successful tests and would therefore, be
reliable. It can later add an IRBM capability based on Agni
which has also been tested. If both the systems are gradually
inducted, it would provide credibility to an Indian nuclear
deterrent. However, India may not integrate nuclear weapons
into its armed forces until it develops a strategic triad
similar to the models developed by the superpowers unless
forced to make an earlier decision.
211 LT. General Eric A. Vas, 'Pakistan's Security Fu-
tures,' in Stephen P. Cohen, The Securit y of Southern Asia:
American and Asian perspectives (Urbana, University of
Illinois Press, 1987), p. 95.
212 Thomas Blau, 'Small Nuclear forces in South Asia,' in
Rodney W. Jones, Small Nuclear Forces and U.S. Securit y Policy




A study of India's nuclear strategy suggests that
there has been a coherent and continuous strategic rationale
in its development of a nuclear weapons capability. It is
inspired by a political perspective based upon security,
aspirations for regional leadership and a great-power role.
Indian nuclear weapons capability was designed within the
civilian nuclear power programme through a three stage
development strategy formulated by Dr. Bhabha in 1954.1 The
development strategy took into account its automatic expan-
sion along the growth of the civilian nuclear programme. India
pursued a policy of ambiguity regarding the employment of
atomic energy for peaceful versus military purposes. It
claimed that the Indian nuclear programme was meant for
exclusively peaceful uses, but denied verification of that
claim by rejecting the application of international safe-
guards as discriminatory. Prime Minister Nehru was the
architect of India's doctrine of nuclear ambiguity and his
successors continued to advance the weapons capability within
the ambit of ambiguity.
There was no basis for Nehru's claim that the Indian
policies were based upon political and moral superiority as
compared with, what he called the military line of thinking of
the great powers. 2
 He rejected the principle of Ahimsa (non-
violence] as a matter of state policy. 3
 Speaking to the Far
1 NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRIN-INDIA (U), the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Technical Intelligence,
pp. 2-4. For full details, see Chapter Three, Section 2, pp.
68-73.
2 See Chapter Two, section 1, p. 31.
Lok Sabha Debates, Part 2, Vol. 1, 15 February 1956,
Col. 814-15. Also see Chapter Two, section 1, p. 29.
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East American Council of Commerce and Industry, he admitted
that India's approach to its problems was not doctrinaire, but
pragmatic except its insistence on the democratic method.4
This in itself contradicted his claim of politico-moral
superiority. Nehru envisioned a 'Greater India' (Maha Bharat]
and aspired for a role in the world affairs commensurate with
its size and power potential. 5
 He believed that the only way
to realize that objective lay in its socio-economic develop-
ment and scientific-industrial progress.' Being a pragmatic
statesman, he looked for practical solutions to India's
problems but rationalized them into philosophical principles.
He opted for non-alignment vis-a-vis the superpowers, peaceful
co-existence with China and a power-politics approach in South
Asia.' He occasionally used force to resolve territorial
disputes with India's smaller neighbours. He campaigned for
general and complete disarmament but rejected unilateral
nuclear disarmament for India. 8
 However, despite Nehru's vigo-
rous campaign for general nuclear disarmament, the evidence
indicates his awareness that it was not an attainable goal
under the cold-war paradigm.9
Nehru attached the highest priority to the develop-
ment of atomic energy as a vehicle for development and power.
His pre-independence views did not rule the employment of nuc-
lear energy for "defence" and "protection" of India. 10
 After
independence, while seeking foreign technological and finan-
Chapter Two, section 1, pp. 29-30
ibid, p. 28.
6 ibid, pp. 28-29.
' ibid, Section 2, pp. 35-50.
See Chapter Two, section 4, pp. 51-56.
ibid.
° See Chapter Three, section 1, pp. 58-67.
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cial assistance for the development of atomic energy, he opted
for vague and ambiguous terms such as 'evil' and 'destruc-
tive' for providing assurances of its 'only peaceful use'. It
appears that he deliberately avoided the term, 'military
use'." On the other hand, a scrutiny of Indian government's
thinking in that period indicates that it did not consider the
use of atomic energy for defence and military purposes as evil
or destructive.'2
 Nehru's government refused to accept the
application of international safeguards to verify the assuran-
ces India gave for the only peaceful use of atomic energy.' 3
 It
argued that international safeguards on atomic energy were not
only discriminatory, but impinged upon the Indian national
sovereignty 14
Nehru was the political architect of the Indian
nuclear option. It was realized in his life-time by the
completion of two safeguards-free nuclear facilities, CIRUS
reactor in 1960 and Trombay Reprocessing Plant in 1964.' Both
these facilities were acquired under assurances of 'only
peaceful use' but there were no verification provisions.
Bhabha planned a nuclear weapons capability within the
structural framework of civilian nuclear programme by opting
for dual-purpose technologies." Documentary evidence of
Bhabha's interest in nuclear weapons technology dates back to
the same year (January 1954) when he sought cooperation of the
U.S. AEC officials for collecting observational data on atomic
" ibid.
12 ibid. Also see, British Foreign Office Records, FO 371
/_149591, dated 23 January 1960.
13 See Chapter Three section 3, 81-88.
14 ibid.
15 ibid, pp. 74-81.
" ibid, pp. 68-81.
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explosions. 17
 At that time, the concept of plowshares for the
use of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for underground
engineering purposes had not been developed and his search for
data on atomic explosions was motivated by a quest for nuclear
weapons technology. It is improbable that he would have app-
roached the U.S. AEC officials on such a sensitive matter
without Nehru's prior consent. It suggests that Nehru and
Bhabha wanted to create the basis for a nuclear weapons option
for deterrent in extremis. It was inspired by a strategic
perspective, but they wanted to pursue it without a formal
acknowledgement. The origin of India's doctrine of nuclear
ambiguity dates back to the Nehru era.
Successive Prime Ministers of India pursued a
similar course and expanded the nuclear weapons capability
cloaked in the policy of ambiguity. Prime Minister Shastri
took a decisive step forward and sanctioned the work on a
Subterranean Nuclear Explosion (SNE) Project after the first
nuclear test by China. 18
 The decision for the SNE project was
hardly surprising in view of the direction of India's nuclear
programme in 1962-1963, when Nehru and Bhabha indicated the
"built-in defence" use and feasibility of a nuclear device.'9
Shastri's interim strategy focussed on seeking nuclear
security guarantees from the superpowers and Britain against
China until India developed its own nuclear weapons capabi-
lity. 20
 However, he gradually drifted away from that approach
once India recovered from the initial impact of the 1964
Chinese nuclear test. As a long-term strategy, his government
regarded extended nuclear security guarantees as inadequate,
' ibid, pp. 64-65. Also see, Department of State, Central
File, 891.2546 / 1-2954, dated 29 January 1954.
18 See Chapter Four, section 1, pp. 98-102.
' See Chapter Three, section 2, pp. 80-81.
20 See Chapter Four, section 2, pp. 102-09.
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unreliable and incredible. India wanted to develop a nuclear
weapons capability and the provision of nuclear security
guarantees was incompatible with that position.
Mrs. Indira Gandhi postponed the SNE project due to
domestic political expediency and unfavourable international
environment. Her government rejected the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 21 She decided to
convert the nuclear option into a weapons capability by
carrying out the 1974 nuclear test. The test was a logical
culmination of India's traditional nuclear policy. Evidence
suggests that the 1974 test had a configuration close to a
weapon test and its triggering mechanism had military signi-
ficance. 22
 It was termed a PNE because India used plutonium
recovered from the CIRUS reactor (meant for 'only peaceful
use') and reprocessed at the Trombay Reprocessing Plant. It
was presented as a low-risk measure to appear less provoca-
tive to India's two main nuclear suppliers, Canada and the
United States. However, both rejected the PNE rationale and
eventually terminated nuclear cooperation with India. The
official Indian report declared the 1974 test a 'successful
experiment' •23 Despite that, there is no known project in India
where it has applied the result of that 'successful ex-
periment' in the last 17 years. It appears that the real
objective of the 1974 nuclear test was to transform the
nuclear option into a weapons capability. Additional objec-
tives were to demonstrate India's technological prowess and
reap politico-strategic advantages such as a recognition of
its strategic position in the regional and international power
21 ibid, section 3, pp. 110-17.
22 ibid, pp. pp. 152-54.
23 ibid, p. 149. Also see, Annual Report 1974-1975:
Department of Atomic Energy, GOl, p. 7.
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equilibrium. 24
 It was also intended to alleviate domestic
political pressure generated by the pro-bomb lobby after
China's development of nuclear weapons. A CIA study carried
out immediately after the 1974 test categorized India among
the countries involved in the 'weapons acquisition' attempts
and assessed the Indian status as a nuclear capable state,
functionally close to a nuclear weapon state. 25
 According to
a Washington-based report, quoting State Department aide,
India produced an unspecified number of nuclear devices during
the last years of Mrs. Gandhi's government (1974 to 1977) •26
However, there is no further evidence to back this up.
The 1974 Indian nuclear test intensified Pakistani
perceptions of a nuclear threat or blackmail from India.
Pakistan rejected Mrs. Gandhi's assurances offered to the late
Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Au Bhutto, that the test had no
military implications. 27
 The Indian government not only under-
estimated international reaction to its 1974 test, but also
the Pakistani ability to respond so quickly to the threat per-
ceptions generated by the 1974 test. Z.A. Bhutto responded by
laying the foundation of a nuclear weapons capability through
a widespread network of clandestine operations for illicit
acquisition of various elements of a nuclear weapons capabi-
lity. He had already vowed in 1965 that if India acquired
nuclear weapons, Pakistan would follow, even if it meant
24 See Chapter Four, section 5.a, pp. 136-54.
25 ibid, p. 152-53. Also see, Prospects for Further
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A CIA Memoranda No. DCI NIO
1945-74, dated 9/4/74 (S/NFD)
26 
'Indian Said to Be Building 20 Nuclear Weapons a Year',
United Press International, 25 April 1988, PM cycle, referred
in Spector, THE UNDECLARED BOMB, p. 106.
27 See Chapter Five, pp. 155-58.
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eating grass. 2' After Bhutto's removal, General Zia continued
Pakistan's nuclear pursuits under a policy of nuclear am-
biguity similar to India. While highlighting the peaceful
nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme, Zia developed a
nuclear weapons capability. In March 1987, he declared that
Pakistan had acquired the capability to make nuclear weapons
whenever it liked. 2' By that time, India had also enhanced
efforts to expand its nuclear weapons capability in response
to Pakistan. It tried to contain Pakistan's nuclear weapons
programme through the U.S. pressure but failed. Some reports
also suggested that India considered pre-emptive air strikes
at Pakistan's nuclear enrichment plant at Kahuta. 3° Since then,
India-Pakistan nuclear programmes have been interlocked in an
action-reaction paradigm which has defied a mutually accep-
table solution despite intensive nuclear diplomacy
After Mrs. Gandhi's electoral defeat in 1977, Prime
Minister Morarji Desai stated that Indian scientists could not
convince him that a PNE had any economic or peaceful tech-
nological objective. 31
 His government demonstrated a condi-
tional softness on the issue of nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion. In his short tenure, India did not develop nuclear
weapons, but refused to accept full-scope safeguards and the
NPT until the great powers concluded a comprehensive test ban
treaty. 32
 However, he was willing to negotiate a solution to
the nuclear proliferation issue. As a quid pro quo for his
conditional softness, he managed to get the enriched uranium
fuel for Tarapur atomic reactors from the Carter Adininistra-
29 ibid, section 3, pp. 182-91.
29 ibid, section 4, pp. 191-201.
30 ibid, pp. 195-96.
31 See Chapter Six, section 1, p. 208.
32 ibid, pp. 208-12.
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tion. His successor, Mr. Charan Singh, abandoned Desai's
approach and reiterated the traditional nuclear policy.
However, his government was too short-lived to make a worth-
while contribution.
After her return to power in 1980, Mrs. Gandhi
reiterated India's interest in further nuclear tests. 33
 By that
time Pakistan's quest for a nuclear weapons capability was
well known and India perceived a Pakistani nuclear threat for
the first time. Despite emphasizing Indian interest in
carrying Out more nuclear tests, Mrs. Gandhi actually refrain-
ed from that in view of the Indo-U.S. nuclear negotiations.34
However, Mrs. Gandhi was determined to keep a lead over
Pakistan in the field of nuclear weapons technology. She main-
tained the Pokharan nuclear test site in a state of readiness
in case India had to carry out another nuclear explosion. 35
 One
source pointed out that her government re-assembled the team
which carried out the 1974 nuclear test. During her last two
years (1983-1984), India not only conducted further research
on nuclear weapons but carried out work on thermonuclear
weapons technology •36
More significant expansion in India's nuclear
weapons capability took place under the government of late
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when it started recovering large
quantities of plutonium from safeguards-free reactors, MAPP-
I, MAPP-II and DHRUVA in 1986-1987.' Rajiv Gandhi was rela-
tively less equivocal in projecting nuclear ambiguity and
ibid, pp. 214-19. Also see, 'Gandhi Says National
Interest May Require Nuclear Blasts', WASHINGTON POST, 14
March 1980.
ibid, section 2, pp. 214-19.
ibid.
36 ibid.
ibid, section 3, pp. 220-25.
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often stressed the imperative of reconsidering the policy of
not making nuclear weapons. 38
 In one interview, Rajiv Gandhi
indicated that India might have manufactured nuclear weapon
components to meet the Pakistani threat contingency and could
assemble them rapidly." He concentrated on developing military
power in all branches of the Indian armed forces to unprece-
dented levels, including the induction of nuclear powered sub-
marines on lease from the Soviet Union. 40 Under his govern-
ment, the expansion of Indian nuclear weapons capability was
more rapid than any of its predecessor. 4' India test-fired an
intermediate range ballistic missile, Agni (fire) on 22 May
1989 . 42
 Agni provided a substantial boost to India's power
potential with its 2,000 pounds payload and 2,500 km range.43
Rajiv Gandhi, like Nehru, also demonstrated an interest in
global nuclear disarmament. During his government, India con-
cluded an agreement with Pakistan not to attack each other's
nuclear facilities in December 1988, which has not been
ratified so far. The expansion of the Indian nuclear weapons
capability continued in the post-Rajiv period despite a state
of political instability during the two Janata governments in
1989-1991. The newly installed government of Mr. Narsima Rao
might not arrest the tendency.
In 1988-1989, many reports suggested that India was
not only producing nuclear weapons components, but also
° ibid.
" ibid.
40 ibid, pp. 225-29.
41 ibid. Also See Chapter Seven, section 3, (pp. 290-95),
section 4 (PP. 295-97) and section 5 (pp. 298-308)
42 Chapter Seven, section 5.c, pp. 306-08.
ibid.
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engaged in the development of thermonuclear weapons. 44
 This
expansion continued under the traditional policy of arnbigui-
ty. A wide range of evidence indicates that India is secret-
ly producing nuclear weapons components which can be assem-
bled in a crisis-situation and deployed by an aircraft-based
delivery system. 45
 It now possesses various elements of a
limited nuclear force, although there are different estima-
tes. 46
 The various elements of an Indian nuclear deterrent are
not yet put together as an assembled force, and so far there
is no public evidence that India has integrated nuclear
weapons into its armed forces. Nothing is known about the
likely deployment procedures and command, control and commu-
nication () network, or targeting acquisition options. That
indicates the formulation of a nuclear strategy wherein India
has developed various elements of a nuclear force, and an
imminent capability to assemble and deploy, if so required.
Pakistan, too, has moved ahead towards the development of
various components of a crude nuclear deterrent.41
South Asia appears to be gradually drifting towards
an undeclared state of primitive nuclear deterrence which is
unique because of deliberate ambiguities generated by India
and Pakistan. South Asian nuclear deterrence is implicit in
nature rather than based upon explicit and declared statements
of mutual deterrent postures. Neither India nor Pakistan ack-
nowledge the development of nuclear weapons in assembled or
unassembled forms despite a wide range of evidence to the
contrary. India's capability is larger in size than Pakistan.
It has the advantage of testing a nuclear device in 1974. The
" ibid, pp. 309-12.
ibid.
46 ibid. Also see appendices VI, VII and VIII.
41 See Chapter Five, section 2, pp. 175-81.
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delivery systems are aircraft-based at the moment. There is no
conclusive evidence of nuclear capable ballistic missile
operational as yet, but may be added in the near future once
nuclear warheads are developed. India's recently tested IRBM,
Agni is a decisive advantage over Pakistan.
Despite the Indian nuclear superiority, Pakistani
officials claim a nuclear deterrent against India. General
Zia personally generated such an impression in June l988.° He
claimed the effectiveness of Pakistan' s nuclear deterrent even
if it possessed less nuclear weapons than India. 49
 The Indian
response to Zia's claim was less explicit. Indian officials
responded by alluding to the advancement and sophistication of
their nuclear weapons capability. 50
 If this trend goes unabated
and both countries continue to act on worst-case scenarios,
they could assemble nuclear forces in the near future. The
dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia may be quite
different from the existing models. It may be unstable because
of its primitive nature and the underlying ambiguous postures
of the two states. The essential pre-requisite of stable
deterrence is that the parties present explicit statements of
their strategic postures and behaviour they are likely to
adopt in case of further deterioration in their relations.
India and Pakistan's refusal to acknowledge their nuclear
weapon programmes, and the absence of explicit strategic
doctrines make the task of developing a plausible hypothesis
about the dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia as
speculative.
" See Chapter Five, section 4, pp. 200-201.
ibid. I was also present at the occasion as a member
of the delegation when General Zia made this statement.
° See statements of the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi





RESEARCH REACTORS IN OPERATION AND THEIR PLUTONIUM
OUTPUT CAPACITY BY 1991
NAME & LOCATION, OPERATION, SAFEGUARDS, PU OUTPUT, TOTAL PU
PER YEAR IN KGs
ASPARA BARC
	 1956	 Free	 Zero	 Zero
CIRUS	 BARC	 1960	 Free	 9.4	 291.4
ZERLINA BARC
	 1961	 Free	 Zero	 Zero
PURNIMA-I BARC 1972	 Free	 Zero	 Zero
(Replaced in 1983)
PURNIMA-il BARC 1983	 Free	 Zero	 Zero
(Replaced in 987)
PURNIMA-Ill BARC 1987	 Free	 Zero	 Zero
KAMINI	 IGCAR 1984	 Free	 Zero	 Zero
DHRUVA	 BARC 1986	 Free	 25	 125
TOTAL SAFEGUARDS-FREE PU FROM RESEARCH REACTORS BY 1991: 416.4
KG
SOURCES: Annual Reports, DAE, 1960 to 1991, Nuclear India,
1960-61 to 1990-91, Research reactors at Trombay, (Bombay,
DAE, 1987), ANALYSIS OF SIX ISSUES ABOUT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES





NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN OPERATION BY 1991
THEIR ANNUAL POWER (MWe) AND PU (KG) OUTPUT











1969	 148 160	 60 kg IAEA-U.S.
1969	 148 160	 60 kg IAEA-tJ.S.
1972	 202 220	 60 kg IAEA-CAN.
1981	 202 220
	 60 kg IAEA-tJSSR
1983	 220 235	 60 kg Free
1985	 220 235
	 60 kg Free
1990	 220 235	 60 kg Free
1991	 220 235	 60 kg Free
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
IN-9, KAPP-I, Kakrapar
	 1992	 220 235
	 60 kg Free
IN-10,KAPP-II,Kakrapar	 1992	 220 235
	 60 kg Free
IN-11,RAPS-111 Kota
	 1995	 220 235	 60 kg Free
IN-12,RAPS-IV Kota
	 1995	 220 235
	 60 kg Free
IN-13,KAIGA-I	 Kaiga	 1995	 220 235	 60 kg Free
IN-14,KAIGA-i1 Kaiga	 1995	 220 235
	 60 kg Free
SOURCES: Annual Reports, DAE, 1960 to 1991, Nuclear India,
1960 to 1991, NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM-INDIA (U),
the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency, pp. 1-23,
World Nuclear Industry
 Handbook, 1990 (Sutton,
Nuclear Engineering International, 1990),





HEAVY-WATER PRODUCTION PLANTS IN INDIA
AND THEIR ANNUAL CAPACITY IN METRIC TONS
SI NO.	 LACTATION	 ANNUAL CAPACITY
IN METRIC TONNES
1. Nangal (Punjab)	 14
2. Baroda (Gujrat)	 45
3. Kota (Rajasthan)	 85
4. Tuticorin (Tamil Nadu)
	 49
5. Talcher (Orissa)	 50
6. Thal-Vaishet (Maharashtra)	 110
7. Manugura	 185
8. Hazira (Gujrat)	 110
TOTAL PLANNED CAPACITY ESTIMATED:
	 648-650 MT
Most of these plants are not operating due to different
reasons like design faults, operational in-experience and
accidental closures. Against a planned output capacity of 300
to 400 metric tonnes in 1985, India could only produce 50 MT.
The production has recently gone up but precise figure are not
available. Therefore, India has heavily relied on the imports
of heavy-water. A few of the major suppliers for legally
imported heavy-water are Canada, the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. According to Milholin. Indian inventory of this
material at present 1038 MT. The Indian requirement is
estimated at 1239 MT. The difference, according to Gary
Milholin, is being met through Illicit imported amounts
through Norwegian, Swiss and German firms.
SOURCES: Annual Reports, DAE, 1960 to 1991, Nuclear India,
1960-61 to 1991, Gary Milholin, HEAVY-WATER IN
INDIA: A STUDY (Washington DC, Wisconsin Project no




REPROCESSING PLANTS IN INDIA AND THEIR CAPACITY TO
REPROCESS RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN METRIC TONS PER YEAR
NAME & LOCATION, YEAR OF OPERATION, CAPACITY, SAPEGUARDS
TRP* (Trombay)	 1964	 100 MT	 Free
PREFRE (Tarapur)	 1979	 100 MT	 Free**
KARP (Kalpakkam)	 199 0-91	 125 MT	 Free
TOTAL REPROCESSING CAPACITY BY 1991: 	 325 MT
	 FREE
Two more reprocessing plant are planned to be in-
stalled under the Nuclear Planning Profile 1985-2000 AD, each
with a capacity of 400 MT but their location and operation
schedule have not been disclosed so far.
* TRP: Trombay Reprocessing plant had initially a
capacity of 30 MT but was refurbished in late 1970s and its
capacity was raised up to 100 MT.
** PREFRE: (Power Reactors Fuel Reprocessing).
Safeguards are only applicable on PREFRE when it reprocesses
fuel which is under safeguards but not otherwise.
KARP: (Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant).
SOURCES: Annual Reports, DAE, 1986-1987, Nuclear India, 2].
(6 & 7), 1983 and 23 (1), 1984, Special Issue, and
NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAN-INDIA (U), the U.S. Defence




TOTAL ACCUMULATED SAFEGUARDS-FREE PLUTONIUM IN INDIA
FROM RESEARCH AND POWER REACTORS IN KILOGRAMS
NAME & TYPE, YEAR OF/, TOTAL OUTPUT BY: 1991,	 1995, 2000
operation
CIRUS*	 1960	 9.4 kg annual 291.4	 329	 376
MAPP-I	 1983	 60 kg annual 480	 720	 1 0 2 0
MAPP-II	 1985	 60 kg annual 360	 600	 900
DHRtJVA	 1986	 25 kg annual 125	 225	 350
NAPP-I	 1990	 60 kg annual	 60	 300	 600
NAPP-II	 1991	 60 kg annual	 --	 240	 540
KAPP-I	 1991-92	 60 kg annual	 --	 180	 480
KAPP-II	 1991-92	 60 kg annual	 --	 180	 480
RAPS-Ill	 1995	 60 kg annual	 --	 ---	 300
RAPS-IV	 1995	 60 kg annual --	 ---	 300
KAIGA-I	 1995	 60 kg annual --	 ---	 300
KAIGA-Il	 1995	 60 kg annual	 --	 ---	 300
TOTAL ACCUMULATED PU FROM CIRUS BY:
	 291.4	 329 376
TOTAL ACCUMULATED SAFEGUARD-FREE
(excluding CIRUS) .............BY:
	 1025	 2445 5570
TOTAL SAFEGUARD-FREE PU........BY:
	 1316.4	 2774 5946
The plutonium recovered from CIRUS is worked out separately
from the rest of stockpile that India could use for weapons
purposes. India needs some quantities of plutonium for R & D
and as fuel for the FBTR which can be met from the CIRUS.
SOURCES: As in appendix I & II; Nucleonics Week, 15 August
1985, INFCE, Report of the Working Group 1, the IAEA, 1980 and
Warren H. Donnelly, INDIA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, a CRS Issue
Brief Updated 30 March 1989. All the planned reactors may not
go into operation on schedule because of the heavy-water
shortage and other technical problems. Therefore, the future




INDIA' S SAFEGUARD-FREE WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM
IESTIMATED) AND ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
YEAR PU IN KGS,
	 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS
8KG	 10KG	 2OKG*







* It is generally presumed on the basis of its state
of technological development at present, that India may not
have the technology to fabricate bigger than 20 kg (pluto-
nium) nuclear warheads at the moment but might be able to do
so in future.
Please note that this estimate does not include
plutonium recovered from CIRUS which is free from interna-
tional safeguards but India has assured to use the reactor
for peaceful purposes. This estimate is approximate in view
of the fact that no accurate information is available on how
much plutonium India has set aside for R & D and fuel re-
quirements for the FBTR from its safeguard-free stockpile or
using only the plutonium recovered from CIRUS and from the
reactors under safeguards, like TAPS-I & II and RPPS-I & II.
India can use plutonium from its reactors under safeguards
for the above requirements.
SOURCES: As per appendices I, II and the data collation
worked out in appendix-V.
NUMBER




INDIA' S AIRCRAFT-BASED (NUCLEAR-CAPABLE) DELIVERY SYSTEM
Jaguars	 80 (5 sqn)
MIG-29	 50 (3 sqn)
Mirage 2000 46 (3 sqn)
COMBAT-RADIUS AND CAPABILITIES
600 miles: A high performance and
versatile bomber.
650 miles: A low-flight and deep-
penetration strike aircraft.
600 miles: An all-weather and
multiple-role aircraft.
650 miles: A sophisticated multiple
role aircraft.
MIG_25*
	 8-12 (1 sqn)	 A high altitude reconnaissance
aircfart for strategic survei-
llance.
* Exact number of MIG-25 acquired by India is not
known.
SOURCES: MILITARY BALANCE 1986-87 TO 1990-91, (London, IISS),
Spector with Smith, pp. 78-79, and Elkin and
Ritezel, 'The Indo-Pakistan Military Balance', Asian




INDIA' S PRESENT BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY
NAME & Type, RANGE, PAYLOAD, LAUNCHER, TEST-DATE, DEPLOY-i
MENT
PRITHVI 200 miles (2,200 LB)
	 mobile	 25-2-88 1991-92
SSM	 (1,000 KG)
AGNI	 1,500 miles (2,200 LB)
	 SLV-3	 22-5-89 Not known
IRBM	 2,500 km	 (1,000 KG)	 fixed





SLV-3	 2,500 km	 1,000 kg 22-5-89
	 IRBM:successful




---	 1,000 KG 1994-1995 IRBM
GSLV	 36,000 km	 2,500 kg late 1990s ICBM
22,000 miles 5,500 LB late 1990s ICBM
SOURCES: MISSILE PROLIFERATION: SURVEY OF EMERGING MISSILE
FORCES, CRS Report for the U.S. Congress, 3 October 1988, pp.
CRS-71-77; 'India Succeeds in Missile Test Launching',
WASHINGTON POST, 26 FEB 1988; 'India "has Nuclear Arsenal',
THE INDEPENDENT, 22 March 1988; 'Gandhi denies nuclear
application as India launches missile', THE TIMES, 23 May
1989; Spector with Jacqueline Smith, p. 74; Elkin and
Fredericks, 'Military Implications of India's Space Program,'
Air Universit y Review, May-June, 1983, pp. 58-60.
There is no evidence so far that India has developed




PAKISTAN' S ESTIMATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
WEAPONS -GRADE MATERIAL
PLANT & LOCATION, OUTPUT CAPACITY: BY YEAR: 1991 1995 2000
WGU PER YEAR EGS
Uranium Enrichment
Plant Kahuta	 50	 250 450
	 700
PAKISTAN'S ESTIMATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
YEAR WGU IN KGs ESTIMATED NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS
15KG	 20KG	 25KG
1991	 250	 16	 12	 10
1995	 450	 30	 22	 18
2000	 700	 46	 35	 28
I) Kahuta plant's capacity for producing weapons-
grade (90 % enriched) uranium is estimated at 50 kg year and
it is known to be operational at that capacity since 1986.
See Chapter Five, pp. 163-168 and Hedrick Smith, 'A-Bomb Ticks
in Pakistan', NEW YORK TIMES (magazine), 6 March, 1988, p. 38.
II) About 15 to 30 kg of weapon-grade uranium is
regarded suitable for reliable and sophisticated nuclear
warheads, Office of Technology Assessment, NUCLEAR PROLIFERA-
TION AND SAFEGUARDS (New York, Praeger, 1977), p. 30.
III) Pakistan is known to be in the process of
fabrication of nuclear weapons components at Pakistan Ord-
nance Factory, Wah, and has already tested in 1986 non-
nuclear components of a nuclear device based on the implosion






PAKISTAN' S NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
AIRCRAFT-BASED DELIVERY SYSTEM
NUMBER	 COMBAT RADIUS AND CAPABILITIES
37 - 39 650 miles: A highly sophisti-
cated bomber considered better
for nuclear delivery missions
than any aircraft in the Indian
inventory.'
Mirage-V	 600 miles: A multiple role
medium bomber.
PAKISTAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY




80 km	 500 kg	 1988	 1989
(50 miles)
HAFT-Il SSM 300 km	 500 kg	 1989	 1990
(185 miles)
SOURCES: 'Pakistan in missile age', JANES DEFENCE WEEKLY, 18
February 1889; 'Pakistan Enters Missile Age: General Beg's
Disclosure', DEFENCE JOURNAL (karachi); and 'Pakistan develops
missiles', FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 15 April. For aircraft
capabilities, see MILITARY BALANCE: 1989-1990 (London, IISS,
1990)
' The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, James L. Buckley
testified its capabilities for nuclear delivery missions
before Senate Committee on foreign Relations, AID AND THE
PROPOSED ARMS SALE OF F-16's TO PAKISTAN: HEARING BEFORE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 97th
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